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ABSTRACT 
 
Contributing to our understanding of self-development in literature, Object Lessons: 
Technologies of Education in British Literature: 1762-1851, examines Romantic-era and 
Victorian writers who represent education as an embodied experience, with learning and literacy 
grounded in what they called “object learning” or “the education of things.” Denouncing rote-
learning in favor of an induction method, object lessons promised to coordinate the development 
of body and mind by using the pupil’s sense exploration of physical surroundings as a catalyst 
for higher cognitive thought. I begin with late-eighteenth-century author-educators who 
reconceptualized manual activities as education and child’s play as serious work. When adopted 
by utilitarian and Whig advocates of education for the poor, however, these pedagogies proved 
inadequate for addressing the challenges faced by nineteenth-century poor children.  
 Object Lessons helps to explain why humanities scholars portray education, alternately, 
as an ideological state apparatus used for control, or our best hope for empowering the 
oppressed. Returning to when these polarized conceptions of education begin, I investigate the 
consequences of predicating child agency on an object theory derived from Enlightenment 
science, which creates active child subjects by pacifying the world of things. This active/passive 
dichotomy construes all learning subjects as either omnipotent or powerless.  
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 CHAPTER 1 
“Sensible Signs and Representations”: Object Lessons in British Literature 
 
In the Pygmalion story of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the first to provide a name for the lifelike 
statue, Galatea reaches out her hand to touch her lover. “Me,” she says, “’tis me,” then, touching 
touches a block of marble, “oh! this is not me.”1 Like Frankenstein’s monster sensing the world 
for the first time, the moment when Galatea becomes a named individual happens when she feels 
the stone under her fingers. Like Georges-Louis Buffon’s Adam coming to life, she moves 
between nonliving objects and the warm life of her lover, awakening her awareness of herself as 
an object newly capable of feeling. In such Enlightenment moving statue stories, encountering 
the nonhuman world activates consciousness and begins the human’s separation from the world 
he or she seeks to know. 2 Such primary object encounters were origin stories about how humans 
born without innate ideas acquire knowledge, including a basic self-identity, by activating a 
consciousness that senses and responds to a passive world of objects.3  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Rousseau, Pygmalion, 31, 32. I quote from an English translation and adaptation of Rousseau’s play (1779). The 
original French from Rousseau’s play provided at the bottom of the English edition’s pages matches an earlier 
French edition (1772) with more sparse dialogue. Galatea simply says, “Moi,” Pygmalion echoes “Moi,” then 
Galatea, “C’est moi,” and touching the marble, “Ce n’est plus moi,” or “This is no longer me.” The closer 
juxtaposition of these lines in the French play further dramatizes this moment of méconnaissance as the origin of 
Galatea’s self-identity through sensation. 
2 According to sensationist physiological theories of eighteenth-century empiricists (eg. Charles Bonnet, George 
Buffon, George Cuvier, the abbé Condillac), all sense impressions are united in the sensorium commune, where the 
brain meets the soul. Because of the unity of the senses, a person is aware of his unified conscious self. (Riskin, 
Science, 25). Rousseau’s Pygmalion closely follows the moving statue thought experiment of Condillac, which 
explains how a subject formed passively through sense impressions becomes active and self-aware. Condillac, like 
other sensationists, privileged the sense of touch as unmediated and as less deceptive than vision; therefore, in 
Condillac’s account, a moving statue that comes to life would only develop a self-identity when it gains touch and 
encounters other objects. Touch teaches a person where the self ends and the world begins, engaging the “sixth 
sense” or common sense that allows a unified self (Riskin, Science, 44-47). The legacy of Condillac’s elevation of 
touch over sight explains one reason why many British educators insist that sense exploration of passive objects 
must precede verbal literacy; touch is unmediated and completely intuitive, whereas visual literacy, like reading, 
requires extensive training. Buffon’s Adam agrees with Condillac’s statue, according to Riskin, and I would add that 
both agree with Rousseau’s Galatea. See also Figlio, “Theories of Perception.” 
3 De Man, “Self (Pygmalion),” Allegories of Reading, 163-165; Yousef, Isolated Cases, 1-26, 96-114; Douthwaite, 
Wild Girl, 70-92. According to Douthwaite, these moving statue “thought experiments of sensationist philosophers 
1
  This dissertation considers how objects and literary texts function as complementary 
technologies of self-development. Studies on the invention of the modern subject in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries privilege narrative, especially autobiographical writing, as an 
indispensable tool that allows subjects to give physical form to the disorganized stuff of 
experience, shaping fictional self-identities that seem present and whole to themselves. Drawing 
on Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor, for whom “narrative is the medium of human 
agency,” Michael Mascuch argues that an individualist self-identity is necessary for modern 
autobiography, a genre in which the author is at once creator, medium, and subject, “unified as a 
single, autonomous totality: the trope of the author as the hero and originator of his heroism.”4 
These theories have informed literary scholarship that documents an increased prominence of 
autobiographical genres during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including the novel and 
lyrical poetry, as well scholarship on the corresponding rise in epistemological theories of the 
self’s formation in response to investigation and mastery of the physical world.5 Arguing that 
objects perform much of the same cultural work during this period as autobiographical genres, 
this study identifies emergent literacies of object manipulation and exchange that were taught 
together with verbal literacies. 
 According to much of the scholarship on narrative and subject formation, texts facilitate 
self-development because they are externalized, physical objects, or passive stand-in for the 
active selves that authors them. Such representations of self-fashioning through narrative objects 
are typical of Romantic lyrical poetry—Wordsworth’s egotistical sublime in particular—where 
composing poetry revisits and reorders earlier sensations into a coherent, self-reflexive textual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
such as Buffon, Condillac, and Bonnet were undertaken as a means of exploring the origins and processes by which 
human beings translate physical impressions into thought” (92). 
4 Mascuch, Origins of the Individualist Self, 21, 23. See also Hess, Authoring the Self; Henderson, Romantic 
Identities; Nussbaum, The Autobiographical Subject; Taylor, Sources of the Self. 
5 See Smith, Scandalous Knowledge; Levine, Dying to Know. 
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 body that both calls into existence the poet’s self and mirrors the poet’s process of conscious 
self-creation. The poet’s authority to instruct readers in how to form an individualist self rests on 
his autodidactic education from rude landscapes, in place of corrupting social experiences. 
Despite Wordsworth’s dependence upon the literary marketplace and his interactions with his 
readers, he represents himself as a solitary wanderer or peddler, although such pretensions of 
autonomous self-creation among the Romantic poets are qualified by a self-conscious theatrical 
quality at odds with the poet’s claims of authenticity and simplicity. Jacqueline Labbe shows 
how the poems of Charlotte Smith, like Wordsworth’s Prelude, express “an active understanding 
of the act of composition, of putting words together; not merely reflecting the self but writing, 
and thereby re-presenting, a self.” Smith’s ventriloquism of her speakers and her multiple poetic 
personas call attention to her incomplete attempts to create herself through writing, “to sculpt or 
fashion—the shape of the Romantic Poet.”6 Like autobiography, lyrical poetry affords generative 
power to language by facilitating a mutually animating relationship between subjects and the 
natural world, just as Rousseau’s Pygmalion creates himself by bringing to life Galatea, who 
acknowledges herself in him. 
 Likewise, texts are physical avatars or circulating bodies in Nancy Armstrong’s argument 
that novels fabricate the modern subject. Individuated by superior wit and ability, spurred by 
dissatisfaction with the social world, the protagonist of a novel imagines and models for readers 
a modern subject defined by free choices and social mobility, who authors his or her own 
existence. Exceptional as authors, Pamela, Crusoe, or Moll Flanders “could inscribe him or 
herself in writing as an object, or body, separate and apart from the subject that inhabited that 
body, and put that body through a sequence of moves to enhance its social value.”7 The doubled 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Labbe, “Smith, Wordsworth,” 1:4. 
7 Armstrong, How Novels Think, 6. 
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 subject that haunts philosophical debates about identity—Locke’s separation of person and self, 
or the Cartesian divide between mind and body—finds its practical substantiation in novels as 
textual bodies authored by characters. The novel is unique among cultural artifacts, according to 
Armstrong, in modeling for authors and readers “what the Lockeans could only theorize”—the 
fiction of a modern self-governing subject who owns and creates the self.8 
 In order to question the exceptionalism that Armstrong claims for the novel we need only 
return to Locke, who offered practical implementation for his philosophy of mind in his essays 
on education. His recipe for self-governing children by disciplining the mind instead of whipping 
the body advises enticing children into intellectual activity through play, such as teaching them 
to read with lettered dice or cards. In the same decade that Samuel Richardson and Henry 
Fielding debated how to instruct their readers with model characters, Anthony Collins, John 
Newberry, and Thomas and Mary Cooper commercialized Locke’s suggestion by printing 
alphabet books that instructed parents to cut out the letters and make cards to play games with 
infants. Contemporaneous with the rise of the novel, such toys and books for children 
proliferated in the 1780s and 1790s. These education materials served a similar purpose as 
biographical literary forms by inviting children to sympathetically identify with toys as didactic 
reflections of the self and to see literacy as tangible property. This study examines educational 
objects—board games, toys, prints, classroom teaching aids, factory machinery, and automaton 
exhibits—that mirror self-development as they instruct and construct subjects, as well as how 
conventions for observing the physical world and narrating object encounters entered popular 
fiction and shaped its didactic strategies. 
 The literary texts I examine are written by authors with professional teaching expertise 
who represent learning as an embodied experience, with literacy grounded in what they called 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Armstrong, How Novels Think, 5. 
4
 “object learning, “experiential learning,” or “the education of things.” Denouncing rote-learning 
in favor of an induction method, object lessons promised to coordinate the development of body 
and mind by using the pupil’s sensual exploration of physical surroundings as a catalyst for 
higher cognitive thought. I begin with late-eighteenth-century author-educators who 
reconceptualized manual activities as education and child’s play as serious work. When adopted 
by utilitarian and Whig advocates of education for the poor, however, these middle-class 
pedagogies proved inadequate for addressing the challenges faced by nineteenth-century poor 
children. Reform-minded Victorian authors and educators were increasingly skeptical of 
pedagogies that conflate work and play when child labor and extended hours for adults deprived 
working families of the leisure to learn. Remonstrating the slippage between work and play, 
working-class Radicals—who inherited a strong materialist tradition through William Godwin, 
Thomas Paine, and Robert Owen—nevertheless used the phrase “education of things” and 
denounced “mere words” as a protest against church-controlled schools and elitist government 
leaders whose nonsensical Latin training supposedly qualified them to lead the nation. As a 
bridge between practical and theoretical knowledge, object learning also offered middle-class 
reformers a way to repair cross-class sympathies by elevating the art of workers who produced 
goods and by informing consumers of the labor behind everyday objects. 
 Although I consider objects and texts as equally embedded within cultural landscapes that 
determine their meanings, many authors that I investigate assign object learning a unique status 
as a necessary precursor to writing. Objects promise to instruct people from outside of language, 
politics, or culture; an autodidact who learns from unfettered exploration and experimentation is 
therefore less corrupted or subservient and more creative, open-minded, and self-governing than 
someone who learns by submitting to the untested authority of texts. In some ways, the object 
5
 status of autobiographical texts is what enables these narratives to create free subjects. While this 
observation may seem counter-intuitive because we associate creative and active minds with 
authoring texts, it accounts for why literary scholars and the authors they study persistently 
describe the advantages of writing in terms of creating a textual body, or object, with this second 
textual self is owned, subjected, and manipulated while its author remains free. Writers shape 
themselves through their work, much like Pygmalion creates himself by forming Galatea, his 
second self. “It is the capital and distinguishing characteristic of our species,” explains Catherine 
Macaulay, “that we can make ourselves as it were over again,” becoming “the carver of [our] 
own happiness” and fashioning “that artificial being, a social man.”9 Macaulay’s sculpted 
“artificial being” underscores a tendency to externalize development by creating artificial 
doubles, models for self-reflection that give material substance to a linguistic convention of 
referring to “ourselves” in the possessive. 
 My interdisciplinary methodology takes advantage of the broader field of autobiography 
studies laid out by Mascuch by turning to the material culture and teaching practices of British 
education. Far from limiting the work of self-fashioning to texts, Mascuch uses Bourdieu to 
suggest that autobiography is a “field of significance” that in its most inclusive sense “leaves the 
graphe as open as the auto, and bios.” Potentially limitless in form, autobiography “includes not 
only conventional ‘literary’ texts” but also “non-verbal” discursive practices, such as “films, 
photographs, collections of ephemera, wardrobes, gardens, and so forth.” 10 More recently, the 
intersection of autobiography and object has become the territory of thing theory. According to 
Igor Kopytoff and Arjun Appadurai, scholars who recover the broad and varied life cycle of 
“specific things, as they move through different hands, contexts, and uses,” resist commodity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Macaulay, Letters on Education, 9, vi. Macaulay attributes this observation to Lord Monboddo. 
10 Mascuch, Origins of the Individualist Self, 18. 
6
 fetishism through “methodological fetishism,” or by ironically treating objects as if they are 
living people who can relate their autobiographies. 11 Drawing on work in cultural studies and 
anthropology, literary scholars Julie Park, Mark Blackwell, Jonathan Lamb, Cynthia Sundberg 
Wall, Elaine Freedgood, and John Plotz have examined how the behavior of objects in literature 
has changed across centuries of colonial trade and commoditization, industrialization, and 
modern capitalism. In literature, objects are tools used to form and communicate identity, 
sometimes appearing as characters with their own stories to tell or as treasured personal 
talismans that, like fiction, transport memories across the globe.12 Turning to the literature and 
philosophy of education, I investigate where these connections between objects, fiction, and 
identity originate. 
 I have argued that the “object” status of texts gives life and agency to its author, much 
like the block of marble touched by Galatea makes her aware of herself. What most interests me 
about thing theory is its complication of the divide between the subject who knows and the 
object known, or between living creatures and stone. Objects safely kindle individuality because 
they have no will of their own; they evade the central contradiction in any myth of complete 
autonomy: if everyone creates themselves through free choices, then people who live together 
actually co-author one another.13 That is why when one person touches another person, their 
individual differences must be denied, or one person becomes an object to the other. When 
Galatea reaches out and touches the marble, she creates herself, but when she touches her lover, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Appadurai, Social Life of Things, 34. Appadurai here summarizes Kopytoff’s concept of a “cultural biography of 
things.” 
12 Park, Self and It; Blackwell, Secret Life of Things; Lamb, Things Things Say; Wall, Prose of Things; Plotz, 
Portable Property. Heather Klemann uses thing theory to explain the materiality of children’s literature and the 
novel, focusing on John Newbery’s The Pretty Little Pocketbook, sold with ball or pincushion. See also: Peer, 
Romanticism and the Object; Langbauer, “Marjory Fleming and Child Authors”; Kuznets, When Toys Come Alive. 
13 Mascuch points out that the self is “co-authored” but “the individualist self overlooks this fact and subscribes to 
the illusion of total control, of personal autonomy, over and above mere agency. The individualist self imagines the 
peculiar fiction of being in total possession of itself in all situations” (Origins of the Individualist Self, 22). 
7
 her méconnaissance creates Pygmalion as an active subject against herself as object, as a person 
with no “I” to challenge his desire. Just so, Buffon’s Adam creates himself in his desire for Eve, 
who is part of his flesh. By contrast, Frankenstein’s companionless monster fully defines himself 
against the objects of nature only to battle the world of men each time his fingers meet stray from 
natural objects to socialized subjects. Novels of education are full of metaphorical moving 
statues feeling their way from object to subject status in order prove their creator’s agency. 
Children are the objects (and potential agents) by which parents prove their agency, while 
workers are the mechanical bodies (and potential agents) against which the middle class defines 
itself as the nation’s instructor. In this world where everyone is an object or a subject, but anyone 
can easily pass between these categories through education, the ability to manipulate dead matter 
is the passport to subjecthood. Each of my chapters explains a different sort of mechanical 
literacy that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British educators believe children and the 
working classes must master, in conjunction with verbal literacies, in order to become agents 
who control their bodies and their environment. 
 
Learning from Objects in Science and Education 
 The object lesson has a long history as a didactic form reliant on practical example or 
poetic justice. Many schoolroom prints and chapbooks use cautionary tales to frankly depict the 
consequences of playing with guns and fire, stealing, or climbing fences. During the seventeenth 
century, however, a new kind of “object lesson” gained popularity. Influential educators 
advocated strategies for learning more effectively through the senses, supported by scientific 
concepts of knowledge production through personal observation. These experientialist 
pedagogies value teaching children directly from things in the context of everyday life—from 
8
 object lessons in the literal sense. Rather than cautionary tales that substitute safe, virtual 
experience for learning the hard way, these object lessons invite children to try out what they 
read and learn from direct experience. Object lessons are both literary and non-literary; they 
include the practices of actual children who learn by examining what is at hand, pedagogical 
texts that describe how to teach using experiments, and literary narratives that portray children 
engaging in educational play. Such literary and non-verbal lessons are closely linked because 
narrated objects lessons are performative texts that invite children to imitate the experiments of 
child characters.14 
 While using the phrase “object lesson” in the context of Enlightenment experimental 
educators, I should clarify that in the history of pedagogy it is often associated with the 
Pestalozzian movement, which was popularized in Britain in the 1830s and became influential 
across the curriculum in the latter half of the nineteenth century.15 According to Swiss educator 
Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, children should handle and describe objects, uniting “hand, heart, 
and head” in what was called “object teaching” or “object lessons.” But as Jill Shefrin argues, 
one of the peculiarities of the history of European pedagogy is the resurgent call as far back as 
classical Greek education texts for practical teaching methods that value physical engagement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 O’Malley, “Acting our Crusoe.” O’Malley demonstrates the performativity of Robinsonades for children, which 
invite readers to imitate in play the child characters who build their own tools and houses. 
15 Carter, “On an Object Lesson,” 8. Carter credits Pestalozzi with the “basic concept of object lessons” and 
describes his method: “children were first to develop sensation, then perception, notion, and finally volition, learning 
how to act morally based on an individual view of the world.” Considering Pestalozzi published his education 
treatise, How Gertrude Teaches Her Children, in 1801, he developed his unique methods for object teaching in the 
same pedagogical climate as Maria Edgeworth. Although drawing on the same predecessors, these two educators 
developed methods of practical, experimental teaching for different arenas—Pestalozzi for teaching the poor in 
schools, and Edgeworth for teaching the middling or upper classes at home. Hence, one of the early British 
advocates of Pestalozzian teaching, Elizabeth Hamilton, advocated introducing Carter’s methods to train the senses 
of the poor in Lancaster schools as a way to make children active learners. To avoid confusion, I do not use the 
specific Pestalozzian phrase “object teaching,” but I consider “object lessons” as a phrase in general circulation, 
used in common conversation and open to literary scholars of all periods. I reserve “the education of things” for the 
Rousseauvian method. 
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 over memorization.16 Their ideas rooted in Francis Bacon’s induction method and John Locke’s 
philosophy of mind, John Amos Comenius, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Stéphanie Félicité, 
Comtesse de Genlis, the abbé Pluche, Lady Ellenor Fenn, and Richard and Maria Edgeworth, 
among many others, had previously established a pedagogical tradition of training children’s 
senses through objects well before Pestalozzi.17 I follow the practice of early children’s literature 
scholars in referring to object learning more generally as “experiential learning,” but I use 
“object lessons” to refer to a subset of narratives and practices that emphasize single object 
encounters or intense episodes rather than the vast, nebulous influence of natural landscapes or 
life experiences on the mind. 
 For educators who favored experiential education, the learning style of children is closely 
connected with the way scientists make discoveries.18 The overlap between scientists and 
children derives from the popularity in Britain of Francis Bacon’s induction method and Isaac 
Newton’s celebrity status as Bacon’s disciple. As subsequent generations understood Bacon’s 
method, induction explains how to carefully expand knowledge by moving from particulars to 
increasingly general theories. Bacon considers the significance of his methods for education in 
The New Atlantis. After the pattern of Thomas More’s Utopia, Bacon imagines a place where 
scientists pursue practical and theoretical knowledge at an educational and research institution 
called Solomon’s House, portraying Solomon as a scientist who pursues divine Wisdom by 
minutely gathering observations on the behavior of matter before slowly deriving general 
theories about the fixed laws that govern these behaviors.19  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Shefrin, Dartons: Publishers of Educational Aids. Jill Shefrin’s recent survey of over 4,000 items from the 
Darton’s educational ephemera indicates just how much of what children’s publishers produced did not fall neatly 
under the category of books. 
17 Schultz, Pestalozzi’s Mark, 25-29. See also Shefrin, Shefrin, Dartons: Publishers of Educational Aids for this 
history. 
18 Secord, “Newton in the Nursery”; Hilton, Women and the Shaping of the Nation’s Young, 113-132. 
19 Olson, Kingdom of Science, 41-66. 
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  At the same time that Bacon’s status grew, John Locke argued, in An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, that knowledge accumulates through the senses, with abstract ideas 
derived from particular observations. Locke’s essay implies that children follow empirical 
methods when they accumulate sensory impressions during infancy then produce secondary 
ideas of increasing sophistication and abstraction through reflection. Like a good scientist, who 
avoids hypothesis while gathering particulars and circumvents classical authorities with 
experimental methods, an ignorant child enjoys a privileged epistemological position because his 
faculties are unclouded by the false, untested assumptions transmitted by past generations.20 
Children “have no prejudices,” writes Maria Edgeworth, whose Practical Education invokes 
Bacon’s practical methods, “therefore they have the complete use of all their senses; they have 
few ideas, but those few are distinct; they can be analysed and compared with ease.”21 
 Founded in scientific method, the “new philosophy” of education places children in a 
powerful position relative to the natural world, which they have the authority to creatively 
interpret, manipulate, and narrate. Speaking for the natural world requires poetic skill, but since 
its foundation is in observation and analysis of the material world, linguistic literacy is 
codependent with mechanical literacy. Arguing that Bacon’s induction is connected with the 
beginning of a modern attitude of “conquest” over nature, Paul A. Olson demonstrates that 
Bacon’s utopia depicts human triumph over “everything tangible” through combined scientific, 
educational, and colonizing projects. Believing that human improvement through education 
enables scientists to harness the forces of nature towards eliminating suffering, Bacon charts a 
dangerous path taken by successive nineteenth-century progressivist utopians and utilitarians, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Hilton, Women and the Shaping of the Nation’s Young, 26-30. 
21 Qtd. Manly, “Maria Edgeworth,” Repossessing the Romantic Past, 146. 
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 who support state-sponsored universal educational as a means of engineer society.22 However, by 
depicting Bacon, Adam Smith, and the Utilitarians as environmentally short-sighted and 
pedagogically oppressive, and praising oppositional voices of Alexander Pope, the Lake Poets, 
and Charles Dickens, Olson deepens the divide between the “mechanics” of science and political 
economy on the one hand and the “organic” imagination of literature on the other, overlooking 
how these traditions intersect. As Jonathan Smith documents in Fact and Feeling, scientists 
retained a respect for induction through the nineteenth century, but they increasingly called 
attention to the imaginative leaps and hunches that transformed their methodology into 
something more creative than naïve empirical fact-gathering, just as poets represented the subject 
of poetry and the writing process as grounded in observation and “particular facts.”23 What 
concerned Wordsworth, Coleridge, and their followers was not science, but depictions of the 
mind as a passive instrument that collects facts rather than an active shaper of the external world. 
More recent studies on sensibility by Sharon Ruston, Alan Richardson, and Noel Jackson 
emphasize the importance of materialism for the Romantic poets, documenting the closing gap 
between mind and brain—between thinking and feeling—in Romantic-era science.24  
 What these studies neglect is the practical implementation of sensation, or experiential 
education, in children’s literature, private homes, and public classrooms, and how these practices 
informed authors of the period, who were more often than not professional educators. Among 
notable women authors—Anna Letitia Barbauld, Amelia Alderson Opie, Charlotte Smith, Mary 
Wollstonecraft, Mary Hays, Charlotte Elizabeth Tonna, Harriet Martineau, and Felicia 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Olson, Kingdom of Science, 66. 
23 Smith, Fact and Feeling, 55. Smith quotes Wordsworth’s Preface to Lyrical Ballads. Smith argues that, “Far from 
repudiating the imagination, then, nineteenth-century scientists and philosophers say it is an indispensable 
component of scientific method” (37). During this period, Smith argues, the methods and language of science and 
poetry converge. 
24 Richardson, British Romanticism and the Science of the Mind; Ruston, Shelley and Vitality; Jackson, Science and 
Sensation. In Richardson’s study, . . . , while in Jackson’s account, Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Keats do not 
withdraw from history through their inward turn but embrace the self as historical through the mind’s embodiment. 
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 Hemans—nearly every one wrote for children or the working classes, sometimes as a quick 
source of money, yet with great care and theoretical sophistication. While women like Hannah 
More and Charlotte Yonge wrote devout instructional texts, other educated women writers were 
concerned about making complex ideas approachable for less educated and affluent audiences. 
Elizabeth Hamilton wrote Essays on the Principles of Education for mothers who wanted to 
follow the latest cognitive theories of Dugald Stewart in their child rearing practices but did not 
find his philosophy of mind sufficiently approachable. In her Essays on Education, Moral and 
Miscellaneous, Mary Hays translated metaphysical debates over necessity into an epistolary 
exchange between two young women. Among the Lake Poets, the same dedication to education 
predominates. Robert Southey and Coleridge publically defended Andrew Bell’s monitorial 
methods, while William Wordsworth, a friend of Bell, volunteered in one of his schools for 
several years. In his obituary, Household Words celebrated Wordsworth primarily as a national 
educator, quoting at length from The Excursion to show his support “respecting National 
Education.”25 Considering that poetry and fiction defended their public usefulness in didactic 
terms, it is no surprise that the public image of authors during this period converged with that of 
the public instructor. 
 Despite vitriolic contests over who should be educated and to what end, some remarkable 
commonalities underlie diverse approaches to instruction. In their survey of teaching methods 
from 1770-1850, Steven Shapin and Barry Barnes find that, regardless of vast pedagogical 
differences, writings on education consistently reinscribe a “gnostic” / “banaustic” culturally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 “William Wordsworth.” Household Words, 1 no. 9 (May 25, 1850): 210-13. 
The lines chosen include the country’s obligation, “to teach / Them who are born to serve her and obey; / Binding 
herself by statute to secure / To all her children whom her soil maintains, / The rudiments of Letters, and to inform / 
The mind with moral and religious truth” (213). Technically, Wordsworth did not support the “National Education” 
system (Lancastrian schools) but a similar method under the Anglican church with Dr. Bell, but by the time of this 
obituary the distinction was less important. Nonetheless, Household Words subtly attempts to redefine 
Wordsworth’s legacy. 
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 constructed binary in human mentalities that corresponds to social hierarchies of race, class, 
gender, and age. The gnostic mentality, assigned to adults, men, and upper classes, is verbal or 
symbolic and capable of abstract, complex thought, purposeful action, and self-control; whereas 
the banaustic mentality, assigned to children, women, and working classes, is primarily sensual 
or concrete, tending to superficial, non-symbolic thought and mechanical, automated action. 
According to this divide, the mental development of all persons in the banaustic category, adults 
included, seems equally child-like and “primitive.” Because they are illiterate or disinclined to 
abstract thought, such people experience the world differently, engaging directly with objects 
and using fewer cultural or linguistic mediations. Whereas education for wealthier children 
focuses on raising children from a banaustic to a gnostic mentality, note Shapin and Barnes, 
education for women and workers rarely encouraged this transition up the hierarchy from 
concrete to abstract thinking.26  
 Viewing humanity through this binary, childhood is one moment of intellectual equality 
during which everyone accesses the world as a sensual creature. Even when its ambitions are 
limited for educating the poor, I find the goal of object learning is to introduce children to 
abstraction in the only way possible, through the body’s contact with its physical environment. If 
sense experience is the sum of early education, then children must become adults with gnostic 
minds through the body’s mechanical movements. Instead of exercising abstraction or language, 
per se, object learning permits self-referential awareness of the process of learning through the 
senses; it fosters consciousness, self-monitoring, and abstract thinking by using object-
exploration as a stand-in for self-observation.  
 In many of the texts I examine, such as Godwin’s Caleb Williams or Maria Edgeworth’s 
Rosamond stories, the physical world and the mechanical laws that govern it are analogous to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Shapin and Barnes, “Head and Hand.” 
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 human beings and their anatomical laws, such that a child like Rosamond can learn about herself 
(and herself learning about herself) by investigating objects. The means of passing from 
banaustic to gnostic mentalities, therefore, is to develop this self-referentiality, which generalizes 
the child’s experience of control over passive and knowable objects into self-governance. This 
process, whereby children conceive themselves as abstract thinkers and autonomous individuals 
through sense exploration of passive matter, is what I mean by “mechanical literacies.” Such 
practices took many different forms. Authors who supported expanding the minds of workers 
through education often advocated access to diverse objects or pictures of objects, 
recommending theoretical mechanics as a way to elevate workers’ minds and respect their craft. 
Galatea’s object encounter with marble and flesh is another version of this self-referentiality, as 
are the children I later explore who watch automaton displays in London shows or machinery 
displays at the 1851 Great Exhibition. Despite my emphasis on the “mechanics” of a passive 
world, these methods for expanding minds are ultimately similar to those used by lyrical poets, 
who move from natural particulars, such as a flower, to observation of their own minds in 
contemplation, to an abstraction of human mental processes and sensual experiences. 
 The conviction that a child’s path to language lies through the senses supported a 
significant shift in how many wealthier children of the late eighteenth century learned to read. 
Making language accessible to these infants meant making words and letters physical things. In 
the following sections, I analyze new toys and methods that linked language with body 
movement and object manipulation, developing at once the child’s mechanical and verbal 
literacies. Since experientialist educators believed, for the most part, that all children begin as 
sensual creatures with minds equally empty, object lessons promised democratic access to 
unprejudiced, unmediated knowledge, transmitted from outside of politics, history, or 
15
 authority.27 I demonstrate, however, that rapid commercialization of object learning drew 
attention to how attitudes towards objects are necessarily class specific, dependent on concepts 
like property, labor, and consumption. 
 
Transforming language into tangible property 
 The extent to which literacy connected with sensation is most obvious in the toys children 
used to learn to read. According to M. O. Grenby, during the second half of the eighteenth 
century children were increasingly likely to learn to read through alphabet toys instead of 
books.28 Taking the extreme position, Catherine Macaulay and children’s author Ellenor Fenn 
advised that parents should not allow toddlers to handle books before mastering their letters with 
toys. For young children who are easily waylaid by multiple distractions, books present too much 
information at once, whereas alphabet tiles made of horn or ivory, printed alphabet cards, or 
lettered dice allow children to interact with the letters in a physical space at their own pace. More 
affluent families could arrange these tiles in boxes or filing cabinets to increase the child’s 
physical movement and connect spatial memory with letters.29 
 Because of these advantages, Fenn designed a box of educational toys to accompany her 
manual, The Art of Teaching in Sport, which explains to parents how to make learning active and 
abstract concepts concrete: 
 “Letters ought to be the most attractive toys; the study of them, the most sprightly 
play that can be invented. The first sounds of syllables should likewise be so acquired; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Manly, “Maria Edgeworth,’” Repossessing the Romantic Past, 140-159. Manly argues that “Edgeworth’s notion 
of education” is “based on enquiry, observation, and experiment.” The discovery of knowledge is an “egalitarian, 
collaborative effort” between students and parents (144). 
28 Grenby, The Child Reader, 41-43. 
29 See Immel, “Mistress of Infantine Language”; Shefrin, Dartons: Publishers of Educational Aids; Stafford, Artful 
Science; Te Heesen, World in a Box. 
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 this may be effected with ease, by mean [sic.] of a set of letters, which the child may 
place as he is directed; this amusement may pass under the eye of a mother or an elder 
sister, as she sits at her work; and rather be allowed to the child as an indulgence, than 
required of him. 
 “To fetch the letters from another table, will enliven the sport, and effectually 
prevent that languor, which is so apt to creep upon a child who remains long in one place. 
 The rudiments of language should not be taught in a book; a dull child, or a giddy 
child will be disgusted; first impressions are powerful and lasting; who would not wish 
her little one to conceive, from the first, an agreeable idea of books? . . . 
 The sum of all this, is, that reading must not be a task—No! it must be a lively 
amusement.30 
The goal of using playful literacy toys, for Fenn and many others, is to associate pleasure with 
reading so that children want to read on their own. Rather than reprimanding children for their 
inability to sit still and hold books, she accepts the child’s need to move around and touch things 
while learning, adapting the environment to fit the child. As a good observer, Fenn allows 
children to teach her how to learn—a concept of childhood that we tend to associate with 
Wordsworth. Fenn’s methods require children to “fetch the letters” from across the room because 
movement tackles short attention spans. Similarly, she uses beans or counters to teach math, 
because “Children ought always to count sensible objects,” and she suggests math and spelling 
games that use dice or cards.31 
  Active children at play are common illustrations for alphabets and grammar lessons, 
which associate letters with bodies in creative ways. The puppet horn book (1810) [figure 1] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Fenn, Art of Learning in Sport, 10. 
31 Fenn, Art of Learning in Sport, 67. 
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 allows toddlers to handle or suck the harmless toy then slowly discover the alphabet carved on its 
torso, while older children can use the toy for puppet shows or to entertain younger siblings. 
Illustrations for Posture Master’s Alphabet Jigsaw Puzzle (ca. 1800) feature children exercising 
their bodies by bending to form each letter [figure 2]. Children can use the pieces like any other 
alphabet card, or assemble the puzzle pieces, or imitate the illustrations by making letters with 
their bodies. Because alphabet toys are sturdier than books, they have fewer prescriptions for 
proper use, affording children several ways to safely interact with letters while exercising their 
bodies.  
 Books for children increasingly anticipated the child’s need for active play, as the 
distinction between toys and books became less of a sharp division than a continuum. 
Semantically, books for children were often called “toys.”32 Sold as unbound chapbook sheets, 
inexpensive books required purchasers to fold, sew, and cut the pages at home, giving families 
the choice to instead glue pages to cardstock or post illustrations on the wall. Some of the earliest 
alphabet cards are from books, with the alphabet section printed twice so that parents can make 
cards of one set and a bound book from the other.33 During this period, publishers produced the 
first pop-up and flap books for children while, at home, collecting and scrapbooking illustrations 
from purchased sheets or lotto rewards was a common activity for children (as was writing in 
books), making the book’s format an invitation for tactile manipulation.34 By combining physical 
and mental exercise through these literacy toys, children reinforced the connection between 
training their bodies and learning about the world around them.35 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 A “toy book” is a specific kind of production, similar to a chapbook, but sold bound and adorned with a separately 
printed cover.  
33 I have seen both a bound book and cards constructed from Thomas Cooper’s The Child’s New Play-thing at 
Princeton’s Cotsen Children’s Library. 
34 Whitton, Paper Toys of the World.  
35 Shefrin, Dartons: Publishers of Educational Aids; Stafford, Artful Science. 
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  In addition to unadorned tiles, alphabets transform into object lessons through the 
illustration of each letter with a corresponding object. I have come across these object alphabets 
on scrolls, panorama cards, Jacob’s ladders, dissected maps (puzzles), or themed card 
collections, which require tactile manipulations to accompany familiarization with letters. 
Because this style of illustration is so ubiquitous, isolated objects floating in space, arranged on 
lotto grids, or paired with single word labels constitutes a dominant visual rhetoric signifying 
childhood [figures 3 and 4]. These object arrangements associate literacy and play with property 
ownership and collection, as if children’s minds are little cabinets that organize and store what 
they pick up from the natural world, gathering quotidian detritus on the way to adulthood.  
 Although I do not want to suggest that philosophy of mind was so literally represented, or 
that every use of lotto prints is somehow an expression of abstract epistemological theories, there 
is at least some purposeful reinforcement between this visual rhetoric of objects and pedagogical 
theories.36 The eclectic design of two board games suggests as much: Learning in Sport! A Newly 
Invented Game to Promote Improvement [figure 5] and The Elegant and Instructive Game of 
Useful Knowledge, Designed to Impart Information to the Minds of Youth of Both Sexes [figure 
6], both of which depict objects, framed and visually isolated, as a path for the players’ tokens . 
The complete randomness of these object selections, each with no connection from one to the 
next besides the connecting path (eg. dog, windmill, teakettle, monkey, estate house, man 
reading the paper), replicates the eclectic visual impression of lotto sheets or alphabet cards. The 
choice of a chain metaphor for Useful Knowledge may refer to Hartley’s theory of association, 
where objects picked up by the senses become organized in the mind along chains of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Te Heesen, World in a Box. According to Anke Te Heesen, pictorial encyclopedias like the picture academy for 
the young, which forms the center of her study, organize information about the world in storage boxes that represent 
the student’s mind. Even though Heesen’s study covers the German Enlightenment, the same ideas were propagated 
in England by David Hartley and later by James Mill. See also: Stafford, Artful Science, 225-264. 
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 associations. Games like these are similar to Shoots and Ladders, but children can only advance 
if they answer quiz questions provided in a separate booklet that pertain to each space where they 
land. The game play for Useful Knowledge reinforces the notion that preliterate children sharpen 
their minds by encountering various practical objects before they learn to read by having players 
advance along the object-chain path to a central circle image of schoolboys presenting their 
slates to a schoolmaster [figure 6]. The architecture of the school, along with careful details (eg. 
the children’s hats kept on string, children grouped at the walls), suggests that the school 
depicted here is modeled on the methods of Quaker educator Joseph Lancaster, whose classroom 
materials were printed by the Dartons, the Quaker publishing family that made these two games. 
Lancastrian schools were among those that used rewarded lessons with prize tickets as a way to 
teach children to save money and appreciate property. In short, there is a subtle logic to the way 
this game gathers distinct, practical things, connecting them on chains to literacy, that is in 
keeping with teaching principles at use in classrooms and recommended by philosophy of mind. 
 Simple pictures of things serve a practical purpose as conversation starters for adults and 
toddlers, but their containment on grids, chains, and cards also suggests anxieties about double 
meanings, as if connecting language symbols as closely as possible to the objects represented 
prevents miscommunication. Consider the hieroglyphic puzzles popular during this period, 
which substitute objects for words, such as the set published by game and mapmaker John Wallis 
using Anna Letitia Barbauld’s Hymns in Prose for Children [figure 7]—some of the most 
common poems for children to learn by heart.37 In addition to providing clever puzzles, 
hieroglyphs reflect a linguistic theory, prior to the Rosetta Stone’s translation, that ancient 
Egyptian writing directly represents objects, unlike the sound symbols used in the Roman 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Several letters from children’s publisher William Darton to his children are written in hieroglyphs much like 
these. 
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 alphabet. Hieroglyphic communication was, at the time, considered more direct, or closer to a 
primitive state when humans related to nature through their immediate physical needs. 
Consequently, Francis Bacon wanted to create a language of pictograms that would collapse the 
gap between objects and words. There may be echoes of Bacon’s dream that inform the use of 
hieroglyphs by later educators, who recognized the arbitrary nature of language signs and for that 
very reason wanted words to acquire some sort of material presence.38 In a more contemporary 
case, Pestalozzi recalls that he discovered his method of “pure forms,” which teaches language 
through drawing, when his orphan students refused to learn their letters until he practiced 
conversations about objects. He found himself “obliged to lay aside the alphabet, that first 
torment of youth” when the child “felt no interest in those dead signs; he would have nothing but 
things, or pictures of things.”39 
 As these challenging games suggest, materials for making language active and tangible 
were by no means limited to toddlers. Inventive textbooks for children occasionally explain in 
the preface how teachers should take advantage of the child’s supposed absorption with physical 
realities. George Mudie, the author of The Grammar of the English Language Truly Made Easy 
and Amusing; By the Invention of Three Hundred Moveable Parts of Speech (ca. 1840) taught 
composition at the Strand in London by printing words on separate pieces of paper, color-coded 
by nouns, verbs, participles, etc. [figure 8]. He published his method as a book with instructions 
for teachers, lessons for students, and an attached case containing words as “moveable parts.” In 
Dickensian prose, he mocks traditional instructors as “luminous expositors of palpability, and 
most methodical creators of confusion” who “complete the mystification of what the Students 
had sufficiently understood before their understanding fell into the hands of their new instructors, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Olson, The Kingdom of Science, 56-57. Olson argues that Bacon wanted to prevent “linguistic libertinism” by 
using pictograms or “written signs that attach to real things rather than the phonology of a particular word.” 
39 Hints to Mothers, 175. 
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 by unintelligible terms and pompous enunciations.” He lists a befuddling array of grammatical 
terms, calculated to make students “relinquish in despair” and asks, Why all of these words, 
when students comprehend very well what is right in front of them? He rejects abstraction and 
celebrates mechanical, material approaches to language: “Students PRACTICALLY observe the 
divisions and distinctions themselves, though they can neither see through nor comprehend the 
clouds and mystery with which the School Grammarians have surrounded them. . . . They 
already know the THINGS themselves”40 Therefore, teachers should avail themselves “of 
Sensible Signs and Representations, and of Movable Pieces of the Parts of Speech and even of 
Colours.” With these methods “The laws of Grammar are thus practically exemplified . . . before 
the eyes of the Students, who thus readily perceive and easily comprehend.” He suggests that 
“Instead of abstract Rules,” teachers use “practical realities of Grammar.” “I show them the 
PARTS OF SPEECH themselves, and the GRAMMATICAL LAWS actually WORKING upon 
and amongst the Parts of Speech sensibly moving and changing, controlling and governing the 
latter . . . . before the eyes of the delighted, the attentive, and the rapidly improving Learners, 
who thus quickly obtain the very SUBSTANCE of the Grammatical Knowledge with which it is 
sought to imbue them.”41 The lessons that he provides draw analogies between simple 
grammatical terms and familiar objects. A Conjunction, for instance, is a “Grammatical Joint or 
HINGE.” He invites his students to “examine on the hinges or joints of the door of this room” 
and see how each joins together two things.42 
 George Mudie may seem like an unholy combination of Mr. Wizard and Thomas 
Gradgrind, but his methods are playful and child-centered. He implies a number of fascinating 
claims about the privileged epistemological position of children; they “know the THINGS 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Mudie, Grammar, viii-x. 
41 Mudie, Grammar, xiv. 
42 Mudie, Grammar, 23. 
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 themselves” precisely because they have not yet been mystified by language. Language properly 
taught can have substance (“SUBSTANCE”!) because words, like things, are subject to “LAWS” 
and can be manipulated “sensibly” by the same principles used to manipulate the material world. 
Abandoning traditional grammar jargon, Mudie adopts terms from mechanics to describe how 
language works: “laws,” “working upon,” “moveable pieces,” and especially his choice of both 
“joint” and “hinge,” which appear together in standard mechanics textbooks.43 Mudie considers 
grammar a similar enterprise to kinematics, reducing language to simple parts to see how they 
act on one another. And implicitly, he considers children’s practical, physical worldview similar 
to that of artisans and factory workers.  
 Making language into something tangible allows children to combine body movement 
and intellectual training with a growing awareness of their control over world around them. By 
manipulating words and the things represented by words, the child author builds his own mental 
landscape and becomes aware of his ability to shape himself. 
  
Objects with properties and Children of property 
 Object learning teaches children about social station by connecting literacy with owning 
property. If stimulating objects from nature and nursery prepare infant faculties to comprehend 
texts, then children who do not own toys are, theoretically, at a disadvantage, especially if they 
work in cities at indoor occupations and have little access to objects from nature. Through 
“infant library” collections, toys, and natural history specimens, children of leisure from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Egbert Willis’s Principles of Mechanism (1841) begins a section on the universal hinge: “DR. JOHNSON gives 
seven different definitions of the word joint, of which the second is that which is applicable to mechanism; namely, 
Hinge; ‘junctures which admit motion of the parts;’ or rather, of parts that are connected. But in scientific language I 
prefer to employ the term ‘lines of flexure’ for hinge-joints. Such joints were termed in Old English, gimmals or 
gimbals. The derivation of these words is doubtless from the French gemeaux (gemella, Lat.), twins; which is 
applied properly not only to a hinge composed of two portions of exactly similar form and size jointed together, but 
to anything else which is formed of twin pieces of like dimensions united in any manner” (507). 
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 comfortable homes reached beyond alphabets and grammar, imbibing a broader notion that 
comprehension is akin to ownership; we “grasp” ideas through objects. 
 Returning for a moment to Fenn’s Learning in Sport, the importance of property is 
implicit in her method, and not only because her materials were expensive. Children eagerly 
learn their letters from toys, according to Fenn, because they naturally desire to collect and own 
things. She recommends that mothers give their child a box and play a game of forfeits with the 
letters:  
let him call [the box] his own; as he acquires a knowledge of the letters let him deposit 
them in his box . . . If he should forget a letter, then he forfeits that one till he recognizes 
it . . . Children love property; the box will be often produced, its contents displayed;—
“these letters,” (the happy child will say) “are my own!” [Fenn’s emphasis]44  
The child’s play literalizes an internalization process where the box represents the mind; the 
child grasps knowledge and owns it inside of himself like portable property. These alphabet 
lessons are couched within Fenn’s larger system of playful instruction, in which mothers use the 
picture cards she provides for starting conversation, or use daily constitutionals as opportunities 
for “instilling benevolence” and “infusing ideas” through everyday objects. The world is “full of 
toys for children.”45 A consistent logic connects all of these “sport” activities—from more direct 
object lessons, to picture conversations, to object letters and counting beans, to the infant’s first 
spelling books—such that the child gains knowledge of the wider world through the same 
exploratory activities used to teach reading and writing. Such methods for making language 
accessible to the senses through objects prepare children to become active learners and self-
directed adults, while associating the acquisition of knowledge with property and social mobility. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Fenn, Art of Learning in Sport, 19-20. 
45 Fenn, Art of Learning in Sport, 5, 9. 
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  These connections between literacy and property are illustrated on box lids and book 
covers that depict wealthier children learning to read with toys. The sliding box lid for The 
Alphabet Cabinet shows a girl outdoors in a country estate, cards spread at her feet while she 
boasts her literacy to the family cat [figure 9]. The girl’s posture claims possession of her 
affluent space and uses her illiterate subordinate, the cat, to foil her education as the source of 
her authority. By the nineteenth century, children’s publishers also sold children’s books in sets 
as “Children’s Libraries.” These sets prepared children to see themselves as library owners by 
grouping early readers, nonfiction, and short fiction, as well as anthology collections from 
English novelists (made possible by the changes in copyright law in 1774), housing them in a 
small box or wooden bookshelf. The trend extended to other kinds of education equipment, such 
as specimen cases sold for young natural philosophers as well as different sorts of “toy cabinets,” 
or alphabet cards with animals, plants, herbs, etc., also sold in boxes. The alphabet as a cabinet 
collection evokes the popular practice of collecting unusual objects or natural history specimens, 
tying literacy with Enlightenment science and property ownership. 
 One of the early proponents of this idea was the abbé Pluche, whose Spectacle de la 
Nature Diderot used as a model for his encyclopedia.46 Its careful descriptions of the natural 
sciences and artisan crafts, based on Pluche’s observations of workers and factories, position its 
child readers as the bridge between physical labor and abstract science, anticipating that some 
children will become manufacturers or improve production with their scientific investigations. 
To stimulate active, spontaneous learning, Pluche recommends giving children “objects that 
belong to them, and instruments which they may dispose of as their own property. Give them an 
old-fashioned clock, a small timber-framed house put together with removable pegs, a jack, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Koepp, “Curiosity, Science, and Experiential Learning,” Childhood and Children’s Books,176; Stafford, Artful 
Science, 217-220, 233-237. 
25
 small crane, rammers, and all the engines for driving piles into the ground to be taken apart, with 
each piece numbered in order to put the whole thing together again.”47 By taking apart machines 
and putting them back together, children verse themselves in the mechanical interactions at work 
in the physical world. The added injunction that children should “own” these toy machines 
teaches what Simon Schaffer argues is a middle-class concept of intellectual property, 
propagated by the Encyclopedists, that only the managers of manufacturers can comprehend and 
survey the entire process of production, making them owners of knowledge previously protected 
by guild craftsmen.48 Although Cynthia J. Koepp considers Spectacle democratic in its attention 
to “mechanics” or artisan laborers, Pluche’s insistence that wealthier children connect physical 
with mental labor is advantageous to the developing managerial class who must comprehend the 
labor of factory workers and the mathematical concepts behind machinery.49 In England, these 
are the middle-class students who attended the Dissenting Academies and, in the next century, 
the mechanics institutes.50 Owning toys means taking responsibility for their condition by fixing 
them when they break, as recommended by Mme de Genlis in Adelaide and Theodore; or, 
Letters on Education and Maria Edgeworth’s opening chapter on toys in Practical Education 
(1798). The Edgeworths not only recommend Pluche’s Spectacle but make similar suggestions 
about mechanical play. Parents should give infants toys that can be taken apart, while older 
children learn mechanics by constructing their own machine models, reading print diagrams, and 
visiting factories.  
 Object learning became popular when it did not only because of Locke’s philosophy of 
mind and Bacon’s inductive method, but because material and economic factors were favorable. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Koepp, “Curiosity, Science, and Experiential Learning,” Childhood and Children’s Books,166. 
48 Schaffer, “Enlightened Automata,” Sciences in Enlightened Europe, 145-47. 
49 See Koepp, “Advocating for Artisans,” Idea of Work in Europe. 
50 Koepp, “Curiosity, Science, and Experiential Learning,” Childhood and Children’s Books, 173-77. 
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 Despite an emerging consensus that children are innocent and distinct from adults, wealthier 
young children actively participated in consumer culture as consumers. They were more likely 
than previous generations to join parents in fashionable nightlife and more likely to have a 
separate nursery space with toys and books targeting their specific age group.51 With Britain’s 
explosive population growth, there were more children in Britain than ever before, and a greater 
number of these received formal schooling at the insistence of ambitious parents for whom 
literacy, speech, and comportment communicated the family’s social status.  
 Object learning not only appealed to middle-classes values, but also to booksellers who 
wanted to sell books and toys at a time when education was becoming increasingly 
institutionalized. Past the age of seven, boys left the feminized spaces of home and dame school, 
where they acquired basic literacy, to finish their education in institutions that prepared students 
for various enterprises. “The end of the eighteenth century and beginning of the nineteenth can 
be understood as a transition,” comment Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, “between a 
system built around informal training of children by the family, kin and community to one which 
relied on institutions created specifically for educational or professional training.”52 These 
schools required books and equipment, and since many of them were headed by dissenting 
families who wanted educational materials that fit the unique religious and occupational needs of 
their middling-class clientele, schoolmasters often wrote or designed their own materials for 
classroom use, then published these more widely.53 Anna Letitia Barbauld, who opened Palgrave 
school with her husband, Rochemont Barbauld, first wrote her infant lesson books for use in her 
classroom, while science instruction at Warrington academy used machines and manufacturing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Peter Borsay shows that in the later eighteenth century wealthier parents were more concerned than previous 
generations about exposing girls and boys to fashionable entertainments to make them less shy and awkward under 
public scrutiny. See “Children, Adolescents and Fashionable Urban Society,” Fashioning Childhood, 53-63. 
52 Davidoff and Hall, Family Fortunes, 235. 
53 Sullivan, “Cultivating a ‘Dissenting Frame of Mind.’” 
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 models with advanced students. Educational books and materials became a lucrative commercial 
enterprise by the 1780s and 1790s, with publishers and shops specializing in these wares.54  
 The spontaneity of learning from whatever objects are at hand implies that children who 
must live in an unpredictable world-in-transition are ill-served by prescriptive rote lessons.55 
Such an approach to education particularly appealed to those in the socially mobile middle-
classes, who were responsible for producing most pedagogical literature.56 Andrew O’Malley 
argues that the middle classes embraced Locke’s concept of child subjects born equally blank, 
deficient in reason but malleable and improvable, in order to differentiate themselves from the 
stations above and below them. He connects the popularity of the tabula rasa metaphor for the 
infant mind with what Isaac Kramnick identifies as a dominant middle-class metaphor of life as a 
fairly run race—the “equal opportunity” of an even start that is really a “justified and morally 
acceptable inequality.”57 The middle and upper classes were also best situated to transform their 
homes into safe learning environments, according to the ideal promoted by object learning, 
where ordinary objects and household activities spontaneously suggest practical lessons in 
natural history, charity, time-management, frugality, and sensibility. Enclosed spaces under 
parental control certainly imply either estates with fenced gardens or town houses with rooms 
separate from servants and dangerous or breakable materials.58 Although object learning, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 By observing that children’s books and toys were more commercialized by the 1780s, I do not mean to imply that 
previous generations neglected to write children’s literature or sell equipment for rearing children. Recent work on 
Medieval and Early Modern children calls into question Peter Coveney’s sweeping statement that children only 
emerged thematically in the later eighteenth century. 
55 On using quotidian objects and toys to teach young children in “education of the moment,” see Immel, “Mistress 
of Infantine Language,” 25. 
56 Godwin captures this notion in his Enquirer: “It is of less importance, generally speaking that a child should 
acquire this or that species of knowledge, than that, through the medium of instruction, he should acquire habits of 
intellectual activity” (5). For the politics behind approaches to memorization in education, see William McCarthy’s 
essay contrasting Hester Thrale and Anna Barbauld’s pedagogical strategies with their respective students, 
“Performance, Pedagogy, and Politics,” 261-71. 
57 Qtd. O’Malley, Making of the Modern Child, 2-6. 
58 For the significance of enclosed, domestic spaces for education to the middle classes, see Hall, Family Fortunes, 
357-97; Smith, “Centering the Home-Garden,” 24-48. 
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 especially in Emile, originally depended on quotidian objects, works like Maria and Richard 
Edgeworths’ Practical Education (1798) comfortably assume readers are tuned into the booming 
market in education apparatuses and have resources to purchase everything from microscopes 
and fossil storage cabinets to child-carpenter tools and mini-wheelbarrows. And, as we’ll see in 
Maria Edgeworth’s Rosamond stories, choosing between objects with different self-forming 
potentials can be dramatized as a purchase. The marketing advantages of object learning were 
quickly realized by children’s booksellers, who shamelessly printed stories where children 
played with and praised the educational toys sold in their shops, and they commonly packaged 
books together with toys. A Pretty Little Pocketbook, Newberry’s first children’s book, came 
with a choice of pincushion or ball for keeping track of faults and good deeds—essentially a toy 
version of a Protestant autobiography.59  
 Games and books for children are blatant, but also self-reflexive, about the participation 
of children and booksellers in commercial markets. Some of these works celebrate the child’s 
participation in consumer culture without an explicit didactic message. A card game like The 
laughable game of what d'ye buy (ca. 1860) had no more didactic content than the immensely 
popular “London Cries” chapbooks, which featured different street vendors calling their wares 
and services [figure 10]. Players simply match cards with items sold to the appropriate 
storekeeper’s card—for instance, “a dissecting map” (a puzzle) or “a dressed doll” belong to the 
“toyman.” While Patricia Crown deprecates such shameless commercialism, I am more inclined 
to celebrate that children’s books occasionally muster quality satirical commentary on the 
literary marketplace in the fine tradition of Jonathan Swift’s A Tale of the Tub. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 For some fascinatingly egregious examples of the practice, see Crown, “Visual Culture of Consumption,” 
Fashioning Childhood, 63-73. There is a noticeable difference for anyone reading these stories between the way 
respected educators criticize or promote objects for purchase and the blatantly self-serving marketing of publishers 
who tell their authors to promote their products. When Edgeworth suggests an object, she rarely says where to 
purchase it unless it is difficult to find, and she is quite selective, explaining her choices. 
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  Even the most straightforward didacticism of marketplace narratives exhibits a level of 
clever, almost postmodern, play that argues against any knee-jerk rejection of such works. One 
of my favorites is John Newberry’s The Toy-shop, or, Sentimental Preceptor (1787), which hints 
that families demonstrate good conduct and taste when they visit toyshops. The mother 
protagonist, Lady Meanwell, brings her children to a special toyshop, where the shopkeeper tells 
instructive stories about each toy. For instance, he gives them a mirror that mocks vanity, while a 
telescope teaches how people see their own faults reduced and the faults of others enlarged. Lady 
Meanwell praises the shopkeeper as “a new kind of satirical person; your shop is your scripture, 
and every piece of goods is a different text, from which you expose the vices and follies of the 
world, in a very fine allegorical sermon.” The shopkeeper agrees, “I may, indeed, be called a 
parson,” for he delights to have “a full congregation in my shop.” The book suggests that some 
families make thoughtless purchases, while others use objects for self-improvement. The toyman 
warns that “people sometimes condescend to take home the text, perhaps, but mind the sermon 
no more than if they had not heard one.”60 This extended analogy between the toyshop and the 
Bible transforms the toyshop into a microcosmic “book of nature.” The toys are texts that, like 
God’s creations, contain lessons for careful observers, and the children are natural philosophers. 
  Once they are old enough, the children learn to imitate the toyman’s conceit about objects 
that speak lessons. At one point they compose a story from the perspective of their old doll (a 
popular genre called the “it-narrative” or “object narrative”) in which they “let the doll appear to 
speak for itself.”61 When they return to the toyshop as young adults and request something 
“above the common baubles,” the shopkeeper again presents them with what he calls “a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Barker, The Toy-shop, [ca. 1791] 26-7. The 1830 reprint of this book includes an introduction that explains the 
instructional advantages of fiction as a way to gain control over the imagination. Through books like this one, “The 
attention may be thus insensibly seduced from the present objects of the senses, and the thoughts accustomed to 
dwell on the past, the distant, and the future” (vi). 
61 Barker, The Toy-shop, [ca. 1791], 87. 
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 Looking-glass,” but instead of the same mirror he first introduced to the children, he hands them 
a book. “[I]t is the Looking-glass for the mind, or Intellectual Mirror,” he explains. “It contains 
an elegant collection of the most delightful little stories and interesting tales, such as cannot fail 
of improving and enlightening the understanding; the price of it is half a crown, and is sold by 
Mrs. Newbery, the corner of St. Paul’s Church-yard. I would recommend the perusal of it to all 
those, who prefer useful knowledge to empty conversation, and substantial advantages to mere 
phantoms.”62 The toyman advertises several other titles for sale, including abridgments of 
Fielding and Richardson’s novels, revealing that the shopkeeper is Newberry himself, and the 
children characters are the readers who have just purchased and read The Toy-shop. While the 
conclusion blatantly flatters customers for their superior discernment while pushing Newberry’s 
wares, there is something admirably complex in its metatextual contemplation on the status of 
books and toys as objects that fix didactic lessons within collectable material objects. The Toy-
shop presents books, readers, children, and objects as strangely interchangeable, each speaking, 
acting, reading, and moralizing in turn. Books are mirrors, mirrors are books, and children’s 
minds are mirrors; children are like dolls, while dolls can be made to speak like shopkeepers. 
 Through these commercially conscious books, children associate learning to read with 
learning to make purchases in ways befitting their social station. The format of The toy-shop 
transforms Bacon’s empiricism by presenting objects within social settings, where they speak 
lessons determined by the context of their circulation. No longer isolated within laboratories, 
toys and books and artisan wares are social creatures, much like the shopkeepers who sell them, 
the parents who purchase them, and the children who speak for them. 
 For those children who lacked the purchasing power of the wealthy, literacy was 
nonetheless steeped in overt messages and subtle games about property. Poor children might 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Barker, The Toy-shop, [ca. 1791], 118. 
31
 learn to read from donated books or by drawing in sand to avoid purchasing slates. They would 
be surrounded by prints of objects on the walls, some of these prints telling them not to steal. 
Their introductory reading lessons, which may comprise their entire education, usually featured 
passages from the Bible about respecting property. And, if they were successful at their lessons, 
they may be rewarded by playing “lottery,” where a child pokes a pin through a book and takes 
out a little square picture of an object, which students collected, like a poor child’s specimen 
cabinet. These object pictures, called “lotto sheets,” were staple classroom materials, and since 
pictures of objects were considered substitutes for learning directly from physical objects, there 
is some continuity between lotto rewards and John Harris’s marketplace object lessons. In 
Lancaster’s Monitorial schools, children earned reward tickets instead of lotto pictures, which 
they collected and traded for prizes or access to a lending library, if the school had one, again 
linking the accumulation of objects (economic or mental) with literacy. The purpose of these 
rewards was to teach poor children the pleasures of saving money and owning property earned 
by hard work. While middle-class children learned about consumption when they learned to 
read, working-class and charity school children learned to work for money and save their 
earnings. These connections between economic incentives and the advance of national literacy is 
explicit in government policy, where Parliamentary representatives who supported expanding 
schools for the poor simultaneously called for poor law reforms as a way to fund national 
education. As I discuss at length elsewhere, the wealthy people who managed schools wanted to 
teach less affluent children to adopt their attitudes toward literacy and property. 
 Experiential learning could vary significantly by class or institution, partly because the 
question of how to educate people for different stations seems tied to its most central concepts. 
Since people who labor with their hands were considered mechanically minded, object learning 
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 was a logical choice for teaching working-class adults about rhetoric and natural philosophy, 
while at the same time, wealthier young people who expect to work as adults might enliven their 
memorization-focused, book-based routine by watching or imitating in play the work of skilled 
laborers. During a period when education became institutionalized, object lessons were one 
method of appropriating traditional modes of personalized, community-based education, such as 
apprenticeship, into modern classrooms or country estates, along with the skills of manual 
laborers. Even the mechanics institutes of the 1820s and 1830s could be viewed, in these terms, 
as places where workers, “whose lives being spent in the midst of mechanical operations, are at 
the same time instructed in the general principles upon which these depend,” as Henry 
Brougham explained, while “the learners of natural science in other conditions of life” can 
consult a “compendious set of machines” kept on-hand for practical experiments.63 
 In order to explain how labor and cross-class interactions function in object lessons, I will 
explore two sophisticated examples of theoretically informed experientialist children’s books. 
Selected to cover the full period of my study, both of these works illustrate how acquiring 
mechanical and verbal literacies requires educational exchanges between middle-class children 
and workers that are potentially problematic. 
 
Practical Education (1780) 
 Only five copies of the second volume of Practical Education (1780) survive [figure 11]. 
The joint work of Richard Edgeworth, his second wife Honoria Edgeworth, and his close friend 
Thomas Day, the children’s story was published for a small audience of friends, eighteen years 
before Richard and Maria Edgeworth published their influential education treatise by the same 
title, Practical Education (1798). The story contains The History of Harry and Lucy, featuring 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Brougham, Practical Observations, 10-11. 
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 two child characters that Maria Edgeworth later revived in Early Lessons (1801), in which the 
siblings perform scientific experiments with everyday objects like teakettles and wash basins. 
The origins of her storyline are evident in the 1780 volume, which depicts Lucy’s investigation 
of how cream is made in her mother’s dairy and Harry’s observations on how bricks are made. 
The lone second volume opens with a dedication to its pedagogical inspiration: “This little book, 
written upon the Principles of ASSOCIATION, Is inscribed to Dr. Priestley.” On the following 
page are instructions for how parents might use the book: “The asterisk in the text refer to the 
Glossary; and when the Child is directed to ask to see any thing, it is hoped, that his teacher will 
shew him what he asks for, and let him handle and examine it.” The appended glossary defines 
words from the stories that address the senses, like “observation,” “shape,” and “sweet.” But 
whenever it lists a common object that a child can ask to handle, the glossary withholds a 
definition in favor of first-hand exploration.  
 The story and glossary hypertextually reference the sensual, material world of child 
readers, inviting them to imitate Harry and Lucy by asking adults about the things they see, hear, 
touch, taste, and smell. Consistent with the Associationist principles of the physician David 
Hartley, whose work was recently republished in a heavily edited edition by Joseph Priestley in 
1776 (without the section on vibrations that later offended Coleridge), the story assumes that 
children require sensual engagement to form orderly associations between the otherwise abstract 
or symbolic content of printed text. By combining things and words, Practical Education 
answers the concern that children might learn words as mere symbol or sounds without meaning. 
The book teaches by joining together concrete and abstract, objects and text, familiar and 
strange, hand and eye.  
 This strategic coupling of what is at hand, or known, with what is removed, unknown, or 
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 abstract, also structures Harry and Lucy’s narrative. The story begins in the familiar domestic 
space of their bedroom, where the children wake from sleep; then proceeds outward into the 
strange world of dairies, meadows, and brick layers; and closes with the children’s introduction 
to narrative as they listen to their mother read a story. Implicitly, the child audience for Practical 
Education learns that reading books is related to the hands-on learning enjoyed by Harry and 
Lucy, and the glossary suggests that they turn from their books to examine the world around 
them. 
The 1780 Practical Education may have had a small circulation, but its literary impact is 
far-reaching. Thomas Day’s classic Rousseauvian children’s book, The History of Sandford and 
Merton, was originally intended as a short story for a sequel volume before Honoria’s death 
made Richard Edgeworth abandon the project. Like Harry and Lucy, the two boys in Sandford 
and Merton model how education should integrate reading with physical play—to integrate 
symbolic and sensual learning. After reading a Robinsonade about four Russian sailors who 
survive shipwrecked alone on a desolate island with only a few tools, Day’s boys determine to 
build a house themselves using only wood and a hatchet. Sandford and Merton models how 
children should trade activities between reading their book and imitating the experiments it 
contains—a tradition extended through subsequent Robinsonades for children.64 Closer to home, 
Richard and Maria Edgeworth continued Harry and Lucy into three multi-volume collections. 
Beginning with Early Lessons in 1801, Maria Edgeworth began elaborating the history of Harry 
and Lucy by providing enough information about equipment and processes for children to carry 
out the same scientific experiments as her characters. This sort of half-fictional book, something 
between a science textbook and a children’s story, became a popular genre in its own right, with 
works by Jane Marcet, Harriet Martineau, and Nathaniel Hawthorne (The Book of Wonder) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Day, Sandford and Merton, 40-8, 64-5. 
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 following suit. 
 
The New Picture Book: Being Pictorial Lessons on Form, Comparison, and Number, for 
Children under Seven Years of Age (1858) 
Designed by German educator Nicholas Bohny and first published in Germany as Neues 
Bilderbuch (1850), The New Picture Book reached at least nine British editions in a dozen years 
after its Edinburgh publication in 1858, its popularity amplified by enthusiasm for Froebel’s 
kindergarten movement.65 The first edition copy that I examined was signed “to Isabella Napier 
Wilkin from her loving Auntie, Jane Rigby, 1st January, 1860.”66 Based on the Pestalozzian 
method, which catechizes children about everyday objects through open-ended questions, the 
book offers illustrations as substitutes for direct object interactions, and its preface confidently 
affirms that discussing objects creates a foundation for abstract thinking. Both verbal and 
mathematical skills depend upon developing the child’s powers of observation: 
“The first thing to be secured in Education is the habit of observing accurately, 
yet with readiness—a habit acquired by the exercise of attention, through the eye, on 
visible objects. All objects have form, are presented in different positions, and are one or 
more in number. In these properties of objects lie the germs of thought and knowledge; 
and in the perception of these, combined with the use of speech in describing them, we 
have a sure foundation upon which to rear a solid superstructure of education. Nor can we 
over-calculate the detriment arising from the neglect of this habit of readily and with 
accuracy observing the qualities and relations of objects.”67 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Maloney, English Illustrated Books for Children, 56-57. Maloney’s book is a companion to a series of facsimiles 
of early children’s book classics from Toronto Library’s Osborne Collection.  
66 The copy of The New Picture Book that I examined is from Princeton’s Cotsen Children’s Library. 
67 Bohny, New Picture Book, preface, n.p. 
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 Notice the active participation demanded of the implied child audience, who must not only 
observe but verbally describe what he or she sees on these pages. The emphasis on “form” in the 
preface is peculiar to Pestalozzi, who approaches letters and numbers as aesthetic shapes 
composed of basic lines and curves. Drawing is a significant part of the Pestalozzian curriculum 
because it requires children to find and replicate basic curves or lines within everyday things—
the same forms that children find replicated within letters and numbers used for symbolic 
representations.  
 The preface next expresses anxieties about the child’s quick perception and comparative 
difficulty detailing everything that so rapidly enters the eye: 
“The experience of all who have taken interest in the early acquisitions of 
children, goes to show, that they easily comprehend objects, pictures of them, and find 
delight in examining them and speaking about them. They not only wish to compare and 
measure objects according to their shape and size, but to distinguish and separate the 
large from the small, the thick from the thin, the long from the short, etc. With this hint 
from nature, of which advantage may be safely taken, their mental activity can be turned 
to account in advancing their education. It is, however, necessary to direct the child’s 
observation carefully, in order to secure a correct impression of whatever is noticed, and 
an accurate mode of speaking about it. It has therefore been deemed advisable to . . . 
draw their attention to the objects which surround them in their every day life.”68 
Conceiving of children under seven as quick and mentally active by nature, The New Picture 
Book anticipates the strengths and weaknesses of this developmental stage by offering children 
familiar objects that they want to examine and discuss. Yet the teacher who uses this book must 
shape a child’s natural ability towards greater acumen, since that same eager eye may cause 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Bohny, New Picture Book, preface, n.p. 
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 inaccuracies. 
 Instead of merely making numbers into physical objects, The New Picture Book builds 
upon associations with numbers that children may have experienced intuitively before learning 
abstract figures. The opening page progresses from “one” as conceptually singular, to “two” as 
intimate and confiding, and “three” as social [figure 12]. On the top line, one soldier holds his 
gun casually, resting contrapposto, his lack of military alertness suggesting that he is not 
threatened, nor does he feel observed by superiors who might expect him to stand at attention; 
then two soldiers engaged in conversation; and three soldiers stand at attention, as if observed. In 
the following pages, illustrations raise increasingly complex questions about the relationships 
between counting and categorization, form and identity. A full page dedicated to “five” 
compares five male deer, their antlers splayed out from their heads, against the forms of five 
fallen trees with bare branches that stretch towards the sky while loggers cut them apart. Below 
these, three butterflies, one caterpillar, and one chrysalis make five. Are these five the same 
animal, despite their radically different forms? And if what changes form retains its identity, 
what are we to say of the dead trees that the loggers cut apart to make into wooden objects? And 
what of the chrysalis, now dead, while the butterfly lives?  
 In addition to making abstract numbers concrete, these illustrations foreground questions 
of identity, especially since the objects selected are often combinations of living and growing 
creatures or dead objects accompanied by the craftsmen and tools used to transform natural 
resources into products. These living and nonliving items lie on the brink of transformation, 
much as the child looking at the book undergoes biological changes that may challenge his sense 
of self. The stories a child tells about these objects are biographies of things, and the telling 
mirrors and facilitates his own transformation from child to adult, exercising the same narrative 
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 methods of self-creation ascribed to autobiographical writing or lyrical poetry. 
 Although based on different pedagogical theories, The New Picture Book and Practical 
Education (1780) take a similar approach to experiential learning. Both books are self-reflexive 
about how adults can teach children using books while also directing the children’s attention to 
the world beyond the pages, with conversation and sense exploration. What little text appears in 
The New Picture Book (directed at adults) explains how to use the book and what sorts of 
questions to ask about the pictures, while children are expected to experience the book as an 
aural, social, and sensual activity. Indicating its intended use, the book’s cover shows children of 
various ages engaged in age-specific toys that were associated with developing mechanical 
literacy, such as blocks, models, and drawing, all within a comfortable domestic schoolroom 
setting while a female instructor shows The New Picture Book to children ranging from about 
three to seven years old, who casually gather and touch the pages. Working in cross-age groups 
like these, children can access the book’s illustrations from a variety of developmentally specific 
subject positions, with the older children asking questions about abstract concepts or practicing 
arithmetic while the youngest practice simple descriptions of what they see. Although more 
textual and less visual, Practical Education (1780) models its use through its hypertextual 
glossary and through its conclusion, when Harry and Lucy listen to their mother read a story 
before discussing its meaning with her. In both cases, books are aural, conversational, familial, 
active and experiential.  
 Since both books celebrate the playfulness of learning, they share an attitude towards 
physical labor that is potentially problematic. Harry and Lucy enjoy depictions of physical labor 
and artisan skill—woodworking, bricklaying, smithy work, and so forth—which they replicate 
(or consume) as domestic play. The impulse to consider brick-making “fun,” as Harry clearly 
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 does, is only possible because Harry and Lucy are not bricklayers, which begs the question of 
how pedagogies designed for children of leisure function for working children. The New Picture 
Book is a good illustration of this problem. Initially, Pestalozzi’s methods were associated with 
the poor, since he dedicated his life to teaching destitute orphans. In England, Pestalozzi’s 
methods were first introduced by novelist Elizabeth Hamilton for use in monitorial schools for 
charity children and later adopted by Wilfred Owen, who hired Pestalozzi-trained instructors for 
his New Harmony utopian experiment. Yet the cover illustration for The New Picture Book 
addresses wealthier readers with its depictions of middle-class children in a well-equipped, 
comfortable domestic setting, even though its pages show simply clothed artisans engaged in 
carpentry and farming. [figure 19] The contrast between the cover’s more middle-class 
occupants and the simply clothed artisans on its pages could indicate that charity schools might 
purchase a single copy by subscription, whereas wealthier children, like the one who received 
this copy as a Christmas gift from her aunt, might own a book at home. But the combination may 
instead reveal the ways that traditional modes of working-class education, such as apprenticeship 
or dame schools, were appropriated by wealthier families in order to preserve some sense of 
intimacy and practicality within institutional settings. Although scholars tend to celebrate 
children’s books that contain positive depictions of artisan skill or playful attitudes towards 
learning, these same books appropriate and idealize the educational practices being replaced by 
systematic, factory-style schooling as a way to soothe anxieties about the intrusion of educational 
institutions in what was formerly a private, family affair.69 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Of course, not all children are educated in the home by their parents, but the home setting was more common prior 
to the mass construction of schoolhouses in the early nineteenth century. Poor children learned their letters in dame 
schools, which were essentially kitchens where a mother did housework while teaching and babysitting children. 
Relocating infants from homes to schoolhouses is a major shift of the Romantic period, a trend in education that is 
similar to the professionalization and masculinization of other forms of work formerly performed by local women, 
such as the midwife. Nonetheless, education remained one avenue where women could assert public authority under 
the “natural” gender expectations. 
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  Through such appropriation, object learning conflates the developmental stages of young 
middle-class children, who are occupied with the physical world, with that of adult workers. 
Children and workers are orally-centered, illiterate, sensually engaged, incapable of abstract 
thought, and occupied by immediate pleasures over sustained discipline—“primitive” in their 
relationship to the material world, which they experience in terms of direct needs and uses rather 
than as figurative, general, or abstract. Pestalozzi credits one of his assistants, notably a local 
illiterate man named Kresi, with discovering the “elementary principles of intellectual action,” 
presumably because Kresi has the advantage of existing in a closer mental state to the orphan 
students. As paraphrased by Pestalozzi, Kresi explains his discovery: “I did with my children, as 
nature does with savages, first bringing an image before their eyes, and then seeking a word to 
express the perception to which it gives rise.”70 Objects first, then words. When The New Picture 
Book presents common objects from everyday life, it tells child viewers that they are like artisans 
and farmers; it begins with the child’s playful home world, then progresses to manual labor 
within its pages, much as Richard and Honora Edgeworth’s Practical Education (1780) follows 
Harry and Lucy from their home to the brick layers and Smithy and back home again, where they 
transform the hard work of artisans into backyard play. This conflation of work and play is 
laudable for children who are not required to work and who acquire a love of learning through 
pleasurable schooling, but it is potentially harmful for poor children whose tiring work was 
easily romanticized as some form of educational improvement. 
 
Overview of the project 
 Rather than focusing on a single genre, my chapters cover a wide range of popular 
literature associated with vulnerable audiences who were supposed to need guidance and self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Pestalozzi, Biographical Sketch, 192-3. 
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 improvement: children, young adults, women, and workers. Recent collections have grouped 
together many of the same authors and genres as this dissertation, and I am indebted to these 
works as models of cross-writer and cross-audience approaches:71 Philip Connell’s Romanticism, 
Economics and the Question of ‘Culture;’ Alan Rauch’s Useful Knowedge; Alan Richardson’s 
Literature, Education, and Romanticism; Ian Haywood’s The Revolution in Popular Literature; 
and Mary Hilton’s Women and the Education of the Nation’s Young. The didactic literatures 
examined in this study construct their audiences much the way that object learning understood 
children, as creatures close to the physical world who have difficulty with abstraction and self-
control.  
 By combining so many forms, I do not mean to imply that certain adult readers are child-
like or require protective guidance, but since authors like Hannah More, Sarah Trimmer, Maria 
Edgeworth, Jane Marcet, and Harriet Martineau specialized first in writing books for children 
and educational treatises and second in writing “safe” literature for the working classes, there is 
ample evidence that pedagogical strategies developed for middle-class children were 
universalized by the mid-nineteenth century and applied to educational programs and literatures 
for workers. Likewise, a century earlier, experiential education drew inspiration from the 
Encyclopedists’ project to unite practical artisan skills with abstract, mathematical knowledge. 
Over the course of two centuries, therefore, the project to popularize knowledge has conflated 
pedagogical strategies for a variety of so-called child-like or vulnerable audiences, which were 
collectively understood as mechanically-minded or unable to think and see beyond what is 
physically and temporally in front of them. However “child-centered,” any pedagogy of this kind 
has its limitations, which is why I include the voices of workers who were annoyed by object 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 I borrow my terminology from U. C. Knoepflmacher and Mitzi Myers, who argue—concerning “cross writers” or 
authors who write books for children, adults, and other audiences—that books may specify an audience of readers 
while being read by a wide variety of unintended readers. See Myers, “From the Editors,” vii. 
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 learning’s tendency to isolate knowledge from political and economic issues, and who wanted to 
take charge of their own educational institutions. 
 My second chapter defines the empiricist object lesson as the central genre of 
Enlightenment and Romantic-era children’s literature. By circumventing revered textual or 
parental authorities, object interactions promised that children might learn autodidactically, 
without reinforcing past errors or social hierarchies. I focus on object lessons in Maria 
Edgeworth’s Rosamond stories (1796-1821), placing her pedagogy in dialogue with Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and Anna Letitia Barbauld to uncover the politics of empiricist pedagogies in 
Britain’s post-revolutionary climate. Using archival research from Princeton’s Cotsen Children’s 
Library, I show that British children’s literature emphasized that objects are imbued with social 
meaning, so that children learn their place in society by discovering how objects, as property, 
signify properties of their owners—that we are what we grasp. 
 My third chapter explores the philosophical underpinnings of the turn towards the 
education of things. I argue that materialist social protest fiction by William Godwin and May 
Hays altered the instructional function of the novel. Situating their work within the Fielding/ 
Richardson debates over exemplary and cautionary characters, I use reception history to show 
that Hays’s The Memoirs of Emma Courtney (1796) and The Victim of Prejudice (1799) and 
Godwin’s Caleb Williams (1794) break with established generic conventions by instructing 
readers to understand characters in relation to the extensive social networks informing their 
behavior. Readers arrive at this new perspective through a novel whose characters make remote 
connections between points of moral crisis and early formative events, interpreting identity as the 
totality of a person’s experiences. Such fictions induct readers into a new way of comprehending 
moral agency, where humans and their physical environment are mutually formative. The 
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 materialist approach to education exhibited in fiction by Godwin and Hays ultimately informs 
radical approaches to education in the 1820s through 1840s, explored in chapter 6. 
 My fourth chapter surveys pedagogical treatises, teaching aids, Parliamentary debates, 
and polemical essays to track object learning in the nineteenth century, when educating the poor 
gained public attention. With the rise of consumer culture, sensual exposure to a variety of 
natural and artificial forms was supposed to develop mental organs such as judgment and 
imagination, and access to objects became a precondition for gaining recognition as a subject 
with a complex mental life. If the education of things is the foundation of moral sentiments and 
intellectual capacity, as suggested by Dugald Stewart, Elizabeth Hamilton, Robert Owen, and 
Pestalozzi, then the widening “object gap” threatens social cohesion between rich and poor—
between hyper-consumers who own collections and have leisure for contemplation and workers 
who are occupied with repetitive labor. Debates about educating the poor through object learning 
thus subsumed political positions on property and work. 
 Drawing on contemporary machinery displays, automata, and mechanics textbooks, my 
fifth chapter demonstrates how Edgeworth’s fiction participates in a larger cultural movement 
that associates machine technologies (pedagogical and industrial) with self-development and 
self-mastery as a function of human mastery over the “external” natural world, prefiguring the 
technological progressivism of 1820s and 1830s educators. Because of its abstract foundation in 
mathematics, mechanics bridges manual and intellectual labor. Instruction in “mechanical 
philosophy,” whether natural history or political economy, thus confers both the practical 
competence of artisans and manufacturers and a wider comprehension of the principles behind 
manipulating the world of things. Contextualizing Maria Edgeworth with writing for the working 
classes by Jane Marcet, Hannah More, Elizabeth Hamilton, and Harriet Martineau, I show how 
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 her Popular Tales (1804), her novel Belinda (1801), and her science tales Harry and Lucy (1801-
1821), use mechanism to mark racial and class inferiority, while owning, controlling, and 
modeling machines indicates social mobility and self-governance.  
 My sixth chapter follows oppositional voices that demanded access to a practical 
curriculum of hands-on learning but resisted linking intellectual development with property 
ownership. Debating education on working-class terms, radical periodicals called for labor 
regulations that would secure the leisure to learn and working-class management of institutions 
that disseminate knowledge, such as schools, libraries, and the free press. In Henry 
Hetherington’s Poor Man’s Guardian, so-called popular “education” (always in ironic 
quotations) deserves skepticism because elites use charity to control the curriculum. Similarly 
cynical, pamphlets published by William Hone adapted familiar classroom genres into political 
satire (eg. Wilke’s Catechism, Hone’s National Toy). 
Closing with the Great Exhibition of 1851 and industrial novels, my last chapter recovers little 
known books and games that educated children about political economy and the factory system 
to argue that education and machinery discourses become entwined through a mutual association 
with progress. Rather than dismiss these factual education materials as attacks on the child 
imagination, I show that children’s literature participated in the same concerns as social protest 
fiction of the same era. Factual books for children aimed to heal the two nations by raising a 
generation of educated consumers who know and care about how their goods are produced. 
Closing with nursery scenes from Michael Armstrong (1840) by Francis Trollope and Hard 
Times (1854) by Charles Dickens, I argue that changes in public sentiment supported decoupling 
work and play and accepting that educating the public requires regulating labor to create the 
leisure to learn. 
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CHAPTER 1: Figures
Figure 1: (top) J.E. ABCD...[Wooden jumping jack with 
inlaid ivory; hornbook]. 1810. Princeton University 
Library.
Figure 2: (bottom) [Posture master’s alphabet jigsaw 
puzzle.] [London?: Sayers and Bennett?] [ca 1800]. 
Princeton University Library.
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Figure 3: (top) Multiplication table. Neatly dissected. England, [ca 1820]. Princeton University Library.
Figure 4: (bottom) Common things necessary to be known. London: William Darton. [ca 1825]. Princeton University 
Library.
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Figure 5: Learning in sport! A newly invented game; to promote improvement and amuse a friendly party. London: 
William Darton [ca. 1822]. Princeton University Library.
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Figure 6: (top) The elegant and 
instructive game of useful knowledge; 
designed to impart information to the 
minds of youth of both sexes. London: 
William Darton. [ca 1819]. Princeton 
University Library.
(bottom) Detail of the same.
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Figure 7: Barbauld, Anna Letitia. Hieroglyphic Lessons from Mrs. Barbauld. London: John Wallis, [181–].  
Princeton University Library. [The box front on the bottom right may be a facsimile created at a later date.]
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Figure 8: Mudie, George. The Grammar of the English Language Truly Made Easy and Amusing; By the Invention 
of Three Hundred Moveable Parts of Speech. London. John Cleave. [not before 1840]. Princeton University Library.
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Figure 9: (both images) The alphabetical 
cabinet. London: Printed and sold by Marshall 
& Co., [1815?]. Princeton University Library.
The miniature book that accompanies 
the cabinet (bottom picture) comes with 
the alphabet cards, which is common for 
“cabinets.” The cabinet invites various uses 
depending on the child’s reading skill, ranging 
from conversing about the pictures (pre-
literate), to reading or catechizing with the 
book.
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Figure 10: Punch, Professor. The laughable game of what d’ye buy. London: J. Passmore, [ca 1860]. Princeton 
University Library.
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Figure 11: [Edgeworth, Richard Lovell, Honoria Edgeworth, and Thomas Day.] Practical education: or, The history 
of Harry and Lucy. Volume II. Lichfield: Printed by J. Jackson, and sold by J. Johnson, 1780. Princeton University 
Library.
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Figure 12: Bohny, Nicholas. The new picture book: being pictorial lessons on form, comparison and number, for 
children under seven years of age with explanations by Nicholas Bohny. Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1858.  
Princeton University Library.
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Figure 13: [Champion, Joseph (Senior), illustrator], The five senses [writing blank]. London. Robert Sayer, [between 
1752 and 1769?]. Princeton University Library.
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 CHAPTER 2 
“The education of things”: Liberty and Confinement in the Object Lessons of 
Maria Edgeworth and Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
 
Many children’s books of the late eighteenth century share the pedagogical approach of 
Practical Education (1780), explored in my opening chapter. As the book’s confessed 
investment in Priestley’s associationism indicates, books for children were in conversation with 
philosophical works of their time and offered commentary on human cognition through a 
medium with comparatively little cultural prestige. Following these cues, this chapter places 
Maria Edgeworth’s Rosamond stories in dialogue with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Emile; or, On 
Education (1762) to show two models of learning from objects that espouse different attitudes 
towards property and socialization. In doing so, this chapter uncovers the particularities of the 
late-eighteenth century educator’s approach to teaching with objects, especially how such 
pedagogies were understood in the context of Britain’s fraught political climate following the 
1789 French Revolution.  
 Object lessons were a key formal element of Romantic-era children’s literature and its 
response to “the new philosophy.”72 As Catherine Macaulay explains, this concept of education 
as sensation “supposes the human character to be the mere creature of external impressions.”73 
From an optimistic perspective, the notion that children are passive clay or blank slates, their 
desires shaped by their surroundings, suggests the potential to mold perfected subjects (or 
citizens) through environmental conditioning. If, however, the ideal subject is an autonomous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Alan Richardson notes that object lessons are the most recurrent structural element across Romantic children’s 
literature: “the fictionalized ‘object lesson,’ however theoretically inconsistent, came to shape the moral tales of 
many children’s authors of the period, including those who, like Trimmer and Sherwood, held Rousseau’s writing in 
anathema.” See Literature, Education, and Romanticism, 132. 
73 Macaulay, Letters on Education, 23. 
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 one, then the very means of educating children through external impressions challenges the 
concept of an essential self who originates its own desires, judgments, and actions. How exactly 
can external sensations produce the ingenious interiority of bourgeois individualism? By 
considering children experiential learners who lack a developed symbolic or abstract 
intelligence, the new philosophy insists that the mind be educated through the body and 
autonomy developed through mechanical exercises. The object lessons of Maria Edgeworth and 
Rousseau narrate a solution to this epistemological and ontological paradox by imagining a 
process of ingenuous internalization, one that develops the child’s “inside” even though it must 
rely on the external world. 
By beginning with Rousseau, I do not want to imply that Emile is more sophisticated that 
Edgeworth’s fiction, or than pairing children’s literature with canonical philosophy is necessary 
to justify taking it seriously. On the contrary, reading Edgeworth’s fiction alongside Rousseau 
calls attention to the larger stakes and sophistication of her object lessons, which detail how a 
child’s mundane interactions with objects reflect such political concepts as property ownership, 
desire, gender construction, moral autonomy, and constitutional reform. Any Enlightenment text 
on child development potentially rehearses a progressive narrative of human civilization 
emerging from the state of nature, as the child moves through the same stages from primitive 
sensual learning to abstract thought, associated with the transition from savage to civilized. 
Although more pronounced in Rousseau’s Emile, this tendency supplies an implicit political 
undercurrent to many pedagogical works, including Edgeworth’s children’s literature.74  
Rousseau was attracted to object learning as a way to circumvent education’s immersion 
in the authority structures of social life, which would preserve children from the destructive taint 
of institutions and mimetic desires. Unlike his predecessor, John Locke, who advocates shame 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Shapin and Barnes, “Head and Hand.”  
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 and praise in place of physical punishment, Rousseau considers psychological or corporeal 
incentives equally dangerous. Either method teaches children to act according to the judgment of 
others and, when adults, they are unaccustomed to reasoning for themselves. Rousseau’s 
solution, what he calls “the education of things,” places Emile in a world of objects devoid of 
social context, which the child explores only in relation to his physical needs. Rather than 
commanding Emile, Rousseau indirectly instructs his pupil, shaping his desires through the 
orchestration of his environment. 
The benefit, for Rousseau, of learning from things is that they are not people. But for 
Edgeworth, interiority is the product of socialization, and exploring objects with all their 
baggage of class, gender, and commerce, is how creatures of sensation transition into moral 
agents. Rosamond gains self-awareness by attending to the significance other people assign to 
those objects she chooses to acquire, which she learns reflect on her identity in ways she can 
anticipate but not control. In the worlds of commodity signification and experimental education, 
we are what we grasp.  
By socializing Rousseau’s education of things, Edgeworth alters its significance. Instead 
of demonstrating how education can create a perfect generation that breaks with its cultural 
history and inherited assumptions, Edgeworth’s object lessons illustrate how children inevitably 
learn the social meaning of the choices they make and the objects with which they associate. 
Rather than total freedom, children can learn to control their actions under set constraints, since 
generational change implies participating in communities, and participation is the means for 
altering the possible interpretations under which they operate.  
 
Objects and authority in the critical reception of the Rosamond Stories 
59
 In a series of short stories that begin with “The Purple Jar” and “The Birthday Present” in 
The Parent’s Assistant (1796), Edgeworth follows the educational development of Rosamond, an 
impatient heroine whose “little faults” include losing her needles, wildly riding her horse to show 
off her courage, and making excuses for everything. Rosamond’s debut story, “The Purple Jar,” 
(1796) is widely anthologized in children’s literature collections and commences Perry 
Nodelman’s genre study of children’s literature. It has long been the center of contentious 
discussions about the aesthetic value of didactic fiction and the construction of bourgeois identity 
through children’s literature. How the Rosamond stories are organized within the series 
emphasizes the importance of object lessons for teaching Rosamond how to “think for 
yourself.”75 Beginning with “The Purple Jar” and its sequel “The Two Plums,” Rosamond’s 
mother gives her a choice between two objects available for her scrutiny, training her to develop 
her senses and use them for rational judgment.76 Rosamond’s first choice to purchase a pretty 
purple jar she fancies instead of the new shoes she needs is punished with sore feet for the rest of 
the month. In “Socializing Rosamond: Educational Ideology and Fictional Form,” Mitzi Myers 
praises Rosamond’s “rational mother,” a strong figure that often dominates women’s children’s 
literature, and finds in “Rosamond’s progress from confused passivity to rational agency” a 
dynamic alternative that combats the adult nostalgia behind Rousseau or Wordsworth’s 
stagnantly innocent child. The story’s insistence that a seven-year-old girl suffer weeks of sore 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Edgeworth, “Purple Jar,” 1-2. 
76 “The Purple Jar” was published in Maria Edgeworth’s first collection of children’s literature, The Parent’s 
Assistant (1796), and republished as a series of Rosamond tales in Early Lessons (1801) that included “The Two 
Plums” and “The Rabbit,” among other additions. Two more sequels follow Rosamond into her teens: Continuation 
of Early Lessons (1814) and Rosamond: A Sequel (1821), containing “The Bracelet of Memory,” which I also 
discuss. Because these tales were frequently reprinted, many of the older editions available in libraries today 
combine stories from these four major collections under one of the earlier titles, which can be misleading. For 
instance, the “New Edition” of Early Lessons (London: Routledge, Warne, & Routledge, 1862) that I cite includes, 
under the title Rosamond, all of the stories from Early Lessons and Continuation of Early Lessons. Edgeworth’s 
publisher for all of these children’s books was Joseph Johnson (and his successor), known for publishing the work of 
1790s radicals and dissenters, including Mary Wollstonecraft. 
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 feet for choosing a frivolous purchase, showcases “a liberal psychology of child management 
directed toward rendering children autonomous and making the only penalty for error the 
experience of its natural consequences.”77 Responding to Myers’s work on Maria Edgeworth and 
Mary Wollstonecraft, scholars have subsequently reevaluated the previous dismissal of Georgian 
children’s literature as simplistic ideological programming. Building upon this revision of 
Edgeworth’s work, my argument contributes to our understanding of why the short stories 
composing Rosamond, like much contemporary didactic children’s fiction, exhibit a complex 
engagement with experiential learning by repeatedly structuring plots around a child’s object 
lessons. In doing so, these stories displace social relationships onto the world of things in order 
to depict moral knowledge as objectively generated, without relying on authorities like parents or 
revered texts for its verification. This displacement resolves anxieties over how to the 
transmission of cultural values to the next generation might be consistent with fostering 
independent thought. 
 In her review of the Rosamond stories from Early Lessons for The Guardian of 
Education, Sarah Trimmer expresses the most reservations about “The Purple Jar.” A staunch 
church and king supporter, Trimmer founded the Guardian to expose what she believed was an 
“illuminati” plot to overthrow the English government through works on education and 
children’s literature. What she dislikes is Rosamond’s reliance on her own observations instead 
of her mother’s advice. She recognizes that the story is “apparently founded upon this principle 
in the author’s System of Practical Education” and objects that if Rosamond had been taught 
Christian principles, then she would not “have been subject to such a variety of sensations, as 
evidently confused her mind, when left to form for herself . . . having acquired beforehand the 
habit of seeking the advice of her parents, and of submitting to it as a guide for her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Myers, “Socializing Rosamond,” 55. 
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 inexperience.” Her advice for parents is that they use “The Purple Jar” to teach children that 
appearances are deceptive, and children are not to “depend too confidently on their own opinion, 
when they may avail themselves of the advice of their parents or other experienced persons.” Of 
course, “The Purple Jar” teaches precisely the opposite of both these morals, but Trimmer 
remains confident that “a mother or governess may easily give it this turn, by her own 
observations upon it.”78 Her suggestion that parents change the moral, presumably blocking their 
children from deriving their own interpretation, accords with Trimmer’s criticism of Mother for 
letting Rosamond make her own choices and mistakes. 
Trimmer is quick to identify how knowledge circulates in the story outside of familial 
authority structures instead of directly from mother to child, and she connects this omission with 
Edgeworth’s secular approach. Matthew Grenby notes in his introduction to the edited collection 
of the Guardian, that Trimmer’s “initial questions of any children’s book that came before her 
were always first, was it damaging to religion and second, was it damaging to political loyalty 
and the established social hierarchy.”79 What Trimmer finds suspect about “The Purple Jar”—
Rosamond’s ability to generate knowledge without rehearsing submission to Mother—is 
structurally embedded in object lesson narratives. It derives from the connection between 
experimental education and Enlightenment science. Object lessons use Bacon’s inductive 
method, which advocates observation without preconceived hypotheses, to derive moral and 
scientific knowledge from practical experience. The lessons that follow an object narrative seem 
to be the natural consequence of physical laws; there is no need to appeal to a teacher, tradition, 
or text for their veracity. Although subjectively interpreted by the child, such lessons appear 
universal by appealing to the object, rather than the student or tutor, as the source of information. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Trimmer, Guardian of Education, 2: 235-37. 
79 Trimmer, Guardian of Education, 1:xviii. 
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 Using this method to teach the next generation promises a progressive correction of human 
knowledge by learning without transmitting past prejudices. It is clear, then, why Trimmer does 
not like the moral of “The Purple Jar.” The universal accessibility of knowledge through the 
senses; the perfectibility of mankind; the possibility of teaching without practicing submission—
these advantages of object lessons are associated with radical republicanism. At the very least, 
they gesture to politically sensitive questions: whether a revolutionary generation can radically 
break from its past through education; whether subordinates such as women, children, or the 
poor should consider matters for themselves without appealing to persons in authority; or, from a 
conservative perspective, whether the subjective ideas some people call prejudice (love of one’s 
country, religion), are among the most important things to teach.  
 
 
Rousseau and the “education of things” 
 One of the biggest culprits, for Trimmer, of rebellious, anti-authority approaches to 
instruction was Rousseau, and she was not entirely off the mark. Rousseau’s Emile provides one 
of the most complex theories for how children learn from objects, clarifying how the experiential 
lessons of the later eighteenth century depart from mere cautionary tales. Imitations and parodies 
of Emile’s object lessons permeate British literature, testifying to Rousseau’s influence on the 
motif through his pedagogical novel Emile. A self-consciously contradictory amalgamation of 
practical childcare manual, thought experiment, and abstract pedagogical theory, it details the 
education of Emile by his fictional tutor and author-double, Jean-Jacques, from infancy through 
his courtship and marriage to Sophie, concluding with the expectation of their first child. I begin 
with Emile because it places object learning at the center of Rousseau’s concept of freedom. This 
discussion is refracted through in the pamphlet wars and Jacobin novels of 1790s Britain, where 
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 the question of how environments are responsible for constructing subjects intensified the 
political controversies informing pedagogy and children’s literature. In the wake of the Reign of 
Terror, the treason trials, and the British censorship laws of 1795, anti-Jacobins identified 
Rousseau as the chief source for both the political theory of British contractarians and the new 
pedagogies of radical educators. I develop this relationship between object learning and freedom 
at length in order to highlight the corresponding political significance of Edgeworth’s object 
lessons and her different approach to developing child autonomy. 
The importance of object learning to Rousseau first arises where he divides education 
into three categories: “The internal development of our faculties and our organs is the education 
of nature. The use that we are taught to make of this development is the education of men. And 
what we acquire from our own experience about the objects which affect us is the education of 
things.”80 These three categories, men, nature, and things, are less arbitrary when viewed in the 
context of his political philosophy, The Social Contract, written and published 
contemporaneously with Emile in 1762. The educational trajectory of Emile correlates with the 
history of human kind outlined in Rousseau’s political writings, the social contract aligning with 
puberty, when Emile gains the ability to use reason and is drawn into social life to fulfill his 
sexual needs. Before he is able to reason, Emile is free as the natural man is free, subject only to 
the limitations of his body and the material world, and learning exclusively through sensual 
experience—through objects. Emile’s interactions with objects are meticulously planned to form 
him into the kind of subject, with limited desires, who can rationally and freely submit to the 
general will because it aligns with his particular will. Consistent with perfect liberty, a citizen so 
educated is never asked to relinquish anything he wants or any power over himself as the price of 
political life. Whereas Hobbes imagines the state as a fearsome authority that prevents subjects 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Rousseau, Emile, 38, hereafter cited in text. 
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 from realizing their naturally limitless desires, which always exceed their needs and infringe on 
the needs of others, Rousseau imagines a society without hierarchical authority, made possible 
by subjects whose desires, firmly established in isolation, never exceed their needs or impinge on 
the needs of others. Only a person whose desires perfectly match what he can procure, who has 
no need for exchange or division of labor but chooses to engage in it, can participate in a society 
with others and remain as perfectly free as he would be in isolation: “The only one who does his 
own will is he who, in order to do it, has no need to put another’s arms at the end of his own; 
from which it follows that the first of all goods is not authority but freedom. The truly free man 
wants only what he can do and does what he pleases . . . . all the rules of education flow from 
[this maxim]” (Emile, 84).81 
Emile’s object learning thus always anticipates a social meaning apparent to the reader 
but kept hidden from Emile. Learning progresses outward from his body, beginning with what he 
can grasp sensually by taste or feel and eventually extending out to concepts, or what he can see 
at a distance, and finally to abstract or metaphysical ideas beyond sensation—coordinating with 
the development of his self-centered love in the state of nature (or amour-de-soi) into the love of 
others in relation to himself under the social contract (or amour-propre). When Emile gains a 
conscious awareness of the metaphysical concept of himself as an agent, free to follow or deny 
the physical impulses that shape his childhood, he becomes autonomous, capable of self-aware 
self-governance.82  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Catherine Macaulay recognized the centrality of this passage to Emile, which she paraphrases in her chapter on 
“Habits of Independence” in Letters on Education: “surely he alone is free, who stands in no need of the assistance 
of others to put his design in execution. Hence, says Rousseau, it follows, that the greatest of blessings is not 
authority, but liberty . . . his system of education is founded on independence; and all its parts are rendered 
conducive to this end” (42). She uses this passage in much the same way, to show that wealthy people surrounded 
by servants are the most dependent, and suggests both curbing those desires we cannot satisfy and freeing children 
from unnecessary restraints. 
82 Since my essay tends to focus on an empiricist Rousseau, James Miller’s description of Rousseau’s metaphysical 
concept of freedom is a helpful corrective: “Unlike Hobbes and other materialists, Rousseau took freedom to be not 
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 Because Rousseau holds a metaphysical concept of freedom such that only other human 
wills could restrict Emile’s freedom, he emphasizes materialist education as a way to indirectly 
form Emile without submission to his tutor.83 Rather than command Emile to obey, Jean-Jacques 
changes his environment until Emile voluntarily does as he wishes. “You will not be the child’s 
master,” advises Rousseau, “if you are not the master of all that surrounds him” (Emile, 95).84 
Jean-Jacques substitutes things, which act as necessities that cannot be questioned, for 
commands that would introduce hierarchy between tutor and pupil. By controlling Emile 
indirectly through his environment, Jean-Jacques prevents the satisfaction of Emile’s needs from 
ever becoming a contest of wills. “As long as children find resistance only in things and never in 
wills, they will become neither rebellious nor irascible” (66), and, “Let him see this necessity in 
things, never in the caprice of men.” (89). Supporting this advice is the logic of object lessons, 
which teach through consequences: “Never present to his undiscriminating will anything but 
physical obstacles or punishments which stem from the actions themselves and which he will 
recall on the proper occasion” (86). Object interaction, sequestered from the “education of men,” 
is the linchpin in Rousseau’s theory of freedom, ensuring that young Emile never submits to 
authority (others), only to necessity (himself). If the education of men interrupts the education of 
things, then power struggles are introduced that disrupt Emile’s delicate preparation.85 
Proper object learning that preserves a child’s freedom must begin at birth. The first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a mere word for unimpeded action, but rather a mysterious power, revolving around an inexplicable spontaneity, the 
miraculous ability to initiate an act without a cause. . . . The choices a human being freely makes over time take the 
form of habits.” But “Freedom, in short, gives human beings, whether in isolation or in concert, the capacity to start 
over, to form new habits, even to establish spontaneously a new constitution of the soul or of society” (“‘Abyss of 
Philosophy’,” 96). 
83 “Nature commands every animal, and the beast obeys. Man feels the same impetus, but he realizes that he is free 
to acquiesce or to resist; and it is above all in the consciousness of this freedom that the spirituality of his soul is 
shown,” Rousseau, Origin of Inequality, 26. 
84 The paradox of internal freedom, enabled by mastering external environment, is shared by the Priestley circle’s 
adaptation of David Hartley. 
85 For a similar discussion of Rousseau education of things, which supports my reading, see Simon, “Natural 
Freedom and Moral Autonomy.” Simon argues that relations between things fail to teach Emile social relations, 
leaving him morally dependent on his tutor as an adult. 
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 object a child encounters is swaddling, which by the time Rousseau wrote Emile was already 
symbolic of personal liberty.86 Samuel Richardson’s heroine, Pamela, praises Locke’s call for 
loose clothing and sympathizes with the swaddled babies who resemble her late imprisonment 
under Mr. B.: “poor babies rolled and swathed . . . triple-crowned like a young pope . . . a 
miserable little pinioned captive, goggling and staring with it’s eyes, the only organs it has at 
liberty, as if it was supplicating for freedom to it’s fettered limbs!”87 From the very moment of 
an infant’s birth, the evils of swaddling “chains” show that our social customs violently interrupt 
nature’s intention—free movement—indicated clearly enough by the baby’s release from the 
womb. Swaddling introduces a power struggle, much like Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, 
between the parent who makes the child remain still according to custom’s constructed womb 
and the child who tries to move.88 As with any tyrannical government, nature gives way to 
constraint by force, but the child recognizes the injustice. He becomes angry, rebellious; he 
wants to be the one to make the rules. A battle for authority ensues: “Either we submit to his 
whims, or we submit him to ours. . . Thus his first ideas are those of domination and servitude” 
(48). Leaving the child’s limbs free allows him to conclude that his own physical weakness, not 
outside authority, makes him dependent on others to meet his needs. This child will long to 
become an autonomous adult who desires only what he can provide for himself. By contrast, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Ezell, “John Locke’s Images of Childhood,” 153. 
87 Richardson, Pamela, 528. 
88 In Hegel’s fight to the death, initiated by two selves seeking consciousness through recognition, the master defeats 
the slave but does not gain recognition because in his victory he declares that the slave is nothing. The slave, 
however, who has accepted his own nothingness through fear, can acquire a sense of consciousness through working 
on objects whose independence only he recognizes and internalizes. What Rousseau shares with Hegel’s concept of 
consciousness is a sense that victory over others unites omnipotence with dependence. The master, who is also 
nothing, constantly seeks further recognition for himself from all people and things only to confirm his impotence, 
whereas the slave (Rousseau’s natural man) who interacts with objects achieves true independence. That Rousseau 
thinks a child can develop consciousness by avoiding rather than overcoming a master-slave dialectic says a lot 
about why Emile’s sensual learning initially occurs in isolation. Rousseau’s object lessons enact a fantasy of 
unmediated learning between child and thing, where each object encounter proceeds on the same terms as the first 
one that initiated a self/other division, essentially preventing history (or, on the individual level, prior experience) 
from impeding a completely free series of object encounters over a person’s lifetime—exactly the opposite of 
Hegel’s embrace of history. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 633-35. 
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 arbitrary restraint teaches the child that his needs are best met by manipulating or conquering his 
captor, and as an adult, this “slave and tyrant” will rage against others and demand their 
submission or use flattery in obsequious servitude. Such children confuse people with things: 
They attribute will to inanimate objects and objectify people; they throw tantrums when the 
physical world refuses to submit to their desires and “consider the people who surround them as 
instruments depending on them to be set in motion,” because they interpret all of the world as a 
challenging will they must bring into submission. When they are defeated, they become 
subservient cowards, convinced that if they are not omnipotent, they must be powerless.  
The struggle for mastery potentially initiated by object encounters symbolizes a historical 
moment from Rousseau’s The Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men 
(1754), the institutionalization of unequal wealth. When people become enslaved to their 
desires—which are enflamed beyond their needs by the increased production and status 
comparison that accompany cooperative communal life—the strong prey on the weak, and out of 
fear, all enter into a precipitous contract that secures unequal property under a pretense of legal 
equality. Interacting with the material world without attributing will to objects secures Emile 
from this detour until he can enter the alternative social contract Rousseau advocates, where each 
member voluntarily gives to every other member all of his freedom, and in chain letter fashion, 
achieves greater freedom in return. The social contract only exists as a constantly renewed, 
voluntary participation that celebrates continued autonomy. As adults, citizens make conscious 
choices that reaffirm the general will, and in doing so, express their autonomy (synonymous with 
self-mastery) by obeying the laws each person legislates for himself and everyone else through 
direct democratic governance. The renewed affirmation of self-governance through obedience, 
possible for adult male citizens, has its childhood corollary in the affirmation of an essential self-
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 hood through object encounters.89 Proper object interaction, like the social contract, is an 
expression of freedom through submission to law. Rousseau explains this relationship between 
natural and social law, objects and men: 
There are two sorts of dependence: dependence on things, which is from nature; 
dependence on men, which is from society. Dependence on things, since it has no 
morality, is in no way detrimental to freedom and engenders no vices. Dependence on 
men, since it is without order, engenders all the vices, and by it, master and slave are 
mutually corrupted. [Each becomes dependent on the other.] If there is any means of 
remedying this ill in society, it is to substitute law for man and to arm the general wills 
with a real strength superior to the action of every particular will. If the laws of nations 
could, like those of nature, have an inflexibility that no human force could ever conquer, 
dependence on men would then become dependence on things again; in the republic all of 
the advantages of the natural state would be united with those of the civil state, and 
freedom which keeps man exempt from vices would be joined to morality which raises 
him to virtue. (85) 
The law capable of leaving citizens free would be as constant and inflexible as gravity, and 
rebellion would be useless and unnecessary. In this new Garden of Eden, where eating the fruit is 
both impossible and undesirable, “society” is subordinate to “nature.” Its pedagogical foundation 
is a parallel subordination of “men” to “things.” 
Perhaps the strongest confirmation of how object interaction determines political 
subjecthood is the education of Sophie, or woman, in Book V of Emile. Made “to please and to 
be subjugated” (358) and dependent on her husband for her needs, Sophie’s object interactions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 In chapter 1, I examine this affirmation through object encounters in Rousseau’s play, Pygmalion, which 
resembles Buffon’s story of Adam and Eve. 
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 introduce her to mastery and subjection by initiating those same power struggles Emile must 
avoid. As Emile’s inferior in strength, Sophie cultivates qualities of the slave/tyrant power 
complex that bar her from civic life—flattery, deception, guile, showy display, loquaciousness—
so that she “governs” Emile “while obeying him” by “exploiting man’s position.” Mary 
Wollstonecraft, who complimented Rousseau by reading him carefully, noticed that Sophie’s 
hierarchy retains in domestic life the relationship between King and subject rejected by 
contractarians for one of equal citizenship, mutual obligation, and self-legislation—thus her 
association of Rousseau’s “feminine” virtues with the aristocracy and “masculine” virtues with 
republicanism.90 For Rousseau, female subjection is necessary for male freedom because 
unlimited desire—what Hobbes used to justify the Leviathan—exists between men and women 
in the state of nature. And unlike the unnatural expansion of desire for unnecessary goods that 
precipitates the institutionalization of unequal wealth, sexual desire cannot be eliminated through 
education; it must be controlled through subjugation in a cordoned domestic arena if men are to 
remain free in civic life. Without modesty and shame, the female substitute for male reason and 
self-control, “men would be tyrannized by women” (359). Sophie is the most dangerous “object” 
for Emile because she is an inherently socialized object (i.e. an oppressed subject) that inflames 
his desire, but she prevents a power struggle between Emile and herself by her precautionary 
meekness. Metaphorically swaddled from infancy, Sophie indeed projects her will into objects, 
most infamously her doll, and manipulates others into satisfying her needs, just as Rousseau 
predicts men would do if their object lessons were given a social context. 
 In a purposeful defiance of those precautions that secure Emile’s autonomy, Sophie’s 
education of things is subordinated to the education of men. She grows up embedded in social 
life (we first meet her with her family), considering first and foremost not how things relate to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Johnson, English Jacobin Novel, 12-24. 
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 her, but how her encounters with objects are observed and interpreted by others. Rousseau 
repeatedly dramatizes this oppositional awareness of audience between boys, who “care little 
what might be thought of them,” and girls, who are “governed” by their fear of what others will 
say (365). For women, virtue includes the appearance of virtue: 
It is not enough that [women] be estimable; they must be esteemed. It is not enough for 
them to be pretty; they must please. It is not enough for them to be temperate; they must 
be recognized as such. Their honor is not only in their conduct but in their reputation . . . 
when a man acts well, he depends only on himself and can brave public judgment; but 
when a woman acts well, she has accomplished only half of her task, and what is thought 
of her is no less important to her than what she actually is. From this it follows that the 
system of woman’s education ought to be contrary in this respect to the system of our 
education. Opinion is the grave of virtue among men and its throne among women. (365) 
Empirical access to knowledge through physically engaging a world of objects is mediated, for 
Sophie, by her social relationships. This single rule unites seemingly disparate details of her 
education. Because she only approaches power or knowledge through others, she willingly gives 
her consent for her husband to mediate her access to religious truth, legislative power, and 
property. The link between her subjection to men and her mediated empiricism is confirmed by 
the many occasions when Rousseau contrasts Emile’s knowledge with Sophie’s aesthetic 
awareness: “Man says what he knows; woman says what pleases. He needs knowledge to speak; 
she needs taste” (376). 
 Audience in object lessons, which signifies social context (or the education of men), is 
emphasized for Sophie and eliminated or controlled for Emile. Whereas Sophie naturally feels 
shame while still a child, as if she is always watched, Emile maintains his moral innocence by 
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 feeling unobserved: “it is important for a child to do nothing because he is seen or heard—
nothing, in a word, in relation to others; he must respond only to what nature asks of him, and 
then he will do nothing but good” (93). If a boy is overheard by an adult who imitates or mocks 
him, Rousseau advises confronting the “actress” (she is female) with “My good woman, you are 
sick. I am sorry of it.” And before she can react, whisk the child away “before he can see the 
effect,” or, “distract him with other objects which make him forget it right away” (97). The way 
audience is handled in Rousseau’s object lessons indicates to what extent empirical learning 
yields autonomy. 
 Since as an adult Emile must live in society, Rousseau devotes one of his longest and 
most elaborate object lessons to Emile’s safe introduction to the world of audience. During the 
puberty stage between ages twelve and fifteen, when reason, sexual needs, and amour-propre are 
just emerging, Emile is newly vulnerable to seeking praise from others. His tutor protectively 
frames a lesson about audience within an empiricist object lesson about discovering how to build 
a compass, thereby containing the education of men with things. After playing some time with 
magnets, metals, and other materials that attract with charged particles, the two attend a fair 
where a performing magician attracts a floating wax duck with bread in his hand. They recreate 
the trick at home by shaping a wax duck around a needle, floating it in a tub of water, and 
attracting the duck with a magnet hidden in a piece of bread. The next day Emile attends the 
same show armed with his bread and magnet, where he embarrasses the magician by replicating 
his trick to the delight of all onlookers. Seduced by praise, Emile accepts the magician’s 
invitation to come again the next day and invites his friends, wanting “the whole of humankind 
to be witness to his glory” (173). But the magician uses Emile’s desire for approval as bate for 
his trap: he hides a boy with a stronger magnet beneath the tub. This time the audience jeers and 
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 laughs when Emile fails, and they mock him by enthusiastically applauding the magician’s 
success. Cured of any notion that praise from others relates to his own merit, Emile realizes that 
the crowd praises or insults him to maximize their own pleasure. 
To complete the lesson, the magician visits them the next morning and lectures them on 
their cruel attempt to ruin him, protesting, “if I had some other talent by which to live, I would 
hardly glorify myself with this one” (174). Emile observes, in the magician, a man caught in the 
master/slave complex, who commands the attention and applause of everyone, who seems to 
command nature itself, but who nonetheless is a slave to his audience’s pleasure because he 
cannot otherwise provide for his needs. During the Book III years of Emile’s life, Emile holds 
the greatest relative bodily strength as a ratio of his as-yet childish desires (i.e. his greatest self-
determinism), which is why the magician’s attractive ability to command audiences and 
manipulate magnetic forces, a kind of super-autonomy, must be neutralized by revealing the 
connection between mastery and servitude. 
At the story’s close, Emile discovers the floating duck and needle always point north.  
Emile’s social debut is contained within an object lesson about building your own navigation 
instrument, a symbol of self-guidance. Like his compass, Emile’s social self is layered in 
conformity to his natural self. He is pliable wax under his tutor’s hand, formed around a needle-
center that now responds to natural laws, not magic tricks. Rousseau explains that children 
should always discover and make their own scientific instruments, literally, but also figuratively: 
“To arm him with some vain instruments which he will perhaps never use, you take away from 
him man’s most universal instrument, which is good sense. You accustom him to let himself 
always be led, never to be anything but a machine in others’ hands. . . . With all these fine 
speeches that you make to him now in order to get him to be obedient, you are preparing the 
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 success of those speeches which will be made to him one day by a visionary, an alchemist, a 
charlatan, a cheat, or any kind of madman” (178). Emile is his compass, but potentially could 
have been the magician’s entertainment apparatus—these are the same instrument, used for 
different purposes. By constructing his compass, Emile prepares himself to follow only the 
gravitational pull of physical objects while he watches the magician shows of other people in the 
world at large. Placed in Book III, just prior to Emile’s social awakening, the controlled audience 
provides a warning that prepares Emile for his adult life, when his needs become entwined with 
those of others, and virtue becomes possible with the constant presence of an unstaged audience. 
The innovation of an audience for Emile’s object encounter in the compass narrative is so 
obviously foregrounded that the relationship between audience and moral autonomy becomes its 
subtext. 
 Any straight-forward reading of the compass object lesson is challenged, however, by the 
obvious comparison between the abject magician—who must deceive others, hide his 
knowledge, and lecture in public in order to earn a living—and his master magician doubles, 
Jean-Jacques the tutor and Rousseau the author. Rousseau clarifies in a footnote that Jean-
Jacques must have orchestrated the entire experience, arranging everything ahead of time with 
the magician, Emile’s friends, and the townspeople in the audience. He is the ever-present tutor 
who masterfully controls his passive student, yet he claims invisibility for the sake of validating 
the objectivity of Emile’s lessons. Caught in his own master/slave relationship to his reader 
audience, Rousseau the author is likewise both a virtuoso intellectual performer who vainly 
inserts himself as a character in his own texts and a transparent medium for communicating 
empirically grounded observations about education.  
 On one level, then, the gender-specific handling of audience in Rousseau’s object lessons 
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 habituates Sophie to constraint while it enables Emile’s autonomy. Yet the doubling of Jean-
Jacques as both master magician and self-effacing guide for Emile’s explorations, gives credence 
to critics, from Edmund Burke and William Godwin to J. L. Talmon and Hannah Arendt, who 
question whether absolute submission to civil law as a sign of self-governance is actually 
consistent with moral autonomy.91 Isolating Emile from other human influences (i.e. eliminating 
audience) might be unsympathetically interpreted as securing Jean-Jacques’s power over Emile. 
In the state of nature, Emile is free to do as he chooses, but the desires that guide his choices are 
determined by his tutor’s micromanaged environment, a problem the text advertises as an 
advantage: “There is no subjection so perfect as that which keeps the appearance of freedom. 
Thus the will itself is made captive. The poor child . . . is he not at your mercy? Do you not 
dispose, with respect to him, of everything which surrounds him? . . . Doubtless he ought to do 
only what he wants; but he ought to want only what you want him to do” (120). Like the wax 
duck, Emile’s own status as a material body allows his tutor to shape him into his instrument, to 
control even his will. This passive child is borrowed straight from Condillac and other 
materialists, whose signature of influence on Emile appears as the automaton or moving statue 
metaphor, used to describe man’s sensual development from “a perfect imbecile, an automaton, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Critics object that under Rousseau’s social contract, if a citizen should disagree with the general will—understood 
as higher, truer expression of himself than his particular will—he must be forced to submit to it, which only 
increases his freedom. The forcer d’être libre provision of the social contract is supposed to explain how a person’s 
subjection to civil law furthers, rather than restricts, his natural freedom. But critics see the provision as a stepping 
stone to an abusive totalitarian democracy, where the government claims to know better than its citizens how to 
make them free, and there is no provision for dissent—indeed, free dissent is an oxymoron. Any persistent objection 
that the state is corrupt or mistaken would indicate these people are no longer citizens, but enemies of the state. (See 
J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, 38-50). Rousseau was likewise targeted in Isaiah Berlin’s 
influential essay “Two Concepts of Liberty” for suggesting that freedom requires both self-government and 
rationality, such that forces outside the self (other people, or the state), might step in and “second guess” a person’s 
true desires, justifying coercion by claiming superior awareness of that person’s best interests. The consequences of 
second guessing are certainly troubling in Emile. Since women are incapable of self-government, and children are 
incapable of reason, their interests would always be represented indirectly, by adult male citizens. For a discussion 
of Berlin’s objections and a feminist perspective on freedom in Emile, see Hirschmann, Subject of Liberty, 4-39. For 
a refutation of the authoritarian implications of Rousseau and an alternate reading of the forcer d’être libre 
provision, see Evans, “Freedom in Modern Society,” 245-46. 
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 an immovable and almost insensible statue” in some of the text’s thought experiments.92 The 
child as passive object, subject to his tutor’s experiments, is connected with the very thing that is 
supposed to give him freedom, his isolation. No place seems circumscribed enough to satisfy 
Rousseau: “But where will we put this child to raise him like a being without sensation, like an 
automaton? Will we keep him in the moon’s orb or on a desert island? Will we keep him away 
from all human beings?” (94) Yes, we will. In an already socialized world, the environments 
suggested by Rousseau must be contained and controlled—that is, artificial. Even William 
Godwin, with his optimistic assessment of a teacher’s ability to form his student’s desires, rejects 
Rousseau’s isolationist methods. “The preceptor cannot go out of the world . . . . Attempts of this 
kind are generally unhappy, stamped with the impression of artifice, intolerance, and 
usurpation.”93 
 The philosophical novels of the late eighteenth century that borrow from Emile reflect the 
tenuousness of Emile’s freedom when they describe enclosed and isolated education spaces as 
quasi-dictatorial worlds, vacillating between utopia and dystopia. As an alternative, Maria 
Edgeworth fuses the socialized life of Sophie with Emile’s object lessons to form a different 
model for the development of moral autonomy. 
 
Object-ing to Rousseau: Freedom and Enclosure in the British response 
 The influence of Emile is traceable among popular British fiction in the surge of 
stunningly bizarre education experiment novels translated from French during the 1760s, 70s, 
and 80s, many of them with a Rousseavian flair. Only one year after the publication of Emile and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 A full discussion of the relationship between sensation and discovering the existence of a free, essential self 
comes from the Savoyard Vicar section, explained by Noble, Language, Subjectivity, and Freedom, 133-70. By 
machine or automaton, Rousseau means the child’s body, distinct from functions of the soul, for instance, “accustom 
the operations of the machine and those of judgement always to work harmoniously,” Emile, 141. 
93 Godwin, Political Justice, 50. 
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 Origins of Inequality, Gaspard Guillard de Beaurieu wrote L’Eleve de la nature (1763), 
translated as The Man of Nature by James Burne (1773). The protagonist’s father and mother 
(named Sophia Rousseau) agree upon their marriage to devote every child after the first six to 
“the hands of Nature, to be the subject of an experiment which may become useful.” In an 
unremarked instance of emotional distance, these parents raise this youngest son in a wooden 
cage set in a pit, equipped with a fly, unchanged straw, and a stone, while food, water, and heat 
appear during his sleep. His education truly begins at age fifteen when he is transported to an 
island, where he eventually finds a tutor in a Prospero-type philosopher and a wife in his 
daughter. After a brief tour of Europe, where he witnesses the evils of society and observes 
several innovative education projects, he returns to the island with a group of the virtuous, where 
he founds a new republic based on Rousseauvian pedagogy. A review of the novel from The 
Scots Magazine surprisingly praises the book for its morality, in combating “the bad effects of 
fashionable customs,” which makes up for the fact that “its primary idea” is not “absolutely 
new.” Nor would it be the last.94 Banned for its immoral tendency, the erotic novel Imirce; ou, la 
fille de la nature (1765, translated 1787) is narrated by a girl who is educated together with a boy 
in a dark cellar. In the most rudimentary of object lessons, the voyeuristic philosopher-master 
they mistake for a God-like provider periodically lowers single objects (a rose, a mirror, a parrot) 
to observe the effect on their developing faculties. Through sense exploration Imirce equates sex 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Man of Nature citation. This English version has considerable alterations and additions to the French. Although 
the caged childhood experiment in Man of Nature greatly restricts its pupil’s movements and explorations, the result 
of the experiment is a summary of Emile’s basic principles: “the most perfect education, is not that which gives 
[children] those virtues and talents which excite admiration, but that which prevents their acquiring the vices of 
society, that brings them nearest to Nature, and trusts them in her hands” (vol. 2, 120). The caged man motif is 
merely a convenient devise that enables a first-person narration of Aristes’s early sensations on the island, which 
would ordinarily be experienced prior to memory or language. Dozens of pages near the completion of the tale are 
devoted to describing the educational methods of two idealized families in Europe, which combined with the 
information gathered from the island experiment constitute a new pedagogical system for the republic. The 
patchwork borrowing from Rousseau in The Man of Nature, with ample innovations on subjects like religion and co-
education, characteristically illustrates how Emile was disseminated piecemeal through popular novels. 
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 with pleasure and death with the smell of rotting flesh, discovered from her baby’s corpse.95 The 
female protagonist of The Triumph of Truth; or, Memoirs of Mr. de la Villette (1775) by R. 
Roberts fares better in semi-isolation, with a servant, playfellow, and carefully selected books, 
where she is committed by her mother to prove to her unbelieving husband the innate human 
ability for divine inspiration. The more explicitly ambivalent attitude of these novels towards 
isolated empirical learning draws attention to the troubled connection between Emile’s 
desocialized object lessons and autonomy. 
 These French novels were part of a larger cross-channel dialogue that included Robinson 
Crusoes who survive on isolated islands and Quixotes who survive on romances—later joined by 
the ingénue educated within the confines of the idealized British country estate, and its double, 
the Gothic protagonist trapped within convent or castle. The more popular of these, such as Mme 
de Genlis’s Adèle et Théadore (1782), Bernardin de Saint-Pierre’s Paul et Virginie (1787), 
Charlotte Smith’s Emmeline; or, The Orphan of the Castle, Ann Radcliffe’s The Romance of the 
Forest, and Thomas Day, Sandford and Merton (v.1, 1783), 96 freely innovate Emile’s system, 
becoming influences in their own right on later philosophical novels. Rather than claiming the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Imirce was wildly popular in France and translated into English in 1787 as part of an eight volume set of favorite 
French tales. The Gentleman’s Magazine pronounced the collection “very much beyond the ordinary run of French 
frippery” and singled out Imirce as one of the best. (Gentleman’s Magazine: And Historical Chronicle. Vol. 62. 
London: Printed by Joh Nichols, for David Henry, 1787, p1092). 
96 Stéphanie Félicité, comptess de Genlis, a writer on education often cited as Mme de Genlis wrote Adèle et 
Théadore; ou, Lettres sur l’éducation (Paris: Lambert and Baudouin, 1782), translated as Adelaide and Theodore; 
or, Letters on Education (London: Cadell, 1783). Paul et Virginie, a key work referenced by Maria Edgeworth’s 
Belinda, was translated as Paul and Virginia by Helen Maria Williams, the well-known English author of Julie 
(1790) and various letters reporting firsthand on the revolution in France. Her works influenced other English 
authors who lived in France while writing about the events, like Charlotte Smith and Mary Wollstonecraft. 
According to her “Preface,” Williams translated Paul and Virginia as a safe writing project during the Terror. Her 
edition became the standard translation of this enduringly popular novel. Radcliff’s Romance of the Forest contains 
a framed tale about the ideal education of Clara in the Swiss countryside. Thomas Day’s Sandford and Merton, a 
children’s book about a rich and poor boy educated by a farmer using Rousseau’s methods, was published in three 
volumes in 1783, 1786, and 1789. Day was a family friend of the Edgeworths and notoriously performed his own 
unsuccessful Rousseauvian experiments on two French orphan girls he adopted, planning raise his ideal wife. 
Wollstonecraft’s children’s book about the education of two girls by a virtuous rational dame, Original Stories for 
the Regulation of the Affections, was called a female Sandford and Merton. 
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 direct influence of Rousseau on British educators like Maria Edgeworth, it is more accurate to 
say this genre-nexus provided various literary platforms for the mediation, diffusion, and 
satirization of Rousseau, among other authors on education, their ideas mingling into fresh 
combinations that lack the comprehensive and theoretically abstract vision of Emile. As French 
pedagogy became stigmatized as Jacobin subversion in the 1790s, British educators increasingly 
stressed the importance of individualized and practical plans over theoretical philosophy. 
(Godwin’s The Enquirer, Barbauld’s essay “On Education” and Maria and Richard Edgeworth’s 
Practical Education are all explicitly anti-theoretical.) In this political climate, the already 
established novel of ideas performed a particularizing function that refurbished earlier 
philosophical systems.97 As J. M. S. Tompkins notes in cataloguing “these secluded prodigies of 
the French imagination” and their influence on post-revolutionary English novelists, “with the 
English writers life will keep breaking in.”98 Many participating texts in this cross-channel 
discussion, children’s literature included, develop scenarios that imagine to what degree isolated 
education spaces develop independent adults or stifle autonomy through artificial constraint. 
 In general, British education experiment novels express greater skepticism about the 
control teachers can or should exert over their students and suggest less constricted and prepared 
environments in order to foster independent thought. If desires are formed by environment, then 
Rousseau makes a deceptive distinction when he substitutes physical force for moral authority, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Education experiment novels influenced by the Rousseavian surge of earlier decades and published in the decade 
after the Reign of Terror include: William Godwin, Things As They Are; or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams 
(1794), Eliza Fenwick, Secresy; or, The Ruin on the Rock (1795), Elizabeth Inchbald’s Nature and Art (1796), 
Robert Bage, Hermsprong; or, Man as He Is Not (1796), Maria Edgeworth’s Belinda (1801), and Amelia Alderson 
Opie’s Adeline Mowbray (1804). An additional genre that borrows from Rousseau is the Socratic satire, where an 
uncivilized foreigner reports first-hand on European barbarity, for instance Voltaire’s L’ Ingénu; or, the Sincere 
Huron (1768), and Elizabeth Hamilton’s Letters of a Hindoo Rajah (1796). The most original novel that enlivens 
these interlaced conventions is Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), separated by several decades but retaining all 
the immediate influences present to the her parents when they wrote about education. Other later examples of 
education experiments include Harriet Smith from, Jane Austen’s Emma (1815), and the island-educated Immalee 
from Charles Maturin’s Melmoth the Wanderer (1820). 
98 Tompkins, The Popular Novel in England, 299. 
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 or things for commands. Under isolation and enclosure, the student regresses into a passive 
machine or clay in the hands of her educators, the mind itself consumed in physical necessity. 
We see this transformation in Fanny Burney’s Camilla; or, a Picture of Youth (1796), a novel 
that satirizes Emile’s dependence on his tutor as he courts Sophie while exposing the limitations 
of the empiricist epistemology that underpinned new pedagogies. Camilla’s love interest, Edgar 
Mandlebert, is advised by his tutor, Dr. Marchmont, to carefully “test” and “experiment” with 
her character, “doubtfully to watch her every action, and suspiciously to judge her every 
motive,” to determine whether she has a “voluntary affection” for him.99 Although Marchmont 
assures Edgar that “a very little observation will enable you to dive into the most secret recesses 
of her character,” each investigation only reveals an uncertain knowledge of Camilla’s internal 
life from her indeterminate actions, justifying new investigations in an obsessive pattern that 
hazards alienating her. “Ah doctor!” Edgar pleads, “by this delay . . . by these experiments . . . 
should I lose her!”100 Altered by his scrutiny, Camilla becomes less spontaneous, less legible, 
less able to freely give Edgar her affections. She is transformed into “a fair lifeless machine, 
whom the music, perforce, put in motion.”101 Through the constant judging presence of Edgar 
and her family, Camilla discovers how little control she has over how her actions are interpreted 
by others, who are determined to misconstrue her motives. Edgar must accept that her actions 
will never yield a final confirmation of her choice in love before they destroy her ability to 
choose. The novel systematically rejects the determinacy promised by absolute control over 
environmental factors in Emile, even though it explicitly endorses experiential learning. Camilla 
opens by supporting the superior efficacy of experience over moral precepts, which the novel 
promises to prove: “The experience which teaches the lesson of truth, . . . comes not in the shape 	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 of warning nor of wisdom. . . .‘Tis in the bitterness of personal proof alone, in suffering and in 
feeling, in erring and in repenting, that experience comes home with conviction, or impress to 
any use.”102 Using practical experience to teach is a sound method, but expecting to control the 
outcome is both undesireable and impossible. 
 The same distinction between embracing strategies from empiricist education while 
rejecting its power structures is reiterated in Secresy; or, The Ruin of the Rock (1795), an 
epistolary gothic novel by Eliza Fenwick, the close friend of Mary Wollstonecraft and Mary 
Hays. The novel follows an orphan heiress, Sibella, raised by her uncle, Mr. Valmont, on his 
walled and moated estate, along with an adopted brother, Clement, in an environment carefully 
manicured to simulate Sophie and Emile’s education in nature. Sibella is never allowed to leave 
the estate, and misanthropic Mr. Valmont admits few visitors. At the novel’s opening, Mr. 
Valmont consents to Sibella’s correspondence with Caroline Ashburn, a chance recent visitor, 
who has learned from the negative example of her dissipated, wealthy mother to appreciate 
Sibella’s simplicity. Caroline’s letters describe the social follies of her drawingroom associates, 
and the lessons she learned from less affluent friends. She is a projection of what the gifted 
Sibella might have been if her uncle permitted her to learn by circulating in society. 
A surprising number of people manage to smuggle their way into Mr. Valmont’s walled 
estate and frustrate his little experiment. His overbearing control of his children proves futile at 
keeping the outside world at bay. Left vulnerable to the amorous and avaricious schemes of these 
visitors, Sibella is twice abducted and dies at the end of the novel. Her brother, Clement, the 
unworthily adored Emile to her Sophie, is himself seduced by the worldly pleasures he was 
raised unprepared to resist, and betrays a “natural marriage,” pledged and consummated with 
Sibella, to marry Caroline Ashburn’s mother for her money. The novel purports to teach the evils 	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 of secrecy—in particular, the consequences of Sibella’s secret natural marriage with Clement—
but her secret is eclipsed by the bizarre secrecy of Mr. Valmont’s walled estate and education 
system. He never discloses to Sibella her eventual financial independence from him as a wealthy 
heiress, nor does he explain that in England marriage is a social institution requiring witnesses 
and a financial transaction enmeshed in anxieties about consolidating property. Even Sibella’s 
educated friends never explain to her the theory behind her education, and Rousseau’s name is 
conspicuously absent in this philosophical novel. While Sibella makes ignorant choices in a 
moral vacuum, Fenwick’s readers have access to a variety of social and literary contexts for 
decoding the significance attached to her actions, forcing them to confront how these contexts 
enable their character evaluations. With a plot hinged on an English marriage that is not one 
because there are no witnesses, Secresy develops a connection between social observation and 
virtue. Although I cannot do justice to the complexity of Fenwick’s critique of Rousseau in this 
chapter, it is worth noting the emphasis she gives to Mr. Valmont’s authoritarian control over his 
children’s environment, the ultimate failure of that control, and its stunting effect on his 
children’s virtue. The objections to Rousseau given in these novels paint the literary setting 
against which Maria and Richard Edgeworth published their education works. 
 
Maria Edgeworth and the socialized object lesson 
 In the chapter “On Truth” from Practical Education (1798), Maria Edgeworth denounces 
Rousseau and other theorists who “have counseled parents to teach truth by falsehood. The 
privilege of using contrivance, and ingenious deceptions, has been uniformly reserved for 
preceptors; and the pupils, by moral delusions, and the theatric effect of circumstances 
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 treacherously arranged, are to be duped, surprised, and cheated, into virtue.”103 In what should 
now be a familiar line of attack, Edgeworth cites Rousseau’s bean garden property lesson as an 
example of how parents effectually lie to a child by creating a false environment, which teaches 
deception and artifice when the child figures it out. Emile first learns about property through an 
incident entirely prepared by his tutor, who engages a farmer to act a prescribed role in his object 
lesson. Jean-Jacques invites Emile to plant beans, mixing his labor with his soil in Locke’s 
concept of possessive individualism, so that he feels invested in the outcome. After several 
weeks tending the beans, Emile arrives to find them plowed under by a farmer who claims that 
Emile dug up melons that he planted previously. Because the farmer intended to share the 
melons, Emile immediately feels the loss as his own, and he understands the farmer’s plight 
because he shares the same grievance (Emile, 98-99). As a child, Emile understands morality 
only in relation to himself; he is never expected to sympathize with others who are different from 
him, since he should not yet realize other wills might conflict with his own. By taking the farmer 
under his employ, Jean-Jacques makes sure the farmer’s will does not initiate a power struggle of 
the sort Rousseau’s object lessons seek to avoid. He artificially removes social conflict from the 
property lesson, making ownership a relation between things instead of people.104 The 
Edgeworths find this complicated effort to create a lesson ludicrous, impractical, and counter-
productive, and they object, furthermore, to the whole concept of property it teaches. 
In Maria Edgeworth’s alternative property object lesson, “The Rabbit” in Early Lessons 
(1801), a young girl, Rosamond, learns possessive individualism while defending her laburnums 
from a hungry animal, who turns out to be the pet rabbit of a poor girl. The real-life causal 
relation between Rosamond’s garden enclosures to protect her land, and the small natural 	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 compensations available to the daughter of a city dressmaker, dangerously ill from working long 
hours in a restrictive city apartment, reintroduce a sensitivity to limited resources, conflicting 
desires, and social movements (enclosure and urbanization), intentionally avoided in Emile; 
likewise, a charged discussion between Rosamond and her siblings about what is best for the 
rabbit, a safe cage or release in the wild, and whether they have the right to decide for the animal, 
suggests the children’s ability to engage in political discussions about slavery, property, factory 
conditions, the restraints of women’s domestic education, and vegetarianism. By deciding not to 
keep the rabbit as a caged pet, the children demonstrate a sophisticated awareness of the abusive 
potential of claiming to know what is best for another, a liberal objection to Rousseau’s forcer 
d’être libre clause in The Social Contract, which notoriously suggests that citizens who withhold 
consent from the general will should be forced to do so because submission increases their 
freedom.105 Like so many caged animals in Romantic-era stories, the rabbit allows for a safely 
dislocated discussion of freedom. Without providing a simple or generalized solution, it exposes 
how contractarian political philosophies that make enfranchisement dependent on property 
constrain the choices of propertyless women, children, and laborers. 
In addition to providing greater social context for similar object lessons, Richard and 
Maria Edgeworth dispute the importance Rousseau places on the child’s absolute freedom in 
Practical Education. They consider the substitution of things for men a slight-of-hand. “A false 	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 idea of the pleasures of liberty misled Rousseau. Children have not our abstract ideas of the 
pleasures of liberty . . . liberty is, with them, the liberty of doing certain specific things which 
they have found to be agreeable; liberty is not the general idea of pleasure, in doing whatever 
they WILL to do. Rousseau desires, that we should not let our pupil know that in doing our will 
he is obedient to us. But why? Why should we not let a child know the truth?”106 Their objection 
rests first on the inevitability of excessive child desire and second on the deception offered the 
pupil, who thinks he submits to what must be when he really submits to Jean-Jacques’s will. 
Accusing Rousseau of dishonesty and artificiality voices a typical contemporary critique that 
Emile only appears to be free. What Edgeworth’s object lessons offer, then, is not a method for 
closing down the freedom of a natural child, as Wordsworth complained in Book V of The 
Prelude, but a different kind of freedom that she found more compelling and realistic—limited 
and provisional, but a product of the social world. My argument expands a conversation about 
Edgeworth and other women children’s writers that began with Mitzi Myers, who argues that a 
Romantic canon focused on Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Charles Lamb, men who wrote about 
children instead of for them, obscures the contribution of women once respected as education 
authorities, such as Anna Letitia Barbauld, Mary Wollstonecraft, Sarah Trimmer, Ellenor Fenn, 
and Maria Edgeworth. These women depict children as developing agents and rational thinkers 
instead of adopting the innocent child Rousseau popularized for their own aesthetic projects.107 I 
propose that these women authors, Maria Edgeworth in particular, offered a compelling counter-
position on liberty and autonomy to that described in Rousseau’s Emile. Instead of Rousseau’s 
natural child whose social development must be delayed until he reaches puberty and acquires 
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 reason, these women assume children are social, sensual, and, to some degree, rational creatures 
from birth—that in fact sensation is always socialized because objects are interacted with and 
judged in the context of their cultural signification. 
 “The Purple Jar” opens with Rosamond and her mother window shopping on the way to 
the cobbler. The seven-year-old Rosamond—whose all-encompassing desires are well beyond 
her needs—begs her mother to buy all the pretty things she sees, with “O, Mother, how happy I 
should be.” The sparse detail of the opening scene suggests its iconic status: Rosamond’s 
excessive desires are typical for a young girl, and adult readers are invited to imitate the mother’s 
strategy of using a common situation to develop their child’s discrimination. The mother’s 
approach uses lively open questions: “What all! Do you wish for them all, Rosamond?” or “what 
use would they be to me?” Vivacious Rosamond fires back with her own questions and 
exclamatory descriptions of her sensations: “look, look! Blue, green, red, yellow, and purple! 
Oh, mamma, what beautiful things! Won’t you buy some of these?” 108 The mother challenges 
Rosamond’s connection between happiness and purchasing beautiful things as opposed to useful 
things, but she prefers to let Rosamond discover this distinction on her own. Mirrored syntax of 
questions and exclamations between mother and daughter indicate Rosamond’s learning 
trajectory towards the sensory organization of her mother, while it overturns the one-sided 
catechism of child textbooks.  
The most attractive object for Rosamond is a purple jar she sees in a chemist shop 
window, which she takes for a flowerpot. Her mother, who understands what the shop sells better 
than her daughter, suggests that Rosamond “see it nearer” and “examine it” to make sure it is 
what she expects, but she declines.109 When they arrive at the shoe store, her mother gives 	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 Rosamond a choice of what she will buy for her that month: a useful pair of new shoes to replace 
her worn ones, or the pretty purple jar. Rosamond asks for her mother’s opinion, but she 
responds with the story’s most oft-quoted line, “Nay, my dear, I want you to think for yourself.” 
Rosamond chooses the purple jar, but she worries that her mother will think she is “very silly” 
for it, introducing an often over-looked theme of the story: Rosamond’s growing awareness that 
judgments are publically evaluated and produce social consequences. Her mother addresses her 
concern: “when you have to judge for yourself you should choose what will make you happy, 
and then it would not signify who thought you silly.”110 Feeling her choice confirmed by her 
mother, Rosamond happily returns home and waits for the servant to fetch her new jar. But when 
it arrives, Rosamond discovers it is filled with a foul-smelling purple liquor, and when emptied, 
it is an ordinary clear jar. 
Regretting her decision, Rosamond offers her mother the jar in exchange for shoes, but 
the mother insists she abide by the consequences of her choice: Rosamond misses out when 
people call for her; she cannot go on family walks; and worst of all, she cannot go with her father 
and brother to the glasshouse. On the way out the door he notices her worn shoes and considers 
how her shabbiness would reflect publically on his parenting: “Why are you walking slip-shod? 
No one must walk slip-shod with me; why, Rosamond,’ said he, looking at her shoes with 
disgust, ‘I thought that you were always neat; go, I cannot take you with me.’ Rosamond 
coloured and retired.”111 As a consequence of choosing the purple jar, Rosamond has to endure 
painful shoes for a month, but the pain of her feet is connected to her embarrassment at being 
dismissed by her father and her realization that her mother thinks her “silly.” She learns not only 
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 to use her senses to examine objects more closely, but also to apply what she learns to make 
better judgments.  
Rosamond’s keen senses are alert to her environment and feed her imagination, but she 
cannot yet direct them towards an orderly and sustained examination, required for judgment, the 
faculty used to compare two ideas—a failing commonly ascribed by philosophy of mind to 
people deficient in reason, especially women and children. Her active imagination is symbolized 
by her attraction to the colors in the shop window, which Myers reads as “the young child’s 
undiscriminating openness to stimuli and the inability to read its culture which it must lose if it is 
to become an adequately functioning human being.”112 This lesson in cultural literacy is 
particularly structured to connect Rosamond’s reasoning skills with her sensual training, and 
suggests higher moral stakes. Barbauld, who influenced and corresponded with Maria 
Edgeworth, wrote a widely-read, admired essay on choices and their consequences, “Against 
Inconsistency in Our Expectations,” that sounds remarkably like Edgeworth’s story and uses a 
market metaphor for abiding by the consequences of our judgments: “We should consider this 
world as a great mart of commerce, where Fortune exposes to our view various commodities, 
riches, ease, tranquility, fame, integrity, knowledge. Every thing is marked at a settled price. . . . 
Examine, compare, chuse, reject; but stand to your own judgment; and do not, like children, 
when you have purchased one thing, repine that you do not possess another which you did not 
purchase.”113 Barbauld cautions against the false optimism Rosamond demonstrates when she 
believes she can enjoy the benefits of both choices, instead of only what she chooses. 
Rosamond’s marketplace choice is a motif commonly used in Edgeworth’s stories about both 
boys and girls to emphasize that choices, like purchases, are irrevocable, often mutually 	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 exclusive, and legible according to publically determined codes.114 As the only one of the 
Rosamond stories where she fails to make the correct choice,115 this first object lesson declares 
the need for the education that follows, as well as her potential to become a reasonable creature. 
In a sequel joined with “The Purple Jar” in Early Lessons (1801), the mother asks 
Rosamond to repeat her judgment exercise by choosing between two plums that look identical 
from a distance. Remembering the purple jar, Rosamond asks to look more closely: she looks, 
touches, and smells the plums, and finds that one is only a stone that looks like a plum. While 
she eats the real plum, her mother places a housewife next to the stone plum and asks her to 
again choose which one she wants. Rosamond knows she could use the housewife because she 
keeps getting into trouble for losing her needles. “I hope I shall not make such a silly choice as I 
did about the purple jar! Let us consider; the [stone] plum is certainly the prettiest: but then to be 
sure the housewife would be the most useful.”116 At first Rosamond reasons falsely with herself 
that, of course, she might take the stone and be more careful with her needles, just as she earlier 
convinced herself that she could make do with worn shoes. Her reasoning process is unreliable 
when she divorces judgment from the evidence of her senses, which is why her mother tests her 
judgment using another deceptive purple object. The color purple triggers Rosamond’s memory 
in a visual and auditory way: “Rosamond, as she pronounced the words purple jar, turned her 
eyes from the stone plum and fixed them upon the housewife.”117 
What finally tips the balance is Rosamond’s desire for her mother’s approval when she 
no longer loses her needles: “I was very happy when you smiled and praised me, Mamma, and 	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 said the other day that you were glad to see that I wished to cure myself of my little faults; and I 
daresay, Mamma, that you will smile a great deal more, and be a great deal more pleased with 
me when I really have entirely cured myself,” and when she finalizes her choice, “I hope, dear 
Mamma, that I have considered well this time, and I think that I have chosen better than I did 
about the purple jar.”118 In both stories, the mother never directly tells Rosamond what she thinks 
of her choices. Rosamond only realizes what her mother thought about the jar after she 
discovered her mistake for herself and thought herself silly, whereas with the plum, she 
anticipates her mother’s judgment correctly because she has already internalized her mother’s 
reasoning as her own. In order to learn good judgment, Rosamond needs to witness how other 
people judge her according to what objects she acquires, which is part of experiencing the 
consequences of her actions. Her mother’s advice “to choose what will make you happy, and 
then it would not signify who thought you silly,” does not mean, as Rosamond first assumes, to 
ignore what others might think of her, because the approval of others affects her happiness. If 
that were not the case, her father would have defied public opinion and brought his daughter with 
him to the glasshouse, regardless of how sloppy she looked. Instead, his actions clarify the 
mother’s lesson by confirming that rational adults allow some consideration to what others think 
of them when making choices.  
Since Rosamond is a girl, we might suspect that Edgeworth is merely following 
Rousseau’s gendered education in teaching her to care about what other people think, but the 
complexity of her mother’s advice about valuing her own happiness belies that assumption. To 
the contrary, the repeated opposition between the useful and the ornamental in Rosamond’s 
choices can be read as a straight-forward rebuttal of Sophie’s necessary obsession with how her 
actions are socially judged by their aesthetic appearance, rather than their moral substance: “Man 	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 says what he knows; woman says what pleases. He needs knowledge to speak; she needs taste. 
Useful things ought to be his principal object and pleasing things ought to be hers.” The 
aestheticization of Sophie’s moral choices deprives her of Rosamond’s ultimate satisfaction in 
obeying her own judgment, her trade-off for at times defying public opinion. And lest we assume 
that Edgeworth encourages a mere performance of morality and independence, the ornamental 
objects are deceptive in precisely the way Rousseau describes women: “flatterers and 
dissimulators” who “quickly learn to disguise themselves.”119 Under Rosamond’s careful 
examination, this dubious compliment proves equivalent to a misogynist reduction of woman to 
dirty vessel. 
Part of the difference between Edgeworth’s contextually-embedded object lessons stems 
from her attention to Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education, which recommends that 
parents avoid corporal punishment for all but the most stubborn children and appeal to the 
child’s reason. Since Locke believes children should be treated as “reasonable beings,” he sees 
no danger that early socialization or appeals to the child’s reason could produce adverse 
results—quite the reverse: “The sooner you treat him as a man, the sooner he will begin to be 
one.”120 Rousseau honors Locke as a model for writing on modern education, but objects there is 
“nothing more stupid than these children who have been reasoned with so much. . . . If children 
understood reason, they would not need to be raised” (Emile, 89). Trying to reason with children 
would have the same outcome as Wordsworth’s “Anecdote for Fathers”; the child can mimic 
something he thinks will answer the adult’s demand, but his clumsy affectation is easily spotted 
by reasoning adults and only trains him in deception.  
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 Behind these opposing positions on reason is a debate over how to effectively guide the 
child’s internalization of his education so that he becomes an autonomous adult. Both Locke and 
Rousseau worry that children raised through strong authority will never transition from the fear 
of an externally-applied punishment to the need for self-approval and, once grown, will disregard 
their education to follow a default motivation. “Every man must some time or other be trusted to 
himself and his own conduct,” says Locke, “a good, a virtuous, an able man, must be made so 
within.”121 Accessing what is “within” requires stimulating the “most powerful incentives to the 
mind,” rewarding the child with esteem and punishing with disgrace to provoke “ingenuous 
shame.”122 These mental rewards and punishments, precisely those qualities Rousseau denigrates 
as amour-propre (or self-love dependent on comparison with others), replace corporeal 
punishment in Locke’s treatise, producing psychological motivation that models adult autonomy. 
But as Rousseau sees it, ingenuous shame is a contradiction: the mental incentives Locke prefers 
feed the child’s need for approval from others, which will eventually corrupt him into adopting 
their follies. How is it, exactly, that Locke’s child is supposed to transition from shame and 
approval, as externally enforced as any beating, to a sense of virtue made possible by owning 
internally directed actions? 
By objecting that children cannot reason, Rousseau accuses Locke of encouraging an 
affectation of reason, or an outward sign of an inward state that is developmentally impossible. 
As a child, Emile is not permitted to imitate virtuous actions like charity whose moral import is 
linked with intent, in an attempt to circumvent the anxiety surrounding affectation that plagues 
Locke’s treatise. As a passive receptacle for sensation, Emile has no “internal” separate from his 
external world; his “brain, smooth and polished, returns, like a mirror, the objects presented to it. 	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 But nothing remains; nothing penetrates. Our sensations are purely passive, while all our 
perceptions or ideas are born out of an active principle which judges. . . . children, not being 
capable of judgment, do not have true memory” (Emile, 107). Lacking interiority, children are all 
affectation. They approach people and objects ready to take them in and establish an affinity 
between themselves and their surrounds, accumulating sensations in preparation for reason’s 
arrival. If a child can only learn through its senses, then Locke’s substitution—shame for beating 
and praise for gingerbread—is a chimera. The only way to develop lasting internal motivation is 
to develop the mind through the body. 
The shift from separating mental and physical stimuli to collapsing them under sensual 
education was picked up by Godwin as the centerpiece of his education writings, which is no 
surprise if we consider Rousseau’s objection to Locke as resting on affectation. In the anarchist 
philosophy of Political Justice, total honesty between people enables personal, voluntary self-
correction without the law’s use of force, which reduces all moral choices to compulsion. His 
pedagogical work, The Enquirer Reflections on Education, Manners, and Literature, calls 
attention to the extreme deprivations of liberty under which children must suffer in order to 
learn, and mitigates these with solutions from Emile: 
I may recommend some species of knowledge by a display of the advantages which will 
necessarily attend upon its acquisition, or flow from its possession. Or, on the other hand, 
I may recommend it despotically, by allurements or menaces, by showing that the pursuit 
of it will be attended with my approbation, and that the neglect of it will be regarded by 
me with displeasure. 
 The first of these classes of motives is unquestionably the best. To be governed by 
such motives is the pure and genuine condition of a rational being. By exercise it 
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 strengthens the judgment. It elevates us with a sense of independence. It causes a man to 
stand alone, and is the only method by which he can be rendered truly an individual, the 
creature, not of implicit faith, but of his own understanding.123 
Godwin clearly considers Locke’s shame and praise a form of physical compulsion, incapable of 
forming independent adults. The goal of Godwin’s approach is to “entirely change the face of 
education” so that there is neither “preceptor or pupil” and “everything bespeaks independence 
and equality.”124 Rousseau’s understanding of personal liberty is embraced by Godwin, but not 
by many of the rational dames, who objected to the implications for Sophie. 
Shame emerges with reason and sexual desire during Emile’s transition into adulthood, 
creating an unexpected correlation between sexual maturity, reason, and interiority. As Mary 
Wollstonecraft noticed, however, shame is part of Sophie’s education from the time she is 
young. The implicit connection between Sophie’s body and her sense of shame reintroduces the 
prurient audience for her object lessons, implying an early moral awareness from her already 
sexualized body, prescient of her social function as mother. Emile’s liberating childhood and 
autonomous adulthood is never extended to Sophie because marking any transitional period of 
advent sexuality is too dangerous when Sophie lacks the outlet Emile uses for redirecting his 
sexual energies into an outward-extending investigation of the natural and social world beyond 
his body. Whereas Emile’s domesticity securely aligns his personal needs with social concerns, 
Sophie’s adult domestic space is commensurate with her childhood education environment, 
which conditions her to constraint and command. By connecting shame, modesty, and coquetry 
with Sophie’s body, her biological nature, Rousseau justifies reintroducing shame, the 
motivation technique he rejected in Locke, newly minted as sensory education. 	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 Although Edgeworth insists with Locke that children have reason and internalize through 
shame and approval, she offers an alternative to Rousseau by combining elements of Emile and 
Sophie in Rosamond. Concluding the lesson in choice from “The Purple Jar” and “The Two 
Plums,” Rosamond’s brother asks to borrow a needle, which she produces safely from her 
housewife. As a reward, her father invites Rosamond to join them while they do “several 
experiments with her needle and a magnet.”125 The father permits Rosamond to join in her 
brother’s scientific education, provided she did not lose her needle; likewise, in “The Purple Jar,” 
the worst consequence of her shoes was missing out on their trip to the glasshouse. Rosamond’s 
moral development is motivated by her desire to escape her house and share her brother’s 
scientific education. We can contrast Edgeworth’s problematizing approach to female desires 
with how object lessons are used in the popular and contemporary The Daisy; or, Cautionary 
Stories in Verse by Elizabeth Turner, published in 1807, a series of moral poems and illustrations 
that correct child errors through shame and pain. Turner’s aptly named “Miss Sophie” tumbles 
head first while trying to climb the garden gate, and learns from her “hurt and bruis’d” body that 
“girls should never climb”; In another panel, a girl who refuses to get dressed discovers that she 
is unsuitable to meet visitors or eat dinner. The direct physical impact of object lessons are more 
violently associated with their bodies, without offering alternative enjoyments that legitimate the 
girls’ desire for mobility and self-fulfillment.126 
The common objection that education should not produce bluestockings or consummate 
musicians, but women with practical feminine skills that endear them to others, is quietly 
countered by Edgeworth, who makes household management the prerequisite for pursuing the 
scientific and philosophical education often reserved for boys. Instead of restricting Rosamond’s 	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 education, these stories illustrate that her lack of scientific learning—the ability to observe 
objects, or recognize chemistry equipment—impedes her feminine practicality.127 Edgeworth’s 
compromise between radical and conservative approaches to education is repeated in the political 
allegory behind Rosamond’s choice. The alluring jar filled with disgusting chemicals recalls 
Edmund Burke’s rhetorical association of chemistry deceptions with French politics in 
Reflections on the Revolution in France, as well as radical chemists Joseph Priestley, Humphry 
Davy, and Thomas Beddoes (Edgeworth’s brother-in-law), who largely inspired the association 
of chemistry with seductive revolutionary politics in the political cartoons of the 1790s.128 
Replacing Rosamond’s worn shoes offers incremental reform as a viable, rational alternative to 
revolution.129 Rosamond’s story opens with her already in the market, submersed in the moral 
and public world of Vanity Fair, and resolves with a compass instead of using it as a frame to 
contain her exposure to the outside world. The narrative thus combines elements from Sophie 
and Emile. 
If all of these layers are not enough, “The Purple Jar” and “The Two Plums are stories 
about insides and outsides, about jars with icky insides and clear outsides, needles encased in 
wax, and fruits with stones inside and stones next to them—or about the process by which 
children internalize judgment through external stimuli. In Rosamond, A Sequel to Early Lessons 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Edgeworth’s collection, Harry and Lucy, follows the scientific adventures of a brother who teaches his younger 
sister by doing experiments together. Again, she embraces co-education in science, but her position is moderated by 
Lucy’s young age and the older Harry’s precocious understanding as her teacher. 
128 Golinski, Science as Public Culture, 176-86. 
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Will” from Popular Tales, three brothers compete for their father’s inheritance through hard work. While one 
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 (1821), the teenage heroine undergoes a more complex choice between purchasing a horse for 
sixty guineas or a beautiful bracelet equipped with a hidden watch inside. The watch functions as 
a reminder mechanism that can prick the wrist at a set time. Like “The Purple Jar,” Rosamond 
chooses between mobility and ornament, but with larger stakes and greater ambiguity. The 
bracelet is useful for a forgetful girl like Rosamond, who has trouble telling regular time from 
her subjective experience of it as a racing or lagging measure, according to her own 
engagements. (In one story, she manages to be late while holding a watch, because she is too 
distracted to consult it.) Recalling the purple jar, she tells her sister, Laura, “I have reason to look 
careful . . . for I have a great judgment to make.” Laura draws her mocking brother into the next 
room while Rosamond deliberates, but Godfrey objects, “No, no . . . what a pretty sort of 
judgment a person must have who cannot decide when others are standing by; . . . I think that it 
is not quite fair that my mother should stand there, as she does, looking so anxious; that must 
disturb Rosamond’s reflections; and if she decides only to please my mother, or because she is 
afraid to give my mother pain, there will be no trial or no proof of prudence.”130 The presence of 
her family adds to the drama of Rosamond’s choice, since she is afraid of her brother’s mockery 
and of losing the respect of her parents and sister. Deciding for the horse, Rosamond explains 
that she would grow indifferent to the watch’s prick, a conclusion based on higher order ideas 
drawn from a sophisticated understanding of the sensualist principles behind her education. 
Situated near the conclusion of Rosamond’s education, “The Bracelet of Memory”—itself a kind 
of mind/object, or automaton replica of the human body—depicts Rosamond’s successful 
internalization of her mother’s prudence. Rosamond refuses to risk losing a skill developed from 
habituated discipline, her ability to keep track of time, by re-externalizing her own internal clock. 
By refusing the bracelet for the horse, Rosamond demonstrates her self-regulation.  	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Conclusion: Anna Letitia Barbauld and the “education of events” 
 The difficulty with separating the education of men from the education of things is most 
consistently argued by Barbauld, whose essays on education refute the notion that sensual 
learning escapes hierarchical structures. On the contrary, she demonstrates how the ability to 
create learning spaces depends on class status and augments the child’s ideological submersion. 
As the daughter of educators, the co-founder and instructor (with Rochemont Barbauld) of 
Palgrave School for boys, and tutor for young women pupils, Barbauld’s teaching credentials are 
extensive, and she was well-respected for writing some of the first books for infants and younger 
children.131 In “What is Education?” Barbauld objects to Rousseau’s complicated method of 
controlling the child’s every experience to avoid hierarchy, and she instead encourages an 
education suited to the child’s station but flexible to changing fortune. The trouble with minutely 
constructing the child’s environment to mimic rustics is that only wealthy people have the means 
to recreate a simple life for their children while also providing for all their needs. With her 
characteristic essayic bite, Barbauld emphasizes the distance between real and fabricated 
simplicity: “you take a country-house in a good air, and make him run, well clothed and carefully 
attended, for, it may be, an hour in a clear frosty winter’s day upon your graveled terrace . . . and 
you think you have done great matters.”132 Affluent simplicity is different from the occasional 
want that accompanies real poverty, and any attempt to recreate the education of a poor man on a 
rich man’s estate will not have the same result. Accepting this realization is difficult, Barbauld 
admits, because parents are attracted to Rousseau’s promise that children grow up to be like their 
teachers. Middle-class parents and gentlemen, like her letter’s addressee and others in her 	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 community of dissenters, who were raised with less money and fewer opportunities for a good 
education, do not want their children to grow up to treat their parents like inferiors; yet raising 
their children to be like themselves is impossible and misguided.  
She embraces the theory that everything children encounter educates them, but in taking 
Rousseau and Hartley seriously to their logical extreme, she shows how class educates in its 
pervasive, irrepressible detail: “above all, your rank and situation in life, your house, your table, 
your pleasure-grounds, your hounds and your stables will educate him . . . the education of 
circumstances—insensible education . . . of infinitely more consequence to the habit, than that 
which is direct and apparent. This education goes on at every instant of time; it goes on like time 
. . . Poverty educated you; wealth will educate him. In your heart, you like plain dinners, and 
early hours . . . But it will not be so with your son.”133 The paradoxical phrase “insensible 
education,” or those experiences omitted from our education according to class, ironically 
remarks on the complacency with which Rousseau’s more conservative readers could assimilate 
the implications of education through the senses into private middle-class life. If knowing how 
environment forms a child’s mind opens the possibility of intentionally shaping children 
scientifically, as Catherine Macaulay and Mme de Genlis proclaimed, it also reveals the 
impracticality of doing so without attending to the structural changes in society at large, which 
are responsible for producing a limited range of subject positions.134 When reduced to consumer 
choices in toys and tutors, radical education strategies, first proposed to reform society through a 
mass reeducation in republican values, can be harnessed to serve the parent’s narcissistic desire 
to reproduce a replica of his thoughts and experiences in his child—an exact reversal in its 
progressive implications by assuring the continuation of the status quo. 	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 When middle-class families follow Rousseau’s advice about teething rags and simple 
clothes, the environment they prepare stops at the end of their lawns. They build a wall around 
the child (or a picket-fenced garden) and control everything within that private space by what 
they purchase. “It is not necessary, with Rousseau or Madame Genlis, . . . to surround him with 
an artificial world.” “In these mimic experiments of educatiosn,” writes Barbauld, “there is 
always something which distinguishes them from reality; some weak part left unfortified, for the 
arrows of misfortune to find their way into.”135 The allusion to Achilles dipped in the river Styx, 
but left vulnerable to an arrow to the heel, satirizes the engraving of this myth used as the 
frontplate for Book I of Emile. And why does this strategy not succeed? The mother holding the 
child’s heel changes the experiment by her inevitable presence, mediating the child’s interaction 
with objects while mistaking sensual learning for direct, unmediated access to the world. No 
education at home is truly a private education: “the education of your house, important as it is, is 
only a part of a more comprehensive system.”136 Barbauld encourages parents to remember that 
the larger world itself, controlled by providence, is also a constructed learning environment—
what she calls “the education of events,” to rival Rousseau’s education of things.  
Barbauld’s religious description of event education is no pilgrim’s progress of personal 
salvation in the next life; her pedagogy connects individual development with the political events 
of this world. As she does in her essay, “Sins of Government, Sins of the Nation,” Barbauld 
concludes by connecting the personal with the political: “States are educated as individuals—by 
circumstances.”137 Nations, too, are judged and educated by events that work for their 
reformation. The difference between things and events is control: There is no human, god-like 
mastermind capable of orchestrating events on any significant scale, calculated to develop 	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 children in particular ways, and any attempt to create such an omniscient power over children, let 
alone concentrate it in a few human beings with authority, is abusive coercion. Things are 
arranged; events just happen. Barbauld’s “education of events” is a short-hand for the English 
response to Rousseau: a recognition of the larger significance of the child’s social environment, 
an embrace of audience as part of object lessons, a rejection of isolation and the artificiality of 
theoretical experimentation, and a renewed emphasis on the temporality or historicity of 
learning. 
Celebrating the spontaneity of event education is a way of respecting children’s liberty. 
By recognizing that an environment cannot be completely controlled, parents come to terms with 
their inability to determine what their children will do and think. That is why Rosamond must 
abide by her choice in “The Purple Jar”—not because the mother is cruel or overly utilitarian, 
but because Rosamond really is free to choose as she likes, and her mother does not deceive her 
when she promises to buy only one thing that month. Where Rousseau relies on the Savoyard 
Vicar to rescue individual freedom by arguing that sensation proves the existence of a unified 
self that feels and freely wills, Barbauld concludes that children are free because the array of 
experiences that shape them are too vast to come under the purview of other people or 
governments.  
The impossibility of any totalizing will behind environmental influences opens the 
opportunity for the child to participate in self-creation. By associationist principles, the child 
creates itself, like any educator would, through its environment, which means self-creation is 
likewise an uncertain, socio-historical process. While the kind of liberty possible under 
Barbauld’s interpretation of empiricist education is limited, it does involve a measure of 
autonomy, granted by the children’s increasing understanding of the mechanisms by which their 
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 environment shapes them, and their inevitable engagement with the social world in the process 
of self-creation, thus shifting their given restrictions even though these discourses are not under 
anyone’s control. In these respects, Rosamond’s freedom has more in common with Barbauld 
than Rousseau. By the conclusion of Rosamond’s education, she understands the mechanisms by 
which she has been formed, how her choices change both who she is and the environment in 
which her future choices will be made. She has an advantage not only over the unenviable 
Sophie, but over Emile, as well, who according to Julia Simon, remains dependent of his tutor at 
the novel’s conclusion because his liberal independence fails to equip him with the relationship 
skills necessary to teach his infant son. Rousseau’s “effort to preserve natural freedom destroys 
the possibility of creating moral autonomy,” the quality Rosamond successfully develops 
through socialization.138  
In the following chapter, I show how Mary Hays and William Godwin finesse freedom in 
a determined world in a similar way. These materialist educators teach readers to understand the 
mechanisms through which their physical environment forms their minds, so that they can 
control their own development by mastering their material surroundings. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
“Morals and mechanics are here analogous”:  
Exemplarity and Necessity in the novels of William Godwin and Mary Hays 
 
“All well written books, are in reality so many histories of the progress of the mind.” 
Thomas Holcroft, “Introduction” to The Adventures of Hugh Trevor.139  
 
The introduction to The Adventures of Hugh Trevor by Thomas Holcroft is a strange 
philosophical conversation between two people on “the progress of the human mind.” One man, 
convinced that his mind generates knowledge from its own superior resources, resolves to write a 
perfect, irrefutable argument without consulting, “books, or things, or men,” while his 
companion, who “scoffed at innate ideas” replies “he knew of but one mode of obtaining 
knowledge; and that was by the senses.”140 If his companion were correct, retorts the student of 
Locke, then he might as well have composed his perfect essay before being born. As Holcroft 
informs us, the purpose of this dialogue is to explain how his book will instruct readers through 
the senses: “For these reasons, I have occasionally called the attention of the reader to the lessons 
received by the principal character of the following work, to the changes they produced in him, 
and to the progress of his understanding.”141 The recommendation that we learn from a 
character’s experience is nothing unusual. But Holcroft also recommends that we learn from how 
Hugh Trevor changes from his experiences, how his mind expands over time, and (since we 
identify with the protagonist) how our minds change as we read. Trevor is a model for how the 
reader’s mind develops from infancy through the senses, which for Holcroft is the highest 
purpose of novels. 
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  In this chapter, I address two friends of Holcroft, Mary Hays and William Godwin, who 
largely share Holcroft’s philosophy of mind and write novels influenced by experiential learning. 
Fitting Holcroft’s idea of a “well written book,” their novels teach readers “the progress of the 
mind” and, like Hugh Trevor, they demand a new kind of reading practice. Instead of using the 
novel to teach through identification with a flawed protagonist (what amounts to a traditional 
object lesson), Hays and Godwin use the novel to teach how the mind develops over time, 
through the senses, in response to its physical environment. By following a character’s mental 
development, readers reflect on their own growth, gaining insight into how their mind forms as it 
experiences new things. Such novels teach the self-reflexivity that Rosamond gains by seeing 
herself in the purple jar or the time-keeping bracelet, which allows readers to master the 
mechanisms through which a material world determines who they become. 
Godwin and Hays approached novels differently because they (and Holcroft) were 
philosophical necessitarians who believed that the principles of causality governing the natural 
world extend to human thoughts and actions. According to necessity, our decisions inevitably 
reflect an accumulation of prior experiences (education) that together constitute the conditions of 
possibility for our actions; experience determines our actions. Opponents of necessity argued that 
individuals are responsible for their moral choices; without acknowledging “liberty,” they 
argued, there can be no such thing as guilt or justice because society at large is responsible for 
everything. Philosophical necessity acknowledges that individual actions are part of what 
Clifford Siskin describes as “system.” The genre of system is a “primary modern means of 
totalizing and rationalizing our experience of the social” that became embedded in novels and 
changed how novel characters relate to their fictional worlds. Using Caleb Williams as his test 
case, Siskin shows how Romantic novels became “information systems,” their characters (and 
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 readers) acutely aware of the social as “totalizing,” as what “we now call ‘The system.’”142 To 
adopt Siskin’s vocabulary, necessity is the system that makes novel characters commensurate 
with their totalized experience of the social, and the didactic purpose of necessitarian novels is to 
make the system legible and navigable. Caleb’s psychological development resembles a total 
picture of how his world is organized, and that picture, as well as his method for producing it, is 
the lesson Godwin’s novels encourage their readers to learn.  
 Because necessity questions whether readers control their actions as autonomous agents, 
necessitarian fiction departs from established generic conventions about how novels instruct their 
readers. According to Alex Eric Hernandez, most eighteenth-century fiction teaches through 
poetic justice that “functioned according to market principles of rational exchange”: Characters 
enjoy the rewards or suffer the punishments of their actions, while readers test their judgment 
according to whether they sympathize with virtue or applaud mischief and suffer self-
conviction.143 Henry Fielding’s Jonathan Wild, the Newgate antecedent for Caleb, meets his end 
at the gallows—and Fielding clarifies that Wild “suffers the Punishment without obtaining the 
Reward. . . . I believe it is not easy to teach a more useful Lesson than this.”144 But in the novels 
of Hays and Godwin, as in much 1790s social protest fiction, characters are neither rewarded nor 
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143 Hernandez, “Tragedy and the Economics of Providence,” 602. I do not want to imply that all eighteenth-century 
fiction uses a simplistic poetic justice model. Hernandez shows that Richardson’s Clarissa opposes a financial 
model of providence, where poetic justice is confined to worldly punishment and rewards, because Clarissa’s reward 
is in heaven. While this argument demonstrates the complexity of fictional justice models, Clarissa is still rewarded, 
herself, for what she does, which has more in common with Fielding’s justice in Jonathan Wild (where, similarly, 
Heartfree is ultimately rewarded on earth for his own actions) than it does with causal networks. In fiction by 
Godwin and Hays, individual judgment is difficult to separate from community judgment. 
144 Fielding, Jonathan Wild, 221. Hays’s “tracing consequences” and Godwin’s essay “On History and Romance” 
(1797) (discussed later in my essay), form a helpful contrast to the opening pages of Jonathan Wild. Fielding 
defends his thief’s history by explaining that the histories of men’s lives provide “Knowledge of human Nature in 
general; its secret Springs, various Windings, and perplexed Mazes.” He sounds much like Hays and Godwin, until 
Fielding continues, “we have here before our Eyes, lively Examples of whatever is amiable or detestable, worthy of 
Admiration or Abhorrence, and are consequently taught, in a Manner infinitely more effectual than by Precept, what 
we are eagerly to imitate or carefully to avoid” (7). I don’t think that tracing consequences in Godwin’s fiction can 
be reduced to practical examples (the traditional object lesson). 
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 punished as their actions deserve. Indeed, the lack of poetic justice in Caleb Williams or The 
Victim of Prejudice is thematized by their critique of the criminal justice system.145 What, then, 
is the instructive purpose of these histories of the mind if they do not teach poetic justice, but 
expose injustice? 
Holcroft and Hays are quite explicit about what fiction should teach. “All well written 
books, are in reality so many histories of the progress of the mind,” Thomas Holcroft informs his 
readers as they begin Hugh Trevor,146 while for Hays, the “most interesting” and “useful 
fictions” are those that “afford materials, by which the philosopher may calculate the powers of 
the human mind, and learn the springs which set it in motion” (EC, 3). Hays twice uses Caleb 
Williams as an example. 
Tracing consequences or mental progress in necessitarian fiction is not about illustrating 
rewards and punishments or about offering a “moral” that readers might apply to their lives; it is 
about understanding characters in relation to the extensive socio-political networks informing 
their behavior. Novels can provide a roadmap for connecting a climactic crisis with early 
formative life events through retrospective narration. Because mental development is conceived 
as political, tracing consequences reveals how seemingly inconsequential details of experience 
accumulated over a lifetime shape individual habits to reflect large-scale cultural practices, such 
that each person’s moral improvement requires national reform. The necessitarian novel thus 
expands its didactic domain to include political critique as an implicit extension of domestic 
values commonly advocated by the novel, such as compassion, prudence, and family affections. 
Thus, while depicting “things as they are” through character psychology, this narrative form 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 For Richardson’s rejection of poetic justice in Clarissa as a rebellion against the mid-eighteenth century’s 
dominant didactic logic, and the resulting frustration expressed by readers, see Hernandez, “Tragedy and the 
Economics of Providence.”  
146 Holcroft, Hugh Trevor, 1:ii. 
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 suggests the possibility of new social realities. Furthermore, the same tracings that produce a 
snapshot of “things as they are” through character psychology can suggest new possible social 
realities. By practicing the causal analysis encouraged by these novels, readers can formulate 
what environments or institutions are most conducive to virtuous action. The novel is an 
experiment to discover these conditions, and characters are its subjects. 
 Although Godwin and Hays share this approach to the novel’s purpose, they each 
espouse different versions of philosophical necessity that are surprisingly legible in their fiction. 
For that reason, I explore their metaphysical systems in some depth, explaining how each author 
finds necessity surprisingly liberating. Following David Hume, Godwin links necessity with 
authorship and imagination, while Hays favors Joseph Priestley’s recuperation of the body as the 
promise of utopian progress. Consequently, both authors show how society “miseducates” their 
protagonists, but Godwin’s Caleb Williams; or, Things as They Are (1794) is a novel about 
psychological trauma, while Hays’s The Memoirs of Emma Courtney; or, The Victim of 
Philosophy (1796) and The Victim of Prejudice (1799) are novels about physical violence. All 
three novels feature protagonists who write their lives, which allows Godwin and Hays to 
imagine reading and authorship as sources of agency in a determined system. 
 The ability to create the self through authorship depends upon mastering the laws 
governing the physical world, which apply equally to the mind. “A long train of consequences 
succeed, even, our most indifferent actions,” reflects Hays’s heroine, Emma Courtney, “Strong 
energies . . . produce correspondent effects. Morals and mechanics are here analogous.”147 These 
comfortable analogies between mind and matter make the novel complementary with 
“mechanics.” Because ideas function like objects, education, self-fashioning, and human 
progress are subject to regularity, promising that even in a necessitarian world, individuals have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Hays, Emma Courtney, 145. Hereafter cited in text. 
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 agency if they understand how the mind works. Reading necessitarian fiction, therefore, provides 
a form of mechanical literacy. 
 
Caleb’s mechanical literacy 
 Godwin connects mechanical literacy with authorship in Caleb Williams through the 
diverse talents of Caleb. A Jack-of-all-trades, mental and physical, Caleb passes the time in 
prison constructing furniture while organizing his life story. Attracted from his youth to stories 
about “corporeal ingenuity or strength,” Caleb accustoms himself “to mechanical pursuits” and 
“mechanical invention,” but he is also literate: a secretary to Falkland, an author, and the narrator 
of his own tale.148 
 In the 1797 third edition to Caleb Williams, revised the same year as he wrote his essay 
on romance, Godwin added a passage after the third paragraph of the book to explain why Caleb 
is at once curious, good with his hands, and obsessed with fiction. 
The spring of action which perhaps more than any other, characterized the whole train of 
my life, was curiosity. It was this that gave me my mechanical turn; I was desirous of 
tracing the variety of effects which might be produced from given causes. It was this that 
made me a sort of natural philosopher; I could not rest till I had acquainted myself with 
the solutions that had been invented for the phenomena of the universe. In fine, this 
produced in me an invincible attachment to books of narrative and romance. I panted for 
the unraveling of an adventure with an anxiety, perhaps almost equal to that of the man 
whose future happiness or misery depended on its issue. (60) 
Caleb’s “mechanical turn” quickly passes from “youthful sports,” to curiosity, to causality (59). 
Soon Caleb confesses himself a “natural philosopher” who investigates the workings of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Godwin, Caleb Williams, 60. 
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 universe, and with one final, unexpected turn: Caleb loves “narrative.” From the casual way that 
Caleb explains the matter, there is nothing unusual in this progression from “corporeal 
ingenuity” to authorship, even though grouping fictional narratives, lower-class labor, and 
natural history together defies the conventional class-inflected division between the labor of a 
“mechanic” who works with his hands and the mental work of a philosopher who traces causality 
in a mechanical universe.  
Godwin makes no such class distinctions. In his philosophy of mind, fictional narrative 
and causal analysis are as mechanical as making furniture and fixing watches. His Enquiry 
Concerning Political Justice and Its Influence on Morals and Happiness argues that causality 
operates with the same regularity whether it takes place in the mind (between thoughts) or in the 
physical world (between objects).149 Godwin’s definition of necessity incorporates this analogy 
between mental and physical causation by positing a hypothetical omniscient observer who can 
predict the actions of men with absolute certainty: “He who affirms that all actions are necessary, 
means that the man, who is acquainted with all the circumstances under which a living or 
intelligent being is placed upon any given occasion, is qualified to predict the conduct he will 
hold, with as much certainty, as he can predict any of the phenomena of inanimate nature.”150 By 
making the mind as regular as “inanimate nature,” Godwin transforms mechanics into natural 
philosophers and watch-makers into novelists. If the best novels, as Holcroft suggests, are those 
that follow the “progress of the mind,” then readers and authors of romance are the closest we 
come (short of God) to that omniscient observer imagined in Political Justice, who can predict 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Godwin insists that this analogy between mind and matter is accepted intuitively by people of all ranks, who 
daily persuade their neighbors using their knowledge of human behavior with the same confidence that they plant 
crops according to the seasons. When someone acts unpredictably, they search “like the natural philosopher” for 
“the secret spring of this unlooked-for event,” just like Caleb searches for the cause of Falkland’s mental disturbance 
(Godwin, Political Justice,1:373). 
150 Godwin, Political Justice, 1:363.  
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 the conduct of men.151 
 The link between “mechanism” and authorship strengthens when Caleb adopts additional 
identities that bridge these two talents. Over the course of the novel, Caleb has several jobs—
secretary, carpenter, crime biographer, author, lexicographer, and watchmaker—all of which 
require investigating the complex interactions between simple building blocks like words, clock 
springs, and human motives. Curiosity is not what drives Caleb; his curiosity springs from his 
fascination with causality, with “tracing the variety of effects which might be produced from 
given causes.” Causality, wrote David Hume, piques curiosity; it makes natural philosophers of 
us all: “Nothing is more curiously enquir’d after by the mind of man, than the causes of every 
phaenomenon.”152 Caleb’s curiosity, his diverse mechanical talents, and his narrative impulses 
all spring from his captivation with tracing consequences. 
 Causality stimulates curiosity because cause and effect cannot be directly observed. 
Causality is the secret chest we all open, hoping to confirm what we suspect, but we are left only 
with more questions. Godwin borrows his omniscient observer, like his theory of necessity, from 
David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40). Hume uses causation to demonstrated the 
limits of empiricism; we cannot actually see causation, yet we infer that one thing causes another 
based on a “conjunction of events’ that creates an “association of ideas.” After repeatedly 
observing that clapping my hands is accompanied by a sound, for instance, I might conclude that 
clapping always causes that sound. But that conclusion mistakes the association I have formed 
through repeated experiences for a causal relationship that I cannot witness. Causality in the 
physical world works just like it does in the mind: in both cases conjunction” or “association” is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Instead of using self-reflection, like most philosophers of mind, Godwin uses a third-person observer, like David 
Hume. Since people cannot know the thoughts of another with the same precision as their own, introducing this 
third-person observer makes causal relationships a matter of speculative and subjective interpretation. Analyzing 
causality means generating fictional narratives or hypotheses that make sense of limited information.  
152 Hume, Treatise, 266. 
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 the closest we come to confirming cause and effect.153 The “true principle of association among 
ideas,” Hume explains, is “the very same with that betwixt the ideas of cause and effect . . . We 
have no other notion of cause and effect, but that of certain objects, which have been always 
conjoin’d together, and which in all past instances have been found inseparable. We cannot 
penetrate into the reason of the conjunction. We only observe the thing itself, and always find 
that from the constant conjunction the objects acquire an union in the imagination.”154 Godwin’s 
Political Justice uses Hume’s terminology, “correspondence” or “conjunction of events,” to 
describe causality: “[M]ind, as well as matter, exhibits a constant conjunction of events, and 
furnishes all the ground that any subject will afford, for an opinion of necessity. It is of no 
importance that we cannot see the ground of that necessity, . . . we are equally incapable of 
perceiving a ground of connection between any two events in the material universe.” The 
common notion that we witness causation is merely “a vulgar prejudice.”155 Clearly, Godwin 
agrees with Hume’s skepticism and with his connection between curiosity and causation.156 
Because causality cannot be witnessed, it makes us curious investigators who question why one 
event follows another, much like an eager novel reader. 
 A skeptical account of causality gives a key role to fiction-making in knowledge 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Hume offers a skeptic’s reconciliation between the free-will and necessitarian positions by pointing out that a 
common objection to necessity—our inability to see thoughts, or observe mental causation—is also true of the 
natural world. Harris, Liberty and Necessity, 64-87. Harris’s book is an excellent resource for the different 
approaches to necessity in the eighteenth century. 
154 Hume, Treatise, 93. 
155 Godwin, Political Justice, 1:368-69. 
156 Godwin credits Hume with the dominant role in shaping his theory of mental causation in all three editions of 
Political Justice, whereas Priestley (who attacks Hume’s skeptical necessity) is notably absent in Godwin’s citation 
footnotes and index. Godwin repeats Hume’s ideas in “Essay IV: Of the Sources of Genius” from The Enquirer 
(1797) as a reason why human knowledge is limited, indicating Hume’s enduring influence on his thought. He 
argues that we should be humble because “we imagine our science to be greater than it is,” when in fact, “We 
perceive the succession of events, but we are never acquainted with any secret virtue, by means of which two events 
are bound to each other” (20). Nevertheless, Godwin borrows Priestley’s teleological phrase, “the chain of cause and 
effects,” which implies a visible connection between causality that Godwin denies elsewhere in Political Justice and 
The Enquirer. The chain metaphor is inconsistent with Hume’s looser notion of a “conjunction of events,” and 
Godwin’s failure to clarify these inconsistencies could account for the widespread dissatisfaction with his 
necessitarianism among literary scholars.  
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 production, since we constantly generate fictional causal relationships that transform conjoined 
events into meaningful narratives. When the senses fail, the imagination fills causal gaps with a 
story. While these fictions are subjective and possibly incorrect, we cannot make sense of the 
world without them. Thus Caleb’s “mechanical turn” explains his addiction to romance. 
 The plot tension in a crime novel like Caleb Williams depends upon “association” and 
“conjunction”—the juxtaposition of events that, according to Hume or Godwin, can deceive 
observers into finding causation where none exists. When he first joins Falkland’s service, Caleb 
rejects the story Collins tells of his master’s past and uses his mechanical skill as a “natural 
philosopher” to author his own narrative. Collins and Caleb observe the same events, but the 
history they generate to make sense of these conjunctions are different. Whereas Caleb interprets 
Falkland’s restlessness, his nights wandering the hills, and his emotional outpouring at a murder 
trial as the effects of a guilty conscience, Falkland’s steward interprets these as signs of insanity 
from the damage done to his reputation. According to Collins, Falkland obviously did not kill 
Tyrrel, because his strict sense of honor would demand calling him out in a duel: “a mere 
concurrence of circumstances made it necessary that the best of men should be publically put on 
his defence” (172). The ambiguity of “a mere concurrence of circumstances” (a conjunction) 
allows Falkland to get away with murder and prevents the falsely accused Caleb from clearing 
his name.  
All of the novel’s prosecutions proceed on circumstantial evidence that require 
narration—Caleb, Falkland, and Hawkins are never caught in an act that speaks for itself. Even 
Caleb offers “circumstantial proof” of Falkland’s guilt (377). The narratives authored by Caleb, 
Gines, Collins, and Falkland compete for validity by promising their audiences a way of viewing 
the world and making character consistent; these authors make sense of events by transforming 
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 ambiguous conjunctions into causal fictions. 
 
Godwin’s theory of authorship 
 Hume’s determinism is the basis for Godwin’s theory of authorship. Authors are natural 
philosophers who understand how causation forms character, and by delineating character 
development for their readers, authors record everything that acts upon individual minds, 
amounting to the history of an entire culture. In his unpublished essay, “On History and 
Romance” (1797), intended for an abandoned sequel to The Enquirer, Godwin recommends that 
fiction assume the prestige assigned to history, for “True history consists in a delineation of 
consistent human character, in a display of the manner in which such a character acts under 
successive circumstance, in showing how character increases and assimilates new substances to 
its own” (466).157 By describing a character’s responsiveness to his evolving environment, the 
romance provides a complete social history in a psychological portrait. A fiction writer’s ability 
to collect, analyze, and select from all sources of human experience tests the limits of a writer’s 
abilities to project behavior. While posing as omniscient, authors can only try their best to master 
everything that acts upon each character at a given moment: “The Romance writer is continually 
straining at a foresight to which his faculties are incompetent, and continually fails” (167). 
Fortunately, incomplete stories invite reader participation, as readers test the author’s causal 
logic. As natural philosophers, authors make readers into students who are curious about 
causation, using novel characters to teach mental causality. These students become authors when 
they reflect on their own lives and education. 
 Although focused on individual characters, an analysis of mental causation through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Godwin’s “On History and Romance” is quoted from its inclusion in the Broadview edition Caleb Williams and 
cited in-text. 
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 novels teaches readers virtue in the wider world. Causality and virtue are closely connected in 
Political Justice, where utilitarian judgment requires a masterful ability to project into the future, 
anticipating benefit and harm across a whole population. The capacity to analyze present 
circumstances and produce intelligent predictions is the basis for virtuous actions; hence virtue 
“supposes an extensive survey of causes and their consequences.”158 Indeed, one of the most 
important goals of education is to produce people proficient in investigating consequences, who 
can help others comprehend the world and proceed with the more worthy objects in view: “Men 
of genius must rise up . . . to analysis the machine of human society, to demonstrate how the 
parts are connected together, to explain the immense chain of events and consequences, to point 
out the defects and the remedy. It is thus only that important reforms can be produced.”159 
Reformers must imagine the future by constructing a panoramic view of the present, and Godwin 
believed that the “Romance writer” possesses these abilities and can teach them to his audience. 
By instructing readers, authors give them the ability to take “voluntarily” action—that is, to 
accompany action with thought by using foresight, which elevates people from mere 
“automatism” into human beings capable of benevolence, or acting for the good of others. 
Traditional authors use cautionary tales or exemplary characters, commanding readers to change 
their behavior by strength of will alone; the determinist author teaches causality, which invites 
readers to master the tools of narrative and become benevolent and transformative. 
Novels that forgo direct moral instruction can teach foresight while preserving equality 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Godwin, Political Justice, 1:309; cf. Radcliffe, “‘Metaphysician’ to Novelist.” According to Radcliffe, virtue in 
Political Justice is conceived outside of a temporal space, whereas I emphasize the projection power of virtue and its 
connection with narrative. I argue that reading necessitarian fiction engrains habits that are the foundation of 
virtuous action. Mary Hays discusses this purpose in her epistolary novel, Emma Courtney, which incorporates 
letters from her actual correspondence with Godwin. Emma (Hays) writes to Mr. Francis (Godwin): “What is virtue, 
but a calculation of the consequences of our actions? Did we allow ourselves to reason on this principle, . . . we 
should be compelled to shudder at many parts of our conduct, which, taken unconnectedly, we have habituated 
ourselves to consider as almost indifferent. Virtue can exist only in a mind capable of taking comprehensive views. 
How criminal, then, is ignorance!” (EC, 135-36). 
159 Godwin, Enquirer, 10-11.  
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 between author and reader. Instruction is vital yet problematic for Godwin because the implicit 
hierarchy between teacher and pupil undermines the goal of education: to make the instructor 
obsolete and the pupil independent.160 “All education is despotism,” argues Godwin, in his 
education treatise, The Enquirer, “There is no equality, no reasoning, between me and my task-
master. If I attempt it, it is considered as mutiny.”161 Unlike Rousseau, who considered the 
submission of readers to books insurmountable, Godwin imagines that readers can create a 
dialogue with the author as equals by contributing thoughts as they read. Consequently, the 
author’s professed moral is unimportant next to the book’s “tendency,” or its effect on the 
reader’s mind.162 Because of the uniqueness of each person’s mental state, each reader needs to 
learn by “experiment” how books (and experiences, generally) alter their identities by creating or 
reinforcing new trains of thought. Tendency is an unpredictable alchemy between reader and 
text: A new stimulus interrupts established patterns, triggering “new trains of thinking” and “by a 
blending and compound effect, produce in him an improvement which was out of the limits of 
his lessons.”163 Becoming aware of tendency, of the workings of one’s own mind, requires 
understanding the basic principles guiding mental development, which are the study of novels. 
Readers who trace causality are active learners, who, like the students in Godwin’s education 
philosophy, accept neither “preceptor or pupil.” Between readers and author, students and 
teacher, “Everything bespeaks independence and equality.”164  
 Although determinism may seem to limit human freedom, Godwin finds a way to make 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Note the similarity between Godwin’s instructor and government; they should make themselves unnecessary. 
161 Godwin, Enquirer, 60, 67. 
162 “The moral of a work is a point of very subordinate consideration,” Godwin insists, “the only thing worthy of 
much attention is the tendency. . . . a work may be fairly susceptible of no moral inference, or none but a bad one, 
and yet may have a tendency in a high degree salutary and advantageous. . . . The impression we derive from a book, 
depends much less upon its real contents, than upon the temper of mind and preparation with which we read it.” 
Godwin, Enquirer, 137. For an alternative reading of tendency, cf. Rajan, “Wollstonecraft and Godwin.” 
163 Godwin, Enquirer, 146. 
164 Ibid, 80. 
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 determinism the foundation for equality, voluntary action, and authorship. The influence of 
determinism on the novels of Godwin, Hays, and Holcroft is well established, but scholars 
mistake its significance for fiction because they do not investigate the diversity of necessitarian 
systems, some of which are compatibility with liberty and imagination. According to Gary 
Kelly’s The English Jacobin Novel, necessity is analogous to logical argument, lending Jacobin 
novels a sense of inevitability: plots are too predictable; characters are too polarized towards 
good and evil; and readers are “bound by the chain of necessity” and “must draw the moral.”165 
As we will see, however, most critics believed Caleb Williams had no pervading moral. Jon 
Klancher and Evan Radcliffe, agree with Kelly that necessity is hostile to the aesthetics of 
narrative, and Godwin’s move away from necessity is couched in terms of his increased attention 
to fiction, emotional motives, and imagination.166 There is no need, however, to place Godwin’s 
Romantic appreciation for the imagination in competition with his determinism. Because 
Godwin draws from Hume, imagination and fiction-making are necessary for making sense of 
history and human behavior because causality is not available to the senses. 
 
The Dysfunctional pedagogies of Things as They Are 
In addition to instructing readers in causality, Caleb Williams is self-reflexive about the 
didactic strategy of necessitarian fiction through its characters, several of whom are masters of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Gary Kelly, English Jacobin Novel, 152. Kelly discusses Thomas Holcroft in these terms and argues that Caleb 
Williams is more successful at avoiding these pitfalls. 
166 Klancher, “Republican Romance Genre”; Radcliffe, “Godwin from ‘Metaphysician’ to Novelist.” Klancher finds 
in Godwin’s unpublished essay on novel writing as history from 1797 a welcome movement away from the 
stultifying necessitarian view of history in Political Justice, towards a Romantic celebration of historical 
contingencies. Evan Radcliffe argues that Godwin must abandon the limitations and inconsistencies of necessity in 
Political Justice in order to narrativize the complexities of character choices in Caleb Williams. He unfavorably 
compares Godwin’s concept of static, consistent character in Political Justice with the dynamic portrayal of 
character in Caleb Williams. Radcliff does not take into account that character and necessity in Political Justice are 
borrowed from Hartley’s associationism, which describes character as constantly evolving through accumulated 
experience. 
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 causal analysis. The novel’s ideal pedagogical model is the poet Mr. Clare, whose 
“remonstrances produced astonishment and conviction” but “never mangled what it was intended 
to heal” (83). Mr. Clare maintains equality between teacher and pupil, as an author does with his 
readers. On his deathbed, Mr. Clare uses causality to predict that Falkland and Tyrrel will have a 
violent conflict, and he shares his foresight by warning Falkland. With Mr. Clare’s death, the 
novel focuses on a struggle for power between two skilled narrators, Caleb and Falkland, who 
each misuse their mastery of causality to seize power and “instruct” (i.e. oppress) the other.  
 The paragon of causal foresight in Caleb Williams is Falkland, who is foiled by Tyrrel’s 
fatalism. Falkland anticipates conflict with Tyrrel and approaches him because he “foresaw 
consequences.” These forebodings seem arrogant to Tyrrel, who returns, “As for consequences, 
what must be must be. As we brew we must bake. . . . I shall not trouble myself about what is to 
be” (89). Since Tyrrel is unwilling to anticipate the future, he is a brutish man, incapable of 
voluntary action, a mere puppet of his educational conditioning. His plots succeed because he 
controls his accomplices through fear, and those like Emily and Hawkins who oppose him are 
equally unsophisticated in the science of causation. When he relates how Tyrrel ruined Hawkins, 
Collins remarks that Hawkins “ought to have foreseen the consequences” and known that 
Tyrrel’s wealth would triumph over his honesty. “Nothing could have been more easy to predict” 
(137). Unlike Tyrell, Falkland forges elaborate long-term plans that manipulate Caleb or 
anticipate how to best deceive his neighbors. The complicated contrivance to plant jewels just 
where Caleb would hide his things and to ask his servant to witness the broken lock on his 
storage chest requires precisely predicting Caleb’s actions, while the surprised Caleb finds 
himself “at a loss to conceive, through every stage of the scene, what would come next” (252). 
Only when unpredictable events trigger immediate, conditioned responses is Falkland surprised 
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 into involuntary action. When Tyrrel returns drunk to the club after being expelled, for instance, 
“nothing could be more unexpected,” and Falkland draws on his habits from Italy to kill Tyrell. 
Recognizing this, Caleb pities Falkland for his involvement in “a catastrophe, exceeding all that . 
. . the most penetrating foresight could have suggested” (164). 
 If Falkland is a causality mastermind, then Caleb is his most promising student. While 
skilled in causation from his childhood, Caleb views the experience he gains living with Falkland 
as an education. Caleb’s “constant state of vigilance and suspicion” as Falkland’s victim quickly 
transforms Caleb into “a competent adept in the different codes in which the human intellect 
displays its secret workings” (199). Writing from a position of experience, the narrator Caleb 
uses fatalistic, foreboding language to throw into relief his former causal blindness to “what 
would come next” (252). In contrast with young Caleb’s naïveté, the narrator Caleb exaggerates 
Falkland’s skills into godlike omniscience, which Falkland encourages with threats and 
promises: “You have taken no material step through their whole course with which I have not 
been acquainted,” he tells Caleb. “I meditated to do you good” (383). While Falkland may pose 
as Caleb’s protective elder, Caleb perceives his instructive guidance as a threat. In Caleb 
Williams, truly “All education is despotism.”167 Caleb actually accuses Falkland of educating 
him: “You took me up a raw and inexperienced boy, capable of being moulded to any form you 
pleased. But you have communicated to me volumes of experience in a very short period. I am 
no longer irresolute and pliable”; he adds, with sarcasm, “I may thank you for having taught me 
a lesson of insurmountable fortitude” (384-85).  
 Their instructional relationship is dysfunctional as long as education is equated with 
exerting power over who another person becomes. When master and pupil are not equals, 
education presents one of two subject positions: the hunter or the hunted, the oppressor or the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Godwin, Enquirer, 146. 
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 oppressed. Initially, Caleb resists adopting these categories: “I thought with unspeakable loathing 
of those errors, in consequence of which every man is fated to be, more or less, the tyrant or the 
slave. . . . I resolved . . . never [to] fill the part either of the oppressor or the sufferer” (238-39). 
In the tragic final court scene, Caleb must recognize in Falkland’s broken form the work of his 
hands—that he, too, is an instructor, a writer, “the author of this hateful scene” (427). His 
illusion of his teacher’s omniscience dissolves with Falkland’s wasted body, and he recognizes 
that his instructor’s knowledge is limited. 
 Part of Caleb’s intense guilt over Falkland’s destruction derives from his conviction that 
Falkland is a “man of genius,” with foresight and generous impulses, who could have reformed 
society had not his education instilled him with a misguided love of chivalry. Instead, Falkland’s 
ability to analyze the social machine and access the inner lives of others is perverted into a 
weapon. The path from benevolence to corruption followed by Caleb and Falkland suggests a 
productive reading of Caleb Williams as a response to the politics of Thomas Hobbes’s 
necessitarianism.168 According to Hobbes, humans are automata determined by an insatiable 
desire for pleasure, and deliberation is merely the process of projecting which option feeds the 
individual’s desire for the pleasures of life. Such self-serving and ultimately self-destructive 
appetites excuse the creation of an authoritarian state (also an automaton) whose power to punish 
places excessive desires in conflict with the natural impulse for self-preservation.169 While 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Hobbes’s argument for necessity is only briefly outlined in The Leviathan, but expansively addressed in A 
Treatise of Liberty and Necessity. Hobbes’s debate with Bramhall formed the original modern philosophical 
conversation on necessity. The later contributions that are most influential across the century include those by John 
Locke, Anthony Collins, and Samuel Clark—but Godwin is unique in systematically rethinking how necessity 
relates to government. Godwin presumably names Caleb’s father-figure and mentor (Collins) after Anthony Collins. 
169 While Hobbes was an atheist, pronouncing human abandonment to appetite nevertheless accords with the 
Calvinist defense of predestination. American revival preacher, Jonathan Edwards, wrote a necessitarian Calvinist 
work published in America (1754) and London (1776), read by Priestley before he wrote his necessity works, and 
favorably cited by Godwin. For Edwards, necessity explains why humans are irrecoverably sinful without the 
miracle of grace. Pairing Enlightenment optimism with necessity is a distinctly late-eighteenth century movement 
that ultimately shifted its politics. 
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 Godwin’s contemporaries considered Hobbes the first English philosophical necessitarian, the 
politics of necessity had slowly shifted over the course of the eighteenth century as the radical 
dissenter Joseph Priestley reedited classic necessitarian works by Anthony Collins and David 
Hartley and republished them through Joseph Johnson, along with his own Unitarian treatises 
defending materialism.170 By the time Political Justice appeared in 1793, the foundation was laid 
for entirely remapping the political implications of mental causation for the age of Rousseau by 
assuming human goodness and perfectibility. Most importantly, Godwin pairs his section on 
necessity in Political Justice with an argument for benevolence. Human beings are 
“mechanical,” Godwin argues, but their need to accompany action with thought separates them 
from Hobbes’s “automatism”; they are capable of using imagination to project the consequences 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Priestley’s publications track how this political shift in necessity occurred, as later-eighteenth century 
intellectuals learned about necessity largely from his works. A founder of Unitarianism and a celebrated pneumatic 
chemist, Priestley was lampooned by anti-Jacobins as a devil consorter but considered himself a dedicated Christian 
uniquely positioned to address the moral implications of materialist theories of mind. In his 1790 introduction to his 
reprint of Anthony Collins’s A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty, which was generally considered 
the most cogent introductory text on the subject, Priestley admits that “unbelievers” like Collins, Hobbes, and Hume 
failed to adequately address legitimate concerns that necessity destroys moral responsibility for one’s actions, the 
efficacy of prayer, the presence of God in the universe, and divine revelation. His own work on necessity, The 
Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated (an appendix in vol. 2 of his 1777 and 1782 editions of Disquisitions 
on Matter and Spirit) fills the relative silence on theological issues among necessitarian philosophers. Priestley 
describes how contemplating upon our determined actions fosters a sublime realization that all events have 
connections unknown to us but foreseen by an all-knowing, benevolent God. The teleological dimension of 
Priestley’s chain appears in another work he edited and reprinted in 1775 and 1790 David Hartley’s Observations on 
man, a foundational text of associationist psychology that also defends necessity. Hartley theorizes how the mind 
mechanically joins together ideas from experience, creating causal chains of associated thoughts and actions unique 
to each individual. In Hartley’s optimistic assessment, social interaction mitigates undesirable extremes by 
exchanging associations. Thus association “has a tendency to reduce the state of those who have eaten of the tree of 
the knowledge of good and evil, back again to a paradisiacal one” (Hartley, 27). Priestley’s “chain of cause and 
effect” captures the utopianism implicit in Harley’s association of ideas, thus offering Priestley a way to reconcile 
God’s goodness and justice with human suffering. He answers Hume’s “shocking suggestion” that God is the author 
of sin by arguing that what we perceive as evil leads to an unknown greater good. Priestly published sections of 
Hartley’s Theory of the Human Mind in 1775 and 1790 with his own essay comments, and Joseph Johnson reprinted 
the entirety of Hartley’s Observations on man in 1791, which contains Hartley’s chapter, “A View of the Doctrine 
of Philosophical Necessity.” 
 Extracting from Hartley a secularized teleological promise of earthly perfectibility through causal 
mechanisms, Political Justice applied that promise to politics and cemented the connection between necessity and 
reform that Priestley instigated. Consequently, an idea originally outlined in Hobbes’s defense of monarchy became 
attached a century later to a republican movement for constitutional reform among English dissenters. As its 
political context drifted, the penultimate historical example of necessity that concludes Collins’s 1717 essay—that 
“it was as impossible for Julius Caesar not to have died in the Senate, as it is impossible for two and two to make 
six”—would take on new valences when Priestley reprinted it in 1790, one year after the storming of the Bastille 
(Collins, 73). 
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 of their actions for other individuals and of choosing the greatest good regardless of personal 
appetites.171 The capacity to act with benevolence reverses the political implications of necessity 
and destroys the case for government through fear. The complex emotional components of 
character motives in Godwin’s fiction, especially the novel’s sentimental conclusion, are 
manifestations of this new politics of causation.172 
 The innovations of Caleb Williams not only reevaluate pedagogical methods along 
necessitarian lines, but in doing so support Godwin’s wider political argument that monarchies 
destructively educate their subjects. The 1795 preface to Caleb Williams makes explicit the 
novel’s “purpose” to refute Hobbes by providing “a general review of the modes of domestic and 
unrecorded despotism by which man becomes the destroyer of man” (55). Man is not by nature 
in a state of war against all; he “becomes” the destroyer of his neighbor as social hierarchies 
violently restructure his psychological makeup. Tragically, a gentleman’s education transforms a 
benevolent man like Falkland, who impulsively risks his life to save Emily from her burning 
home, into another Alexander the Great, scheming to sacrifice thousands to preserve his name 
for posterity. As things are, education is destructive—which implies an alternative possibility, 
where individuals might cooperatively instruct one another with voluntary benevolence in 
Godwin’s necessitarian notion of virtue.  
 
Contemporary Reception of Caleb Williams as Necessitarian Fiction 
 While Godwin’s own literary circle may have understood the pedagogical strategy of 
necessitarian fiction, many of his readers did not. They expected a novel that teaches 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Godwin, Political Justice, 399-403. 
172 In Caleb Williams, the insatiable appetite that plagues Caleb is love, which makes him dependent on other people 
for his emotional well-being. Caleb curses nature that “endowed me with wishes insatiate, and sunk me in never-
ending degradation!” (354). His insatiable wish for companionship and love make him unable to live alone. His 
benevolence endures and torments him in his isolation. 
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 hierarchically, through cautionary tales and exemplary characters. Nowhere is the departure of 
Caleb Williams from established didactic conventions more clear than in its critical reception. 
When the novel first appeared in 1794 (without Godwin’s 1795 introduction), the Monthly 
Review hazarded two possible morals for what it called Godwin’s “fable,” which separated out a 
“higher object” from the interference of Godwin’s “favorite opinions.” First, “the fictitious 
narrative seems to have been written chiefly for the purpose of representing, in strong colours, 
the fatal consequence of suffering the love of fame to become predominant,” and second, “A 
farther object in this story appears to have been to exhibit an example of the danger of indulging 
an idle curiosity, merely for its own gratification.”173 The admittedly puzzled reviewer grasps at 
the two flaws that drive the main characters: curiosity and love of reputation. But there is 
something not quite satisfactory, even to the reviewer, about phrasing the moral of Caleb 
Williams in these terms. The first half of the novel is devoted to the educational background of 
Caleb and Falkland, explaining why Caleb is curious and how Falkland “imbibed the love of 
chivalry and romance” in Italy (67).174 By the time they have a serious confrontation, however, 
the question of how each will act is less of a moral quandary than a foregone conclusion. 
 The reception of Caleb Williams suggests that for a novel of this period to have a moral 
the characters must reap what they sow. The Analytical Review, therefore, finds the novel 
disorganized because of the way consequences fail to affect the characters responsible: 
We will not enter more minutely into the discussion of a plot so imperfect; or inquire into 
the degree of probability, that such characters should act as they are made to do. It does 
not appear to us, that any entire moral pervades this narrative. The author’s occasional 
deduction, on the state of society are but too well founded. The character of Tyrrel is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Graham, Godwin Reviewed, 86, 88. 
174 All references to Caleb Williams are cited in text as CW. 
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 very uncommon, but his fate teaches us nothing. Falkland is extremely singular in his 
motives, his actions, and his wretched end; and this singularity pervades and governs the 
adventures of Williams. The adaptation of the causes to the effects, the merits or demerits 
of the personages, and the whole contexture of the story, apply too little to any thing 
within the ordinary course of observations, to afford any general moral.175 
The novel fails, surprisingly, in what the reviewer calls its “Adaptations of the causes to the 
effects” because there is no poetic justice to tie actions with consequences, which is quite 
different from the accurate psychological causality that concerned Godwin. The shortcomings of 
Tyrrel, who tyrannizes his sister to death, teach us nothing because his fate—he is randomly 
murdered by Falkland—does not follow from his poor choices. The reviewer expects Tyrrel to 
provide an edifying example of how vice produces its own punishments, but Tyrrel does not live 
to regret the cruelty that produces his isolation. Nor does his death avenge Emily, since he is 
killed privately, impulsively, to sooth Falkland’s wounded pride. He is merely the formative 
event that makes Falkland a virtuous murderer. 
 Remarkably, even though the reviewer acknowledges agreement with Godwin’s political 
observations, he finds no moral because the novel’s events are so “singular” that they cannot be 
generalized and applied to something readers might actually face. According to Godwin, 
however, necessitarian novel experiments are useful for the insights they provide into how 
individual minds respond to external political influences. The accuracy of these insights depends 
on whether the fictional narrative attributes to mental development the same causal regularity as 
the natural world, regardless of whether the scenario in which the characters are placed is itself 
highly unusual. Godwin frankly confesses his traffic in unusual scenes while insisting on the 
applicability of Caleb Williams to real life. In the preface to his first edition of Fleetwood, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Graham, Godwin Reviewed, 84. 
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 Godwin offers his new novel, stocked with commonplace events, to his former critics as a “dish 
agreeable to your own receipt,” while conceding that “Caleb Williams was a story of very 
surprising and uncommon events which were supposed to be entirely within the laws and 
established course of nature, as she operates in the planet we inhabit.”176 Unusual events are not 
unnatural events, provided they submit to scientific regularity. 
 The critical reception of Caleb Williams suggests several ways in which reviewers differ 
from Godwin in how they imagine readers gain instruction from novels. Reviewers recognize 
moral content related to domestic affections and personal choices and separate these lessons 
from the author’s presumed political or philosophical messages. They give less weight to the 
expansive personal histories of characters, which for Godwin are central to the reader’s 
development of a necessitarian perspective on characters’ actions. Reviewers value symmetry 
between a character’s actions and the consequences visited upon that character, and they 
consider this symmetry vital to the novel’s cohesive vision, its realism, and its applicability to a 
reader’s life; whereas Godwin values accurate psychological causation, which because it 
conforms to the laws of the natural world, provides universal instruction about how the minds of 
all readers are formed.  
 Godwin anticipates his critics’ confusion within his novel through his exemplary 
character, Laura, who misreads Caleb’s life story. Laura cannot accept a world of complex 
morality, where a virtuous man like Falkland might also commit a horrible crime, or where vice 
is not punished and virtue rewarded. She finally refuses to hear Caleb’s defense because she 
reveres Falkland as the man who selflessly rescued her father from ruin. Addressed by Caleb as 
“admirable, exemplary Laura,” her position on moral clarity requires that she reject Caleb when 
she learns he is the subject of Gines’s Newgate biography (CW, 403). While a disreputable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Godwin, Fleetwood, 13. 
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 publication might seem unlikely to defeat months of established goodwill, it is unclear whether 
Laura finds Caleb a threat because she believes Gines’s story or because the existence of two 
plausible narratives threatens her with moral ambiguity. In Caleb’s youth, he recalls, he believed 
that “[i]nnocence and guilt” were “opposite to each other” (243). Laura now reflects back the 
beliefs Caleb overturned with experience. “The good man and the bad are characters precisely 
opposite,” she tells him, “not characters distinguished from each other by imperceptible shades.” 
She interrupts Caleb’s pleas of innocence with, “I do not wish to have my understanding 
perverted, and all the differences of things concealed from my apprehension” (404). In their 
debate, Laura takes Richardson’s position of moral clarity, while Caleb insists that characters 
like himself are morally complex.  
 Since Caleb and Laura are both instructors of Laura’s children, they represent two 
pedagogical models. Laura believes what is “recorded in books,” that “ingenuity” cannot 
“subvert the distinctions of right and wrong” (256-57). What especially bothers Laura is the 
possibility that “words” influence how we assign moral responsibility. “True virtue refuses the 
drudgery of explanation and apology,” she insists, “True virtue shines by its own light, and needs 
no art to set it off,” and she concludes, “Virtue, sir, consists in actions, and not in words” (256-
57). She mistrusts Caleb’s verbal skills as a sign of deceit instead of a tool of analysis. 
Confronted with Laura’s expectations of moral transparency, Caleb is forced to fully recognize 
that fiction plays a role in his confessions as much as it does in Gines’s biography. “Exemplary” 
Laura occupies a position rejected by the novel and voiced in order to clarify Godwin’s theory of 
fiction, where conjunctions only become meaningful through fictional narration. 
 One reader who understood the pedagogy of Caleb Williams was Godwin’s friend, Mary 
Hays. In their correspondence, Hays tells Godwin that she considered him the ideal reader of her 
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 life and her novels, because they both have a necessitarian approach to consequences: “It is 
because you are a philosopher that I can unfold my mind without reserve or apprehension: you 
are able to trace, & to investigate, the sources of its disorders & its mistakes.”177 Where Godwin 
speaks about conjunctions, Hays substitutes “tracing,” a phrase that evokes both writing and 
causality. 
Hays comments astutely on the didactic function of novels, using Caleb Williams as her 
ready example for how writers should instruct readers through fiction. Her letter to the Monthly 
Magazine “On Novel Writing” that appeared in September 1797, opens by reviewing Samuel 
Johnson’s Rambler No. 4, in which he praises the novels of his friend, Samuel Richardson, for 
their exemplary characters, and questions whether Henry Fielding’s morally mixed characters 
encourage the wrong kind of emulation. Johnson’s view is that espoused by Laura in Caleb 
Williams. Differentiating virtue from villainy, while engaging affection for the one and disgust of 
the other, is what distinguishes the novel as an instructional tool over quotidian experience. Mary 
Hays respectfully disagrees; she criticizes the aloof perfection of Richardson’s Clarissa and 
argues that disgust prevents readers from developing humility and sympathy based on their 
common human frailties—what Fielding claims to cultivate through mixed characters. By using 
Caleb Williams as her prime model, Hays positions Godwin as an heir to Fielding, despite 
similarities between Caleb, an innocent fugitive driven from his home, and that other persecuted 
flight-risk, Clarissa Harlowe. 
 Hays and Godwin attach political signification to fictions that “trace” or explain causality 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Brooks, Critical Study, 201. Hays wrote an essay on necessity, “Letter to Amasia” in Letters and Essays, Moral, 
and Miscellaneous (1793) just months before she first read Political Justice and corresponded with William 
Godwin. Necessity was central to her theory of novel writing and education, making her a convenient ideal reader 
who “gets” Godwin’s method. Elizabeth Hamilton’s Memoirs of Modern Philosophers features two characters based 
on Godwin and Hays who spout necessitarian cant, indicating that a novel-reading public was expected to know 
their metaphysics (or not get the humor). 
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 because theories of causation are also theories of power. 178 As Hume argues, the association of 
ideas”—that is, the fictions we create in our mind to explain what we experience—is the “source 
of all the relations of interest and duty, by which men influence each other in society, and are 
plac’d in the ties of government and subordination.”179 In short, power relationships depend on 
custom to appear natural. Kings, masters, and husbands do not have the power to command 
others because they are superior, or even because hierarchy is necessary for social order; they 
command because subjects and servants, who are accustomed to observe servants do what 
masters tell them, generalize from their limited sphere of observation that servants must obey 
their masters. That is why Godwin argues in Political Justice that submission out of respect to a 
person’s rank is more harmful to society than submitting to force, because at least force exposes 
that only violence (not superiority) maintains oppression.180 Following Hume’s example, 
Godwin credits custom and habit with establishing everything from our religious beliefs and 
experimental inferences, to our assumptions about the power dynamics between human beings—
that “the far greatest part of our reasonings, with all our actions and passions, can be deriv’d 
from nothing but custom and habit.”181 Causal fictions complete to establish hegemony; narrative 
is a tool, therefore, for revising what is possible. Caleb can change places with Falkland by 
authoring a different story about power: “At present,” Caleb muses, “he appears to be the 
persecutor, and I the persecuted: is not this difference the mere creature of the imagination?” 
(412).182 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 “The several instances of resembling conjunctions lead us into the notion of power and necessity” (Hume 165). 
Hume is following a connection between causation and power shared by Locke’s chapter, “On Power,” which 
addresses freedom of the will. 
179 Hume, Treatise, 12. 
180 Godwin, Political Justice, 1:49. 
181 Hume, Treatise, 118. 
182 Cf. Evans, “Shelley, Godwin, Hume.” Evans gives a cogent explanation of Hume’s philosophy and its influence 
on Shelley and Godwin, but concludes “There is none of Hume’s skepticism, however, in Godwin or Shelley. . . . 
There is no evidence of Godwin’s awareness that in using Hume’s reasoning and illustrations he had completely 
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Mary Hays: Necessity against Exemplarity 
If Elizabeth Hamilton’s satirical portrait of Mary Hays as Brigetina Botherim in Memoirs 
of Modern Philosophers is any indication, Hays’s necessitarianism contributed to her reputation 
as an aggressive bluestocking. Bridgetina is an avowed necessitarian who makes impetuous, 
random decisions that celebrate her disregard for accepted patterns of behavior. At one point, she 
abandons a house full of guests that she invited in order to visit a philosopher (representing 
Godwin) whom she has just learned is in the neighborhood. In response to her mother’s 
objections, she splices from Political Justice, “And do you think I am now at liberty to remain 
here? I wonder, mamma, how you can speak so ridiculously? Have I not told you again and 
again, that I am under the necessity of preferring the motive that is most preferable? The 
company, if they are not very ignorant indeed, must know that my going instantly to Mr. Glib’s 
is a link in the glorious chain of causation, generated in eternity” [Emphasis original].183 By 
applying philosophical necessity to such quotidian events as a dinner party, Bridgetina 
unwittingly reveals the absurd grandiosity behind Godwin’s representation of individual lives as 
part of a historic, cosmic system of causation. Her impulsive irregularity reflects the position of 
Scottish common sense philosophers that necessity is merely theoretical. The life of a “practical 
fatalist,” pronounced James Beattie, would be “a series of adventures, more ludicrous, or at least 
more irrational than any of those for which the knight of La Mancha is celebrated.”184 
 By feeding Bridgetina bits of decontextualized Godwin, Hamilton’s novel ignores that 
Hays was no passive Godwin groupie. She actually published on necessity before she knew 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reversed Hume’s fundamental point of view” (639-40). On the contrary, a letter from Hays to Godwin dated 
December 1795 indicates that both Godwin and Holcroft embraced Hume’s skepticism of causation when the three 
authors met over tea on November 24, 1795. For Hays’s letters to Godwin, see Brooks, Critical Study,186-87.  
183 Hamilton, Memoirs of Modern Philosophers, 28-29. 
184 Beattie, Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, 393. 
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 Godwin or read his Political Justice.185 Both of her novels, The Memoirs of Emma Courtney and 
The Victim of Prejudice, are self-reflexive about how novels teach, and they represent readers 
who learn from texts and apply necessity in practical ways.  
 Her epistolary novel, Emma Courtney, is based on the author’s actual correspondence 
with William Frend, to whom she confessed her love, and Godwin, with whom she discussed her 
intellectual ideas and confessed her emotional frustration following Frend’s rejection. The novel 
is purportedly a series of letters collected by Emma for her adopted son, Augustus. Like Emma 
(and Hays), Augustus suffers from single-mindedly pursuing a person who refuses his love. The 
conventions of didactic literature inform us that if Emma’s voice is a mask for Hays’s advice, 
then Augustus stands in for the reader, whom she cautions to avoid her mistakes—or so one 
would assume. But what prompts Emma to send Augustus her letters is the news that he has 
already repeated Emma’s error, so the letters are too late to function as a cautionary tale. 
 Emma’s narrative is less concerned with how to avoid her errors, than with how to 
recover from them. The first portion of Emma’s letter are written to Mr. Francis (a figure for 
Godwin) to whom she turns for advice while recovering from the malaise of unrequited love. At 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Mary Hays wrote to Godwin for the first time in 1793 to ask if she could borrow a copy of his Political Justice, 
which is three months after the publication of Letters and Essays. These dates are common knowledge, but the 
independent philosophical traditions of these two writers is not usually emphasizes. There is some indication that 
Hays was familiar with associationism and necessity in her first publication, Cursory Remarks on an Enquiry into 
the Expediency and Propriety of Public or Social Worship: Inscribed to Gilbert Wakefield (1791), which defended 
public prayer against Wakefield’s previously published objections. She does not think that prayer can alter God’s 
plans, but values regular prayer for the habits it forms: 
And though such devout aspirations can give no information to an Omniscient Being, nor alter his plans, 
originally designed for the greatest general and individual good; yet it is possible, that they may be links in 
the great chain of causes and effects, and by giving rise to pure and pious sentiments, be ultimately 
productive of consequences the most beneficial. . . . . even a mechanical devotion, a mere performance of 
external duties . . . may have a restraining effect upon the conduct . . . when through the medium of the 
senses, repeated impressions have been made on the brain, good or evil habits acquire an ascendancy not 
easily to be eradicated; words must first be taught, and ideas will afterwards cling to them. (10) 
Hays defense of prayer as a mechanical exercise might seem unusual for a Protestant tradition, but it shows the 
degree to which Hays approaches ideas or abstractions through the body. Even religious belief is grounded in 
repeated actions. 
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 first Mr. Francis responds to Emma’s confessions by blaming Emma for allowing herself to love 
and pursue a man who fails to declare his interest. All of her misfortunes, he insists, are 
“assiduously, unintermittedly, provided by yourself,” because Emma refuses to control her 
character and her heart. But Emma rebukes Mr. Francis, arguing that she is not the agent of her 
actions or her circumstances. Francis has mistaken his role as her reader. She corrects him, “To 
what purpose did you read my confessions, but to trace in them a character formed, like every 
other human character, by the result of unavoidable impressions, and the chain of necessary 
events.”186 Her tracing process does not reveal places where Emma could have chosen 
differently, as Francis would like to think; it confirms the “unavoidable” and “necessary” 
influences in her childhood.  
 Emma’s correction of Mr. Francis reminds her son, Augustus, that her life story is a 
model for how to learn from the past by creating a narrative arc connecting remote experiences 
from early life with adult moments of crisis. Emma tells Augustus to search her letters for “the 
effects” that Emma’s experiences “have produced on my mind. . . . While I trace them, they 
convince me of the irresistible power of circumstances, modifying and controuling our 
characters, and introducing, mechanically, those associations and habits which make us what we 
are; for without outward impressions we should be nothing” (10). Couched in the language of 
“habits” and causation, the kind of instructive reading that Emma recommends to Augustus and 
Mr. Francis should be familiar by now as the same pedagogical strategy I have outlined in Caleb 
Williams. The novel closes with a description of Augustus’s early education and Emma’s 
innovative parenting, providing the groundwork for him to continue where she concludes by 
tracing his own life, just as readers come away from Hays’s novel with the ability to trace their 
lives.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Hays, Emma Courtney, 147. Hereafter cited in text. 
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  Hays’s second novel, The Victim of Prejudice, interrogates how novels instruct readers by 
targeting Samuel Richardson through Mary Raymond, a heroine who confesses, “my virtues and 
my sufferings” are “alike unrewarded.” (Her life reflects neither Pamela, subtitled “Virtue 
Rewarded,” nor Clarissa.) Whereas Emma Courtney is a flawed heroine who learns to value the 
wisdom gained by hard experience, Mary Raymond is an exemplary heroine whose prudent 
choices and dutiful sexual self-regulation utterly fail against that grand conspiracy, “prejudice.” 
She writes her story while in prison, placed there by the man who raped her, where she seeks to 
“beguile my woes by tracing their origin and their progress” (VP, 168). 
 The necessitarian account of Mary Raymond’s life, “traced” by herself, contains a framed 
cautionary tale: the epistolary confessions of Mary’s mother, a fallen woman who murdered her 
seducer. The Victim of Prejudice plays these two ways of reading and writing against one 
another. Like a good novel reader, Mary Raymond attempts to use her mother as a negative 
example to guide her behavior, but she finds that her choices are limited by circumstances 
beyond her control. Mary writes, “the recollection of my misfortunes lost its poignancy when I 
reflected that by no prudence could they have been averted, nor could any activity have served to 
repel them. In no one instance had I been wanting to myself, but, passive and helpless, a victim 
to circumstances over which I had little power” (VP, 131). Her mother’s cautionary example 
proves simply irrelevant in the face of harmful social norms: men can ruin or rape women with 
impunity; wealthy men are unassailable by the law; and women have few employment options.  
 If we read the mother’s cautionary tale as an inherited didactic genre, which Mary 
Raymond finds inadequate for organizing her own narrative, then its failure to prevent the 
daughter’s ruin represents Hays’s frustration with her own literary tradition. Rather than pretend 
that women can simply choose virtue in a vacuum, Hays prefers necessity, which ties individual 
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 behavior to social environment. A recurrent theme in Hays’s writing, Mary Raymond’s tragic 
repetition of her mother’s fate despite her ideal education demonstrates the futility of reforming 
moral behavior on an individual level in an unreformed world. Mary makes this complaint 
explicit: “While the practice of the world opposes the principles of the sage, education is a 
fallacious effort, morals an empty theory, and sentiment a delusive dream.” (VP, 33) 
 Like Hays, who reworks Richardson’s Clarissa, Mary Raymond discovers an unexpected 
moral in her mother’s story. She learns that morality is not reducible to individual choice: “by 
enlarging the circle of my observation, though in the bosom of depravity, my understanding 
became enlightened: I perceived myself the victim of the injustice, of the prejudice, of society.” 
(VP, 66). Mary feels liberated by knowing that she is not responsible for her fate. However, 
Mary Hays’s reviewers tended to praise the mother’s confessions as the most instructive moment 
in the novel and complain that Mary Raymond’s story shows no correspondence between moral 
choices and consequences. Of course, that’s the point.  
 
Necessity and the body: Mary Hays and materialism 
 Considering that Hays and Godwin agree on how readers might learn from biographical 
fiction, it may seem surprising that Hays uses Emma Courtney’s Mr. Francis, who represents 
Godwin, as a bad reader who fails to understand necessity. However, Hays embraced a different 
version of philosophical necessity that tends to emphasize the body over ideas. For instance, 
when Mr. Francis insists that even love, may be “subjected to the laws of investigation and 
reasoning,” Emma objects that to “argue with the wretch infected with the plague” will not “stop 
the tide of blood, that is rapidly carrying its contagion to the heart” (EC, 141). Where Godwin 
uses necessity to write a novel about psychological trauma, Hays uses necessity to write about 
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 rape, illness, and violence. Although the bloody trauma of Hays’s novels can make them seem 
utterly depressing, Hays ultimately uses necessity to locate agency for women in education. 
Where Godwin uses Hume to find liberty in the imagination, Hays turns to Joseph Priestley’s 
Christian Unitarian necessity to find redemption through experiential education.  
 Hays rejects the latent Cartesian dualism that persists in Godwin’s concept of “reason” as 
a locus of agency or self-control over the passions. Derived from her education among the 
Unitarian community, Hays embraces a determinist materialism that makes the mind biological 
without resorting to gender essentialism. “This fancy of a naked, unembodied mind,” she argues 
in support of the body’s resurrection after death, “appears to me uncomfortable and cheerless.”187 
In a letter to Godwin, written a year before the publication of Emma Courtney, Hays confesses 
that she is a “materialist” since “man appears to me to be but of one substance,” meaning that 
Hays did not believe in a soul or mind separate from the body.188 A material mind explained, for 
Hays, how patterns of behavior establish themselves as part of the body itself through repeated 
actions that become habit or through customs we observe repeated by others.  
Hays’s correspondence reveals that she disagreed with Hume’s skeptical substitution of 
association for causation, the position espoused by Godwin and Thomas Holcroft. Following a 
tea with Godwin and Holcroft in December 1795, Hays writes Godwin to continue a debate 
between the three authors on causation: “My philosophy will, I doubt, become sadly deranged if 
I must banish the terms & the ideas of cause & effect: my whole system of necessity, which I 
conceived to be founded upon a rock, begins to totter.” Although Hays mentions no specific texts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Hays, Letters and Essays, 163. 
188 October 1, 1795, “I have said that I was a materialist & I would say so still if I knew what I meant: but, as I am 
very ignorant of the nature of matter, I will only say, that man appears to me to be but of one substance, capable of 
receiving from external impressions sensible ideas, successively formed into various combinations & trains, carried 
on, by means of sympathy & association with mechanical exactness, in an infinite series of causes & effects” 
(Brooks, Critical Study, 400). 
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 or philosophers, she describes and rejects Hume’s idea of causation as merely an association of 
ideas, created by the imagination and existing in the mind. While Godwin presumably supported 
skepticism over tea, Hays objects that if there is no certainty of causation, then the natural world 
would not function. She continues, 
Had I seen you for an indefinite number of times, follow’d by Mr Holcroft, I might have 
call’d you the antecedent & your friend the consequent, but, at the same time, this notion 
wou’d have been very different from what (by way of distinction) we call a physical 
cause & effect. (I shall get bewildered, you admit of no system of physics, I believe, you 
will make me, ere long, like the ancient pyrrhon’ics, doubt of the reality of my own 
existence, of matter & motion . . . ) . . . . If I, with design, stretch out my h& a thousand 
times a day, & repeat the experiment every day of my life, to grasp an unresisting 
object—this design, this invariable motion, & invariable consequence, seems to bespeak 
a real & necessary connexion, subject to fix’d laws, & which, however ignorant I may be 
of the nature of those laws or the generating substance, I think may, without impropriety 
be denominated cause & effect.189 
Even if we do not observe or understand causation, argues Hays, it is safe enough to conclude 
there is a “real and necessary connexion” when the conjunction remains the same, time and 
again. Taking a practical approach, Hays refuses to question her senses or her material existence. 
As a participant in the Unitarian community, Hays’s philosophical necessity was 
connected with Christian materialism. From 1791-1794, Hays had tea several times with 
Priestley and other Unitarians, while she studied with the Tutors of New College in Hackney. 
She read Priestley’s Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit and his editions of David Hartley and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Brooks, Critical Study, 186-87. Hays mentions tea with Holcroft and Godwin for November 27, 1795, in her 
letter, dated November 24,, 1795; Her December 1795 letter is quoted here.  
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 Anthony Collins, works she cites in “Letter to Amasia” in her pedagogical work, Letters on 
Essays, Moral and Miscellaneous (1793). 190 She specifically praises “Priestley’s admirable 
preface to Collins’s equally excellent inquiry concerning human liberty” where Priestley 
attempts to reclaim necessity as a Christian concept.191 For Priestley, dualism is a Greek 
perversion of early Christianity that vilifies the body and denigrates women. These ideas 
remained attractive to Hays, who fell prey to the malignant literary tradition of demeaning 
women intellectuals by associating female authorship with misogynistic representations of 
women’s reproductive bodies.192 The Unitarian community, in turn, appreciated Hays’s writings 
on necessity. A copy of Hays’s Letters and Essays gifted to Theophilus Lindsay, co-founder with 
Priestley of the Unitarian church, produced a short letter of gratitude, in which Lindsay singles 
out her letters on necessity for praise: “The scarecrow doctrine of Necessity you have known 
how to strip of the horrid form, and to familiarize and make it easy, and I think to vindicate its 
truth. . . . In short, I like both your metaphysics and divinity.”193 All of this indicates that Hays’s 
necessitarianism, unlike Godwin’s, comes from a Unitarian tradition of Christian materialism 
that helps Hays put necessity to practical use in women’s lives. 
While engaging with contemporary feminist intellectuals, Hays differs in her theorization 
of bodies as capable of thought as part of her practical feminism. Whereas Mary Wollstonecraft 
concedes the superior strength of men in order to defend the equal potential of the female mind, 
Mary Hays sees the female constitution itself as sculpted by male domination in intellectual and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Walker, Idea of Being Free, 114-15, 156-161. 
191 Hays, Letters and Essays, 189. 
192 Taking advantage of her reputation, Charles Lloyd, a friend of Hays’s correspondent, Charles Lamb, fabricated a 
story about rejecting Hays’s advances. Elizabeth Hamilton’s portrait of Hays as Bridgetina Botherim in Memoirs of 
Modern Philosophers is typical in its depiction of a scrawny, grotesque figure, more of an intellectual follower than 
an originator, who is mocked and abused in her quest to secure a man who misconstrues her frank courtship. These 
satirical portraits seeped into the reception of Hays’s novels, as when The Critical Review dismisses The Victim of 
Prejudice as “an abortion of improbabilities, issuing from the frigid brain of a paradoxical sophist” (VP, 250). 
193 Walker, Idea of Being Free, 190-91. 
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 political arenas. As Emma Courtney explains to Mr. Francis, “I disallow [sex] as a natural plea” 
for “weakness,” while “I admit it as an artificial, plea.” Women are weak because “character” is 
“modified by circumstances: the customs of society, then, have enslaved, enervated and 
degraded women” (39). Qualities, such as weakness, attributed to women naturally, are produced 
through education and reinforced across generations when young women observe weakness in 
women (and become accustomed to hearing women called weak) and, accepting weakness as 
natural, form habits that conform to their degraded self-image. Biological development includes 
a social feedback, whereby individual women become what they are told they are. 
The shocking prevalence of explicit violence and bodily illness in Hays’s fiction is part of 
her project to expose how bodies inscribe the emotional and mental experiences of individual 
women as part of their very composition. Her work forces its audience to consider how patterns 
of domestic abuse and violence against women are interdependent with the failure to respect 
women as intelligent beings. According to the materiality of mind that Hays envisions, women 
who struggle to re-mould themselves against the grain of their ideological conditioning must 
endure the pain of a surgical procedure. After childhood establishes habits recorded in the flesh, 
reform and reeducation is a form of self-mutilation. The pain endured by women thus occurs in 
two stages, first during childhood and adolescence as girls form unhealthy patterns of behavior, 
and second as women restructure themselves while made to feel self-hatred for mistakes 
committed in consequence of their early conditioning. One reason that Hays dislikes exemplary 
women characters is that they teach women to hate themselves for their imperfections. Hays 
intercedes in this pattern of violence and self-destruction by suggesting that women view their 
actions from a much wider temporal and social perspective, a strategy that emerges from 
necessitarian philosophy. 
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  In her writing, Hays works through the implications of necessity and materialism for how 
women might assert control over their lives, despite a lifetime of exposure to cultural influences 
that weaken their mental powers and their constitution. Taking seriously the control exerted by 
social influences, which become locked in individual bodies through experiential education, 
Hays paints a dismal prospect of the possibilities for any one woman to transcend the limitations 
of her historical moment, but she does so in order to group women together into a history of 
heroic resisters whose painful lessons create the horizon of possibilities for the next generation.  
 Hays draws from Priestley and Hartley the promise that physical suffering is a sign of 
redeeming transformations, in individuals over a lifetime and in humanity across history: 
the God of Providence either subjected our minds to mechanical principles, or lead & 
governs us by the circumstances with which he has surrounded us; that his power implies 
his goodness; & that, after the struggle of the passions has unfolded our reason, we shall 
be gradually prepared for greater & still encreasing perfection.—That we ought to regard 
the vicious in no other light than we do the diseased, & that it is a part of the duty 
assigned to us to aid the general effort for improvement & restoration.194 
Hays makes the typical Enlightenment transition between personal education and humanity’s 
historical progress. As Emma Courtney’s experience demonstrates, “the struggle of the passions” 
is painful and violent but redemptive. Painful experience educates, improves, and restores. 
 Pain and violence permeate Hays’s writing as a sign of her materialist theories of 
education. Pain becomes “improvement & restoration” through the cross-historical, collective 
action of women. Throughout her writings, Hays mentions “victims” and “martyrs,” the latter 
distinguished by her choice to submit to violence publically rather than lend credence to the 
status quo by submitting to authority. In other words, a victim becomes a martyr only when she 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Brooks, Critical Study, 171-72. 
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 publically chooses suffering over submission, transforming individual suffering into a 
meaningful lesson for humanity as a whole. Through victimhood and martyrdom, Hays considers 
how an individual woman’s actions are part of the collective thoughts and actions of other 
women. 
 
Victims and Martyrs: Hays’s theory of authorship 
“I will not see the name of my girl enrolled in the tragic list either of martyrs or of victims.” 
—The Victim of Prejudice, 32. 
The twin labels, victim and martyr, consistently appear throughout Hays’s corpus of 
writing. Both of Hays’s fictional works of the 1790s include “victim” in the title and refer to 
heroines as martyrs, while her biographies of women collected for young readers retell stories of 
women who maintain their integrity under persecution. Her six-volume collection, Female 
Biography; or, Memoirs of Illustrious and Celebrated Women of All Ages and Countries, 
Alphabetically Arranged, Written for Girls, includes the story of Protestant martyr Anne Askew, 
whose life Hays reinterprets as a form of feminist resistance. Askew’s biography clarifies how 
Hays associates martyrdom with female authorship, as well as how she uses violence against 
women to establish a tradition of female intellectual resistance.  
 According to Hays, Askew is thrown out of her home for “Her presumption in making 
use of her own judgment,” which “disgusted and incensed her husband.”195 Askew is a threat 
because her willingness to express heretical beliefs challenges the authority of her husband by 
displaying her intelligence and independence. Askew travels to London, where Henry VIII (still 
Catholic) arrests her for heresy. Hays’s description of her torture contrasts Askew’s mental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Hays, Female Biography, 1:107-08. 
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 stability with the angry men surrounding her, who are easily herded by priests and court 
politicians in their eagerness to maintain power: 
[Askew’s] magnanimity, so worth of admiration, served but to incense her barbarous 
persecutors, who endeavoured by the rack to extort from her what she had refused to their 
demands. She sustained the torture with unshaken fortitude, and meek resignation: her 
courage, her youth, her sex, her beauty, failed to soften the hearts of the monsters which 
fanaticism had inflamed. Wriothesely, with unmanly and infernal rage, commanded, with 
menaces, the lieutenant of the Tower to strain the instrument of his vengeance: on 
receiving a refusal, he threw off his gown, and, maddened with superstitious zeal, 
exercised himself the office of executioner, and nearly destroyed the tender frame of the 
innocent victim. Anne, loosed at length from the horrid engine of their cruelty, with every 
limb dislocated, fainted with anguish. When recovered, she remained sitting two hours on 
the bare ground, calmly reasoning with her tormentors. Again, by flattery, sophistry, and 
menaces, they sought to move her from her purpose, and once more were confounded by 
her courage and resolution. Unable to stand, she was carried away in a chair, and pardon 
and life again offered to her, upon condition of recanting her declarations, which having 
still refused, she was condemned to the stake.196 
While “unmanly” Wriothesely tears off his clothes and cannot restrain his anger, Askew reasons 
with her torturers. In Hays’s account, Askew provokes the authorities specifically because her 
intellectual competence and “her courage and resolution” violate gender norms: “The sex and 
age of the heretic aggravated, rather than softened, the malice of her adversaries, who could not 
pardon in a woman the presumption of opposing arguments and reason to their assertions and 
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 dogmas.”197 By including Askew’s biography alongside those of Catholic women like Mary 
Queen of Scotts, who also earns praise for following her conscience, Hays clarifies that her 
histories reinterpret religious and political martyrs as advocates for women. Like many Clarissa-
like novel protagonists in fiction by Wollstonecraft, Charlotte Smith, and Elizabeth Inchbald, 
Askew is betrayed, imprisoned, and her body assaulted to extort concessions by the very men 
who should protect her, thus exposing the myth of the benevolent patriarch. 
 Martyrdom in Askew’s biography exemplifies Hays’s theory of authorship and reception. 
An author while in prison, Askew writes “a confession of her faith, and an attestation of her 
innocence,” which she entrusts to a visitor for preservation, implicitly empowering a biographer 
like Hays to interpret her work within a wider context.198 Passing along knowledge learned 
through pain is, likewise, the motive for both of Hays’s novel heroines to compose their 
autobiographies. Mary Raymond records her tale in prison “to beguile my woes by tracing their 
origin and their progress,” taking comfort in the evidence that a “fatal mechanism” produced her 
downfall despite her innocence (VP, 168). Mary first addresses her manuscripts to the next 
prisoner to inhabit her cell, while her last words composed in prison exclaim, “Posterity, receive 
my last appeal!” (VP, 168) Emma Courtney, who concludes that “character” is “formed” by 
“unavoidable impressions, and the chain of necessary events” learns these determinist principles 
“at a dear rate—at the expense of inconceivable suffering.” (VP, 147) She willingly revisits her 
“painful mistakes” and “sufferings” so that her life can contribute to a larger “science of mind” 
that will explain the education process (VP, 9). Tracing one’s development grants agency, 
therefore, only when lives are made public, through authorship. 
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  The martyr status of Hays’s novel protagonists, Mary and Emma, depends on their ability 
to join their actions to a larger, trans-historical reform movement through the autobiographical 
process of “tracing consequences.” However, whether these women are recognize as martyrs, as 
opposed to victims, rests on their future audiences, who are called to read a larger significance 
onto individual suffering. This distinction places less importance on the victim’s passivity, as 
opposed to the martyr’s conscious choice to suffer violence rather than abandon principle to 
force. By leaving their status as victims or martyrs dependent on writing and reception, Hays 
develops a mythos of persecuted women working trans-historically to overcome abuse. 
Hays makes individual women represent communities by linking their bodies with the 
body politic. She establishes a correspondence between how the individual body is constituted by 
habitual associations and formed in response to customs, and how society maintains vestigial 
practices through customs and institutions. Hays’s writings are brim full of materialist analogies 
that compare self-improvement and political reform to changes in the body. Her “Thoughts on 
Civil Liberty,” for instance, compares violent revolutions to a diarrheic cure that might kill: “The 
body politic of Europe in general, seems at present like the body natural; when struggling to 
expel offensive and morbid humours; the convulsive efforts threaten more immediate danger 
than even the lurking mischief, and there is reason to dread lest the patient expire under the 
operation of the powerful remedy.”199 The body politic and biological bodies reflect, in their 
construction, the entirety of their experiences, education, and history. Hays compares these 
experiences to a sickness or poison in the body, something foreign from without that is strangely 
part of us. We are composed, entirely, of our past. (After all, personal identity, from Locke to 
Godwin and Hays, is a matter of establishing continuity across time.) Since people are always in 
flux, adding to their associations, the body is in a constant state of conflict with itself. Change 	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 requires biological violence. As Mary Raymond remarks, “Human life has not unaptly been 
compared to a warfare” (VP, 37). Hays’s novels present two sides of the struggle for change: 
Emma Courtney, whose education is seriously flawed, fights against her socially constructed 
weaknesses, while Mary Raymond, who receives the ideal education Emma advocates, wards off 
invading prejudices that attempt to reconstruct her body.  
 As an author, Hays experienced the pain of publicizing private suffering. She admitted to 
Godwin that she would not invite personal suffering for the public good: “I should shrink from 
the idea of a revolution, for I want sufficient courage to claim the crown of martyrdom (and 
those who suffer in endeavouring to benefit others, whatever be the cause, are unquestionable 
martyrs).”200 Her sense that authorship is a kind of martyrdom reflects the reality among radical 
English writers after the Reign of Terror, when the reading public abandoned the reform 
movement and became increasingly hostile to their political fiction. Amelia Alderson Opie, who 
was once friends with Godwin, admired Hays’s willingness to dare public disdain in this climate. 
She wrote Mary Wollstonecraft in December 1796, “I am delighted with Miss Hays’s novel 
Emma Courtney I would give a great deal to have written it, tho’ as society now is, it is 
something to be capable of admiring it”201 
 Hays’s concept of authorship as martyrdom promises redemption, however, by reaching 
beyond the present moment. In her concluding letter to young Augustus, Emma remarks that 
tracing her life is “painful” and “humiliating,” but she believes it will heal “the constitutions of 
society. . . . reformation dawns, though the advance is tardy. Moral martyrdom may possibly be 
the fate of those who press forward, yet, their generous efforts will not be lost.” Posterity will 
celebrate those who “trace, to their springs, errors the most hoary, and prejudices the most 	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 venerated” (VP, 196). Like Askew, Mary, and Emma, Hays saw herself as writing, in part, for 
future generations, when her ideas would be sympathetically received. Her Female Biographies 
are dedicated “more especially to the rising generation, who have not grown old in follow, whose 
hearts have not been seared by fashion, and whose minds prejudice has not yet warped.”202 Only 
by reaching girls before they adopt established customs can Hays reach a sympathetic audience 
that might benefit from her writing. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
The Mechanics of Education / Education of Mechanics 
“Very soon I was obliged to lay aside the alphabet, that first torment of youth; he felt no interest 
in those dead signs; he would have nothing but things, or pictures of things.” 
—Johann Pestalozzi (describes his experience teaching a three-year-old child)203 
 
 
 
Connections between natural philosophy, mechanics, and literacy reach far beyond a narrow 
circle of determinist educators and novelists. By the early nineteenth century, a variety of 
education systems consider the regular laws of mechanical philosophy in some sense analogous 
to the mind’s slow unfolding, according to its own regular laws. These systems promote using 
objects to, at once, “exercise” children’s “bodily faculties” and “excite their intellectual 
faculties,” priming the body with ideas accumulated from the child’s immediate environment, 
before organizing these through spoken language and, finally, representing objects symbolically 
through writing. Without activated, developed mental faculties, children’s minds lie dormant, 
unable to respond with curiosity to the more rigorous and abstract demands of book learning.  
 Pulling together diverse evidence from mechanics textbooks, Parliament debates, and 
treatises on Pestalozzian and Monitorial methods, this chapter investigates a distinct education 
goal that I have referred to as “mechanical literacy,” or children’s capacity to read themselves in 
relation to the regular systems in which they participate. My concept of mechanical literacy 
revises how we think about the relationship between machines and education. Not only was 
“mechanics,” in a literal sense, a valued component of any nineteenth-century education 
curriculum (both as a branch of natural philosophy and artisan skill), but “mechanical literacy” 
(in the sense that Caleb connects his “mechanical turn” with “natural philosophy”) includes the 
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 ability to read social systems—economics, education, government, and trade—which in their 
regularity (and self-regulation) resemble machines. 
 Furthermore, education itself was celebrated as machine. As anxieties rose over the 
effects of repetitive labor on worker intelligence, education became the machine to fix all 
machines. Supporters of the German educator, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, or of Andrew Bell 
and Joseph Lancaster (who invented Monitorial schools), describe these educational methods as 
mechanical systems that organize classrooms and lessons [figure 14]. Depending on whether the 
instruction method or the child is mechanized, labeling education a “machine” is one moment a 
compliment and the next an insult. One proponent of Pestalozzi, for example, favorably contrasts 
his system against Monitorial schools. “Pestalozzi awakened in one child a consciousness of his 
powers, and a tendency to mental self-activity” then uses the child “in awakening other 
children,” whereas “Bell and Lancaster” merely “drill one child through an artificial machinery 
of lifeless tasks, and the child, so drilled, they employ to drill others in the same manner.” He 
exclaims passionately against the empty memorization in Monitorial classrooms, “Oh, that men 
would not harden their hearts and their heads by the repetition of hollow sounds!” Instead, 
instructors should follow, like Pestalozzi the “unalterable nature of things.”204 Yet this very same 
pamphlet, two pages later, quotes Pestalozzi on the origin of his system in “the existence of 
certain physical and mechanical laws, to which our mind is subject in the receiving and fixing of 
external perceptions” to which his friend, Mr. Glayre, responds, “‘Vous voulez mécaniser 
l’éducation.’” [You want to mechanize education.] Pestalozzi readily agrees, but specifies what 
he means by mechanism: “my intention was to bring the different means of education and 
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 instruction into regular courses, adapted to the nature and progressive development of the human 
faculties; and taking the term ‘méchaniser’ in this sense, he certainly was quite right.”205 
 What Pestalozzi intends by “mechanism” is here commiserate with organicism. His great 
“secret of education,” Pestalozzi confesses, is to teach the child “in harmony with, the measure 
and character of the powers already unfolded in him.”206 The Reverend Mayo, often credited 
with popularizing Pestalozzi’s ideas in Britain during the 1830s, describes Pestalozzian 
education as “essentially organic” like “a plant” that “grows by the continual expansion of those 
organs which lie folded up in its germ.”207 Mayo’s contrast between a plant and a stone, which 
grows externally, suggests a possible line of influence between Pestalozzi’s ideas and Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge’s mechanical and organic growth. Within education discourse, however, the 
dangers of mechanization or repetition are superseded through positive machinery, and all of 
these machines concern organic bodies. 
 If anything, modern scholars have asserted a binary where, historically, educators were 
much more nuanced. One “Irish Traveler” who visited Pestalozzi and published his system 
carefully negotiates the multiple meanings of “mechanical” as he lays out Pestalozzi’s method 
for teaching math: 
His Intuitive Arithmetic is, in fact, more or less mechanical; but it is a species of 
mechanism absolutely necessary, because it has for objects merely abstract numbers, 
which, not existing in nature, require some mechanical representation to convey to our 
minds a precise and determinate knowledge respecting the units that compose any sum; 
and it rests upon the idea that our natural faculties can only developed by the impressions 
which our senses receive from external objects. But it is not, at the same time, the 	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 mechanism of a machine whose construction remains unknown to the person who uses it; 
it operates with force on the soul. . . . As soon as a child, by means of intuitive 
calculation, has obtained a clear and distinct conception of unity, all mechanism ceases. 
In fact, the blind mechanism of the mind can only consist in the vain repetition of rules 
and words not understood.208 
The Irish Traveler approves of mechanism when it means providing objects that make abstract 
concepts available to the senses. And he admits that our “natural faculties” function 
mechanically. The child is mechanized, however, only so long as the “construction” of the 
“machine” is “unknown” to him. Pestalozzi uses the mechanism of objects to give children “a 
clear and distinct conception” of how everything they learn fits together. This privileged 
viewpoint is precisely what I mean by mechanical literacy. Those who can read machines can 
navigate them; no longer mechanized, they control the physical world by commanding machines. 
 
Mechanics as the mind’s preparation for reading 
 One of the earliest and most influential proponents of these ideas, Elizabeth Hamilton in 
Letters on Education (1801) outlines a plan of instruction organized, not by subject, but 
according to a child’s cognitive development. Combining Dugald Stuart’s Scottish “common 
sense” with the Edgeworths’ practical education, she introduces mothers to the philosophy of 
mind usually reserved for men by suggesting practical applications in the nursery. Alluding to 
her uncharacteristic public support for female philosophy, the Monthly Review cannot resist 
poking fun: “Miss H. will perhaps alarm many good mothers by her abstract notions and 
expressions; and the energy of mind, which is here required to be called into action, sometimes 
borders not a little on that quality which the author herself has known how to satirize in modern 	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 philosophers.”209 Anticipating such criticism, Hamilton promises not to impose “nice subtleties 
of logic or metaphysics,” yet she calls upon mothers as “rational creatures” to embrace difficult 
studies, for “the woman who would educate her children with success, must begin by educating 
herself.”210 Hamilton rejects determinism yet arrives at the same conclusion as Priestley, Hays, 
or Godwin, on the importance of early education through the senses and the correlation between 
a child’s mind and its physical environment. Because a child is no “mere automaton,” she argues, 
the infant mind gathers perceptions even before the child speaks or reasons, which means that 
parents should direct the mind’s “ever-active principle” from infancy through object learning.211  
 Hamilton argues against reading and memorization without training the senses through 
objects. Because children develop “perception” first, of all faculties, and “reflection” last, God 
has designed the world itself as “a school of virtue,” where “the objects that inspire delight are 
liberally scattered on every side.”212 By appealing to “the objects of sight and sound, before the 
mental faculties have begun to open,” mothers prepare their children’s mind for reading.213 
Hamilton dramatizes this argument through a sample dialogue on everyday things between Mrs. 
Z and her infant son. Notice how Mrs. Z conducts her child through various “faculties” 
(terminology borrowed from Stuart), beginning with perception, through attention, reflection, 
and judgment, thus capturing metonymically, in a casual nursery conversation, the entire mental 
maturation process that spans an infant’s early years: 	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 “Here is a pretty box, mama; but it won’t open for all that I can do.” 
 “That box, my dear, won’t open by force; the lid is screwed on, and it must be 
turned in such a manner as to take out the screw. Observe. There—it is opened—now see 
how the part that fixes, is cut in the manner of a screw.” 
 “Oh, yes, now I understand it, for I remember what papa told me one day about 
the cork-screw, when I was looking at it: but I thought there was no use of screws, but to 
draw corks.” 
 “All screws are made upon the same plan, or principle, as it is called; will you 
remember that word?” . . . . “A piece of furniture that is just by you, is made upon the 
principle of the screw; and if you will find it out, I will give you a kiss.” 
 “I see! I see! It is the stool on which my sister sits at the piano-forte. It turns and 
rises just like the lid of this box.”214 
Mrs. Z allows her son’s immediate curiosity about the box to direct their conversation (he asks 
how to open it); then she provides a general principle exemplified by this particular box lid (the 
screw), which allows a practical test of his judgment (the piano chair). As Hamilton explains, 
Mrs. Z “taught her son the properties of one of the principles of mechanics, in unscrewing his 
toy,” merely one example of how she guides his “accurate examination of every object that came 
within the sphere of their observation.”215 
 And what is the long-term result? “Reading was taught with ease, and considered by the 
children in the light of a privileges, rather than a task.”216 Whereas this boy, Hamilton predicts, 
will one day thoughtfully analyze The Illiad, another woman’s child will struggle with reading 
and hate his lessons. “Viewing the subject in this light, I consider the multitude of little books 	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 that are now given to children at an early age, as so many destroyers of their faculties. If the 
conceptions have not acquired vigour by being exercised on material objects, before they are 
employed on those emotions which it is the business of fiction to describe, I greatly apprehend 
that they will never be cultivated to perfection.”217 Children should only read books that provide 
“accurate ideas” of what they are developmentally ready to consider.218  
  Like Godwin’s Caleb, Mrs. Z’s son 
combines curiosity with the work of his hands to acquire “natural philosophy” and literacy. 
Indeed, the connection between mechanics and literacy would be more dramatic for Hamilton’s 
audience, mothers whose nurseries may include the toy most likely used by Mrs. Z’s son: an 
alphabet, printed on round cards, and stacked in a cylindrical box with a screw-top lid [figure 
15]. Mrs. Z’s son must, quite literally, learn mechanics to access his alphabet. I take Hamilton’s 
recourse to mechanics (the screw is a “simple machine”) to represent a broader skill-group, the 
capacity to manipulate the material world through the body, aided by tools. The infant’s capacity 
to grasp, explore, and observe, is his earliest manifestation of his uniquely human ability to 
conquer his environment by mastering the general principles of natural philosophy. 
 Mechanics was often the first branch of natural philosophy taught to children, and its uses 
were defined as the ability to act upon the physical world to create new objects as property. 
According to an opening advertisement in the perennially popular Pinnock’s A Catechism of 
Mechanics for the subject’s importance,  
MACHINERY is now so extensively used in this country to abridge manual labour and 
produce results which are so much above the physical strength of man, that every attempt 
to elucidate its principles and develop its laws, cannot fail to enlarge the boundaries of 	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 knowledge and demonstrate the advantages derived from the skilful application of 
mechanics. Machinery is employed in preparing for our use the gifts of nature, and in 
adapting to our convenience and comfort very many of her productions. The bread that 
we eat, the wine that we drink, the clothes we wear, the house we inhabit, the coach we 
travel in, the ship that brings us the merchandize of distant countries—are so many proofs 
of the utility of this science, which the genius of man has made his peculiar property.219 
Even mechanical knowledge itself is something owned or held as “peculiar property,” like the 
“gifts” of nature that it “adapts” for human “convenience,” the “labor” and “strength of man” 
that it supplements, and the products that it creates—products that we assimilate to our bodies as 
food, clothing, and transportation. An article from the S.D.U.K.’s Penny Magazine on machinery 
reinforces human dominance through mechanics over an environment of objects: “[Man’s] 
power is in his mind,” which “teaches him to subject all the physical world to his dominion, by 
availing himself of the forces which nature has spread around him. To act upon material objects 
he arms his weakness with tools and with machines.”220 Note that man’s power over “all the 
physical world” includes these prosthetic pieces of himself, the tools and machines that become 
part of his body. Mechanical skill has a way of radically distinguishing humans from the 
environment they dominate, only to collapse the distinction when mastery over objects overlaps 
with mastery over the self. Indeed, many mechanics textbooks teach simple machines together 
with human anatomy [figures 16 and 17]. 
 Investigating objects prepares a child’s mind for literacy because it ensures that the world 
is in complete sympathy with the mind before language creates the complexity of representation. 
The main point of Pestalozzi’s determination to “unite labour to study” in his school is to 	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 stimulate children’s bodily and mental faculties into “spontaneous development,” which creates 
“a perfect agreement betwixt their internal thoughts and external objects,”221 a kind of 
intellectual honesty or accuracy. Just a few correct ideas, confirmed by direct experience, are far 
better than empty words that convey to a child no ideas. Language, or the “knowledge of a just 
and correct denomination,” is simply another level of comparison between object and 
representation.222 
 Pestalozzi developed this system while working with poor and orphan children, who 
ordinarily learn by repeating lessons without really understanding the words. With such a limited 
sphere of experience, and faculties degraded by “privation and want,” the children could not 
connection their lives with the information they were required to repeat.223 To accustom his 
students to speak only what they understand, Pestalozzi instead began teaching with “those 
objects only which immediately encircled my pupils,” with what they actually know and can 
describe with certainty and accuracy, before gradually expanding their knowledge in concert 
with their experience.224 His object lesson question and answer school books for infants, 
published in Britain by Rev. and Elizabeth Mayo, ask children about their hands, then their 
bodies, followed by objects in the room, and proceeding outward towards increasingly abstract 
subjects [figures 18 and 19].225 
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  In the Pestalozzi system, reading and writing are based upon this foundation of practical 
knowledge, gathered through the senses. For instance, letters emerge from the child’s 
observation of “pure forms,” or the lines and shapes that compose the objects around him, so that 
the alphabet itself proceeds from what children “intuitively” learn through the senses. Children 
draw lines, circles, curves, etc., and they practice finding these forms in buildings, trees, food, 
etc. as the composite pieces of these objects, before they consider the same forms as the basic 
building blocks of the alphabet. Prior to teaching letters, Pestalozzi’s assistant, Buss, taught 
students what he called an “alphabet of intuition” [figure 20]:  
[C]hildren ought to be taught to read all these different outlines, like words, and to 
designate all the separate lines, curves, and angles, by letters, in such a manner, that their 
combination may be expressed in writing, so as to comprehend the whole as perfectly as 
a word is spelt, by uniting the letters that compose it: that lines and curves ought to 
become an alphabet of intuition, and, by that means, the basis of a language by which the 
differences of all forms can be not only clearly understood, but expressed and defined by 
words, in the most exact manner.226 
Numbers, too, should be avoided until children can perform math using what teachers today call 
“manipulatives,” or identical objects for counting. Early British Pestalozzian publications for 
teaching “number” contain odd drawings and charts with squares divided into sections. [figure] 
Ordinarily, students do not just look at these charts, which are for the instructors; rather, the 
teachers direct students on how to divide up their slates into regular pieces. Such exercises 
convey that all quantities are part of a whole and provide children with an intuitive grasp of 
factions prior to their symbolic representation with numbers, much as the “pure forms” lead to 
letters.  	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  For all subjects, Pestalozzi divides knowledge into these more basic composite pieces, 
which he makes directly tangible. Complex objects, movements, sounds, sentences, and so on, 
all become legible, as if the world itself is composed of alphabets. Even the children’s aerobic 
exercises are broken down into “the simplest exercises,” called “the alphabet of abilities,” which 
include “striking, carrying, throwing, pushing, pulling, turning, twisting, swinging, &c.”227 
Apparently, students perform a sort of Pestalozzian yoga, moving through these basic motions 
“arranged in the order in which they follow each other practically, according to the structure of 
the human body.” These movements are an “apprenticeship of virtue” that develops a clear 
understanding of and control over the body.228 Such methods became prevalent in Britain, 
beginning in 1815, influencing infant schools and adult education in the mechanics institutes of 
the 1820s, and becoming general across schools for all classes from 1830 to the present. 
 
Mechanics as a Bridge between hands and head 
 Teaching mechanics before (or in tandem with) reading and writing makes sense because 
mechanics is the branch of natural philosophy that explicitly spans body and mind. In textbooks, 
as well as in Richard Edgeworth’s chapter on “Mechanics” in Practical Education (1798), 
“mechanics” is the part of the natural sciences that addresses how physical objects move and 
interact, and how parts of the human body-machine work together on the same principles. 
Newton referred to this philosophical knowledge, which borders on geometry and mathematics, 
as “rational mechanics,” as distinct from the “practical mechanics” used by artisans in their 
workshops—a distinction that polices boundaries between social stations by excluding the 
practical knowledge gained through hand labor from the abstract knowledge of intellectual 	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 laborer. Essays on the principles of mechanics celebrate an intellectual comprehension of natural 
forces, which permits the efficient manipulation of the material world to serve human comforts. 
Implicitly, this kind of knowledge is about organizing people as well as things, factory workers 
as well as factory equipment.  
 A casual surveying of natural philosophy textbooks indicates that the order of these 
lessons about the world roughly follows a child’s development from sensual creature, consumed 
with material needs, to an abstract thinker who investigates what he cannot touch. Applied to 
adults, workers (as mechanics) are stranded in an infantine stage of sensual learning, from which 
wealthier children emerge through an education that moves from manual to abstract thinking. 
Studying mechanics can provide this transition if the curriculum covers the generalizing or 
philosophical principles behind practical craftsmanship.  
 In books on natural philosophy, mechanics is often one of introductory sciences, 
preceding subjects such as astronomy, electricity, and magnetism, which border on metaphysics. 
Jane Marcet, who admired Edgeworth’s children’s literature, begins her Conversations on 
Natural Philosophy (1819, a ubiquitous schoolbook that features three female speakers) by 
explaining the definition of a “body” and “matter,” then exploring gravity and motion, then the 
mechanical powers—thus progressing from what we touch to how we move it. These studies 
provide the foundation for later chapters on astronomy, hydrostatics, and optics.229 Jeremiah 
Joyce, tutor to Earl Stanhope’s children (Stanhope supported Whitbread’s 1807 education bill), 
begins his Scientific Dialogues, Intended for the Instruction and Entertainment of Young People 
(1800) with a volume on mechanics, prefaced with extensive thanks and dedication to the 
Edgeworths (and a nod to Anna Barbauld and John Aiken) for inspiring him to imbed his 
scientific lessons into family dialogues. His lessons on mechanics, a field comprising “[e]very 	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 thing which is the object of our senses,” follow a typical formula that dictates progressing from 
concrete to abstract, beginning with a definition of such basic concepts as matter, space, and 
time, before proceeding to Newton’s laws of motion and the mechanical powers, and concluding 
with illustrations of compound machines.230 Each lesson moves from concrete experiments to the 
general principles they prove, encouraging readers to use their senses to aid abstraction.  
 All knowledge, including morality, is founded on the child’s initial exploration of her 
physical environment. Establishing this progression, Adam Walker’s A System of Familiar 
Philosophy opens with a description of a child’s senses unfolding as the foundation of 
knowledge: “here is laid the corner stone for our knowledge of Nature and her law,” he explains, 
“for at a time when a nurse supposes a child is only amusing itself by striving to catch hold of 
every thing within and without its reach, it is laying in a stock of important information! By this 
propensity, we learn to know distances, hardness, softness, painful and pleasurable objects, heat, 
cold, and may other qualities of bodies, long before it is suspected by the unobserving part of 
mankind.” The general “law” of nature, as well as moral law, Walker asserts, “is in the 
constitution of things.”231 In other words, moral principles are legible in the arrangement of 
physical objects and their movement in the world. 
 Like Walker, James Mill connects early impressions with morality (and with sanity), 
since the child repeats in thought, as he senses his surroundings, the succession of events in the 
natural world, internalizing an awareness of causality that forms the basis of morality: 
“[C]hildren ought to be made to see, and hear, and feel, and taste, in the order of the most 
invariable and comprehensive sequences, in order that the ideas which correspond to their 
impressions, and follow the same order of succession, may be an exact transcript of nature, and 	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 always lead to just anticipations of events.”232 Mill credits Hartley, Condillac, and Helvetius for 
these insights and recommends Maria Edgeworth’s literature for laying the groundwork of 
benevolence in children explicitly because her works are founded on these scientifically-based 
theories of mind.233 
 In conclusion, not only are children’s textbooks on natural philosophy organized 
according to theories of child development, but many of these textbooks are written by authors 
with clear connections to the circle of literary authors most invested in object learning, who 
believed that because mechanics addresses matter in motion, as well as human bodies acting 
upon the material world, it forms a foundation for later abstract thinking—a concept analogous 
to how children stockpile simple ideas from sensation at an early age in preparation for complex 
ideas. This association between mechanics and early development is implicit in Richard 
Edgeworth’s appraisal, that “no species of knowledge is better suited to the taste and capacity of 
youth,” and his approval of parents who are “anxious” for their children to learn “the mechanic 
powers”234 at an early age. Likewise, Maria Edgeworth’s Rosamond stories depict the family’s 
visit to a factory as a suitable educational outing for a seven-year-old girl. My point is that the 
physical laws of the natural world, as experienced through the senses, were widely considered by 
education experts to be the catalyst for moral and intellectual development. These beliefs grant 
ideological significance to the study of mechanics, because it could be construed as a middle- or 
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157
 working-class access-point to abilities like abstract thinking and benevolence, which had long 
been associated with citizenship and considered the purview of the ruling landed class.235  
“The classical scholar may be better qualified for decorating his speech with rhetorical flowers,” 
admits Jeremy Bentham, defending his focus on natural sciences over classics, “but the 
chrestomathic scholar, after a familiar and thorough acquaintance has been contracted with 
things, with things of all sorts, will be, in a much more useful and efficient way, qualified for the 
general course of parliamentary business.”236 Bentham reiterates the slogan of object learning 
(things over words) to establish mechanical literacy as the foundation of statesmanship. 
 By bridging hand and mind, mechanical knowledge not only infuses artisan labor with 
the dignity of natural philosophy, but also confers the power of self-mastery through self-
knowledge. Richard Edgeworth emphasizes that children must be conversant with common 
terms, such as “fulcrum” or “time,” in order to “abstract” and “reason upon general topics,” but 
technical language should be grounded in the body. Through haptic exercises that require 
children to combine their bodies with tools, they feel the comparative effort of moving objects 
assisted by machines. An engineer himself, Richard Edgeworth invented such a machine, which 
he called the “Panorganon,” for “giving a general notion of the mechanical organs” by allowing 
children to “feel” the “effect of his own bodily exertions with different engines.”237 [figure 21] 
He describes experiments performed with the Panorganon that allow children to measure their 
comparative strength using pulleys, different sized levers, screws, and other simple machines, 
activities designed to “bring the sense of feeling to our assistance in teaching the uses of the 
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 mechanic powers.”238 In addition to Practical Education, the device is described and illustrated 
in William Nicholson’s Journal of Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, and the Arts (1801), as well 
as the Encyclopedia Britannica (1823).239  
 The Panorganon transforms knowledge about the physical world into a form of self-
knowledge, as children explore how their bodies move in conjunction with the machine. The 
name Panorganon, like its design, combines all organs into a single sensory experience, from 
parts of the body, to the brain’s mental organs, to the parts of the machine.240 The Panorganon’s 
tendency to complicate the distinction between human and tool is typical of late-eighteenth-
century automata that more carefully simulate living organisms than their later nineteenth-
century counterparts, using supple and wet materials to recreate the effect of squishy biological 
substances. The rubber tubing invented for Vaucanson’s Digesting Duck, or the padded, wet 
leather and linen birthing machines designed and distributed by Mme Du Coudray exemplify 
what Jessica Riskin calls “eighteenth-century wetware,” machines that she argues helped “vivify 
machinery,” transforming earlier enlightenment theories of mechanism by complicating the 
divide between vitalist and materialist philosophy.241 Revising Riskin’s position, Douthwaite 
sees these automata as “incorporating an ambiguity at the heart of Enlightenment thought, since 
many materialist thinkers who espoused vitalism did not make any distinction between matter 
and spirit.” Thinkers like Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Condillac (I might add Helvetius and 
Joseph Priestley) advanced “an epistemology at once mechanistic, vitalist, biological, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 Edgeworth, Practical Education, 2:303. 
239 Nicholson, “Apparatus for Teaching Mechanics,” A Journal of Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, and the Arts. Vol. 
4 (1801): 443-50; “Amusements of Science,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 563-66. See also plate CCCCLXXV for an 
illustration of how to build the Panorganon. 
240 As a name choice, Panorganon also connotes odd machine combinations used in popular educational 
entertainments, such as Maelzel’s Panharmonicon (1818), placing Edgeworth’s domestic machine within the context 
of scientific lectures. 
241 Riskin, “Eighteenth-Century Wetware,” 99. 
159
 Christian.”242 The Panorganon thus draws from an intellectual tradition that considers sense 
stimulation the vehicle for self-reflection or consciousness. 
 Other educators join anatomy and mechanics by drawing an analogy between God-
designed human body and human-designed inventions. Following the examples of the classic 
visual textbook of the natural sciences, Spectacle de la Nature (recommended by Richard 
Edgeworth), contemporary titles such as Margaret Bryan’s Lectures on Natural Philosophy 
include anatomy, or “Man as a Machine,” as a subtopic of the mechanics lesson. After teaching 
the mechanical powers, Bryan directs her students’ attention to their bodies: “Behold that various 
and complicated machinery, which forms the graceful column of man! composed of bones, 
joints, and arteries; and clothed with muscled, veins, and teguments!”243 The body is furthermore 
a convenient at-hand reference for teaching machines without fancy equipment for 
demonstrations.  
 Cumulatively, these comparisons between machines and bodies, and between God-as-
creator and human-as-inventor, enhance the prestige of rational mechanical knowledge and 
associate it with mastery over the body’s work. Those who possess mechanical literacy know 
how to enhance the body’s energy and strategically direct its efforts, thereby manipulating the 
physical world to serve human ends. Mastering the world of objects is akin to mastering one’s 
own body, since both are subject to a reformative process, whether by clever gears and pulleys or 
by education machines. Mechanics becomes an aid to self-awareness and expression, akin to 
literacy by enabling self-fashioning. Mechanical knowledge signifies, therefore, not only the 
practical know-how of artisans and factory workers, but, increasingly, a wider comprehension of 
the principles behind manipulating the world of things, which signifies the sort of lively 	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 intellectual life of self-reflection and moral feeling that grants individual identity and permits 
participation in public life. 
 With the rise of consumer culture, the collection, display, and contemplation of objects 
helped construct the subject’s interiority. In the context of education, sensual exposure to a 
variety of physical forms, both natural and artificial, was considered key to developing mental 
organs such as judgment and imagination. Julie Park’s argument that “anthropomorphized” 
mimetic commodities, such as dolls and automata, reveal “human identity’s susceptibility to 
becoming embodied in inanimate objects,”244 implies that access to these objects is a 
precondition for gaining recognition as a subject with a complex mental life. When workers’ 
environments are reduced to the machines they tend, the working poor suffer (the theory goes) 
from underdeveloped mental abilities that stunt their potential to learn and retract their status as 
thinking beings. If the education of things is the foundation of moral sentiments and intellectual 
capacity, then the widening gap between wealthy and poor threatens social cohesion between 
rich and poor—between hyper-consumers, their homes stocked with objects and their days filled 
with leisure for contemplation, and common people tasked with undemanding labor, their homes 
comparatively empty.  
 
Mechanical literacy and the “object gap: the crisis of diverging class environments 
 Children who acquire mechanical literacy act out the ascendency of middle-class 
managers, who move from practical to rational mechanics as they gain a theoretical 
understanding of manual labor. According to Simon Schaffer, an awareness of one’s 
participation in legible systems of political economy—one aspect of mechanical literacy—marks 
a fundamental class divide between analytical and mechanical labor. Drawing from eighteenth-	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 century political economists and French philosophes, Schaffer shows how public intellectuals 
established “their power,” as system organizers, over artisans and laborers “through their view of 
the machine.”245 Whereas artisans are “ignorant of the system in which they are themselves 
combined,” philosophers like the Encyclopedist Denis Diderot or scientific lecturer John 
Theophilus Desaguliers who observe artisans at work can reconstruct a comprehensive picture of 
industrial processes. Thus while the philosophes claimed to elevate the mechanical arts by 
initiating their readers into the higher philosophy behind craft processes and disseminating 
knowledge hoarded by protectionist guilds, they actually claimed credit for technologies 
developed by workers in order to justify placing manufacturing under the “guidance of 
enlightened managers.”246 A new class of engineering professions managed workers as 
unthinking parts of an organized machine constructed to think for them. Treating workers like 
automata is optimal, according to economist James Ferguson: “manufacturers, accordingly, 
prosper most, where the mind is least consulted and where the workshop” is “considered as an 
engine, the parts of which are men.”247  
 The kind of pedagogical systems extended to workers by wealthy reformers are 
themselves appropriations of instruction methods used between workers. Artisan apprenticeship 
or family education, where children live and work with working adults, is the basis for all 
experiential education. Even dame schools, which education reformers routinely criticized, 
combine by necessity learning the alphabet with everyday things and manual labor, since the 
“dame” is a neighborhood woman who teaches from her kitchen while giving the local children 
occasional errands and tasks. With rare honesty, Robert Southey insisted that the Monitorial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 Schaffer, “Enlightened Automata,” Sciences in Enlightened Europe, 132. 
246 Schaffer, “Enlightened Automata,” Sciences in Enlightened Europe, 130, 126. 
247 Qtd. Schaffer, “Enlightened Automata,” Sciences in Enlightened Europe, 129. Ferguson also differentiates 
between practical and theoretical mechanics. 
162
 system, which both Bell and Lancaster disputed was their original invention, derived from Indian 
peasants, whose methods of mutual instruction Bell observed and implemented in his Madras 
school before publishing his system in Britain.248 What educators did, then, was systematize 
traditional methods used by workers in order to assert their education expertise, placing the 
curriculum goals and content firmly in the hands of those invested in maintaining a stable, 
stratified society. 
 Even though mechanical literacy reflects middle-class values, it was extended to the 
working-classes more frequently than Schaffer’s argument might lead us to suppose. In the early 
nineteenth century, proponents of popular education adapted a revised version of mechanical 
literacy for workers, one that maintains class boundaries (with the occasional “genius” 
exception), because they believed that the rational consent of the governed could best prevent 
protest or revolution. Whether religious or political, consent requires an active, educated mind, 
and reformers blamed social unrest on a poorly educated, passive public that did not comprehend 
its true interests. Hannah More’s Village Politics or Harriet Martineau’s Illustrations of Political 
Economy, for instance, try to convince workers that they harm themselves by burning ricks or 
going on strike.  
 The double appropriation of educational methods and artisan knowledge is most apparent 
in the mechanics institutes, which were imagined and created by workers but quickly overrun by 
wealthy Whig reformers. Henry Brougham, in Practical Observations upon the Education of the 
People, Addressed to the Working Classes and Their Employers, supports the mechanics 	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 institutes as a means of uniting practical and theoretical knowledge by placing artisan and 
middle-class students together. Although most workers have no need to “go beyond the 
rudiments,” those possessed of “superior minds” can study the abstract principles behind the 
machines they tend, their experience as workers lending them an advantage over those who have 
never engaged in manual labor. Brougham encourages “whoever feels within himself a desire 
and an aptitude” to “press forward” in theoretical mechanics and become one of the inventors of 
new machines. “Indeed, those discoveries immediately connected with experiment and 
observation, are most likely to be made by men, whose lives being spent in the midst of 
mechanical operations, are at the same time instructed in the general principles upon which these 
depend [i.e. theoretical mechanics], and trained betimes to habits of speculation.” If workers 
learn to think abstractly and creatively about “objects at once useful and sublime,” they would be 
better at invention than people from wealthier backgrounds because they possess practical 
knowledge gained through a lifetime of work. “Machinery, even in its complicated form, is more 
easily understood by them [workers].”249 For those who lack the worker’s knowledge, Brougham 
suggests using models of machines, much like Edgeworth’s Panorganon, as a way to supply their 
deficiency. By studying together, those with practical backgrounds lend their inventive intuition 
to “the learners of natural science in other conditions of life.”250 Sharing practical and 
mechanical knowledge creates unity between two classes that, as Brougham admits, too often 
believe their interest are “in opposition to each other.”251 
 Jeremy Bentham’s Chrestomathia curriculum, which includes moral teachings and the 
natural science for people of all classes, likewise extends mechanical literacy to all classes. He 
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 asserts that in recent years educators have been forced to admit that, in addition to religious 
instruction,  
there are things worthy of their attention connected with the objects of this present 
world,—the properties and relations of the air they breathe, the soil they cultivate, the 
plants they rear, the animals they tend, the materials they work upon in their different 
trades and manufactures,—the instruments with which they work,—the machinery by 
which a child is able to produce more than many men, and a single man to generate, 
combine, control, and direct a physical power superior to that of a thousand horses. There 
is a growing conviction, that the communication of knowledge of this kind to the working 
classes would make them better and happier men; and that the possession of such 
knowledge by these classes would be attended with no injury whatever to any other 
class.252 
Note the kind of power that Bentham places in the hands of children, who, augmented by 
“instruments” and “machinery” can bend the material world around them. Clearly, mechanical 
literacy was the means through which workers could ascend the social ladder, and yet, such 
ascendency is portrayed as the path of exceptional minds.  
 The more basic “object learning” techniques advocated in schools for the poor focus 
instead on recovering workers from the mental degeneracy of repetitive labor so that they are no 
longer refractory. An uneducated and tractable workforce might theoretically increase factory 
production (and not everyone agreed that was the case), but a vocal subset of public intellectuals 
and policy makers viewed illiteracy as a political liability. The few educated and politically 
subversive working-class leaders could easily lead astray destabilized and uprooted populations, 
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 unschooled in values traditionally transmitted within parish communities. The old networks of 
parish education, like the poor laws, failed to meet this new threat.  
 Unlike Schaffer’s account of Enlightened management of automaton workers, the 
workforce of early nineteenth century Britain could not remain “ignorant of the system in which 
they are themselves combined” if the country was to avoid upheaval. At a time of competing 
system organizers, or competing machine-builders, some of whom are dangerous deceivers, the 
working classes must be equipped to distinguish between machines; they must rationally support 
the “real” machine, the one that represents a viable, desirable social order, and reject fanciful, 
theoretical systems that could never materialize as sustainable forms of government. Those who 
supported popular literacy did so, therefore, by citing the same fears as reactionaries who wished 
to curtail the press—that “too much cannot be attempted for the purpose of averting those 
dreadful calamities by which neighbouring nations have been visited.”253 In this pro-education 
discourse, machines are responsible for degrading the bodies of workers, while education is 
described as a rival machine that redeems the factory system by repairing minds with intellectual 
mechanism. 
 
The division of labor in schools and factories 
 The theory of civilization’s two machines was promulgated by Adam Smith in The 
Wealth of Nations in a widely referenced defense of compulsory national education. Smith 
appealed to an “object gap” (my phrase) between rich and poor as an undesirable result of 
modern production that should be countered by mandatory education for poor children. “In 
civilized state,” he explains, occupations are divided among the populace, so that only those with 
“leisure” have “an almost infinite variety of objects” to form their minds. Among the leisured 	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 class, “contemplation of so great a variety of objects necessarily exercises their minds in endless 
comparisons and combinations, and renders their understandings, in an extraordinary degree, 
both acute and comprehensive.”254 By comparison, the “man whose whole life is spent in 
performing a few simple operations” is unfit for government because he “generally becomes as 
stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind 
renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of 
conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just 
judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life. Of the great and extensive 
interests of his country he is altogether incapable of judging.”255 Since moral sentiments develop 
through diverse social experiences, the leisured classes are suitable governors—yet Smith raises 
the problem of consent: a certain level of moral behavior and critical thinking among workers is 
necessary for them to recognize the advantages of civic republicanism. 
  To alleviate this problem, Smith advocates teaching workers “the elementary parts of 
geometry and mechanics,” because these subjects are useful in nearly any trade, where they 
would “gradually exercise and improve the common people in those principles, the necessary 
introduction to the most sublime as well as to the most useful sciences.”256 The implication is 
that because mechanics occupies a liminal space between the labor of the hand and of the mind, 
the subject provides foundational groundwork to lure the common people into an abstract realm 
of higher moral thought. Surprisingly, mechanics opens the mind in ways that the Romantics 
associated with poetic and fictional language; it stretches the mind’s ability to use everyday 
sensation to stimulate imaginative, moral ideas.  
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  By the nineteenth century, educators recalled Smith’s concerns with a new sense of 
urgency as mechanization and the division of labor reduced the intellectual stimulation of work 
to an unprecedented degree, creating a new generation of workers doomed (so they feared) to 
mental degeneracy. Because most children worked, the question of how work environments 
shape the minds of children was a source of anxiety, especially as Britain’s transformation from 
an agricultural to an industrial society created uncertainty about what kind of future population 
these new labor practices would produce. Since education encompassed “every thing” that 
“operates” on the child’s mind “from the first germ of existence, to the final extinction of life,” 
there was no clear separation between education and work.257 Labor, food, family, tools, 
clothes—these educated children, while formal schooling was infrequent.258 
 As a post-Mathusian incarnation of Smith’s proposal for national education, James Mill’s 
“Education” article in The Encyclopedia Britannica regrets: “The state of defective food and 
excessive labour, is the state in which we find the great bulk of mankind,” a condition that erodes 
their sympathies through constant pain. The first step in educating children is, therefore, to feed 
them, for “nature herself forbids, that you shall make a wise and virtuous people, out of a 
starving one.”259 A good third of Mill’s article addresses the body’s health and labor, and how 
these affect the mind. Prominently retracing Adam Smith’s warning, Mill argues 
Dr Smith made the important remark, that the labour in which the great body of the 
people are employed, has a tendency to grow less and less favourable, as civilization and 
the arts proceed. The division and subdivision of labour is the principal cause. This 
confines the attention of the labourer to so small a number of objects, and so narrow a 	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 circle of ideas, that the mind receives not that varied exercise, and that portion of aliment, 
on which almost every degree of mental excellence depends. When the greater part of a 
man’s life is employed in the performance of a few simple operations, in one fixed 
invariable course, all exercise of ingenuity, all adaptation of means to ends, is wholly 
excluded, and the faculty lost, as far as disuse can destroy the faculties of the mind. The 
minds, therefore, of the great body of the people are in danger of really degenerating, 
while the other elements of civilization are advancing, unless care is taken by means of 
the other instruments of education, to counteract those effects which the simplification of 
the manual processes has a tendency to produce.260 
With this faithful summary, Mill explains why the same tools that enable civilization—
technology and the division of labor—ultimately lay the groundwork for what Carlyle later calls 
the “two nations” problem and the threat of revolution. As machines and the division of labor 
make production more efficient, a portion of the population has leisure to expand their 
intellectual and sympathetic capacities through diverse engagements. Civilization is predicated 
on these two complementary classes, but as the division of labor increasingly refines work into 
mentally vacuous tasks, which degrade the minds of workers—“obliterating sympathy, inspiring 
cruelty and intemperance, rendering impossible the reception of ideas, and paralyzing the organs 
of the mind”—the working classes no longer comprehend themselves as beneficiaries of the 
political system they make possible.261 For Mill, as for Smith, the solution is to appeal to “the 
other instruments of education,” that hopefully “counteract” the dangerous tendencies of dull, 
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 repetitive labor. Divided labor is categorized as one kind of education—a negative, harmful 
education—which deliberate schooling must counteract.262 
 Even Rowland Detrosier, a self-taught manufacturer who helped to found the Mechanics 
Institution at Manchester, frequently blames repetitive labor for deforming the minds of common 
people while he argues for extending political power to them. He gives a more radical spin to 
these familiar ideas. “What is the reiterated apology for refusing even a limited extension of 
acknowledged political rights to the great body of the people?” he asks. “Their political 
ignorance and moral degradation.” But no wonder the people are ignorant. “They are human 
machines for the creation of wealth, whose physical education in the adaptation of their hands, 
&c. to mechanical purposes is all that is thought of.” He notes that if humans are the “creature of 
education and circumstance” and their entire lives are “labour,” then they must be so 
degraded.263 He concludes by joining political life with education, “why not make public 
education a part of our scheme for obtaining political reform. Why not educate our youth to 
public as well as to private virtue?”264 And this education should focus on politics and science, 
not religion: “‘Let our Sunday-schools become the UNIVERSITIES OF THE POOR, in which 
the infant mind shall be taught to look through nature up to nature’s source” through “natural 
philosophy.”265 Detrosier adopts the rhetoric of mechanical literacy to advocate using natural 
philosophy to extend the worker’s mechanical skills into something recognized as politically 
empowering. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Coupling labor and hunger as the twin pains that degraded the working classes, Mill echoes Thomas Malthus, 
who, along with Smith, formed the intellectual credentials for William Whitbread’s opening argument in Parliament 
(1807) for a national school system. 
263 Detrosier, Address, Delivered, 6-7. 
264 Detrosier, Address, Delivered, 14. 
265 Detrosier, Address, Delivered, 10. 
170
  Against the machinery of repetitive labor ranks the machinery of education systems. As 
proposed by Bell and Lancaster, monitorial schools were an appealing, cost-effective solution to 
the threat of social dissolution posed by mechanized labor. They spread rapidly from 1800 to 
1815 because they vastly reduced the cost of educating many children under a single master by 
organizing students to teach one another and minimizing supplies like books and paper. By 
repeating lessons in pairs simultaneously, pupils efficiently covered the material in less time, 
requiring children to absent themselves from work for a shorter portion of their youth, an 
advantage in poor families where parents were tempted to withdraw children from school for 
them to earn wages. This “approved system of mechanical education,” as Whitbread called it, 
offered a poetic solution where the division of labor, after causing so much trouble, emerged 
once again on the side of “civilization” when implemented in the classroom.266 If one kind of 
machine destroyed minds, another machine would regenerate them. 
 Sir Thomas Bernard, president of the Royal Institute and its parent organization, the 
Society for Bettering the Condition of the Poor, directly connects the “mechanism” of monitorial 
education with its ability to counter the “mechanism” of labor. Citing Adam Smith, his pamphlet 
supporting Monitorial schools celebrates the civilizing advance of the division of labor, which 
“gave a new power to the application of corporeal strength, and simplified and facilitated the 
most irksome and labourious operation,” then notes that whomever introduced this innovation 
“did not more essential service to mechanical, than Dr. Bell has done to intellectual operations. It 
is the division of labour in his schools, that leaves the master the easy task of directing the 
movements of the whole machine, instead of toiling ineffectually at a single part. The principle 
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 in manufactories, and in schools, is the same.”267 But far from degrading the mind, the 
machinery of Monitorial schools improves the intellect of workers by forming “the habit of using 
and exercising his own faculties.”268 Invoking the French Revolution for support, Bernard argues 
that intelligent “cottagers” make more loyal subjects, for “in political commotions, the 
uneducated pauper has neither principle nor motive, to induce him to respect or defend that state 
of society, the benefits whereof he has not been taught to appreciate.”269 
 The root causes of unrest cited by Bernard are industrial wealth, global trade, the influx 
of foreign commodities—and the intellect-degrading employments of industry. He describes 
British society as divided into two camps, one whose minds are dissipated by an influx of 
luxurious objects and another whose minds are ruined producing them: 
If other commercial states, if other mighty empires, have been weighted down by the 
burthen of the rich and splendid ornaments with which they have been encumbered, how 
is Britain to plead exemption? What is left but EDUCATION, to preserve her from the 
effects of a rapid and unceasing influx of wealth from both the Indies?—from the 
consequences of boundless and lucrative speculations in every part of the globe?—and 
from the influence of manufactories, which congregate legions of the rising generation, 
disciplined only to watch and direct their machinery, but neglected and forgotten as to 
every privilege and distinction of a rational and immortal being?270 
The threat Bernard describes is a version of what he elsewhere praises as the foundation of 
civilization, but brought to an extreme where the division of labor determines access to consumer 
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 objects to such an extent that those surrounded by fashionable luxuries can no longer relate to 
those who produce them. 
 The “object gap” between rich and poor, described by Smith and Bernard, intersects with 
philosophy of mind by Dugald Stewart on the how varied sensations develop the mental 
faculties. Since the ability to abstract general laws requires early sensual training, children raised 
in barren or unvaried environments are more likely to suffer mental atrophy from repetitive 
labor.271  
 These were the public concerns when Elizabeth Hamilton turned from estate nurseries to 
poor schoolrooms with Addressed to the Patrons and Directors of Schools (1815), which 
introduced Pestalozzi to the British public as a supplement to Monitorial systems.272 While 
Hamilton is better known today as a novelist, contemporary education specialists frequently cite 
her application of philosophy of mind to the education of the poor.273 Concerned about child 
workers who “have their sense of sight perpetually occupied in a narrow sphere,” Hamilton 
advocates developing the senses of working-class students as preparation for learning to read and 
write.274 Based on personal experience while volunteering in Bell and Lancaster school, 
Hamilton insists that poor children, especially girls, only seem incapable of learning because of 
their environment, but with proper education “the intellectual faculties appear often strong and 
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 vigorous.”275 Through exercises that teach “an attentive observation of these objects,” children 
are “led to the acquirement of new ideas, till, step by step, they arrive at those in the want of 
which their apparent stupidity originated.”276 Like Adam Smith, Hamilton concludes from her 
philosophy of mind that the availability of objects for the senses accounts for class and gender 
differences in intelligence. Across the political spectrum, Wilfred Owen’s “academy for the 
formation of character” at New Lanark designed its curriculum upon similar principles. His 
infant schools begin educating the child’s body from infancy with a program of military 
exercises and dancing, activities that Owen speculated helped to improve learning. Like 
Hamilton, Owen was intrigued by Pestalozzi; he hired German teachers personally trained by 
Pestalozzi to teach in his American experiment at New Harmony. 
 As Pestalozzi’s methods became more popular, they were used to teach diverse students, 
adult and infant, wealthy and poor [figure 22]. In my concluding section, I use Samuel 
Wilderspin’s writings on infant schools to show subtle differences between object lessons 
designed for working-class and middle-class children and discuss the circles of appropriation 
between classes. 
 
All children are mechanical, but some children are more mechanical than others 
 As one the founders of infant schools, Samuel Wilderspin promoted with national tours 
and publications schools for children under seven, prior to their admittance in the Monitorial 
schools. His Infant Education: or, Practical Remarks on the Importance of Educating the Infant 
Poor, from the Age of Eighteen Months to Seven Years outlines his system (attributed to 
Pestalozzi in the preface to his second edition), which emphasize exercising body and mind 	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 together. They repeat lessons while on a swing; they form geometrical figures with their bodies; 
they sing many of their lessons. The students learn from cards with objects attached, focus on the 
manufacturing process, moving from raw materials to products. These cards remain stationary 
about the room, while the children circulate, allowing them to move about as they learn.277 
Learning to read in begins by orienting the children within the room. [figure 23] The instructor 
asks questions about where they are seated, what is behind and in front of him, and finally, what 
he holds (a card with a letter). By delaying literacy, the children learn to read much faster once 
they being. “It has been a charge brought against the system, that we are not sufficiently anxious 
to teach the children to read, &c. I consider their learning to read a secondary object, to that of 
teaching them to examine into, and find out the nature and property of things, of which words 
are, but the signs. It is with things, and not words, we wish to make our children acquainted.” 
Learning “signs” too early allows children a shortcut that circumvents investigation, while object 
lessons create an “inquisitive spirit.”278 
 These methods genuinely aim to liberate poor children from the potentially oppressive 
power of education by teaching them independent thought. “Now, the first thing we attempt to 
do in an infant school is, to set the children thinking,—to get them to examine, compare, and 
judge, of all those matters which their dawning intellects are capable of mastering. It is of no use 
to tell a child, in the first place, what it should think,—this is at once inducing an idleness of 
mind, which is but too generally prevalent among adults.” Children who are told what to think 
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 never learn to think for themselves. We make children into passive followers by giving them 
“dogmas instead of problems, opinions instead of interrogatories.” Their minds become “a heap 
of useless lumber,—without a single opinion or idea it could call its own” and “incapable of 
exertion.” Unlike other reformers, Wilderspin advocates this method, not because it makes 
children religious or useful, but because it is “due to the child as a rational being” and 
“essentially necessary for the development of its intellectual faculties”279 These are the 
sentiments that Edgeworth or Barbauld apply to middle-class children. 
 Where object lessons become clearly class specific is on the playground, an innovation 
whose modern ubiquity stems from Wilderspin’s influence. The playground mediates between 
the theoretical space of the classroom, where students learn lessons, and the dangerous, 
unsupervised space of the street. On the playground, these predominantly working-class infants 
learn the social significance of objects that, within the classroom itself, exist in a utopian abstract 
realm. The playground’s periphery includes plants and fruit trees, used for object lessons in 
natural history, but also to teach “respect to private property” by tempting them.280 He compares 
taking the children outside to training animals: “if only one half the pains were taken to break, 
train, and exercise the infant poor, that is taken with gentlemen’s horses and dogs, we should 
very soon sensibly feel its effects.”281 Whereas class status tends to recede within the classroom, 
where object encounters liberate children by awakening their faculties, class reappears in the 
playground, as a space where students may return to “street” activities, such as stealing or 
fighting. 	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balance the apprenticeship in manual skills with other instruction. 
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  Whereas Wilderspin’s school for working-class infants uses classroom organization to 
extend outward, changing behavior in the home and on the street, his object lessons for middle-
class students, appended to his treatise, connect students with systems of production and 
consumption widely across geographical space. For the wealthier children’s first geography 
lessons, “I would have a floor-close in every nursery, painted like a map.” Then “let the children 
then be told to proceed from a certain spot, to go through certain counties, towns, &c. and to 
fetch a piece of cloth from Yorkshire, or a knife from Sheffield, cheese from Cheshire, butter 
from Dorset, lace from Huntingdonshire, &c. &c.” Next, he suggests constructing a huge table 
tray of water with little cork islands, complete with animals, inhabitants, and “natural products.” 
“A little boat should then be provided, and a voyage to a given part undertaken; various islands 
might be touched at, and various commodities taken on board or exchanged, according to the 
mercantile instruction the children should receive; whilst brief accounts might at first be read or 
given of the climate productions, and inhabitants of the respective places; till the little scholar 
should be able to conduct the voyage, purchase or exchange commodities, and give an account of 
the various countries and their inhabitants, &c. by himself.”282 Although Wilderspin is passionate 
about making all of his students “active,” the kind of object lesson that he reserves for wealthier 
students reinforces the connection between mechanical literacy and participatory control of 
complex systems, such as manufacturing and political economy.283 These students essentially act 
out the ascendance of the middle-classes from the “mechanic” class, equated with their 
childhood. 
 The extension of Pestalozzi’s methods to wealthy students adds yet another level of 
appropriation, where the mechanical, tactile existence of very young children is ontologically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 Wilderspin, Infant Education, 289. Note the similarity between these activities and the Wallis map games 
produced a decade later. See chapter 7. 
283 Wilderspin, Infant Education, 277. 
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 privileged in the way that Brougham praises workers with practical machine experience—that is, 
because it is the means of overcoming one’s own status as a machine. Experientialist pedagogies 
and object learning in particular keep changing hands, invented first on a practical level between 
working children and adults, then systematized within institutions that try to imitate the “real 
world” scenarios of work. In a way, Elizabeth Hamilton participates in the same appropriation 
process relative to female nurses and mothers, adopting methods used decades earlier in the 
nursery as newly minted cognitive theories, then offering these back again to mothers. 
Mechanical literacy helps us understand this strained relationship between work, play, and 
education, categories that keep shifting as education institutions attempt to bring together theory 
and practice. 
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Figure 14: Northampton Lancasterian School Reading Lessons. Northampton; London: Abel, Bookseller, and Cor-
deux, Printer; Havery Darton, [ca. 1830]. Princeton University Library. 
These are posted on classroom walls, while students from different classes gather around the separate stations.  The 
cards eliminate the need for books.  It is possible, therefore, for poor children to learn to read in Lancaster schools 
without ever picking up a book, although schools might have small lending libraries.  One of the money-saving de-
vices of Monitorial schools was to divide lessons into smaller books or cards, rather than have each child hold a large 
book with every lesson bound together.
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Figure 15: (both images) Burton, C. [Alphabet coun-
ters]. Birmingham: Kendall & Son, [184–]. Princeton 
University Library.
This cylindrical container for holding an alphabet likely 
resembles the toy used by Mrs. Z’s son.
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Figure 16: (top) Bryan, 
Margaret. Lectures on 
Natural Philosophy. London: 
Sold for the Authoress  by 
George Kearsley; Jordan 
Hookham,1806. Princeton 
University Library.
The opening chapter page 
for “Mechanics” in Margaret 
Bryan’s Lectures on Natural 
Philosophy (1806). The 
summary of the chapter 
contents indicates a typical 
progression from concrete 
natural philosophy to meta-
physical reflections.
Figure 17: (bottom) Emerson, William. Principles of Mechanics. London: W. Innys, J. Richardson, 1754. Online. 
Google Books.
Emerson differentiates between artisan and philosophical mechanics: “It is not my design to treat at all on the lowest 
part of Mechanics, which concerns, annual arts or working by hand. For there is no theory required here, but only 
a habit of working, to be acquired by constant practice.” As a result, he communicates the “fundamental principles 
both in theory and practice.”
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Figure 18: Grant, Horace. Exercises for the 
Improvement of the Senses: for young children / 
by the author of “Arithmetic for young children.” 
London: Darton and Co., 1848. Princeton 
University Library.
These Pestalozzian lesson books guide instruc-
tors through the kind of exercises used to train the 
senses of working-class children. These were not 
generally popular until the 1830s. The top page 
is an introductory lesson, which begins with the 
most basic and sensual topic, the hand. Lesson 
three (from a different book) teaches the concept 
of “different substances” by comparing the child 
to the table, then to a cabbage.
(continued next page)
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Figure 19: Grant, 
Horace. Exercises for 
the Improvement of 
the Senses: for young 
children / by the 
author of “Arithmetic 
for young children.” 
London: Darton and 
Co., 1848. Princeton 
University Library.
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Figure 20: (both images) Biber, [George] E[duard]. Dr. Henry Pestalozzi, and his plan of education; being an 
account of his life and writings; with copious extracts from his works, and extensive details illustrative of the 
practical parts of his method. London: John Souter, 1831. Cambridge University Library.
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Figure 20 (cont.): (both images) Biber, [George] E[duard]. Dr. Henry Pestalozzi, and his plan of education; being 
an account of his life and writings; with copious extracts from his works, and extensive details illustrative of the 
practical parts of his method. London: John Souter, 1831. Cambridge University Library.
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Figure 21: Edgeworth, Richard Lovell, and Maria Edgeworth. Panorganon. Plate II in Vol. 2, Essays on Practical 
Education. 2 vols. London: J. Johnson, 1798. Courtesy of The Rare Book & Manuscript Library of the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
186
Figure 22: Stereometry Made Easy: a short compendium of the facts and principles of that instructive and amusing 
science: intended as a companion to the collection of solids. London, Thompson and Davidson: 1853. Princeton 
University Library.
This Stereometry set is used to teach the relationship between geometry and three dimensional shapes. The set 
comes with a pamphlet, which suggests that children begin by handling the blocks. The cards show people contem-
plating ruins in natural landscapes, adding a trendy Gothic element. Children who handle the blocks move from 
concrete to increasingly abstract contemplation of geometric principles, as suggested by the way the blocks are 
pictured reconstructing old buildings and monuments, with abstract shapes hovering in the sky.  The contemplating 
watchers in the pictures function as interlocutors for this contemplative process. This toy is an example of a middle-
class object lesson.
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apple produced?  A. It grows on a tree. Q . W hat
part of the tree is in the ground ?  A. The root.
Q . W hat is that which comes out of the ground ?
A. The stem. Q . W hen the stem grows up
strait, what would you call its position?  A.
Perpendicular. Q . W hat is on the stem ?
A. Branches. Q . W hat is on the branches ?
A. L eaves. Q . O f what colour are they ?  A.
Green.
Q . Is there any thing besides leaves on the
branches ?  A. Y es; apples. Q . W hat was it
before it became an apple?  A. Blossom. Q .
W hat part of the blossom becomes fruit ?  A. The
inside. Q . W hat becomes of the leaves of the
blossom ?  A. They fall off the tree. Q . W hat
was it before it became blossom ?  A. A bud.
Q . W hat caused the buds to become larger and
produce leaves and blossom ?  A. The sap. Q .
W hat is sap ?  A. A j uice. Q . How can the sap
mak e the buds larger?  A. It comes out of the
root and goes up the stem. Q . W here nex t ?
A. Through the branches into the buds. Q . W hat
do the buds produce ?  A. S ome buds produce
leaves; some blossoms, and some a shoot?  Q .
W hat do you mean by a shoot ?  A. A shoot is a
young branch, which is green at first, but be-
comes hard by age. Q . W hat part becomes hard
first?  A. The bottom.
B.
Q . W hat is this ?  A. B, for bak er, for butter,
for bacon, for brewer, for button, for bell, &c. &c.
[ The teacher can tak e any of these names he
instructions in natural history, which the children simul-
taneously receive, and which is spok en of in a subseq uent
chapter.
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motion of the plan here recommended, it will be
advisable to connect with our alphabetical and
reading lessons, as much information as we pos-
sibly can. By so doing the tedium of the task
to the child will be considerably lessened, as
well as much k nowledge attained. The means of
doing this in a variety of ways will no doubt
suggest themselves to the intelligent teacher;
but, as an illustration of what we mean, the fol-
lowing conversational plan may not be useless.
W e have 26 cards, and each card has on it one
letter of the alphabet, and some obj ect in nature.
The first for instance has the letter A on the
top and an apple painted on the bottom. The
children are desired to go into the gallery, which
is simply seats elevated one above another at
one end of the school lik e stairs; the master
places himself before the children in a situation
so that they can see him, and he them, and
being thus situated, proceeds in the following
manner.
Q . W here ami: A. O pposite to us. Q . W hat
is on the right side of me?  A. A lady. Q . W hat
is on the left side of me?  A. A chair. Q . W hat
is behind me?  A. A desk . Q  W ho are before
me?  A. W e children. Q . W hat do I hold up in
my hand ?  A. L etter A for apple. Q . W hich
hand do I hold it up with?  A. The right hand.
Q . S pell apple.*  A. A-p-p-1-e. Q . How is an
*  It is not supposed that all or many of the children will
be able to spell this, or the subseq uent words, or to give
such answers as we have put down, but some amongst the
older or more acute of them will soon he able to do so; and
thus become instructors of the rest. It may be proper to
mention, also, that the information on natural history, &c.
&c. displayed in some of the answers, is the result of the
r
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Figure 23: (both images) Wilderspin, Samuel. Infant Education: or, practical remarks on the importance of 
educating the infant poor, from the age of eighteen months to seven years, containing hints for developing the moral 
and intellectual powers of children of all classes. London: Simpkind and Marshall, 1829. Online. Google Books.
Note that Wilderspin begins teaching infants the alphabet by asking questions about their position in the room. The 
actual potion of the lesson that focuses on letters or spelling is small in comparison with all of the other questions. 
He proceeds from A for Apple to questions about fruit and trees.
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 CHAPTER 5 
Self-governing Machines:  
Mechanical Literacy in Maria Edgeworth’s Harry and Lucy, Popular Tales, and Belinda 
 
“Now the human mind may fitly be called that great and universal machine by which we operate 
upon all things. We all know the fame which was so deservedly obtained by the late Mr. James 
Watt, for his great improvements in the steam-engine. . . . In improving then this universal 
engine [the mind] we are conferring a service on mankind something the same in kind with the 
improvement of the steam-engine, but in degree and extent of usefulness beyond all comparison 
greater.” 
—“Improvement of the Mental Faculties,” The Penny Magazine, October 26, 1839, 414 
 
Justifying Thomas Love Peacock’s lampoon of the S.D.U.K. as the “Steam Intellect Society” in 
Crotchet Castle, this speech by Matthew Arnold’s father, the Headmaster of Rugby, excerpted in 
Charles Knight’s The Penny Magazine, presents the machinery of education and of 
industrialization as twin avenues for improving society. The more complicated machinery of the 
mind constructs and controls these engines of progress in order to subject the material world to 
human purposes. “Unhappily,” reflects Arnold, there is “no James Watt to perfect this mightier 
engine,” or perhaps “mind being less manageable than iron and steam, the engine has refused to 
be moulded according to the model proposed for its improvement.”284 Arnold equivocates 
between blaming the mind’s complex development or its inherent unruliness for the instructors’ 
failure to transform students into a preconceived vision, but he retains the analogy of instruction 
as engineering, implying that students are submissive (if unpredictable) objects worked upon by 
their teachers. In this analogy, the student’s passivity is complicated by Arnold’s simultaneous 
assertion that the mind is a “great and universal machine” that rules “all things,” a machine that 
creates other machines (the steam-engine) to leverage its power over the material world. Arnold 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 “Improvement of the Mental Faculties,” The Penny Magazine, October 26, 1839, 414. 
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 justifies the controlling mechanisms of education by pointing to its results: a powerful adult who 
comprehends and masters the physical world, using machines as an extension of himself. 
 Illustrating how education and industry fused into a single discourse of machine 
improvement, this chapter examines the literature of self-improvement or moral tales from the 
first decade of the nineteenth-century, which popular literature scholars have shown prefigures 
the Victorian social-problem novel by dramatizing political class conflicts in terms of the 
individual’s moral character.285 Focusing on Maria Edgeworth’s Belinda, Popular Tales, and 
Harry and Lucy, I show how texts that ostensibly target different audiences—children, affluent 
adults, and newly literate readers—consistently use machines as models of self-development and 
link technological progress with education.  
 Although Maria Edgeworth did not consider herself scientifically inclined, her literary 
partnership with her father, an engineer with practical experience in road and canal construction, 
provided her with the technical details for her stories, while the practical industrialists among his 
Lunar Society friends—Erasmus Darwin, Josiah Wedgwood, Richard Arkwright, and James 
Watt—were regular family correspondents mentioned in her tales.286 “My father long ago 
foresaw, what everybody now feels,” Maria Edgeworth recalled in 1825, “that the taste for 
scientific, as well as literary knowledge, which has risen rapidly, and has spread widely, would 
render it necessary to make some provision for the early instruction of youth in science.”287 At 
times she describes herself as the literary machine for disseminating her father’s inventions: “My 
father will allow me to manufacture an essay on the Logograph,” she writes to a friend in April 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 Haywood, Revolution, 83; Patricia Comitini argues that the popular moral tales of Edgeworth and Hannah More 
support the spread of literacy to address the social problems of early capitalism without disrupting the existing social 
order. To do this, these tales reduce “all relations of social and economic dominance to individual ‘choice’” (73). 
The “illusory” choices presented to characters, however, are deceptively arranged so that they must either accept the 
emergent middle-class ideology of self-improvement or be dismissed as criminal and undeserving poor. (91)  
286 Butler, Maria Edgeworth: A Literary Biography, 33. 
287 “Introduction,” Harry and Lucy, xii-xiii. This introduction is dated May 31, 1825. 
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 1795, while her father worked intensely to perfect an early telegraph signal system, “he 
furnishing the solid materials and I spinning them.” 288 A dose of imaginative quirkiness 
pervades Richard Edgeworth’s favorite inventions, which include a machine to climb walls, a 
wind carriage, and “a wagon drawn by fire” (i.e. a steam train).289 The inspiration for his 
devotion to mechanics was his chance encounter with the traveling exhibit of William Bridge’s 
Microcosm, a complex clock decorated with automaton figures and a working model of the 
planets [figures 24 and 25].290 Maria Edgeworth also attended at least one automata exhibit on 
her first visit to London, and clockwork figures appear in many of her works as representations 
of how discipline enables independence. 291 
 Machines in Edgeworth’s fiction range from mundane to wonderful, suggesting that 
mechanical knowledge is useful and accessible to people of all stations. In Popular Tales, factory 
managers and farmers alike reap financial rewards for investing in technologies, while small 
inventions cobbled together by the innovative working-poor are often the means to their social 
advancement. The destitute siblings of The Orphans, who are kicked off their land by a pitiless 
Irish landlord, transform a nearby ruined castle into a manufacturing center where the children 
make shoes. Even something as simple as an improved wedge for locking carriage wheels, 
constructed by a beggar boy in “The Basket Weavers,” secures him a benefactor. Rewarding 
these workers requires educating a generation of patrons who recognize the value of machine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Hare, Life and Letters, 1: 40-41. 
289 Butler, Maria Edgeworth: A Literary Biography, 34-45. 
290 Butler, Maria Edgeworth: A Literary Biography, 24. 
291 Marilyn Butler’s biography records that in the spring of 1798 Maria Edgdeworth accompanied Richard Lovell 
and Frances Edgeworth on their wedding trip. Butler finds this visit “remarkable for the slightness of the 
contribution it made to Maria’s experience, at least as reflected in what she afterwards wrote,” yet Butler’s 
desciption of the mechanical wonders that Maria Edgeworth witnessed suggests otherwise: “several factories in the 
Birmingham area”; “the great ironworks at Ketley Bank”; and, in London, “galleries, museums, and a mechanical 
exhibition” (141). Although Butler does not specify what mechanical exhibition, the date correlated with the 
popularity of Maillardet’s London show. Alternatively, Edgeworth could have known the contents of the Maillardet 
show from advertisements, which describe the items she uses in Belinda. 
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 innovation. Factory tours are an appropriate family outing in Rosamond, and in Harry and Lucy 
(1801-1821), Harry extends his expertise in the natural sciences to his impetuous younger sister, 
describing experiments in detail that readers can replicate at home. After playing with the power 
of steam using a kettle, the siblings watch steamboats at the seashore and investigate the steam-
powered machines of Arkwright’s cotton mill under their father’s guidance. They tour the 
industrial districts of England in Harry and Lucy Continued (1825), describing “a black dreary 
waste, with half burning, half smothering heaps of dross, coal and cinders.”292 Verging on the 
exotic, Edgeworth’s aristocratic characters treat their children to trendy London automata 
exhibits, and celebrated automata makers M. Bautte and Henri Maillardet make cameos in 
Rosamond Continues and Belinda.293 
 The striking diversity of machines and tools in Edgeworth’s didactic fiction indicates its 
participation in a larger cultural project that associated machine technologies (pedagogical and 
industrial) with self-development and self-mastery as a function of human mastery over the 
“external” natural world. Just as the science of mechanics explains how to control bodies in 
motion, the science of education explains how to direct children, who, as I have argued in my 
previous chapters, eventually comprehend these principles and educate themselves. At a time 
when rural domestic settings dominate the moral tales genre, Edgeworth addresses political 
economy and technological improvements within these traditional domestic settings, anticipating 
authors Jane Marcet and Harriett Martineau who later praise her work.294 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Qtd. Butler, Maria Edgeworth, A Literary Biography, 144. 
293 Before M. Bautte appears in Rosamond Continued (1821), where the celebrated Swiss automaton-maker tempts 
her with an ornate “memory bracelet,” young Rosamond investigates a small automaton toy in the curiosity cabinet 
of her mother’s friend. 
294 Harry and Lucy recommends Jane Marcet’s “Conversations on Chemistry” (106); Marcet’s first publication on 
political economy recommends Edgeworth’s fiction and credits her for her inspiration. 
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  In Edgeworth’s fiction, authorship and machine-making perform similar cultural work. 
Literary critics have explained the development of genres like the domestic novel or lyrical 
poetry, as externalized, textual representations of the author’s body, which imagine the 
possibility of a valuable interiority. In How Novels Think, Nancy Armstrong argues that Pamela, 
Robinson Crusoe, and Moll Flanders are “exceptional” only in their ability to “inscribe him or 
herself in writing as an object, or body, separate and apart from the subject that inhabited that 
body, and put that body through a sequences of moves to enhance its social value.”295 Likewise, 
Thomas Pfau in Wordsworth’s Profession argues that the literary forms of psychological self-
narration promoted by Romantic middle-class writers created reading publics that experienced 
aesthetic pleasure from an anxiety-producing pedagogy of self-surveillance, epitomized by 
Andrew Bell’s Monitorial System of education.296 My analysis suggests that literary forms that 
create textual representations of the writer’s interiority—such as confessional literature, 
biography and bildungsroman, epistolary fiction, and lyrical poetry—operate on the same 
principles as mimetic machines. By observing and identifying with machines, Edgeworth’s 
characters seize a position of authority over their machine selves, thus translating the intrusive 
internalization of regulatory structures that comprises education into the reverse: a comforting 
sense of authority over an externalized model of mechanical self-development.  
 Connections between self-development and mimetic machines are suggested by the 
recent criticism regarding automata in literature by Julia Douthwaite, Julie Park, and Alex 
Wetmore.297 Although perusing quite different projects, these authors collectively suggest that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 Armstrong, How Novels Think, 6. 
296 Pfau, Wordsworth’s Profession, 143-179.  
297 See Douthwaite, “Frankenstein of the French Revolution”; Wetmore, “Sympathy Machines”; Park, Self and It. 
Douthwaite, with her astounding discovery of an antecedent to Mary Shelly’s Frankenstein in François-Félix 
Nogaret’s Le miroir des événements actuels, ou la belle au plus offrant (1790), a political allegory featuring a 
scientist named Frankénsteïn who builds an automaton musician to win an heiress, resituates Shelley’s novel of 
failed education experimentation alongside Nogaret’s early optimism towards technological progress as the means 
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 automata dramatize the hierarchical subject/object divide, where a mechanical genius asserts his 
active, human agency through his manipulation of the passive machine that he enlivens. It is this 
divide between creator and created, human and machine, implicit in the automaton show, that 
enables its flexible representation of hierarchical relationships, including self-governance.298  
 Each of the three Edgeworth stories in this chapter describe machine encounters as 
formative moments that determine whether a protagonist is capable of improvement and worthy 
of education. In Harry and Lucy, young Lucy pleads to learn natural philosophy like her brother, 
and her lessons on the power of the steam engine symbolize her ability to channel the energy of 
her imagination in productive ways. The working-class protagonist, Jervas, from Popular Tales, 
proves his ability to ascend the social ladder when he constructs a machine model of the mines 
where he worked as a child. Finally, in Belinda, Lady Delacour signals her reform from 
dissipated aristocrat to devoted mother by visiting an automaton exhibit with her daughter. In 
each case, a potentially mechanized protagonist escapes from a mechanized condition by 
acquiring mechanical literacy. In some cases, peripheral characters encounter machines but 
prove themselves incapable of using these to gain a broader vision or implement reform. 
 While Lucy, Jervas, and Lady Delacour circulate in different spheres, all three characters 
transform themselves by reconceptualizing their relationship to the world of things, displaying a 
way of reading themselves in the world that I develop in chapter 4 as mechanical literacy. These 
different fictional narratives illustrate practical instances of how mechanical literacy works, by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of creating the revolution’s “new man.” Unlike Shelley’s creature, Nogaret’s mechanical man remains an obedient 
object; the novel thus champions the scientist’s ability to pacify the knowable material world to serve human ends. 
Recent scholarship on automata and literature is especially rich. See also, Riskin, “Defecating Duck”; Riskin, 
Genesis Redux; Stafford, Artful Science; Sussman, “Performing the Intelligent Machine”; Hanafi, Monster in the 
Machine; Liu Copying Machines; Willis, Mesmerists, Monsters, and Machines; Schaffer “Babbage’s Intelligence”; 
Spufford, Cultural Babbage. For education and machines in America during this period, see Terrell, “‘Republican 
Machines.’” For an indispensible, comprehensive historical study of automata in Europe, see Kang, Sublime Dreams 
of Living Machines. 
298 Douthwaite, “Frankenstein of the French Revolution,” 381, 399. 
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 conferring a self-reflexivity about human productivity and creativity—a consciousness of oneself 
as an active constituent (and microcosmic representation) of large-scale systems of industrial 
production and consumption, guided by the principles of political economy and contributing to 
human progress. This self-reflexivity grants a privileged viewpoint, whereby the social 
machinery seems rationally organized according to natural laws that make it accessible to a 
select few; thus mechanical literacy includes a mix of ideological associations, whereby 
machinery is linked with progress and improvement, as well as the printing press and the spread 
of literacy. As Lady Delacour’s reformation indicates, mechanical literacy implies an ethos about 
conspicuous consumption as well as production; those who govern machines are not governed by 
excessive desires for the things machines produce. Thus it implies a narrative about how humans 
control the world of things by mastering the natural sciences as well as themselves, which sets 
apart the industrious middling classes from both the laboring poor and those among the wealthy 
who mechanize themselves by mistaking luxuries for necessities. 
 
Harry and Lucy: Mechanics for girls 
 Mechanics connects micro and macro scales: local production with global trade, domestic 
education with empire expansion, simple tools with planetary motion. In Harry and Lucy, 
mechanics connects domestic, feminized work with natural philosophy and global trade, granting 
Lucy the sense that her limited sphere as a young girl extends to great things. The series 
dramatizes the relationship between the poetically-inclined Lucy and her scientifically-gifted 
elder brother, Harry, in a coeducational relationship that mirrored Edgeworth’s partnership with 
her father and illustrates monitorial education in the home.299 Flighty and imaginative, Lucy is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 Although Edgeworth doesn’t mention Monitorial education, her introduction to the 1825 edition recommends 
that children learn from other children, and this theme is underscored throughout: “The system of mutual instruction 
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 frustrated because her female education has made her grow apart from her favorite brother, who 
has “grown so excessively fond of mechanics, and all those scientific things, which he is always 
learning from my uncle and papa.”300 At the commencement of the series, Lucy successfully 
advocates with her mother for the right to join her brother, once again, in his science lessons, and 
the mother is forced to acknowledge with Lucy that “ by acquiring knowledge, women not only 
increase their power of being agreeable companions” to “sensible men” but also “their own 
pleasure in reading and hearing of scientific experiments and discoveries” (1:7). In addition to 
these Wollstonecraftian arguments for expanding women’s education, the purpose of studying 
the sciences is to train Lucy’s ability to direct and sustain her attention, a goal that mutually 
hones her powers of language and observation. The scientific education of women is valued in 
Lucy’s family because her parents believe it will transform her mind, allowing Lucy to control 
her faculties, independent of parental discipline. Meanwhile, Harry is forced to confess that he 
should “try to like poetry better” when he discovers its ability to stimulate affective investment 
in scientific advances (1:54). 
 Experimental science and poetry are symbiotic in Harry and Lucy—siblings, perhaps, or 
(autobiographically) father and daughter—a point that Lucy’s father makes by offering the 
children a rapprochement through a passage from Erasmus Darwin’s The Economy of Vegetation 
from The Botanic Garden on “the wonders performed by the expansive force of steam.” 
Following the children’s steam experiments with a teakettle, he chooses descriptive passages of 
steam-powered machines like grain mills, pumps that drain mines, and bellows in foundries, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
can be still more advantageously pursued in teaching the rudiments of science than those of literature, and may be 
extended even to higher branches of intellectual education. Upon this principle, . . . the young brother is employed to 
teach his sister what he has learns, either from his father or from books” (Harry and Lucy, xi). This “system of 
mutual instruction” is another way of saying monitorial methods, which by this point were implemented in middle-
class schools and in secondary schools. 
300 Edgeworth, Harry and Lucy, 2. Hereafter cited in text. 
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 culminating with the steam-powered national mint: “Hard dies of steel the cupreous circles 
cramp, / And with quick fall his massy hammers stamp; / The Harp, the Lily, and the Lion join, / 
And George and Britain guard the sterling coin.” At these recitations Harry “looked triumphant” 
(1:134) at what he calls the “terribly great power” of steam, which “can do more in an hour than 
two hundred horsed and fourteen hundred men. . . . Think what we men can make it do at our 
bidding” (1:143, 1:118-19). Lucy translates Harry’s praise into her poetic language, exclaiming 
that steam “does more at men’s bidding than any of the genii in the Arabian Tales, more than any 
of the slaves of Aladdin’s lamp” (1:119-20).  
 Both Harry’s technical observations and Lucy’s poetic allusions fantasize commanding 
vast quantities of labor through machines. With such control, the world becomes enlivened, as if 
working in perfect obedience under human management—but these are proper slaves of fantasy 
that have no human needs, desires, or grievances, while the work of actual people is omitted. 
Because the elements can be subdued, Lucy, too, can control herself—she will learn to control 
her imaginative powers while she learns how to measure the world with instruments and 
comprehend machines. As her father’s readings from Darwin hint, Lucy’s mastery of scientific 
principles is not merely an individual journey of progress; she takes part in a transformation of 
national significance, as steam literally makes money, wherein “The Harp, the Lily, and the Lion 
join,” the nations coming together in united power over air, water, and fire. Since Harry and 
Lucy was published around the time of Irish unification with Britain in 1802, the steam-engine 
represents a new future where technology translates seamlessly across borders, bestowing 
universal benefits that enrich every nation at the expense of none.  
 These technological fantasies tie the quotidian education of Lucy’s family with vast 
political changes, economic systems, and physical laws. The method through which both 
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 children learn—Lucy, for instance, observes how the teapot creates steam, and how steam 
condenses on cold surfaces—connects the feminized domestic concerns of education and self-
regulation and the national concerns of political economy and industrial supremacy.301 As Harry 
soon discovers while learning about his sister’s work, industry requires knowledge from the 
domestic sphere. After Mangling “a chain” of tambour work, he must acknowledge not only the 
intricate skill required, but the difficulty of comprehending it accurately enough to replicate 
women’s labor with a machine. Even their father fairs no better, and the two consol themselves 
“that their perfect theory [of needlework] had helped, would help, or should have helped, them 
very much” (1:138). The subtext of the episode is that Lucy is superior at some tasks merely 
because of practice, so her brother should be more patient with her progress in the sciences. This 
lesson precedes their visit to Arkwright’s mill, where they learn about the history of cotton 
manufacturing, whose “machinery earns for England one thousand pounds every working hour,” 
instead of “doing everything by the labour of men’s hands, as in India” (1:177, 1:176). The 
quality of English muslin, their mother notes, now competes with Indian muslins because of 
British innovation. Harry and Lucy shows how mechanical literacy might give a young girl a 
sense of expansive power. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301 There is a biographical element to the domestic and political convergences through which Harry and Lucy 
weaves together the bourgeois discourse of education with a political narrative of British progress. While Maria 
Edgeworth was occupied with codifying domestic education with her moral tales, Richard Edgeworth turned his 
attention to the problem of legislating popular education in Ireland. She writes to Charlotte Sneyd in April 2, 1799, 
“In the paper of to-night you will see my father’s farewell speech on the Education Bill,” and she acknowledges that 
her friend has provided input both “to the Chairman of the Committee of Education [her father] and on her literary 
“lessons for the poor” (Hare, Life and Letters, 1:67-8). Richard Edgeworth’s bill did not pass, and since Ireland’s 
parliament was dissolved with unification soon afterwards, it is difficult to say whether the issue was related to those 
impending political changes. His draft of the bill survives in the family papers. He supported government schools for 
both Protestant and Catholic children, educated together or separate according to local choices, and where separate 
schools are established, Catholic clergymen were empowered to appoint teachers, just as the Anglican clergy did for 
other schools. His position on education and religion is closer to the Lancasterians, or to James Mill’s rallying call 
“schools for all, and not for churchmen only”—that is, he objected to exclusively Anglican schools under the control 
of the Anglican clergy. After her father’s death, Edgeworth despaired of finishing Harry and Lucy without his help, 
and the later stories occasionally betray a more guarded assessment of industrial landscapes omitted from the 
celebratory descriptions of earlier tales (Butler, Maria Edgeworth: A Literary Biography, 144). 
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Popular Tales and Popular Literacy 
 Lucy proves herself worthy of joining her brother’s studies in natural philosophy through 
her ability to appreciate the complexity of machines and what they represent. Similarly, the 
working-class protagonist of “Lame Jervas,” the leading story for Edgeworth’s Popular Tales, 
uses mechanical literacy for self-fashioning. His ability to understand networks of production 
and global trade are continually linked with literacy, appropriate for a story collection that, I 
argue, intercedes in contemporary debates on expanding popular literacy. 
  “Lame Jervas” follows the rags-to-riches progress of a fictional automaton-maker, 
William Jervas, who makes his fortune through a machine model of the Cornish tin mines where 
he worked as a child. After touring Britain with his model, Jervas captures the attention of an 
East India Company agent, who employs him as Andrew Bell’s assistant in his orphan charity 
school in Madras. A historical contemporary of Edgeworth, Bell introduced the Monitorial 
System in England (or Madras System) after its confirmed success in India. Referred to by Bell’s 
friend and supporter, Samuel Coleridge, as a “vast moral steam-engine” that should be “adopted 
and in free motion throughout the Empire,” the Bell system was praised by contemporaries for 
organizing the classroom like a machine and, more recently, derided by Michel Foucault as a 
disciplinary mechanism.302 In other words, Jervas’s progress via automaton construction 
intersects with a historical, international debate about expanding literacy through mechanically 
organized students and classroom exercises. 
 Edgeworth is one of the post-revolutionary educator-authors that spearheaded the 
utilitarian project to educate the masses by disseminating information through printed mediums, 
similar to Charles Knight and Henry Brougham efforts in the 1820s and 30s. Describing “Lame 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 Coleridge, Stateman’s Manual, Lay Sermons, 41. 
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 Jervas” as a “story of self-help which looks back to Dick Whittington and forward to Samuel 
Smiles,” Alan Richardson identifies Jervas “as a prototype of the self-educated technician and 
self-made inventor and entrepreneur who would constitute the ideal (if hardly the actual) reader 
of The Mechanics’ Magazine and the Library of Useful Knowledge.”303 Edgeworth suggests that 
mutual investment in the system of labor exchange and property ownership provides a 
foundation for class reconciliation based on shared values like family affection, loyalty, 
frugality, and industry. 
 The fused values of property ownership and popular literacy in Popular Tales captures 
the spirit of reform promoted by allied Whigs and Radicals in Parliament after 1800. In contrast 
to the patterns of oppression that dominate in a novel such as Godwin’s Caleb Williams, 
Edgeworth designs lines of cooperation that depict sympathetic, poignant interactions across 
class boundaries. When Jervas complains of “tyrants” in the mines, he refers to the way older 
workers defer heavy, dangerous tasks to young children and habitually blame them for their own 
negligence (9), which causes his injury. While at first Jervas longs to become the abuser instead 
of the abused, he exits this cycle of violence through the care of Dr. Y— and his “master,” the 
mine’s proprietor, who tends him after he breaks his leg. When he contrasts their affection with 
the neglect of his companions, he decides to “imitate” the “better sort” of miners who visit him. 
“I learned how they laid out their time and their money,” he reflects, “and I now began to desire 
to have, as they had, a little garden, and property of my own, for which I knew I must work 
hard.”304 Rebounding with his new appreciation for investment, Jervas next protects his master’s 
property by informing on several miners who hide their discovery of “Cornish diamonds” and 
secretly steal the load for their own profits. Jervas gains the confidence of his next master, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 Richardson, Literature, Education, and Romanticism, 226. 
304 Edgeworth, “Lame Jervas,” Popular Tales, 1:14. Hereafter cited in text. All citations are from the first volume of 
Popular Tales. 
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 traveling lecturer, after he calls attention to his mistake in giving him a guinea covered with 
quicksilver (from a chemical demonstration) in place of a shilling. Thereafter, the suspicious 
instructor trusts Jervas with his property, allowing him to read from his library of books and 
participate in producing his lectures. Once in India, the reports of Jervas’s honesty impress Tipu 
Sultan, who employs him to tutor his son and improve his diamond minds. Pointing to the 
prevalence of paternal mentor figures in Edgeworth’s fiction, Julie Wright argues that fostering 
creates a “double-discipline of sentiment and duty” that bonds characters like Jervas to the 
establishment and counteract Edgeworth’s prescient for unlikely (and socially disruptive) 
reversals of fortune. As Wright observes, each stage in Jervas’s advancement requires passing “a 
test” that “proves his usefulness to his masters,” but the common denominator of these 
paternalistic relationships is quite specific for Jervas: by repeatedly demonstrating his respect for 
his masters’ property, they reward him with access to a quality education, one that bestows 
mechanical literacy.305  
 The story’s over-determined relationship between property and education positions 
literacy as something more than reading and writing; learning to read involves a sanctioned 
redirection of desires for objects towards the desire for knowledge, which permits long-term 
investments and delayed gratification. In this way, Popular Tales advocates a particular 
relationship between people and things, property and labor, environment and education, which 
characters must embrace in order to reap the rewards of middle-class security. The collection 
makes the case for educating the working classes and permitting upward mobility on the 
condition that they embrace and disseminate these values of property, labor, and improvement. 
Those who make this transition are masters over machines; they organize the world of things.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 Wright, Ireland, India, and Nationalism, 74; Wright, “Courting Public Opinion,” 149; see also Haywood, 
Revolution, 85. Jervas “chooses paternalism over anarchy and violence.” 
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  Explicitly aimed at the newly literate classes, the collection announces its concern with 
literacy and working-class education by opening with the mystery of a miner’s signature, carved 
in the rocks of a Cornish tin mine. Pointing “to some letters that were carved on the rock,” a 
gentleman touring the mines asks his guide: “Whose name was written there?” The guide 
pronounces, “William Jervas,” and proceeds to recount Jervas’s disappearance long ago and the 
rumors that his ghost haunts the mine. When the ladies and gentlemen laugh at the quaint 
superstitions of their Cornish guide, “words” almost come “to blows” before the inquiring 
gentleman can “put an end to the dispute” by revealing, to everyone’s astonishment, that he is 
William Jervas. The miner-turned-gentleman visits the mine’s proprietor, Mr. R—, and the 
miners accept a general invitation to dine outside in tents with their employer, where Jervas 
appears “dressed in his miner’s old jacked and cap” to tell his story (6-7).306 
 The audience assembled by Jervas for dinnertime biography symbolizes the 
rapprochement between classes advocated by Edgeworth’s collection, with its economically 
diverse target audience. Because he prevents violence from erupting between the miners and the 
touring gentlemen, Jervas is a double for Maria Edgeworth, who convenes a mixed-class 
audience in the intimate setting of her literary dinner table and performs her stories while self-
consciously costumed in the cloak of a working-class speaker. Recognizing her ventriloquism, 
The Edinburgh Review praises Edgeworth’s “talent of observation,” which “has taught her” the 
“simple art, of talking on paper, in the very style really employed by such characters as those that 
she so naturally represents.”307 In the wake of Castle Rackrent (1800) and Belinda (1801), which 
established Edgeworth’s reputation as an adult fiction writer, Popular Tales pleased for similar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 The choice of a Cornish miner as the main character could possibly refer to the abysmal literacy rates among 
mining children, as well as the (rather contradictory) claim that Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man circulated in the 
Cornish Mines. Ian Haywood specifically mentions that Paine’s Rights of Man was reportedly read in the “Cornish 
tin-mines,” which is Jervas’s locale (21). 
307 “Miss Edgeworth’s Popular Tales,” Annual Review and History of Literature, January 1804, 461. 
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 reasons (its Irish characters are always mentioned with enthusiasm), extending Edgeworth’s 
ability to wear the clothes, or assume the voice, of particular stations as well as nationalities. 
 The project’s political significance is obvious to the reviewer, who finds it “superior in 
genius, as well as utility, to the laudable exertions of Mr. Thomas Paine to bring disaffection and 
infidelity within the comprehension of the common people, or the charitable endeavours of 
Messrs. Wirdsworth & Co. [sic.] to accommodate them with an appropriate vein of poetry.” Such 
“superfluities,” he insists, “they might have done very tolerably without.”308 While the notion of 
combining amusement and instruction is as venerable as Homer, he admits, the innovative 
contribution of Popular Tales is its entertaining stories, featuring quotidian experiences actually 
faced by the less affluent reading public—a combination that offers a viable alternative to the 
unsavory literature aimed at these audiences.309 These remarks take their cue from Richard 
Edgeworth’s preface, which defines the audience of Popular Tales as statistically as those nine 
in ten literate Britains, estimated by Edmund Burke at “eighty thousand readers,” of which, he 
estimates, seven in eight are neither “nobility, clergy, or gentlemen of the learned 
professions.”310 These seventy thousand readers from “beyond circles which are sometimes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 “Miss Edgeworth’s Popular Tales,” Edinburgh Review, July 1804, 330. If the British elite learned one thing from 
the suppression of publications in the wake of Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man, which sold 200,000 copies in one 
year, it was that artisans, tradesmen, and common laborers would read literature. As Hazlitt recalled, “It was 
impossible to prevent our reading something” (qtd. Altick, English Common Reader, 73.) Paine’s Rights of Man was 
issued in two parts. Part one, published in March 1791, cost 3s., the same price as Burke’s Reflections on the 
Revolution in France, and reportedly sold 50,000, in part because Corresponding and Constitutional Societies aided 
distribution. In response to demand, the second part, issued in Spring 1792, was available in a 6d. edition, and a 
cheap edition of part one was issued as well. The sales figures for these inexpensive editions made the availability of 
revolutionary literature to less affluent readers a matter of national security (Altick, English Common Reader, 69-
70). For further discussion of Paine and the 1790s as a formative period that defined the popular reading public, see 
Haywood, Revolution in Popular Literature, 11-25. 
309 The Edinburgh Review anticipates that Popular Tales will find favor among “the great and respectable multitude 
of English tradesmen, yeomen, and manufacturers—in that most important part of our population which consists of 
the well-educated in the lower and middling orders of the people,” although it may fail to convert “millinery misses 
and aspiring apprentices” who prefer novels populated by “counts, baronesses, or Adelines” (330).  
310 Burke’s eighty thousand readers is quoted by contemporaries as well as scholars of popular literature (Haywood 
and Altick), but since Haywood cites Altick, I don’t know that the original Burke tally has been located. In 
Proposals for Peace with the Regicide Directory of France (1796), Burke estimates the informed British public at 
“four hundred thousand political citizens, . . . about eighty thousand” of whom are “pure Jacobins” (67). The 
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 exclusively considered as polite” deserve “instruction, in the dress of innocent amusement,” 
adapted to their “different ages, sexes, and situations in life.” Writing literature for this audience 
is necessary, he explains, because the “art of printing has opened to all classes of people various 
new channels of entertainment and information.”311 
 Despite its professed audience, Popular Tales was priced above the pockets of Cornish 
miners.312 Ethical barbs directed at wealthier readers—eg. “The Manufacturers” censures a 
factory owner who would rather play gentleman than look after the condition of his workers—
suggest that Popular Tales discourages sedition among the poor while correcting wealthy readers 
who fail to accept their paternalist responsibilities. This unacknowledged audience of readers 
with a charitable or political investment in the national education and poor law debate, suggests 
that Hannah More’s Cheap Repository Tracts is not, as most critics assume, the closest 
contemporary corollary for Popular Tales.313 Furthermore, while Edgeworth’s didacticism might 
seem heavy-handed to today’s readers, there are some indications that Edgeworth found political 
tracts condescending. In her introduction to Mary Leadbeater’s Cottage Dialogues, Edgeworth 
implicitly advocates didactic complexity in literature for working-class readers: “None of the 
interlocutors in these dialogues are destined merely to speak the author’s fine sentiments, or to 
acknowledge the folly of all who are of an opposite opinion—one of the dramatis personae is not 
produced to harangue, and domineer, and the other to ask questions, and be refuted—one is not 
made a miracle of wisdom, and the other a man of straw.”314 While Leadbeater’s dialogues were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
possibility that Burke’s estimation of the number of Jacobins in Britain has been systematically misquoted as 
Burke’s estimate of readers is an intriguing collapse between two connected, alarming statistics. 
311 Richard Edgeworth, “Preface,” Popular Tales, iv-v. 
312 Provide price information; look up whether Edgeworth attempted to produce cheaper editions, which I think she 
might have. 
313 Cf, Haywood, Revolution, 83-86. 
314 Leadbeater, Cottage Dialogues, 1:iv. Leadbeater’s essays are written for people like Jervas; Sir Thomas Bernard, 
co-founded the Society for Bettering the Condition of the Poor, paid for their distribution among the literate poor. 
See Leadbeater, The Leadbeater Papers, 2:226–27.  
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 distributed to the poor by Sir Thomas Bernard, co-founder of the Society for Bettering the 
Condition of the Poor, Edgeworth’s Popular Tales was not put to the same use—although 
Edward Wakefield, an educational philanthropist and Lancaster supporter, suggested its 
distribution.315 
 While Village Politics may have inspired Popular Tales, the closest match is Elizabeth 
Hamilton’s The Cottagers of Glenburnie (1808), which ostensibly provides moral guidance to 
the poor but in actuality addresses a question that primarily concerned elite readers: Should they 
fear educating the masses?316 Both Edgeworth and Hamilton offer competing constructions of 
the newly literate public that challenge the anti-Jacobin fear-mongering that surrounding the 
spread of literacy. The need to make popular literacy seem safe explains why both books afford a 
central place to rags-to-riches protagonists—Edgeworth’s Jervas; Hamilton’s Mrs. Mason—who 
gain literacy through a benevolent patron, repay education with gratitude, and become centers of 
moral authority within their communities while serving as school teachers for the poor. Where 
Edgeworth promotes monitorial education by inserting Andrew Bell’s school into “Lame 
Jervas,” Hamilton recommends the now forgotten Irish monitorial educator, David Manson, 
adding Joseph Lancaster in later editions.317 These texts promote monitorial schools in the same 
decade that Whitbread defended the practicality of a national system of education before 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 “Did the government purchase the copy-right of Miss Hamilton’s Cottagers of Glenburnie; or Miss Edgeworth’s 
Popular and Rural tales; Mrs. Leadbeater’s Cottage Dialogues; and a few more such works, and sell them at a 
cheap rate, it would save the sheriff the cost of many a halter, and effect more than half the acts of parliament which 
will be passed in the next ten years” (Wakefield, An Account of Ireland, 2:416). 
316 Edgeworth recommended Hamilton’s Cottagers of Glenburnie in a letter to Mrs, Margaret Ruxton, dated Feb 2, 
1809: “This minute I hear a carman is going to Navan. I hasten to send you the Cottagers of Glenburnie, which I 
hope you will like as well as I do. I think it will do a vast deal of good in Ireland, & besides it is extremely 
interesting which all good books are not it has great powers both comic and tragic” (Hare, Life and Letters, 1:160). 
Contemporaries pair Popular Tales with Glenburnie, for eg. in a Letter from Agnes Porter to Lady Mary Talbot 
dated 9 Feb 1810: “I think you would like Mrs Hamilton’s Cottage of Glenburney [sic], and Mrs Edgeworth’s Tales 
of Fashionable Life” (Porter, A Governess in the Time of Jane Austen, 292).  
317 Perhaps because they are not mired in English education politics, Edgeworth and Hamilton avoid partisanship: 
Bell was the choice of most Anglicans and Lancaster associated with dissenters, but neither mentions religion in 
their recommendations. 
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 Parliament by citing Bell and Lancaster. Thus unlike Hannah More’s Village Politics, Popular 
Tales speaks with a forked tongue to two audiences. Jervas is not only a model for other workers; 
for wealthy readers, he represents what the educated worker of the future might look like. 
 For Jervas, the path to literacy begins with his experience as a manual worker. The tools 
of his trade become the means used to teach him the usefulness of reading. When Jervas first 
joins Dr. Y—‘s household, he finds the doctor with his “children about him” engaged in active 
investigations that require moving their bodies: “one little chap on his knee, another climbing on 
the arm of his chair; and two bigger lads were busy looking at a glass tube, which he was 
showing them when I came in.” The doctor invites Jervas to join his children’s lessons, when, 
“He saw that I gazed, with vast curiosity, at several objects in the room, which were new to me: 
and, pointing to the glass tube, which he had been showing the boys when I first came in, he 
asked me if they had such things as that in our mines; and if I knew the use of it? I told him I had 
seen something like it in our overseer’s hands; but that I had never known its use. It was a 
thermometer. Mr. Y— took great pains to show me how, and on what occasions, this instrument 
might be useful” (31). Rather than mocking Jervas’s ignorance, the doctor praises him when he 
asks a “sensible question” (32). Here is the typical illustration of Edgeworth’s treatise, Practical 
Education: the domestic scene, where adults converse rationally with children, teaching them 
casually by letting the children explore the objects surrounding them. Since Practical Education 
targets education in affluent households, it is significant that the entire focus of the doctor’s 
character is to illustrate how these techniques might be extended to a working-class child like 
Jervas. 
 The doctor follows several principles embraced by the pedagogical innovators of 
Edgeworth’s circle, even though these are not typically valued in educating the poor. He lets 
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 Jervas’s curiosity determine what lessons he teaches instead of following a preset agenda; he 
connects new knowledge with older, concrete knowledge from Jervas’s own experience; he uses 
the Socratic method and invites Jervas to ask questions; and he permits Jervas to explore the 
thermometer with his hands. Through handling the thermometer, the doctor discovers Jervas’s 
illiteracy and, once again guided by Jervas’s desires, offers to pay the writing master “as I 
wished to learn” (32). The relationship between handling the thermometer and learning to read is 
the first indication that Jervas’s education plaits together mechanical literacy with other forms of 
literacy. Significantly, Jervas associates the thermometer with a position of authority. It belongs 
in the “overseer’s hands” and Jervas “had never known its use” (31). Now that he holds the 
instrument and understands its uses, Jervas takes the place he previously affords the overseer.  
 Jervas the narrator holds up the doctor as an “example” for “those who give advice to 
young people, especially to those in a lower station than themselves,” because “instead of 
haranguing with the haughtiness of superior knowledge,” he speaks “with such kindness as to 
persuade” and “convince” (35). The methods Dr. Y— uses to teach Jervas are implicitly those 
embraced by Popular Tales more generally, which seeks to persuade readers of all stations 
through appeals to rational argument. The tone of Jervas the narrator, wearing his old work 
clothes while he addresses the miners, imitates the doctor’s attitude toward young Jervas, who is 
a shadow-figure for Edgeworth herself.  
 In a broader political context, the episode with Dr. Y— supports the position common 
among whigs and utilitarians, that educated elites should superintend the extension of literacy 
across all classes in order to ameliorate the discontent spread by unsupervised print cultures. 
“We have always thought general knowledge necessary for the lowest ranks of the community,” 
comments one contributor in the Gentleman’s Magazine (1813), sounding much like Richard 
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 Edgeworth’s “Preface,” “because they become less liable to be duped by those specious 
publications, of which “The Rights of Man” and “The Age of Reason” were the precursors.” 
“[M]eeting with untutored intellect,” such works “produced incalculable mischief.”318 Through 
education, the lower classes become rational, meaning that they support the status quo. Against 
the subset of conservatives who opposed any reading curriculum (let alone writing) in schools 
for the poor, author-educators from Hannah More to Harriet Martineau, argued that workers 
resorted to smashing machines and self-destructive food riots, because uneducated, illiterate 
people are naturally driven by the irrational desire to alleviate their most pressing pains by 
shortsightedly grasping at immediate pleasures.319 Indeed, this tendency to shortsightedness is 
itself a barrier to educating the poor. Samuel Johnson held the opinion that “among the lower 
classes of men, there will be found very little desire of any other knowledge than what may 
contribute immediately to the relief of some pressing uneasiness, or the attainment of some near 
advantage.” One commentator adds in 1825, that the “insurmountable obstacle” to educating “the 
lower classes of society” is their “inappetancy” for “any species of information which does not 
lead, in a direct manner, to the gratification of their sensual appetites.” The “advantages” of 
education are too “remote” to compete with “animal pleasures.”320 
 Assuming the material-mindedness of the poor, educational practices devised for them 
aimed to draw out the mind from its obsession with the immediate, physical world, enabling the 
poor to focus attention on things remote and abstract, or on rational arguments that emphasize 
long-term rewards. This transition, however, required meeting the poor where their minds 
originally stood—in the physical world. Jervas’s story describes his transition from the education 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 “Suggestions to the Promoters of Dr. Bell’s System of Tuition,” Gentleman’s Magazine, July 1813, 57.  
319 For the benefits of reading to social stability, see Altick, English Common Reader, 140-41. Also, Simon, The 
Two Nations & the Educational Structure, 120-40. 
320 “The Education of the People,” Literary Magazine, January 1825, 108. 
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 of things to the education of words. In the lesson with the thermometer, his plunge into literacy is 
tied to investigating an instrument of measurement, itself an abstract extension of his body and a 
symbol of authority over the mines. Learning to read is, furthermore, the impetus for his first 
investment. He uses the reward money from his master to hire craftsmen that help build a model 
of the mines where he worked, according to his specifications. The project requires Jervas to 
revisit the mines at night, risking his life to “make it exact.” “I measured and minuted down 
every thing with the most cautious accuracy,” he recalls (39). As an observer of the mines, 
Jervas’s understanding of the mining process now resembles that of the proprietor who holds the 
themometer: Jervas returns to the mines to measure them. 
Jervas uses his sophisticated automaton model of the mines as an educational 
demonstration for the local children of middle-class families. He describes his model workers as 
mechanical men, superior to the miners in the docility with which they submit to his corrective 
tools. Jervas adjusts “one stiff old fellow” and “an obstinate old woman, who would . . . but 
curtsey, when I wanted her to kneel down and to do her work” (43). 
It was some time, even when all this was ready, before we could contrive to make our 
puppets do their business properly: but patience accomplishes every thing. At last we got 
our wooden miners to obey us, and to perform their several tasks at the word of 
command; that is to say, at the pulling of certain strings and wires, which we fastened to 
their legs, arms, heads, and shoulders: which wires, being slender and black, were at a 
little distance invisible to the spectators. (41-42) 
Jervas’s transition from puppet to puppet-master is representative of a larger pool of such tales 
about automaton makers whose intellect places them above machines that do their bidding. Like 
Maillardet’s exhibit with the child automata, Jervas’s automaton miners communicate a variety 
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 of associations—order, improvement, hierarchy, control—linked with both education and 
industrial inventions.  
 In modeling the mines, Jervas places himself in a God-like visual position, able to see the 
entire mining process at once and comprehend it as his own creation. With his newfound 
perspective, Jervas distances himself from mechanical labor and views the mines as a system. To 
understand the class significance of this move, consider how Andrew Ure (decades later) defends 
the “factory system” as a mysterious whole, incomprehensible to the common laborer: “Of the 
amount of the injury resulting from the violation of the rules of automatic labour, he [the laborer] 
can hardly ever be a proper judge; just as mankind at large can never fully estimate the evils 
consequent upon an infraction of God’s moral law.”321 The perspectival change that Jervis 
undergoes illustrates an emergent iconography used to describe how laborers might be given 
greater respect and authority through education. If Jervas accesses literacy, education, and 
(eventually) wealth through his mechanical knowledge, then presumably other workers can do 
the same. It is unclear, however, to what extent his story advocates that popular education extend 
to the poor the kind of visual power that Jervas assumes through his automaton model of the 
mines. 
 
Jervas in India and Tipu’s Tiger  
 After touring English schools with his automaton model of the mines, Jervas secures a 
position as an assistant in Andrew Bell’s Madras charity school in India, then tutors Tipu 
Sultan’s son and heir in the natural sciences, and finally managing Tipu’s diamond mines. In this 
second half of “Lame Jervas,” Edgeworth celebrates Jervis and Andrew Bell as representatives 
of British superior mechanical skill, the one in natural philosophy and the other in education. 	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 Curiously, her story overwrites an actual history of theft and appropriation, since the British stole 
an automaton from Tipu Sultan and Andrew Bell learned his Monitorial method by watching 
Indian children teach one another. This intersecting history is worth considering in partnership 
with Edgeworth’s fictional tale because she carefully constructs her narrative around facts, citing 
Andrew Bell’s pamphlet on Monitorial education and alluding to recent events in India. 
 The lessons about property rights and social mobility that Jervas gleans in England are 
supported by the dysfunction Jervas finds in Tipu’s mines. Instead of carefully investigating the 
diamond mines in order to patiently correct the corruption that plagues his operations, the Sultan 
rules through fear by punishing innocent workers based on unsubstantiated rumors. Since the 
miners are slaves, they feel little incentive to improve the mines beyond terror. By allowing 
workers to share in the profits created by inventing or implementing new methods, Jervas 
increases mine production, and he eventually persuades the Sultan to free his slaves. His services 
are not rewarded, however, as the cycle of spite and deception land Jervas in jail, and he 
narrowly escapes with his life. By locating ineffectual and abusive working conditions in India, 
the story implies that English miners are comparatively well off as “free” laborers in a capitalist 
system that rewards hard work and honesty.  
 Jervas’s Indian adventures skirt the border between realism and Romance, while 
referencing actual historical figures like Andrew Bell and Tipu Sultan. As Julia Wright notes, 
Edgeworth’s Tipu “is painted in overwrought orientalist colours,” while Jervas, as Ian Haywood 
argues, makes “an ideal representative of empire” in Tipu’s court, as “an ambassador of 
technological modernization.”322 Consumed with greed and petty competition, Tipu fails to learn 
from Jervas’s scientific lectures. “The Sultan,” Jervas observes, “was much more intent upon 
displaying his small stock of mechanical knowledge than upon increasing it; . . . Sometimes he 	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 would put himself in competition with me, to show his courtiers his superiority; but failing in 
these attempts, he would then treat me as a species of mechanic juggler, who was fit only to 
exhibit for the amusement of his court.” When Jervas uses instruments to demonstrate scientific 
principles, the Sultan demands the objects as gifts “with the eagerness of a child who has begged 
and obtained a new plaything” (75-6). Instead of appreciating the abstract principles of science, 
which have practical applications in Tipu’s realm, Tipu fetishizes the objects used in the exhibits 
and relishes mere entertainment. His encounter with Jervas’s machines prove that he cannot 
improve himself or his people. 
 Tipu Sultan’s appreciation for showy displays of wealth and power and his dismissal of 
improving entertainments contrasts with the curious, respectful bearing of his son. Historically, 
two of Tipu’s children became the hostages of Lord General Cornwallis in 1792 at the close of 
the Third Mysore War, ensuring Tipu’s complicity with an unfavorable treaty that seized half his 
lands and a large portion of his wealth. Although these events are not referenced by “Lame 
Jervas,” the story must take place after the heir’s return to Tipu’s court but before the Tipu’s 
death in 1799, when General Baird destroyed Seringapatam. Thus Edgeworth’s readers would 
interpret the superior manner of Tipu’s heir as the result of his British education. Analyzing 
popular sentimental images of Tipu’s sons that circulated in Britain, Catherine E. Anderson 
concludes that depictions of the hostage transfer Europeanize Tipu’s sons and communicate their 
eagerness to accompany Lord Cornwallis, who is represented as a safe, paternal figure. These 
same images, she argues, represent Tipu as effeminate, “a poor father, to his subjects and to his 
sons,” making the case that “the East India Company constituted a better parent to India than its 
own native rulers.”323 The characterization of Tipu and his heir in “Lame Jervas” merely 
reiterates this prescription and proves inconsistent with the letters of Bell’s assistant, William 	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 Smith, whom Edgeworth cites as a real historical corollary for Jervas. Smith’s report of the 
scientific demonstrations he performed in Tipu’s court are appendixed to Andrew Bell’s 
pamphlet on his monitorial system. By Smith’s account, Tipu displays technologically savvy 
when he indirectly interrogates Smith about the military applications of English technologies, 
which is consistent with the respect and fear accorded him, in real life, by British officials. 
 There can be little doubt, then, that Tipu’s casting in “Lame Jervas” as an incompetent 
ruler and cruel slave-owner legitimates the British invasion of Tipu Sultan’s fortress at 
Seringapatam on May 4, 1799, when troops killed Tipu and destroyed the town. Newspaper 
accounts of the fall of Seringapatam appear in the months preceding October 1799, the date of 
composition for “Lame Jervas,” along with reports of Tipu’s unparalleled library (promptly 
shipped to England).324 Considering the preoccupation with property rights in Popular Tales, 
Edgeworth’s portrait of Tipu as an avaricious ruler erases the looting of Seringapatam at his 
death, which was notorious enough to furnish the vengeance legend for Wilkie Collins’s The 
Moonstone. A half-century later, “Lame Jervas” is the only Edgeworth story reprinted in the 
collection Moral Tales “for young readers in Bengal” (1849), with the unfortunate title, “The 
Reward of Honesty.”325 
 In the months following the invasion of Seringapatam, models of the battle, with “new 
scenery and machinery” became a popular entertainment advertised in British London papers.326 
This strange intersection between mechanical popular entertainments and British military 
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 expansion in India received an addition twist with reports, in April 1800, that an automaton 
constructed in Tipu’s court was on its way to London.327 As described in The Weekly 
Entertainer, the machine depicted Tipu’s royal tiger attacking an agent of the East India 
Company [figure 26]: 
A piece of mechanism representing a tiger in the act of devouring a prostrate European. 
There are some barrels in imitation of an organ within the body of the tyger: the sounds 
produced by the organ are intended to resemble the cries of a person in distress, 
intermixed with the roars of a tyger. The machinery is so contrived, that while the organ 
is playing, the hand of the European is often lifted up to express his helpless and 
deplorable condition. This piece of mechanism was found in a room of the palace at 
Seringapatam appropriated for the reception of musical instruments.328 
Upon arrival in October 1799, the tiger was presented to the royal family and promptly displayed 
in the Tower of London, along with two cheetahs and Tipu’s gold throne. Oddly enough, the 
automaton caught the public’s imagination, and a figurine depicting the tiger mauling Monrow 
(the man thought to be depicted) became, as “The Death of Monroe,” one of the most popular 
chimney-piece decorations in British households.329 In other words, “Lame Jervas” chronicles 
the progress of a Cornish miner, who tours England with an automaton model of the mining 
process and earns his fortune by adapting European technologies to Indian diamond extraction—
but in reality it was Tipu’s automaton that traveled to London, where it was tamed into a 
harmless, porcelain model.  
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  “Lame Jervas” portrays a unidirectional transfer of technologies (industrial and 
educational) from England to India, where England is the metaphorical mentor to Mysore, 
represented by Tipu’s sons. This colonial paternalism is undermined, however, by the story’s 
engagement with actually historical events. By citing Andrew Bell’s pamphlet on his Madras 
school for orphans of mixed-race parents, Edgeworth reminds readers that the monitorial 
methods used to educate poor children in England derived from Bell’s observations of children 
teaching children in the villages of India. Popular Tales cannot consciously register the dual-
directional, transnational circulation of technologies of education, because these exchanges 
contradict the narrative of technological and educational progress it uses to assert British 
supremacy. Instead, it replaces this history with Tipu Sultan’s failed machine encounter. His 
ignorance about anything that happens in his mines contrasts with the powerful visual survey that 
Jervis grasps through his automaton model. 
 Such comparisons between England and India follow what Michael Adas describes as a 
new mode of Eurocentrist cultural assessment at the close of the eighteenth-century, at which 
time “European observers came to view science and especially technology as the most objective 
and unassailable measures of their own civilization’s past achievement and present worth. In 
science and technology their superiority was readily demonstrable, and their advantages over 
other peoples grew at an ever increasing pace.”330 He notes that expressions of Britain’s national 
superiority increasingly reference technological supremacy, notably the steam-engine.331 
Technological supremacy is clearly connected, in “Lame Jervas,” with educational supremacy. 
Maintaining British power depends on supporting popular education sufficiently to locate future 
innovators from among the general population—or so its supporters argued. As Andrew Irvine, 	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 chaplain to Marquess Cornwallis, explains in his pamphlet promoting monitorial education for 
the poor, some children will rise in rank, becoming those “by whose skilful exertions the 
resources of our national prosperity will be extended, and Britain’s superiority over other nations 
maintained upon the most noble and commanding grounds.”332 Much the same as the stolen 
automaton, the appropriation of pedagogical methods from the Indian people are conveniently 
forgotten. 
 
Automated Husbands and Mechanical Wives in Belinda 
 Thus far I have explored in Edgeworth’s fiction those machines with less obvious 
mimetic qualities: Jervas gains authority over himself by modeling his labor in the mines, while 
the Panorganon transforms simple machines into something children feel with their bodies. 
These principles are also at work in Edgeworth’s Belinda, where Jervas’s progress via 
mechanical literacy is replaced by Lady Delacour’s transformation into a model wife and mother. 
Those characters who embrace a life of continued education, like Lady Delacour and the 
Percivals, triumph over characters who remain stagnant, mechanical, and unimproved. Yet the 
process of reformation that Belinda teaches the Delacours requires a level of discipline and self-
control that might be described as mechanical, at times reducing Belinda herself to an automaton. 
Belinda demonstrates the complexity of middle-class attitudes towards “mechanized” education 
in its various forms—at once embracing experimental methods that require the body to learn 
from objects, while also regulating the body and rejecting an accessorized approach to identity, 
where a person’s whole self seems to reside, superficially, in costumes, coaches, and exotic 
aloes. 	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  Encapsulating these contradictions, the automaton show referenced in Belinda was a 
London sensation for decades. It featured three child-sized automata that executed drawing, 
penmanship, and musical exercises—all creative accomplishments mastered through repetitive 
exercise. Opening with the Arrival of Swiss clockmaker, Jacquet-Droz from Paris in 1776, the 
exhibit continued under his partner, Maillardet, after the London branch’s liquidation in 1790 
until 1820. Shortly before Edgeworth wrote Belinda, Maillardet gained publicity from royal 
attendance. In 1798, Queen Charlotte, accompanied by the Princesses Elizabeth, Augustus, and 
Sophia, and the royal family’s governess, Lady Charlotte Finch, visited Maillardet’s 
“Automatical Exhibition” in the Grand Exhibition Room of Spring Gardens, London “on which 
they bestowed the most flattering marks of approbation” [figure 27]. While the details of the 
display are little discussed in Belinda, off-hand references to pieces made by Maillardet assume 
readers’ familiarity with his work, which toured Britain just before Belinda’s publication and 
was featured in numerous pamphlets and periodical articles.  
 The exhibit’s composition shifting as pieces were resold, sent on tour, or replaced with 
replications, but the central figures remained child machines whose repeated labors imitated the 
exercises assigned to schoolchildren. Resembling a young boy of three-to-four years old, the 
Draftsman draws six different pictures in pencil, a medium suited to his age. He pauses to blow 
the dust from his paper with bellows-induced breath. The companion of his youth, a Scribe, uses 
a quill to draw pictures and compose poetry, his compositions available for purchase as a 
souvenir for the visitors who watch his progress. The central figure, a young “musical lady,” 
bows to her audience before seating herself at her organ. She offsets the mechanical precision of 
her notes, set to time with her tapping foot, with the interpretive expression of her body 
movements, “the gracefulness” of her “gesture, and lively motion of the eyes,” while her “bosom 
217
 heaves” with the same bellows that animate her instrument.333 Presiding over the three students 
is their creator, a headmaster-of-sorts, who exhibits his own genius through the masterful 
repetition of his students. Occasionally he turns to the mechanical dolls and urges them with the 
commands, “Write! Play! Draw!” 
 By the time Maillardet exhibited his automaton schoolchildren in London, automata were 
already linked in the cultural imagination with industrial technology and the factory system, as 
well as with education reform projects. Advertisements for Maillardet’s exhibit promised family 
entertainment that could “entice Youth to an exertion of their mental faculties.” Another puff 
announces, “future ages may boast of abilities in mechanics, which were first inspired by 
viewing on a holiday Maillardet’s Automatical Exhibition, Spring Gardens.”334 
 The entertainment orchestrated by this exhibit depends on a constellation of associated 
themes and debates concerning education alive at the turn of the century. The way these child 
automatons are exhibited depends on the audience’s awareness of what Otto Mayr argues is the 
machine’s facility in representing authority and obedience.335 When the showman commands his 
automatons, he playfully defines himself as a free agent or artistic genius, elevated above the 
passive creations that must do his bidding—much like Jervas positions himself apart from and 
above the mining operations through his automaton. As human creations, these machines are 
passive tools that clarify the ordinarily contentious liberty of the human agents who build them, 
in much the same way that object learning and mechanical literacy bestows agency on children 
who become masters of their physical environment. Maillardet’s authority over his students 
mimics the hierarchy between instructor and child. Yet the child machines are themselves 
engaged in activities associated with self-improvement, foreshadowing the day when (real) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 “Maillardet’s Automatical Exhibition,” The True Briton, April 1798; qtd. Altick, Shows of London, 66. 
334 “Public Office, Bow-Street,” Morning Chronicle, July 13, 1798. 
335 Mayr, Authority, Liberty, and Automatic Machinery. 
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 children will no longer be objects formed by adults, but self-forming adults. These child 
automatons illustrate an educational principle of their day, that mechanical repetition trains the 
body to form healthy associations and habits. “Mechanism” is the means to autonomy, as well as 
its anathema, an ambiguity captured in the definition of “automatous” in Johnson’s dictionary as 
a “having the power of motion in itself,” as well as its association with the opposite of self-
governance, a person who lacks some quality essential to humanity.336 
 This paradox dovetails with what I have argued concerning mechanical literacy. 
Mechanics is an essential component of the curriculum for all classes; it develops the faculties 
necessary for abstract thinking and bringa the poor and the wealthy together through their mutual 
appreciation of the cycles of production and consumption that contribute to human progress. “Is 
it reasonable or creditable, or decent,” asked one contributor in the Quarterly Journal, who 
questioned prioritizing classical learning over the sciences, “that boys of fifteen years of age and 
more should know absolutely nothing of the simplest laws of mechanical philosophy? That they 
should know nothing of the growth, production and manufacture of the various objects which are 
daily subservient to their necessities and pleasures?”337 Yet the reason poor children should study 
mechanics is partly because repetitious labor was considered a degenerative influence. And for 
wealthier children, the kind of “mechanical literacy” advocated by educators was defined so as to 
largely deny the practical mastery of technologies gained by working-class laborers themselves, 
instead emphasizing the need for a larger theoretical understanding of machine principles and 
political economy—specifically how these are used to articulate the moral and social message of 
the middle-class.338  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 See any nineteenth-century edition of Johnson’s Dictionary. 
337 Qtd, Brian Simon, Two Nations, 100. 
338 What I explain, here, is further developed in the next chapter on working class efforts to gain representation in 
the governance of educational institutions. 
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  Belinda dramatizes these contradictions in the tension between its mechanized characters 
and the educational mechanisms promoted by Belinda and the Percivals. The various characters 
in the novel betray mechanistic behavior when they are controlled externally by others or 
internally by unrestrained passions or regulated desires—a distinction that correlates with the 
two meanings of “automaton.” Lord Delacour, made predictable by his jealousies and petty 
power struggles with his wife, “must be wound up with half a dozen bottles of champagne, 
before he can go” (Belinda 12). Clarence Harvey allows his club friends to fool him into nearly 
drowning himself, while Belinda’s other suitor, Vincent, is easily manipulated by Mrs. Luttridge 
into gambling away his estate. Lady Delacour’s one-time “masculine” friend, Harriet Freke, 
performs the manual exercise with her rifle, just like a soldier automaton owned by Haddock that 
toured England in the 1790s.339 And Belinda’s first rejected suitor, Sir Phillip Baddely, makes 
himself ridiculous by repeating stock-phrase exclamations gleaned from his club buddies (“’Pon 
honour!” and “damme!”), like a speaking machine. Like Harriet Freke, he disguises his lack of 
wit by playing with “his little stick, with which he went through the sword exercise.” Perplexed 
by Belinda’s refusal of a man of his fortune, he “finished by breaking it, and then having no 
other resource, suddenly wished miss Portman a good morning” (154). He is a man ruled by 
conventional language and habituated movements, unable to recognize Belinda’s sincere 
rejections of his offer because her motives do not conform to social prescription. These machine 
characters forfeit their ability to exercise their own judgment, instead subjecting themselves to 
the external guidance by their manipulative, so-called friends. 
Two Maillardet automata are specifically named in the novel, and both have thematic 
significance. The most prominent is from Maillardet’s exhibit. After the firm dissolved in 1790, 
Maillardet added another draftsman, as well as a conjurer and several small, mechanical animals. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 Altick, Shows of London, 67. 
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 Just as Lady Delacour’s daughter, Helena, describes, viewers fed the conjurer tokens printed 
with different questions (for example “What is the most universal passion?). The figure 
consulted his book, struck his wand, and a door opened to reveal the correct answer (Love). 340  
As featured in the novel, Maillardet’s conjurer thematically connects with Lady Delacour’s visit 
with Mrs. Freke and her object of flirtation, Colonel Lawless, to the celebrated fortune teller 
Mrs. W—, described as “no common conjurer,” as well as multiple “magic” tricks Mrs. Freke 
perpetrates to punish those who earn her displeasure (Belinda 47). Maillardet’s mechanical bird 
recalls Virginia St. Pierre, educated in complete isolation by Belinda’s love interest, Clarence 
Hervey, according to Rousseau’s prescripts for Sophie. As the subject of Hervey’s experiments, 
Virginia is quite bird-like: She faints faster than a canary in an airpump when she sees even a 
portrait of the man she loves and resembles her pet bullfinch in her ignorance; she is kept in a 
cage and taught to repeat the same song. In other words, there are direct corollaries between the 
Maillardet automata specifically mentioned by Edgeworth and certain characters in the novel. 
 As “mechanical bird,” Virginia is an especially complex example of a human/automaton 
character. Closer to an animal than a human, Virginia cannot distinguish right from wrong or 
reality from fiction, and she lacks crucial skills of self-knowledge necessary to develop desires of 
her own. “I have only confused ideas, floating in my imagination, from the books I have been 
reading,” she says. “I do not distinctly know my own feelings” (Belinda 381). By reading 
romance novels, Virginia over-exercises her imagination, responsible for generating ideas, 
without balancing it with reason, which orders, compares, and organizes thoughts. She ultimately 
pairs up with Captain Sunderland, who fell in love with her through a telescope, indicating the 
artificiality of her isolation and their interaction. Virgina’s love was inspired by the captain’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 Altick, Shows of London, 66-7. Incidentally, the two automata Edgeworth mentions are the same two featured by 
the cover illustration of Decremps’s The Conjurer Unmasked and Philip Astley’s Natural Magic, books that provide 
scientific explanations for uncanny phenomena. The topic was likely to interest the Edgeworths. 
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 miniature acquired in her youth and resembles Mary Wollstonecraft’s description of memory in 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman as a noncreative function that can enslave the female mind to 
first impressions: “One idea calls up another, its old associate, and memory, faithful to the first 
impressions, particularly when the intellectual powers are not employed to cool our sensations, 
retraces them with mechanical exactness” (Vindication 201). Apparently, this woman of nature is 
all mechanism. The way her memory functions is similar to Marillardet’s draftsman, tracing 
impressions left from her childhood to sketch exact artistic renderings of her early memories, 
without innovation.341 
As the protégé of Lady Delacour, Belinda benefits from the negative example of the 
mechanized society people who surrender themselves to the dictates of fashionable behavior, 
sacrificing personal happiness to create outward display of what everyone else believes will 
make them happy. Lady Delacour and Mrs. Luttridge are preoccupied in a destructive 
competition to outdo one another in lavish parties and political campaigns, while Lord Delacour 
is consumed with his wife’s superior wit and her flirtations with other men. In this environment, 
Belinda learns a skeptical approach to her succession of well-intentioned advisors and to trust her 
own judgment—first rejecting the correspondence of her aunt, then separating herself 
temporarily from Lady Delacour, and finally refusing the well-intentioned match favored by the 
Percivals, the story’s moral center.  
 Belinda’s progression is mirrored by the transformation of those around her, many of 
whom are reformed by the ongoing education of experience, like her, into seizing control of their 
own actions and moral development. The ability to self-correct after a reflexive process of 
candid evaluation distinguishes those characters like Clarence Harvey and Lady Delacour, who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 The figure shows a close-up of the draftsman’s cams, a series of stacked, flat, metal pieces that rotate while a 
metal needle traces their irregular shape, then transfers that movement to direct different parts of the mechanism. 
Clarence Hervey notes that Virginia’s drawings are exact copies of scenes from her childhood, as if no time has past. 
222
 are eventually deemed worthy companions of the novel’s moral paragons, the Percivals and Dr. 
X—. By making improvability rather than perfection the evaluative measure, Belinda 
complicates the stock character foils used in moral tales. Potentiality—that quality of uncertain 
destiny that distinguishes the young ingénue—seems widely dispersed among the most 
experienced and degenerate of the novel’s characters, allowing Lord and Lady Delacour and 
Clarence Harvey to follow the trajectory of improvement traditionally reserved, in a novel like 
Francis Burney’s Evelina, for the young lady entering society. To drive home this point, 
Clarence Harvey discovers that he prefers Belinda’s sophistication over the untried innocence of 
Virginia St. Pierre. 
 Perhaps because Belinda’s experience contrasts with Virginia’s innocence, she embodies 
the ambiguities of an automaton. She is self-controlled to the point of artificiality; indeed, those 
around her often misread her wisdom as affectation. Lady Delacour may exhaust herself and her 
rouge pot trying to convince the world that she is happy, but Belinda requires just as much effort 
to reason herself out of being in love with Clarence Hervey when she believes he will marry 
elsewhere. Even though Belinda prides herself on knowing her own mind and acting by her own 
moral principles, her free choices are so packaged in rational consideration that they are 
indistinguishable from successful ideological indoctrination. By the novel’s conclusion, Belinda 
has learned to stifle her blushes as effectively as Lady Delacour’s paint can disguise them. Her 
stoicism frustrates her sympathetic friend (the Lady “de la coeur”), and by comparison, Belinda 
is less interesting and less witty—in some ways quite like Johnson’s automaton in her too-perfect 
control from within. 
 The convergence at Covent Garden of Lady Delacour and Lady Percival, who represent 
such opposite domestic tendencies, makes sense in light of the automaton show’s paradoxes. 
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 Magicians as well as specialists in practical mechanics used machine displays before mixed 
audiences, the one to entertain with mystery and the other to illustrate scientific advances and 
advertise a mastery of mechanics. Automata displays further blurred distinctions between quacks 
and professional scientists by dramatizing how professional scientific lecturers relied on a 
magician’s showmanship to stage intriguing experiments.342 Trick automata like Kempelen’s 
Turk (which claimed to play chess) could provoke high emotions in audience members because 
these public deceptions threatened to discredit the automaton as a useful and instructive mode of 
entertainment and, by extension, question the expertise of the rising professional class—as 
shown from the oddly virulent objections voiced by Philip Thicknesse in his pamphlet, Speaking 
Figure and Automaton Chessplayer, Exposed and Detected, to machine displays that claimed to 
contribute to industrial progress while offering audiences a mere illusion. 
 The virtues and vices of Lady Percival and Lady Delacour thus intersect in the allure of 
machines that both imitate and explain life. In the Percival family, as Belinda observes, “there 
were not family secrets” or “petty mysteries,” while, by contrast, Lady Delacour delights in 
masquerades and protects her “secret” fatal illness behind locked boudoirs and letter drawers, 
though she truthfully confesses she has “nothing worse than folly to conceal” (215, 270, 57). The 
preoccupation of Belinda with rationalizing mysterious phenomena and opening feminine spaces 
to the “ocular demonstration” of scientific professionals like Dr. X— has attracted critical 
attention. Lady Delacour is herself a mechanical mystery of sorts, whose driving mechanisms 
(like her secret sufferings) are artfully concealed behind decorative exteriors. 
 Secrets and revelations, the drama of Lady Delacour’s life, are dramatized within 
automaton show themselves. By the time Maillardet ran the London exhibit, display conventions 
for mimetic automata that claimed to instruct viewers in the motions of animal anatomy had been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 Stafford, Artful Science, 121-30. 
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 codified into a familiar scripted narrative about scientific enlightenment. Like a cadaver opened 
before medical students, automata showcased their amazing ability to imitate life, usually 
followed by an initiation of the audience into its secrets when the showman opened the 
mechanism and explained how it worked. When exhibited on-stage at a Paris opera house, 
Vaucanson’s flute player began to play with the curtain down while the audience wondered at its 
quick and exact execution; then the curtain lifted to reveal the mechanical player. Similarly, his 
Digesting Duck (which ate corn and produced “digested” matter) exactly replicated the bone and 
feather structures of its biological original, but was displayed with its supporting column of 
mechanical gears exposed for inspection. Authors latched onto the enlightenment narrative of 
machinery display by including automata in booklets, such as Physical Amusements Exposed and 
Detected, which explain supposedly magical phenomena through natural philosophy. 
Edgeworth’s Belinda notoriously concludes in just such a series of revealed secrets and 
rationally explained mysteries. Juba, the superstitious servant from the West-Indies, finds his 
nightly visions of an Obeah-woman are easily dispelled when Belinda demonstrates to him how 
Mrs. Freke executed the practical joke using phosphorus; The mysterious boudoir, where Lady 
Delacour conceals her medicines, is opened to observation and her concealed illness confessed to 
friends and physicians; Her drawer that guards her correspondence with Clarence Hervey’s with 
a secret lock is opened for the perusal of Lord Delacour; and Lady Delacour’s Methodist visions 
of ghostly visitation are proved natural in origin when the gardener’s trap that closes on Mrs. 
Freke, while a moderate minister recalls her to rational religion. In each case, close examination, 
especially “ocular demonstration,” uncovers the illusion through a display-and-explain procedure 
similar to automaton demonstrations (133).  
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 Most critics seem to think these revelations put Lady Delacour in her place. Such a 
reading fails to account for why she retains her ostentatious wit and capricious sensibility 
through the novel’s conclusion. When considered as part of an automaton show, however, 
revelation is not necessarily conservative. One commentator, who explained the secret behind 
Kempelen’s chess player, a famous automaton hoax that contained a human, explained in the 
Edinburgh Philosophical Journal that the deception is actually made possible by an elaborate 
series of disclosures. Kempelen opened all the cabinets and turned back the chess player’s 
clothes, while the human player slid around to avoid detection. During this procedure, any men 
of science who happened to be in the audience were invited forward to closely examine the 
automaton. The writer notes that Kempelen’s tactics were “dictated by sound policy, which 
teaches that the exhibitor cannot be too assiduous in affording facilities to explore every corner 
and recess, which, he well knows, contains nothing that he is desirous of concealing.”343 
Do Lady Delacour and Clarence Hervey sincerely reform, then, by opening up their 
secret boudoirs, or do these they keep false cabinets and invite ocular inspection in order to 
conceal? These characters pave their way to virtue in smashed machinery and open cabinets, yet 
they continue to exhibit the artistic genius and theatrical skill of an automaton showman. During 
a crucial crossroads of her development, Lady Delacour’s reformation is momentary interrupted 
by her insecurities about her worthiness to be loved, culminating in her jealous accusation that 
innocent Belinda self-servingly fosters family peace with the object of marrying Lord Delacour 
for his title after her death. Angry that her life of pleasure yields such fickle friends, “she pointed 
to a coronet set in diamonds on her watch-case, which lay on the table. Then suddenly seizing 
the watch, she dashed it upon the marble hearth with all her force, ‘Vile bauble!’ cried she” 
(Belinda 206). Lady Delacour later admits her mistake and pleads for the departed Belinda to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 “An Attempt to Analyse,” Edinburgh Philosophical Journal, April 1821, 396. 
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 return, after which she submits to an examination by Dr. X— that proves her breast cancer 
merely an irritation due to the malignant incompetence of her quack doctor.  
In a parallel incident, Clarence Hervey, “man of genius,” has trouble extricating himself 
from a mechanical snake masquerade costume of “much ingenuity,” which he accidentally sets 
on fire while applying phosphorous to create glowing eyes (23). Such automaton costumes 
actually made appearances in London masquerades, as Fanny Burney describes in her diary. 
Burney was friends with John Joseph Merlin, a former partner of Cox and an eccentric inventor, 
who advertised his skills by appearing at the Prince of Whale’s masquerade inside Fortune’s 
Wheel and at the Pantheon masquerade as a sick man in a wheelchair invented by himself; he 
crashed other soirées as Cupid and Vulcan “forging his own darts.”344 (Incidentally, Merlin was 
also a close friend of Richard Edgeworth in his youth and fostered his fascination with “natural 
magic.”) Hervey sheds his snakeskin automaton to anticipate that he will abandon what 
Edgeworth describes as a “chameleon-like” tendency to adapt his manners to friends, whose 
dangerous gambling and thoughtless dissipation threaten to mechanize him. Yet, at the novel’s 
close, the bizarre revelation that Clarence Hervey is secretly experimenting on a young lady can 
hardly bode well for domestic bliss, while Lady Delacour’s ability to stage the novel’s 
concluding scene closes by affirming her dramatic skills. 
 
Conclusion 
 Edgeworth’s automata suggest that behaviors censored as “mechanical” among working 
or leisured classes are overcome through practices like education and industrial innovation, 
which, as Maillardet’s automata playfully suggest, are potentially just as mechanical. That is to 
say, Jervas automatically produces resources, and Lady Delacour unthinkingly consumes them, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 Altick, Shows of London, 74-5. 
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 but their mutual departure from such automated participation in morally vacuous economies 
requires gaining self-reflexive awareness of these systems, a process signified by watching self-
regulating machines.  
 The tendency among middle-class educators to emphasize the similarity between children 
and machines when advocating mechanical literacy suggests rethinking how machines 
metaphorically and practically defined class boundaries. While people from all stations are 
surprisingly machine-like, those who possess mechanical literacy have an analytical distance 
between themselves and the machines they resemble. 
 According to Simon Schaffer, the wonder these machines elicit from audiences depends 
upon a vein of forgetfulness about their technological origins: when the audience willingly 
suspends disbelief and forgets that these machines are programmed to write verses and play 
music, the machines seem to execute creative acts independently, by their own initiative. This 
forgetfulness is at work in the idealized product of Enlightenment education, a morally 
autonomous adult individual who stands apart from his age of tutelage—a performance that 
invites collective amnesia about how subject formation happens through education, an inevitably 
social process.345 The automaton show thus asks audiences to participate what Nancy Yousef 
outlines as a common thought experiment of the Enlightenment: a momentary forgetfulness 
about the process of education for the purpose of imagining the “autonomous adult” as an 
uneducated person, sprung full-formed into adulthood. According to Yousef, the point of such 
experiments is to reaffirm, paradoxically, the profound importance of education for subject-
formation and the inevitable intersubjectivity of human beings as social animals.346 I am 
suggesting that a similar thought experiment is at work in Maillardet’s exhibit, as well as Lucy’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 Schaffer, “Babbage’s Intelligence,” 204-06. 
346 Yousef, Isolated Cases, 1-26, 96-114. 
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 domestic power, Jervas’s progress, and Lady Delacour’s transformation. Mailladet’s child 
automatons both display the mechanisms of education (and their determined submission to 
Maillardet) while, simultaneously, inviting the audience to forget the process of education (and 
their creator) in the wonderful variety of their self-directed motions. This strange balance 
between celebrating the mechanisms of education, as a process, while eschewing “mechanism,” 
as an abstraction, is emblematic of the logic at work in the middle-class approach to self-
formation. 
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CHAPTER 5: Figures
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Figure 26: (both images) Tipu’s Tiger, displayed at 
the Victoria & Albert Museum, 2011, photograph by 
the author.
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Figure 27: “The Queen accompanied by Princess Elizabeth . . . ” and “Impromptu, written in the room, on 
Seeing Maillardet’s Mechanical Exhibition, Covent Garden.” Observer no. 339 (June 10, 1798).
This date of this advertisement roughly corresponds to when Maria Edgeworth may have seen Maillardet’s 
automaton exhibit during her visit to London. The figures described in the poem match those referenced in 
Belinda.
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 CHAPTER 6 
“Naughty ‘full-grown babes’”: Public Instructors and the Radical Press, 1816-1836 
“Reading and writing are but extensions of the faculties of seeing and speaking, and is it enough 
for Toryism to refuse those aids? Would it not go further, and have the people deaf, dumb, and 
blind, if it had the power? . . . But nature makes no hereditary distinctions . . . . she is incapable 
of bestowing the exclusive advantages of sight, speech, and hearing on the privileged classes.” 
—Standard347 
 
Reading and writing are extensions of more than the faculties of sight and speech. They are 
extensions of all the senses that let in knowledge. . . . How does the Great-Giver of hearing and 
sight impart those inlets of knowledge? Does he place no guides—no guardians—no control 
upon the first exercises of the dawning senses? Do we allow children unwarned to touch or to 
taste whatever the eye discloses, to hear and repose in memory, all to which the ear may be 
open? . . . . The very same duty of care which requires that we should not allow the lisping infant 
to burn himself at the fire or foul himself in the housepail, enjoins that the full-grown babe, the 
uneducated literate, which the most perfect instruction, without religion, must leave a man—be 
not allowed to inflame his mind with The Poor Man’s Guardian, or make himself nasty by 
dabbling in the Times.” 
—Examiner 
 
During the turbulent years between Waterloo and Chartism, authors in the radical press presented 
themselves as the educators of the people. They offered their publications as an alternative to 
either the National or British Society schools, promoting radical literature as a source of 
politically empowering knowledge for a disenfranchised public and a corrective birch for those 
in power. At the same time that editorial voices assumed the tone of an instructor, however, they 
play-acted the school child, using Socratic irony, name-calling, and infantile rage. Styling 
themselves as young rebels against a parental church and state, radicals embraced and 
reconfigured images of themselves as uneducated children. The child or student—not the animal 
(the “swinish multitude”)—is the favorite epithet embraced by the radical press after 1816.348 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
347 All quotations from the Standard and the Examiner are from Hetherington, “The Stamped and the Unstamped. 
Calumies of the Satandard, &c.” The Poor Man’s Guardian. September 21, 1833. 
348 For the intersection between children’s literature, satire, and radical publishing, see Marcus Wood’s meticulous 
and comprehensive study, Radical Satire and Print Culture. 
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  Child and adult, student and instructor—these are interchangeable positions for radicals 
accused of being children because they dare to correct their natural superiors.349 In the opening 
exchange (above), the Standard presses for Anglican instruction and church controlled 
curriculum against the position, espoused in the Examiner, that the government should support 
all schools that teach reading and writing, regardless of their religious affiliation. Both papers 
equate literacy with the senses, as “inlets” of knowledge, and both equate adult workers with 
young children, but where the Examiner sees popular literacy as an aid to free exploration, with 
literate adults like awakening infants who search and grasp and learn, the Standard envisions 
danger on all sides of these “full-grown babes,” who crawl unattended until they find poison and 
human feces.  
 Henry Hetherington’s paper, The Poor Man’s Guardian, captures a radical editorial voice 
that mockingly plays the public educator in response to exchanges like this one, which the 
Guardian reprinted as a “specimen” of “that press to which we are constantly referred for 
instruction.” As if recommending an edifying article, the Guardian commands its audience, its 
ready students, to read it “for God’s sake” and “for your own,” then, reversing its pedagogical 
purpose, promises to “expose” the “ignorance” of the “‘legitimate’” press. Closing their excerpt 
with the Standard’s lament that the poor do not purchase cheap “innocent” literature over 
unstamped periodicals, the Guardian celebrates this news as the sign of an educated infant 
public: 
So the people will not buy literature in the Whig market! Alas! For the firm of Brougham 
and Co! . . . the naughty ‘full-grown babes,’ with the fear of God and Lord Brougham’s 
birch before their eyes, will still inflame their mind with The Poor Man’s Guardian, and 
make themselves nasty by dabbling in the Times.’ Naughty, naughty, ‘full grown babes!’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 For the “public instuction” role of the radical press, see Murphy, Toward a Working-Class Canon, 7-31. 
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 Now Henry Brougham is the schoolmaster, and the Guardian infantilizes its own readers, 
reveling in the scatological imagery used by the Standard. Perhaps the “‘legitimate’ press” 
would care to put out the Promethean fire of the radical press, they ask, “by such a process as 
Gulliver put out the fire in Lilliput.” Descending into nursery humor, the Guardian is at once a 
“nasty” child and schoolmaster to the people, corrector of the stamped press and unquenchable 
flame, while its readership is a whipped schoolboy whose reading tastes are at liberty, like an 
unswaddled child’s eyes and limbs. Throughout its response, the Guardian restates and 
appropriates the language of the Standard and the Examiner, erasing the fine lines between 
several forms of classroom repetition and child’s play—passive memorization, mockery, irony, 
and satire—until any faithful repetition of the “innocent” lessons provided by the “legitimate” 
press can no longer sound innocent. Is the babe’s infant prattle “naughty” or nice?350 
 By combining instructor and child in a single utterance, the radical press critiqued their 
disenfranchisement as infantilized adults, who, like children, have no need for political 
information beyond what they are fed by their protectors who supposedly govern on their behalf. 
The child’s voice—alternately impotent rage and innocent naïveté—when self-consciously 
performed as political commentary (and, therefore, as public instruction) subverts and confuses 
conservative portraits of the people as passive, uninformed “childlike” readers by making an 
innocent voice into a sign of mischief. Through irony and satire, the radical press repeats lessons 
as instruction, and through these repetitions adds new echoes of meaning that make any childlike 
speech into a mockery of innocence. 
 In the exchange between the Guardian and the stamped papers, children and working-
class readers are paired together as vulnerable audiences who need “innocent” educational 
literature. While children have yet to be formed by their environment, the vulnerable public is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 “The Stamped and the Unstamped,” The Poor Man’s Guardian, September 21, 1833. 
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 composed of newly born readers, with bodily senses left open to chance influences. As this 
analogy suggests, experiential learning conceptually reinforces the political analogy between 
infants and the working classes, who both lead hand-to-mouth existences, and who both require 
supervised education to train them in abstraction, language, self-governance, and delayed 
gratification.  
 Against this potentially infantilizing conflation of children and workers, radicals and 
working-class writers appropriated the language of object learning when they repeated (seriously 
and playfully) its claims about the value of practical experience and physical labor as an 
important supplement to book learning. They embraced the superiority of the child’s 
epistemological position—the child’s closeness to things, its inability to lie, its thirst for 
knowledge, and its potentiality. If mechanical literacy can facilitate the development of abstract 
thought, then it follows that workers are more suited to political life than the leisured classes who 
govern in their name. This radical message differs, in most cases, from the mainstream middle-
class version of object learning, which had appropriated both artisan labor and Baconian 
induction as nursery “play”; but the value this appropriation placed on materiality, observation, 
and the senses fortuitously opened an opportunity for spinning its pedagogical discourse in a 
direction favorable to workers who sought political representation and uncensored access to 
knowledge.  
 Object learning—a pedagogy that formalizes for nurseries and schoolrooms what 
working children do all the time—was one educational discourse re-borrowed, repeated, and 
reinterpreted by the radical press. I close this chapter by showing how radicals mockingly and 
seriously debated what their children (or poor charity children) should read, taking upon 
themselves the same protective duties that church and state used to target the radical press. Given 
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 the playful tone of radical language, which favors appropriation, their (very often) entirely 
serious use of object learning pedagogies to lend respectability to their public education project 
seems poetically fitting. Working-class periodicals could pursue a materialist critique without 
referring to trendy systems of education, but when they do so, they lend the authority of a 
scientific discourse to their radical program of public instruction. 
 
Satire and vulnerable audiences 
 Following the example of Cobbett’s two-penny Register (1816), inexpensive radical 
periodicals, most of them with regional circulation, set an early precedent for the Guardian by 
instructing the public as children while assuming the child’s voice. Since censorship of the 
radical press was justified as protection for vulnerable, ignorant readers, radicals assumed the 
protective mantle of parent and teacher, in their turn, by objecting to what poor children read and 
recited in schools. Thomas Jonathan Wooler’s Black Dwarf condemned a hymn sung by the 
charity children of Tower Ward (and reproduced in Sunday school hymnals), which teaches 
“prostration of the understanding.”351 He regrets that many of the people who support the school 
come from lowly backgrounds, yet instead of encouraging children to emulate the great, they 
teach them that poverty is their destiny:352 
Thy gracious hands to different ranks, 
Hath different tasks assign’d; 
‘Tis our’s to tread the lowly path, 
And bear a HUMBLE MIND, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 Wooler, “Modern Charity,” Black Dwarf, November 20, 1822, 737-40. 
352 The hymn published by Wooler accurately matched one included in several early nineteenth-century hymnals, 
indicating that Wooler did not invent it as a parody of submissive hymns. See, for example, Hymn 139 in The Union 
Hymn Book; Hymn 101 in The Poetical Monitor. 
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 ‘Tis our’s with industry and care, 
To earn our daily food; 
We are not likely to be great! 
But surely may be good. 
“Labour will sweeten plain repast, 
And peace will give us rest; 
But ‘tis thy favour crowns the whole, 
And makes our station blest, 
When thus we work, when thus we live 
Our patrons will rejoice, 
To see the poor to knowledge brought, 
And making God their choice. 
By critiquing the hymn, Wooler elevates The Black Dwarf to guardian of nursery reading, a 
censorship role not entirely distinct from that of his opponents, who claimed that radical papers 
deceived vulnerable adult readers. By dissecting the poem’s politics line by line, Wooler 
separates his readers, who are skeptical enough to learn from this hymn, from children, who 
would unquestioningly repeat what they are taught. He finds the song unintentionally honest 
because it baldly states: while children “work hard, eat little, and confine all their hopes to the 
next world, the patrons will rejoice.” He concludes with a parody hymn for the wealthy patrons 
to sing in church: 
Our gracious lord to different ranks, 
Has different tasks assign’d 
‘Tis ours to tread the royal path, 
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 And bear a haughty mind! 
Without industry, or care, 
We take our daily meat; 
For though we aim not to be good, 
Yet all allow us great— 
Let others labour, while we feast, 
Their toil shall give us rest 
This G—‘s favour crowns the whole, 
And makes our station blest! 
While thus we feast, while thus we sing, 
How can we but rejoice, 
To see the poor so finely taught, 
To play the slave by choice?353 
With this parody, Wooler forces the school’s patrons to sing with a child’s honest voice about 
why they teach poor children submission, while his close-reading of the original child’s hymn 
transforms its simplicity into complex political speech. Child and adult are slippery, unstable 
positions for Wooler and his audience, but also for charity children and their patrons.  
 Radical parody depends upon a display of fork-tongued speech that implies a second, 
simple voice, making the language of children’s literature a helpful mirror of radical language 
because it constructs an innocent child reader, one who cannot detect multiple meanings. 
According to Jon Klancher, radical texts “work out strategies of quoting, parodying, rewriting,” 
while “the radical writer always claims the last word, laying bare the rhetorical stance which his 
middle-class interlocutors find intolerably fixed. Necessarily so, for amidst the proliferation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 Wooler, “Modern Charity,” Black Dwarf, November 20, 1822, 737-40. 
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 signs in the nineteenth century that makes urgent the struggle for their control, the real or 
imagined reference point must be that discourse and its audience whose position is never in 
doubt.”354 In its appeal to the dominant, confident voice of what is conventional, or unquestioned 
until reprinted and reworked by the radical press, radical authors adopt a strain of straight-
speaking, multi-tonal speech in some respects oddly coextensive with a child’s speech, as 
imagined by adults. (Imagine the radical press as the caterpillar, speaking with Lewis Carroll’s 
Alice.) Children’s literature, because it is written by adults who mimic the simplicity they 
imagine belongs to children, is defined, according to Perry Nodelman, by its “doubleness”: a 
“simplicity” mutually constructed by its “shadow, an unconscious” that “hides but still manages 
to imply the presence of—something less simple,” the “hidden adult.”355 Something akin to 
Nodelman’s theory is at work in the article from The Black Dwarf. Wooler places a child’s hymn 
in a patron’s mouth to fantasize about a truthful child’s confession from duplicitous adults, just 
as these adult patrons accidentally confessed their self-serving motives by commanding children 
to speak a truthful hymn. 
 There are historical reasons for this formal similarity between radical texts and children’s 
texts. Socratic irony is a favorite technique of radicals, which they share in common with 
Dissenting children’s literature of the previous generation. In addition to William Blake’s Songs 
of Innocence and Experience (the obvious example), Barbauld and Aiken’s “Things by Their 
Right Names” is a dialogue between a father and his children about the difference between a 
“battle” and a “massacre,” while Elizabeth Inchbald’s novel, Nature and Art, features a child 
protagonist, Henry, who cannot distinguish between “prosecute” and “persecute.” Moreover, 
Marcus Wood meticulously proves that the children’s book industry overlaps extensively, during 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 Klancher, Making of English Reading Audiences, 100. 
355 Nodelman, Hidden Adult, 206. 
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 the Romantic era, with radical satire—a fact easily overlooked, as Donelle Ruwe demonstrates, 
because works that fail to conform to a Romantic concept of childhood innocence (i.e. satirical 
children’s books) are less likely to survive into the children’s literature canon.356 In other words, 
modern scholars prefer books with children who speak with a simpler voice. And so did the more 
politically mainstream middle-class writers, publishers, and adult purchasers whose tastes slowly 
distinguished two vulnerable audiences, children and newly literate workers, thus forming the 
modern children’s literature industry. The familiar argument that the origins of children’s 
literature lie in middle-class ideology, forwarded by Isaac Kramnick and Andrew O’Malley, 
overlooks the constitutive role of the radical press, which required (as Klancher explains) a 
simple voice against which to position its linguistic play.357 In many cases, the child, as 
constructed by children’s literature, was that voice.358 
 
The House that Hone Built: Children’s Literature and Radical Satire 
 During the turbulent post-Waterloo proliferation of cheap periodicals, William Hone 
published satires that made him the best-selling author of 1819 and 1820, several of these based 
on iconic forms of children’s literature with illustrations by his close friend and collaborator, 
George Cruikshank.359 Although popular children’s nursery rhymes and chapbooks were 
commonly adapted by English satirists, Hone’s texts more carefully attend to the instructional 
methods used in books and classrooms. Flaunting the reader’s active transformation of texts, his 
satires of children’s rhymes and the Anglican catechism protest the passivity of education in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 Wood, Radical Satire, 215-63; Ruwe, “Satirical Birds,” Satiric Eye, 130-32. 
357 Kramnick, Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism; O’Malley, Making of the Modern Child. 
358 Klancher hints at the radical distinction between words and things: “The radicals’ verbal truth” insists upon its 
reference, the squaring of signs with things and writers with the readers they represent.” Making of English Reading 
Audiences, 110. 
359 Grimes, “Verbal jujitsu,” Satiric Eye, 175. Since Cruikshank was willing to work for whomever paid him, his pen 
supports conflicting sides of political conflicts. Although the two parted ways, on his deathbed Hone requested 
Charles Dickens to help him make peace with Cruikshank, and the two held hands during Hone’s last hour. 
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 Sunday or charity schools, where children memorize such texts. Through these parodies, Hone 
playfully performs the role the rebellious school child who refuses to repeat his lessons without 
embellishment, thus appropriating for his own purposes the dismissive conflation of the working 
classes with “children.” In the context of debates over expanding popular literacy, his satires 
suggest that once laborers learn to read, they will refuse to repeat what they were taught and 
transform their literacy to serve their own purposes, turning from prescribed conservative books 
of their youth to the instruction served up by the popular press.360 
 Hone’s writings make explicit the connection between his satirical “toy” The Queen’s 
Matrimonial Ladder (1820) and children’s literature. According to his account, Hone reluctantly 
agreed to defend Queen Caroline at the request of her allies, who approached him in her name 
during his evening visit to the British Museum Reading Room. That night while walking home 
he saw “The Matrimonial Ladder,” a children’s paper toy that laid out the virtuous path of 
married life on rungs of a ladder.361 Inspired by the didactic toy, Hone published The Queen’s 
Matrimonial Ladder, a National Toy, with Fourteen Step Scenes, a political pamphlet sold 
together with a prop-up pasteboard ladder toy for one shilling [figure 28]. As discussed in 
chapter 1, selling books with toys was an established marketing technique of children’s 
publishers since Newberry and Cooper’s 1740s collaboration on alphabet games. The “ladder” 
toy, in particular, was a common reference to the ubiquitous “ladder of learning,” put to multiple 
education-themed uses, including the marriage toy Hone saw that night [figure 29]. 
 The “national toy” offered with Hone’s pamphlet is a bookmark version of a Cruikshank 
cartoon depicting the Queen perched in triumph on top of a ladder. Each rung bares a word—
degradation, coronation, accusation, etc.—imitating pronunciation and spelling lessons where 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360 For more on William Hone’s satires as children’s literature, see Wood, Radical Satire and print Culture, 215-63. 
361 Qtd. Wilson, Laughter of Triumph, 320. Wilson cites Hackwood, William Hone; His Life and Times, 236-7. 
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 children recite similar words in long lists grouped by sound, in this case Latinate words that 
recall a privileged education.362 The rhyme story of the accompanying pamphlet, written in the 
style of children’s poetry, uses one of these words on each page to relate how the incompetent 
and dissipated Regent (“qualification”) marries his German cousin, Caroline, as stipulated by 
Parliament in return for paying his debts, later running her out of the country (“emigration”) and 
prosecuting her for infidelity to secure a divorce (“accusation”). In her defense, the Queen 
widely publishes her evidence (“publication”), using the free press to successfully prove her 
innocence (“indignation”) against the unpublished “bag” of mysterious evidence gathered by the 
king’s spies. 
 Using royal sexual politics as a stand-in for the relationship between government and the 
common people, The Queen’s Matrimonial Ladder casts the British public in the role of the 
injured Queen, who  
owes her safety to a fearless Press; 
With all the freedom that it makes its own, 
It guards, alike, the people and their throne.363  
Exhibiting motherly affection in one drawing, Queen Caroline nurses the Princess Caroline 
under a picture of a devil chasing a woman, while outside her husband flirts in the garden. The 
accompanying verses criticize the king’s refusal to “reform” and desire her “form.” Like the 
Queen who was courted for her dower, radical publishers and their readers protested that heavy 
taxes following the Napoleonic wars stole labor from the common people to support lavish royal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 Wilson cites Hackwood for the existence of a similar –tion ladder as a lottery advertisement from the time, 
depicting the rise of family fortunes through lottery winnings. While this may have influenced Hone, the lottery 
advertisement itself may have used the –tion references for this same reason, i.e. that children learned pronunciation 
and spelling through groups of such words. 
363 Hone, Queen’s Matrimonial Ladder, n.p. 
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 carousing and unnecessary court and church lackeys and their pensions. Furthermore, the queen 
faces government spies and secret evidence, in common with many radical publishers and 
protesters. In the recent Oliver scandal, the government allegedly paid spies to entrap desperate 
men, encouraging rebellion and then prosecuting for treason those who were involved. In Hone’s 
own trials for Blasphemy (1817), the prosecutor’s evidence was kept secret from the accused and 
the public alike. The tables are turned in the conclusion of the The Queen’s Matrimonial Ladder, 
when the king stands trial for adultery and the people give him “the bag” (referring, visually, to a 
bag of evidence, but figuratively to the hangman’s noose) and a decrepit-looking Cupid sells his 
body for cat’s meat. 
 Close replication of generic markers was a staple of the Hone-Cruikshank satire team. 
Buonaparte-phobia, or Cursing Made Easy to the Meanest Capacity (1815), with its schoolbook-
sounding title, attacked John Stoddart’s scurrilous articles in The Times. Hone printed this work, 
as well as his other satires on The Times (eg. A Slap at Slop, 1821) as one large sheet formatted 
like the newspaper’s front page. Likewise, Cruikshank’s cartoon, Specimen of a Bank Note 
(1819), criticized the easily counterfeited one-pound bank notes, which tempted the desperate 
poor to commit a capital offense, by imitating an actual printed pound note. Hone and 
Cruikshank had a record of signaling generic traditions, and getting the details right, and they 
had the background to do the same with children’s literature in The Queen’s Matrimonial 
Ladder. As an illustrator for the premier children’s publishing firm of John Marshall (Sarah 
Trimmer, Hannah Moore’s Village Politics, the Taylor sisters), Cruikshank acquired a familiarity 
with the trade in its politically conservative form, while Hone would soon turn to family 
periodicals in 1825s for his livelihood. 
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  By appropriating the trappings of children’s books, Hone promotes the radical press as an 
alternative or “true” educator of the people, against both the false education of middle-classes 
who sold improving toys or the aristocrats who learned with Murray’s Latinate grammars. As a 
symbol of progress, the ladder of learning is commonly associated with children learning to read, 
but Hone attaches progressivism to the imminent power of the free press to bring transparency to 
shady royal dealings and corrupt courts. The most clever part of Hone’s satire is its ironic 
juxtaposition of a passive, memorization technique commonly used in schools (the repetition of 
unmeaning, foreign-sounding and aristocratic words, through the -tion headings), with a practical 
example of himself as a bad student become dangerous instructor, a satirist who refuses to repeat 
a lesson without adding his own voice. 
 Satirical versions of Ballads, national songs, the Bible, and chapbook rhymes are so 
ubiquitous that Hone’s preference for these forms may seem indistinguishable from common 
practice. Where Hone departs from this tradition is through an ironic address to his (mostly 
adult) audience as child students, positioning himself as instructor in a performance that became 
typical of the radical periodical press. At stake is the easy slippage between so-called 
“uneducated” adults and innocent children, who cannot differentiate the subtle valences of 
philosophical or satirical writing and require watchful parents to select appropriate literature for 
them. 
 We can see the use and reuse of “child” language in action with Hone’s  
The Political House that Jack Built (1819), which reached 54 editions and spawned multiple 
sequels and rebuttals.364 The original nursery rhyme (This Is the House that Jack Built) is a 
nonsense cumulative tale, but like many ballads and national songs for which radicals provided 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364 The Royal House that Jack Built; The Real or Constitutional House that Jack built; A Parody on the Political 
House that Jack Built; The Loyalist’s House that Jack Built; The Dorchester Guide, or a House that Jack Built. 
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 political lyrics, its appeal lies in its immediate familiarity as a folk rhyme circulated by chapbook 
or oral recitation.365 Nevertheless, its status as a children’s rhyme is just as important for Hone as 
its folk origins, as indicated by his opening dedication to the “nursery of children six feet high,” 
to whom he, their “political godfather,” offers “this juvenile publication” for “their uninformed 
minds.”366 The reference to adult-sized, ignorant “children” criticizes the infantilization of 
working-class adults by charitable instruction, while Hone offers alternative mentorship that 
substitutes political for spiritual instruction, a poke at church educators who attempt to drown 
agitation with spiritual platitudes. By adding politics to innocent or innocuous children’s rhymes, 
Hone captures the radical perspective that real education politically empowers the common 
people, which contrasts with Whig efforts to disseminate politically vacuous artisanal knowledge 
or free market economics (eg. The Penny Magazine), as well as Tory efforts to spread Anglican 
teachings. 
 A mania for Jack’s architectural achievements swept across Britain in the months 
following Hone’s publication, while among these spin-offs, the question remains in the fore, who 
counts as “children” and who can “instruct” the public. Surveying the slew of nursery rhymes 
reinvented, The London Review expresses surprise to find “Our juvenile companion” is “pressed 
into the service” of “Radical Reform” and singles out for praise a conservative reply to Hone’s 
Political House that contrasts an adult John Bull as the Prince Regent in smart military dress 
against “his CHILDREN, a reprobate pack.”367 A vignette “The British Constitution 
Triumphant,” forming the title page for The Loyalist’s House that Jack built, pleads for reviving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
365 The first print appearance of This is the House that Jack Built was 1755, as a children’s book, making it one of 
the early contributions to the emerging children’s publishing industry. The oral origin of the rhyme could be 
hundred of years earlier. 
366 Hone, Political House that Jack Built, dedication, n.p. 
367 “The House that Jack Built,” The London Review, and Literary Journal, December 1819, 529-33; The London 
Review quotes from The Dorchester Guide, or a House that Jack Built, 7.  
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 the birch rod of laws against sedition to teach “baby” who “beats the nurse” his proper place 
[figures 32 and 33]. Yet another rebuttal, The Real or Constitutional House that Jack built, 
begins with the call to war in Shakespeare’s Henry V and the warning against French 
sympathizers within: “O England! . . . Were all thy children kind and natural!” While the family 
analogy of King-as-father and subjects-as-children is nothing new, the focus on false instructors 
and true fathers is a significant theme throughout this work. For several decades, a serious 
criticism of the Prince Regent involved his disregard for royal succession through profligacy and 
womanizing. Fondly reinterpreting this dubious legacy, Constitutional House refers to the 
“Prince of a generous Mind” as a reformed, spirited Hal who “Dismiss’d from his presence / the 
Friends of his Youth” in time to trounce Napoleon. Fallstaff makes his appearance as William 
Cobbett, the false teacher and turncoat friend who was no friend in need. A string of these 
loyalist satires brand Cobbett “The Public Instructor,” picturing him as a travelling vagrant, “two 
penny trash” in his pockets and Tomas Paine’s coffin on his back [figures 32 and 33]. The name 
and image stuck with him. Just returned from America, where he fled to avoid arrest, Cobbett 
took advantage of his sojourn to publish a surprisingly seditious grammar book and bring Paine’s 
remains back with him to English soil.368 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 Through Political Jack’s offspring, Hone’s name was used to promote two additional political satires on nursery 
rhymes that are not his work, The Green Bag: ‘a dainty dish to set before a king’, a ballad of the nineteenth century, 
(1820) and The Political ‘A, Apple-Pie’ or, the ‘Extraordinary Red Book’ versified; for the instruction and 
amusement of the rising generation (1820), while Hone published a third, The Man in the Moon (1820). Adopting 
the form of an alphabet book, The Political ‘A, Apple-Pie’ lists the names of those supported by tax dollars with 
their salaries or pensions and an alliterative poetic description. For each letter, a Cruikshank’s cartoon depicts them 
greedily carving up the national pie, while the parties currently out of favor watch with mouth-watering envy. As 
with Hone’s Political House, the book addresses its audience as instructors to children and connects literacy with 
political knowledge. The theme of a “National Feast” may have evoked another immensely popular series of 
children’s book satires from the previous decade, John Harris’s children’s satire series The Butterfly’s Ball and 
Grasshopper’s Feast. The alternate title “The Extraordinary Red Book” refers to another protest against public 
spending, The Extraordinary Black Book. Both names derive from the practice in Bell’s Monitorial schools of 
keeping a Black Book of offenses, which the teacher reads to the entire class at the end of the week. Students form a 
jury and judge their peers. This jury practice gave some pause to promoters of the system, some of whom believed it 
trained poor students in an exercise of a power they would not have as adults. 
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  Although the family political analogies at work in these texts are commonplace, the 
metaphor takes on new valences given the transformation in opinion concerning public education 
during this decade. Religious disagreements may have prevented any coherent national program 
of education, but paranoid fears about the rapid spread of Dissenter schools forced the 
conservative Anglican clergy and provincial leaders to enter the fray in full force, despite their 
reservations whether an educated populace is more content with its lot. By leaving a vacuum of 
leadership concerning “the education of the lower orders,” Anglicans elites learned that they 
invited the likes of Jeremy Bentham, Joseph Lancaster, Robert Owen, or Francis Place to step in 
with their “atheistic” rational schools, requiring a panicked, belated response to head them off by 
establishing proper Anglican schools. It was just such reactive Church organizing that lead to the 
organization of the National Society (1811), doomed Bentham’s Chrestomathic project as 
atheistic, and ultimately forced Henry Brougham to compromise on religious instruction in his 
education bill. Looking back over past decades when the clergy neglected their education post, 
The Extraordinary Black Book (1832) observes, “Public education is a subject that appears to 
have peculiar claims on the attention of the clergy; . . . Yet this is a duty they have generally 
neglected. Had not a jealousy of the Dissenters roused them into activity, neither the Bell nor 
Lancaster plans of instruction would have been encouraged by them. A similar feeling appears to 
have actuated them in the foundation of King’s College, . . . a rival establishment to the London 
University.369 As these hints of clerical incompetency suggest, the radical press offered their 
services as an alternative to both Whig and Tory educators, and they had their own ways of 
defining “education” and “adulthood” in terms of acquiring full citizenship. By useful 
knowledge, Radicals invariably mean political knowledge, and by adulthood, they mean the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369 Wade, The Extraordinary Black Book, 6. Cobbett notices the same trend of Anglicans following the lead of 
Dissenters in his article “National Education,” Cobbett’s Weekly Political Register, April 19, 1834. 
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 capacity to guide one’s own education, which includes a free, untaxed press and working-class 
management of the means of disseminating knowledge.  
 These debates are the contemporary scene for Hone’s three parodies of the Catechism, 
The Lord’s Prayer, and The Ten Commandments, attributed to John Wilkes but almost certainly 
written by Hone. These are not parodies of the Bible, per say, but of the Anglican service, 
targeting material that children memorize in Anglican schools.370 Although dissenting religious 
schools composed reading lessons from Bible verses, they usually omitted the Catechism, and 
Anglican accusations that they neglected The Lord’s Prayer and The Ten Commandments 
suggests that Hone’s three parodies directly contribute to the education question with sympathy 
for the Dissenters. Grouping Hone’s parodies with the work of Evangelicals (which makes sense 
in this context), Rev. William Lisle Bowles371 in letters to Brougham and James McIntosh 
blames the increase of crime on these omissions by instructors, who hold up “nauseous accounts 
of miracles of conversion by instant grace (without a word of Christian duties) in the on hand, 
and Paine’s Age of Reason or Hone’s disgusting Parodies in the other: even the very Grammar, 
that has lately been published by Cobbet [sic.], shows its object is to pervert and corrupt the 
youthful mind in its first and earliest avidity of knowledge.372 He repeatedly singles out “the 
catechism,” the “ten commandments,” and the “Lord’s prayer” as what makes Anglican 
education superior,373 and he acknowledges radicals with a lengthy response to their imputations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 For William Hone’s publish status as the last man put on trial for blasphemy, see March, Word Crimes, 1-77. 
371 Bowles is Chaplain to the Prince Regent. He argued against Whitbread’s 1807 education bill on similar grounds: 
Only religious instruction, not merely scientific instruction brings moral progress. The revival of education debates 
in Parliament in 1819 responded to Brougham’s call for an investigation into whether charity funds for education 
were used properly. Since these funds were often connected to clerical positions, there were complaints that the 
clergy appropriates for their own use funds willed to them for the express purpose of educating the poor. The 
McIntosh inquiry concerned reforming the criminal code, but crime and education were closely tied because false 
education was blamed by all for increases in crime. 
372 Bowles, Thoughts on the Increase of Crimes, 12-13. 
373 See Bowles, Thoughts on the Increase of Crimes: “the Catechism by which everyone in the kingdom knows what 
is taught to the children, and in which at least the TEN COMMANDMENTS are not forgotten” (46); “I have said 
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 that the catechism teaches “the first rudiments of political servility.”374 The Wilkes parodies 
tapped into these concerns of Dissenters and radicals that Anglican education prepares children 
for a life of quiet submission. 
 In citing Hone and Cobbett as evil instructors, Bowles followed the lead of Justice 
Abbott, the judge for Hone’s three trials for blasphemy. Abbott described for the jury how 
young, innocent readers, would learn impiety from the Wilkes satires. After Hone demonstrates 
that Gilray, on state pension, produced parodies of The Bible and the Ten Commandments, the 
judge abruptly redirects the conversation by reprimanding the accused as a neglectful father, 
asking, 
if he were a man who felt an affection for his family and for their future welfare, for their 
religion and their morals, how was it possible for him to publish this parody? Could he 
seal hermetically the eyes and ears of his children, that the poison should not enter their 
minds; or if not, how could he hope for a moment that they would not be infected with 
that impiety which such writings must inevitably excite? Would children be able to resist 
that which people of mature years and judgment could not avoid? . . . What but a feeling 
of impiety, if not of ridicule, could exist on the mind of a child during divine service, if 
on the Saturday night or Sunday morning this publication had fallen in its way?375  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the Church of England teaches and blends with public instruction the Ten Commandments. What will a Christian 
legislator think of a great part of religious population studiously excluding these and the Lord’s prayer?”; and in 
conclusion, “This I am sure of, that the manufacturing districts, where the population habitually despise the 
clergyman, however exemplary his life and conduct, who imbibe their divinity from other instructors, are much 
worse in point of morals than those districts (which they call still in darkness), where the divinity of such books as I 
have mentioned, the ravings of “black dwarfs and yellow dwarfs,” and even the solemn sarcasm and portentous 
lucubrations of the second Jeremy, have not yet reached” (55). 
374 Bowles, Thoughts on the Increase of Crimes, 16. 
375 Hone, Three Trials, 65-66. 
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 Every time children hear the catechism, the judge imputes, they will hear Hone’s parody in the 
back of their mind, destroying the sacred effect of the original.376 Through this method, the 
Wilkes parodies defy the power of repetition as a means of education more effectively than the 
new pedagogies of the last generation because they make passive repetition impossible.  
 At the conclusion of Hone’s trial, the prosecution makes the same appeal to the jury, 
mixing the vulnerability of child readers with that of servants and workers. “If there be any 
among you, which is doubtless the case, who is the father of children, and the master of a 
household, I will ask him, if he would suffer that publication to be perused by his servants, who 
are not so well educated as himself? Or if he would suffer his children for one moment to read 
it?” The closing speech shows how easily child readers were joined with “common and ordinary 
people,” described as “the ignorant and uninformed.”377 The judge implies that most people are 
not educated enough to reflect on what they read, making political satire read like 
unsophisticated mockery. By pricing his satires for these “ordinary people,” argues Abbott, Hone 
ensures that he will seduce an audience made vulnerable by their ignorance. 
 Although Hone may agree with earlier educators like Edgeworth, Locke, or Anna Letitia 
Barbauld who questioned whether memorization and repetition brought true understanding and 
eyed askance mere words without things, Hone differs in his willingness to apply these 
pedagogical principles to a population marked for perpetual childhood, who were not expected 
(as were middle-class or wealthy children) to fully transition from a mechanical, bodily existence 
to self-governance. At the time of Hone’s trials, the more conservative proponents of public 
instruction supported teaching the poor to read their Bibles but not to write because these 
plowboys and artisans might write back or (and I’m not making this up) commit forgery. In such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376 For an extended argument of how Hone’s parodies force readers to hear the originals differently, see Grimes, 
“Verbal Jujitsu,” Satiric Eye 173-84. 
377 Hone, Three Trials, 75, 76, 76. 
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 a world-view where the written opinions of common people are automatically dismissed as 
narrow and ignorant, all such writings are, intentional or not, a kind of imitation or forgery of 
original productions—the mockery of school children. 
 
Alive to the senses: the child as a materialist critique 
In addition to criticizing rote learning, radical pedagogies were experientialist because they 
valued the senses and the body as a foundation for literacy. One of the important proponents of 
“practical” education, of sorts, was William Cobbett, who valued the skill and intelligence 
required for physical labor. Like Wooler, Cobbett takes up children’s hymns in Cobbett’s Weekly 
Political Register to protest the ignorance of the so-called higher orders, who should “begin by 
causing themselves to be educated” since they are “without a parallel in the records of human 
ignorance.”378 Cobbett, who was vilified as “the public educator,” continually attacked 
government-sponsored education as thinly-veiled subjugation, paid for by overtaxing the poor. 
Although provided as a sample of what children are taught, Cobbett’s hymn is actually a parody 
written by himself. He accuses the church of undermining the child’s development of the senses 
because nothing but willful blindness can silence the public: 
Come, little children, list’ to me, 
While I describe your duty, 
And kindly lend your eyes to see 
Of lowliness the beauty. 
 
‘Tis true your bony backs are bare, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 Cobbett, “Education and ‘Heddekashun,’” Cobbett’s Weekly Political Register. December 7, 1833. Note that the 
article with this psalm is untitled, appearing annexed to the article “Education and ‘Heddekashun.” 
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 Your lips too dry for spittle; 
Your eye as dead as whiting’s are, 
Your bellies growl for vict’al. 
 
But, dearest children, O, believe! 
Believe not treach’rous senses! 
‘Tis they your infant hearts deceive, 
And lead into offences. 
. . . . 
 
Let dungeons, gags, and hangman’s noose, 
Make you content and humble. 
Your heav’nly crown you’ll surely lose, 
If here, on earth, you grumble.379 
The hymn makes explicit, with a child’s honesty, what Cobbett thinks is the implicit message of 
religious instruction for poor children: Instead of succumbing to deceptive sensations like 
sickness, cold, and hunger, children should have faith in an insubstantial (but somehow more 
real) reward in the afterlife. Although Cobbett’s writings consistently support Christian 
instruction for children, this hymn exposes how propaganda circulates disguised as a 
nonsensical, impractical “religious” text, which tells children to deny their senses and mistrust 
their own experience. The form of a simple child’s hymn allows Cobbett to expose the plain 
truth hidden behind false religious instruction. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379 Cobbett, “Education and ‘Heddekashun,’” Cobbett’s Weekly Political Register. December 7, 1833. 
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  Several radicals develop their own materialist rhetoric, sometimes drawing on Godwin, 
sometimes (like Cobbett) on English practicality. The skeptical, “rational” paper, The Medusa, 
for example, in its opening issue addresses its message “TO THE PUBLIC, Alias The 
‘ignorantly-impatient Multitude.’” This banner allows The Medusa to berate its simplistic 
audience (“Infatuated mortals!”) for letting themselves be governed by their bodies, which feel 
their misery, instead of listening to the authorities, who say they are happy. “Are you 
determined, like Lovegold, to ‘feel, feel, feel, and touch, touch, touch,’ before you will allow 
your happiness to be real? Dreadful obstinacy! How unacquainted are you with the wonder-
working powers of imagination!—Can you not believe that your hunger and thirst are gratified, 
unless you eat and drink?” The opening tirade ends with a command to stop thinking, since they 
cannot think as they are told. “Let your betters, therefore, think for you; . . . . and if the phantom 
should again seize your brain, and tempt you to conceive you are not happy, you must petition 
the happy Constitution to furnish you with some patent engines, pullies, and screws, whereby 
you may at any time wind up your imagination to their pitch, dance to their music, and be as 
happy as themselves.”380 As a tool for social control, the imagination dominates and mechanizes 
the public more than the senses, which offer the truth. 
 Despite their different positions on Christianity, Cobbett and The Medusa both associate 
simplicity and ignorance (the child-like voice) with reliance on sensual evidence, which permits 
them to insist upon the practical facts of poverty and bodily necessities by ironically denying 
their importance. This radical materialist rhetoric insists that real knowledge derives from 
practical experience (or the senses) instead of words (books, authorities). Cobbett had little 
interest in philosophy of mind, and his didactic books follow his own practical approach without 
referencing other pedagogical systems for legitimacy. Nevertheless, his skepticism of any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 Davidson, The Medusa, The Popular Radical Press in Britain, 5:8; 5:10. 
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 teaching that denies reality, as experienced by the senses, accords with one of the main messages 
of experientialist pedagogies. 
 
The Education of “Words” and “Things” 
 The concept of an “education of things” fit with radical distrust of the established 
educational institutions, accused of churning out despotic, ill-qualified young men fit only for 
cushy government positions that were awarded through cronyism and paid for by burdensome 
taxes. Radicals denounced the emphasis on Latin and Greek in public schools as tribute to “mere 
words,” nonsense used to fabricate a false superiority over common people.  
 Questioning whether clergymen truly earn their salaries as public educators, an article in 
Thomas Wooler’s The Black Dwarf distinguishes between the knowledge of words and things: 
In general learning and acquirements, [clergymen] will not frequently be found to excel 
gentlemen of their own rank in society. In practical and useful knowledge, they are, for 
the most part, lamentably deficient. Ignorant alike of men and things, and employed for 
the most part in the study of the language and history of a barbarous age and people, they 
acquire an artificial character, . . . In the business of education, therefore, if we make any 
distinction between a knowledge of mere words and a knowledge of things, between truth 
and fiction, we must allow that, in this respect, the Clergy, so far as they have interfered 
in public instruction, have done more harm than good, by impeding the progress of 
natural and scientific knowledge.381 
Since the free press competed with the Church for the self-proclaimed role of public instructors, 
clergymen most often attracted criticism in the radical press as false instructors in the education 
of words. Wooler, for instance, contributes articles to his paper in the character of The Black 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381 A.H. “Character of the Clergy,” The Black Dwarf, March 24, 1824, 382-384. 
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 Dwarf of Sir Walter Scott’s novel by the same title, and in one of these he pretends that he in an 
instructor in a children’s school, laying about with his birch on his infant students, the unruly and 
ignorant members of Parliament.  
 According to working-class radicals, the education of words is what the upper classes 
learn, an education of fluff and fiction, useful only for deceiving the people. Reared on words, 
the British elite told fantastical stories about the way society must be, which were based on what 
they observe: that everyone gives them their way. Convinced of their natural superiority, these 
elites never consider that hierarchy and submission are learned behaviors, even though they take 
pains to teach these values in school. The education provided to the poor by charities run by the 
rich taught children to consider their state of deprivation the natural, inevitable order of things. 
Referring to this shared radical narrative, Wooler comments “it is truly whimsical to perceive the 
cunning which the managers of charities use to render the education they bestow subservient to 
the purpose of perpetuating “things as they are.”382 Presumably, the radical press offered 
knowledge of “men and things,” the knowledge of people with real experience of how the world 
works. 
 In addition to instructing the working-classes, radicals playfully provide a school of 
experience for wealthy children. While criticizing Princess Victoria’s £10,000 education, funded 
with tax money, The Poor Man’s Guardian offered to educate the princess as an act of charity so 
that Parliament could afford schools for the poor. How is it, asks the Guardian, that “their 
‘education’ costs more than that of a whole country? Poor things! they must be most 
extraordinarily—most extravagantly—most majestically thick-headed and stupid;—why, a 
hundredth part of Miss Guelph’s school-money, would redeem an idiot, would make a ‘learned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 Wooler, “Modern Charity,” Black Dwarf, November 20, 1822, 737-40. 
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 pig.’”383 The pun refers to a popular street entertainment where a trained pig used child’s spelling 
cards to write messages, but also to the poor as “educated swine,” here transferred to the 
princess. References to “Miss Victoria Alexandrina Guelph” (never called by her title) and her 
expensive education became a running joke in a working-class publication sold cheaply “In 
Defiance of the Taxes on Knowledge!” as proclaimed at the top of every issue. The Guardian 
always refers to “education” in ironic quotations unless education includes free access to 
political knowledge. “[L]et the little girl be placed under our tuition for a few months,” the 
Guardian suggests, “and we will teach her such a lesson out of the book of nature as shall make 
her a better woman than will the libraries of incomprehensible error, with which her natural good 
sense and good heart will be fortified and prejudiced against common truth and common right.” 
The author laments that the royal instructors will corrupt the princess, the niece of the king and 
queen: “Poor child! You will be never allowed to think for yourself until removed so far from the 
truth that its light can never reach you: your young mind, now incapable of self-action, will be 
drilled into order and submission to established institutions, until you become the willing slave 
of all the errors—the cruel errors—of this darkened age!”384 When the education of words 
replaces real experience and uncensored reading, even a princess learns error and submission just 
as thoroughly as poor children in charity schools. 
 By criticizing “mere words,” radicals did not contradict their celebration of the free press 
as a symbol of freedom. Words properly used should convey actual knowledge, a distinction 
Cobbett addresses in his fascinating grammar book. Designed to aid workers who teach 
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 themselves, Cobbett’s Grammar encourages young people to read the “history of those Laws of 
England, by which the freedom of the people has been secured” but dismisses pronunciation 
(traditionally part of grammar) because “it is sense, and not sound, which is the object of your 
pursuit”385 His readers are treated to political examples, such as this one, which teaches commas: 
“There were, in the year 1817, petitions from a million and a half of men, who, as they distinctly 
alleged, were suffering the greatest possible hardships.” Through conjugation, Cobbett suggests 
that radical agitators will ignore legal persecution: “Evans defies the tyrants; Evans defied the 
tyrants; Evans will defy the tyrants.”386 In the practice section, Cobbett’s students correct the 
king’s speeches. Although teaching grammar teaches words, Cobbett constantly reminds his 
readers to respect the intelligence required for manual labor and the practical knowledge of 
experience, for “a comparatively small part of useful knowledge comes from books” and those 
who cannot read are not ignorant.387 On the contrary, too many wealthy people acquire the 
“endowments” of “a parrot or a bull-finch” through classroom memorization. “It is this mode of 
teaching, which is practiced in the great schools, that assists very much in making dunces of 
Lords and Country Squires. They ‘get their lesson;’ that is to say, they repeat the words of it; but 
as to its sense and meaning, they seldom have any understanding.”388 
 The opposition between words and things in radical discourse bares no chance 
resemblance to the rhetoric of object learning. Some radicals were deeply invested in 
pedagogical theories, and those who wrote for multiple audiences alternate between addressing 
the working-classes with their message about common sense and addressing the middle-classes 
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 with the legitimizing, scientific language of education philosophy. Richard Carlile and his 
common-law wife, Eliza Sharples, exemplify how radicals draw on pedagogical philosophy, 
including the education of things. 
 Writing while in prison for publishing Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man, Richard Carlile, 
editor of The Republican, The Gorgon, and The Lion, outlined an alternative program of 
education, presumably for both wealthy and poor children, one that recognizably relies on 
experientialist pedagogies. He calls for “men of science” to stand up to the church, declare the 
superiority of their modern knowledge, and use the press to educate the public in mechanics, 
chemistry, and the natural sciences. Children should “at an early period of life form correct 
notions of organized and inert matter, instead of torturing their minds with metaphysical and 
incomprehensible dogmas about religion.” There are “[m]any new plans and schemes for 
education,” he observes, but they all have the same error, “for the subjects upon which our youth 
are taught to read and write, and those in which the dead or foreign living languages are taught, 
are by no means calculated to expand the mind, or to give it a knowledge of Nature and her 
laws.” With the references to “inert matter” and Nature’s “laws,” Carlile indicates his 
indebtedness to radical materialist philosophy of mind (likely Condorcet or Godwin), which 
makes political reeducation analogous to mechanics. Addressing with this pamphlet a more 
formally educated and affluent audience than usual, Carlile warns that classical study “fills the 
mind with useless jargon” and “unmeaning trash—words of sound, to which it would be difficult 
to attach an idea.” Instead, “every school-master ought to be a Man of Science, and not a parish 
priest, as Mr. Brougham would have.”389 References to education schemes and Brougham’s 1820 
education bill suggest that Carlile has equal familiarity with pedagogical and political sides of 
education debate. Whereas religious instruction will “stupefy” children “by so dull and so 	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 constant a repetition,” observation and experiment kindle genius. “Here every thing both in the 
animal and vegetable world, which comes under the every day observation of the child, or even 
the grown person, might be familiarly described and explained in our school-books.” Then a 
child can make the world his classroom and “read a useful lesson in every object that came 
within his view.”390 Carlile describes an experientialist approach for all ages and classes of 
students, with instruction proceeding between equals, as forwarded by William Godwin two 
decades earlier. He accurately describes how to learn from chance, everyday things (“every 
object”), what Ellenor Fenn calls education of the moment, a technique popularized by several 
education experts, including the Edgeworths. Clearly, Carlile is familiar with education treatises, 
and he sees himself participating in this genre.391 
 Modified to include what we might call “nontraditional” adult students, Carlile’s “system 
of education” bears a surprising resemblance to the new philosophy of the previous century, with 
its Baconian emphasis on induction and experiment. Indeed, Bacon furnished the radical press 
with their favorite slogan, “Knowledge is Power,” and the kind of knowledge they urged the 
public to “get,” as they put it, was at once political and practical. The undertones Carlile gives to 
the word “education” are quite different from, say, the Edgeworths’ concept of “practical 
education.” His pamphlet calls “men of science” to end their duplicity, their proud free inquiry 
into the natural world, so inconsistent with their servile submission to church and state for the 
honor of joining the Royal Society—most especially, their unwillingness to express the most 
subversive conclusions of their investigations in plain speech for the common public, lest they be 
accused of fomenting materialism and unrest.  	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  A decade later Carlile and his common-law wife, Eliza Sharples, transformed the London 
Rotunda into a public education space, something resembling a working-class school. When 
Eliza Sharples (editor of the weekly paper, Isis) managed the Rotunda (1830-32), she delivered 
an opening speech in the character of Isis, Goddess of Wisdom, in which she invited her 
working-class audience to test the education of words with experiments: “[K]nowledge must 
consist of observations made on mankind, and on whatever else exists within the scope of your 
observation. Books will aid you, but you must not make an authority of books, or of that which is 
written” but “prove all things.” Only instructors who invite students to actively participate in 
their education by testing words against things truly treat students as equals. “My profession,” 
announced Sharples, nearly quoting from Godwin’s Enquirer, “is that of an instructor willing to 
be instructed.”392 The language she uses sounds carefully borrowed from pedagogical treatises 
and materialist philosophy of mind, and, indeed, she later lectured on determinism. 
 As goddess of wisdom, Sharples took advantage of an already established female public 
identity: the “surrogate mother” or “rational dame,” the neighborhood teacher who bestows 
letters and moral lessons from her home kitchen, which became a symbol for the female author 
of children’s literature. According the Christina Parolin, Carlile’s Rhotunda “catered for and 
attracted a significant number of women at a time when other radical venues were less 
inclusive,” and government spy reports record that children attended events, if not in great 
numbers.393 What is remarkable, however, is not the few children that Sharples reached, but that 
she makes forming the infant mind so central to establishing her public authority. She 
encouraged her audience to “labour” for “the life of mind, or second birth, in addition to the life 
of body, or first birth.” Her first address asked mothers for their aid: “What say you, sisters? . . . 	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 Will you let your children gather round me, and learn from me a love of truth; not to learn to lisp 
the language of superstition with their first sweet prattlings; but that we may teach the young 
idea how to shoot in matters of reason, preserving the purity of the infant mind from those 
overwhelming corruptions which now pervade the general society?”394 Sharples uses the 
innocent child in order to elevate women into an already established role, promoted by the 
middle-classes: the mother/teacher who guards early impressions and bestow the gifts of literacy. 
She invited parents to bring their children to the Rotunda (“Let your sons and your daughters 
come”), and offered to open a school. That Sharples never opened such a school only 
underscores that her position as a female public educator was, in part, a rhetorical strategy. 
Sharples and Carlile exemplify how working class radicals could combine materialist rhetoric 
with specific phrases lifted from pedagogical theories in order to lend respectability and 
legitimacy to their message.  
 By the 1830s, radical periodicals occasionally refer to famous philosophers of education 
including Locke, Godwin, and Pestalozzi, the latter a familiar name through Robert Owen’s 
contributions and the infant school movement (see chapter 4). Because Owen’s schools used 
Pestalozzi’s methods, the cooperative magazines tend to have the most explicit grip on the fine 
points of object learning pedagogies. Advising the best approach for teaching in mechanics 
institutes, The Cooperative Magazine and Monthly Herald insists that students should be “taught 
a real knowledge of things acquired by the evidence of the senses, instead of the words of dead 
languages, scarcely ever taught so as to be known, to be spoken, written, or even read!”395 
[emphasis original] Any donations toward the institutes should be spent on classroom equipment, 
“the sensible signs (where you cannot get the objects themselves) of the things to be taught—	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 maps, models, prints, machines, apparatus, books, &c.” Professors should have “a knowledge of 
all the objects of nature,” rather than theoretical knowledge only. “The old plan of instruction 
was to teach by words and books,” cultivating the “memory,” while “in the new system, words 
and books are mere instruments towards the elucidation of things themselves, or of their 
representatives, submitted to your senses.”396 Although there is nothing “new” about learning 
through “things themselves,” the newness of experiential education must be proclaimed with 
each generation, since appealing to things over words promises to circumvent authority, 
prejudice, and tradition. Object learning promises the unassailable knowledge spoken by things 
themselves, a break with history that remains perennially new and appealing to radicals. 
 
What kind of Knowledge places “Power in their hands”? 
 The definition of education as the sum of human experience, with practical learning 
elevated over verbal memorization, was attractive to the working classes, for whom labor and 
education necessarily overlapped. After the 1832 reform bill, however, many middle-class 
“theoretical” skills gradually became grouped with “men” and “things” as useful, empowering 
knowledge. This shift in what constitutes a working-class “education of things” is legible in The 
Poor Man’s Guardian’s opposition to Cobbett on the question of what kind of education 
empowers workers. 
 In his Political Register, Cobbett protested that institutional education is properly called 
“headikashon” because it is empty, useless words: 
“scrawling upon paper with a pen, and gabbling over words printed upon paper; it 
signifying nothing what sort of scrawling it is, or what are the words which are printed 
upon paper; whether the scrawling be legible or not whether the right letters be put into 	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 the words that are intended to be made, or whether the gabbling be of a Magdalen Hymn, 
or of a smutty ballad: still it is all “headikashon.”397  
According to Andrew Carnegie, who recalled in his autobiography the influence of this article on 
his own concept of education, Cobbett opposed the “headikashon” of formal schooling to the 
“handikashion” of practical knowledge, which children acquire by working alongside adults. 
Like many radicals, Cobbett equates words without ideas with ideological mystification. Words 
set up some alternate, palliative reality that dupes the working classes into submission, which he 
suspects is the design of most church or charity affiliated schools. 
 In his Register, Cobbett uses the phrase “headukation” for any kind of learning that 
sacrifices training in reliable, manual occupations without producing the “bacon”—that is, 
education provided with plenty of promises about getting ahead, but few solid-paying job 
opportunities for ambitious working-class youth. In the same article, Cobbett spells headikation 
differently each time he uses it, mocking the indifferent literacy bestowed in government or 
charity schools. Cobbett uses “headukation” again in his response to Lord Althorp, who called 
Cobbett “an enemy to the education of the people” because, as a representative in the House of 
Commons, Cobbett opposed a grant for the British museum.398 Cobbett points out that such 
institutions lie about their mission to educate the people because they are closed on evenings and 
Sundays, the only times available to workers. The museum is a symbol for Cobbett of a larger 
scheme for taxing the poor to headucate the rich. 
 In this, one of his most lengthy public statements on educational policy, we can see 
Cobbett trying to reconcile his early Toryism with the radicalism of his later years. Most of 
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 Cobbett’s minor objections to national schools are those voiced by the Tories for the past 30 
years. Children sacrifice valuable information learned on the farm with their parents to scrape 
together a little reading and arithmetic, convinced (along with their parents) that it will make 
their fortune, only to find themselves dependent upon fickle employers and lacking the fallback 
of a skilled trade. These are real concerns. Hone only narrowly escaped life as an impoverished 
copy clerk through a generous loan from his in-laws to start a bookshop. But Cobbett concludes 
with his strongest objection, that headikation “has a direct tendency to fashion the minds of the 
people to passive obedience and submission, be their wrongs or their sufferings what they may.” 
Sneering at Brougham and the SDUK, he writes, “’Knowledge is power,” says every pert 
coxcomb, who believes, of course, that all his mamby-pamby phrases contain knowledge. Very 
true,” he concedes, “but it must BE knowledge.” Not some tricky bate-and-switch. Far from 
empowering the poor, National Schools are “seminaries of slavery” where children “are taught 
those principles which make men contented with a Government, under treatment which ought to 
urge them on . . . to lawful resistance.” And how could teachers do otherwise, he asks, when their 
salaries are paid by the government? He points out that anyone with a bit of “common-sense” 
can see that these same politicians who say they want to educate the public pass laws that 
suppress information and aggravate poverty. No doubt reflecting on the Great 1832 Reform Bill 
of the previous year, Cobbett insists that if Parliament intended to give people power, they would 
give them the vote. “How, then, are we to believe; how is any one but an idiot to down the belief, 
that they really mean, by this ‘heddekashun,’ to give the people knowledge which shall be power 
in their hands?” No, they want “to bend the minds of children towards passive obedience and 
slavery.”399 
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  The deep paranoia in Cobbett’s education articles when he refers to teachers as 
government “spies” and “informants” in every county is a staple in radical discussions about 
education since Peterloo. As a voice for agricultural labor, Cobbett focuses on food (bacon) 
because he perceives government schools as a tool for removing children from farms and making 
them wage-dependent, and therefore dependent on their employers to eat. As England became 
more urban, however, radicals came to value precisely the sort of abstract knowledge that 
Cobbett rejected, seeing access to higher education—or education beyond indifferent literacy—
as a solution to poverty and political disenfranchisement. Consequently, Cobbett’s antipathy to 
headikation invited skepticism from contributors to The Poor Man’s Guardian, one of whom 
believed Cobbett intended to keep “the labouring people” mere “willing beasts of burthen,”400 
another of whom sympathize with his suspicions about Whig intentions. Back during his anti-
Jacobin days (before his two-penny Register in 1816), Cobbett referred disparagingly to 
Whitbread’s supporters for the failed education bill (1807-08) as “popular education 
philosophers” who were so delusional as to believe that the public should value Virgil’s poetry 
over a good sirloin.401 Acquainted with Cobbett’s earliest views on education, the editor of The 
Poor Man’s Guardian believed that “Mr. Cobbett does not care a bean whether the labouring 
classes are educated or not, provided they can plough and make hurdles on the one hand, and 
have plenty of home-brewed ale and bacon on the other.”402  
 These responses to Cobbett suggest that what Andrew Carnegie called “handikation” in 
his autobiography, after Cobbett’s “headukation,” came to include, in the 1830s, theoretical 
subjects like political economy and natural philosophy. In much the same way that mechanical 
literacy among the middle-classes was the foundation for mental and economic advancement, the 	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 working classes considered their acquaintance with hard manual labor a spring-board for 
politically empowering and financially rewarding knowledge, which came to include natural 
philosophy, mathematics, mechanics, and rhetoric. Even Cobbett readily acknowledged that 
literacy empowers those who cannot live off the land; “schools are very proper things” in urban 
locations.403  
 Heavily influenced by Robert Owen’s Godwinian theories of character and determinism, 
the cooperative societies tended to express the greatest trust in abstract or theoretical knowledge 
as power in the hands of workers. Reporting on their free evening school, the Co-operative 
School Association of Manchester boasts that three times a week “many ragged little boys, 
barefooted and barelegged” are “absorbed in the study of geometry and algebra.” The author 
taunts Cobbett as the old generation, whose ideas on are outdated:  
methinks we hear old Cobbett or some of his disciples exclaim, ‘are the people cracked?’ 
What! ‘Experiments in electricity and aerostatics for working men instead of beer and 
racks of bacon! And bare-legged boys studying algebra instead of going, ‘at six year old, 
as I did,’ into the fields. . . . Softly, Old Cobbett! The people are not going to desert 
bacon for ‘headikashion.’ . . . It is the bacon that has deserted them, and the 
‘headikashion’ is only part of the means of bringing it back, and something better 
besides.404 
On one point they agreed with Cobbett. Even when accepting considerable charitable donations, 
workers should have the majority leadership in all schools or they risked turning education into 
exploitation. 
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 Even though radicals occasionally adopted the ideas and rhetoric of object learning, their 
motivation was quite different. The middle-class movement in experiential education came out 
of Spectacle de la Nature and the Encyclopedias, the effort to watch artisans at work and publish 
their methods, disseminating knowledge that the rising generation used to educate the future 
managers of the industrial revolution. When celebrating mechanical literacy as the foundation for 
higher learning, the middle-classes confessed to appropriating knowledge and experience from 
workers into their classrooms. Unless workers ran their own technical schools, they risked 
becoming yet another exploitable source of practical knowledge.  
The cooperative societies seem especially concerned about this possibility of abuse, 
perhaps because their ideas were targeted by moderate radicals and whigs. Charles Knight 
advocated capitalist division of labor as the true “principle of co-operation,” while Brougham 
offered the mechanics institutes as a place where workers learn “the true principles and mutual 
relations of population and wages.” By sharing theoretical and practical knowledge, workers and 
capitalists can prevent “the two classes” from conceiving their interesting “in opposition to each 
other.” 405 However, stealing the knowledge of workers while charging them tuition was not the 
cooperative vision of the more radical Coorporatists. A meeting of “The British Association for 
promoting Co-operative Knowledge” in 1831 opened with a reading from Brougham’s Practical 
Observations upon the education of the people, which they promptly condemned, despite 
Brougham’s support in his speech for working-class governance of the mechanics institutes.406 
The conversation swings to how “the poorer classes” were “‘educated’ as it was called by the 
rich or their underlings—that is, they were taught just as much as would suit the purposes of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
405 Knight, Knowledge is Power, 433; Brougham, Practical Observations, 5. 
406 I suspect which parts of his speech would have met with disapproval: a brief Malthusian passage against 
expending charity on food, an opening toss-off assumption that anyone has at least a little time and money for 
education, and his rather back-handed praise of workers as the source of innovation, a sort of “watch them closely” 
if you would like to make some money to the middle-class students. 
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 latter. Thus it was in National Schools, and the same spirit prevailed even in Mechanics’ 
Institutions, where the instruction was strictly confined to science. Men were allowed there to 
have the luxuries, but not the necessaries of learning. But what was the use of a man being able 
to explore all the works of the Creation, if he could get nothing to eat. (Hear.) Mr. M. strongly 
urged the Working Classes to take their education into their hands.”407 The same subject 
frequently appears in the cooperative journals. “Let the mechanics every where govern their own 
institutions: let them conduct their own affairs,” W.T. (possibly William Thompson) urges in a 
multi-issue series on worker management of the mechanics institutes. And “If the higher or 
better orders—as they call themselves—will not aid the mechanics as paid teachers, let the 
mechanics instruct themselves and each other.”408 Associated with the Corresponding societies 
of the 1790s, mutual instruction has a long history that intersects with organization. When 
workers advocate these methods, they claim that all education, including scientific education, 
should be political.409 
 Mutual or self-instruction in worker-managed schools circumvented concerns that 
education pacifies students, which made radicals who, in other respects have little in common 
(eg. Godwin, to Cobbett, to J. S. Mill), oppose national systems of education. With increasing 
frequently, however, radicals declared that any sort of education, however propagandist, would 
at least impart the literary tools for correcting ignorance during adulthood. Objecting to The 
Bible as a primer, a mid-nineteenth century reformer like George Holyoake nevertheless insisted 
that any education is better than nothing: “I would prefer National without Scriptural instruction, 
I consent to accept both together, if National Education cannot be had alone. The Scotch 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407 Hetherington, “The Taxes on Knowledge,” The Poor Man's Guardian, August 20, 1831.	  
 
408 W.T., “To the Members and Managers of the Mechanics Institutes in Britain and Ireland,” The Co-operative 
Magazine and Monthly Herald, January, 1826, 27. 
409 See Simon, Two Nations, 177-89. 
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 Presbytery, the Methodist Conference, the Baines League, or the Church of England, separately, 
or altogether, may direct it. Their sectarian interference will impair but not destroy its 
efficacy.”410 Opposition to national education was, if anything, more common among the most 
radical of poor workers. In a public campaign speech in 1832, John Hunt assured a crowd that he 
shared Cobbett’s position; he “certainly was a warm advocates for the Education of the people; 
but he wished the people to be well remunerated for their labour, whereby they would be well 
fed, well clothed, and to educate their own children in their own way, and not by charity 
(tremendous cheering.)”411 The distinction of charity education was considered demeaning by 
poor and, with its degradations, a cradle for tyranny. So Charles Dickens would characterize the 
petty charity student, Noah, in Oliver Twist, as a boy taught shame and teasing that he might 
abuse anyone lower than himself. 
 Support for public education was problematic in part because very poor families relied 
upon child wages to survive, but Parliament was unwilling to regulate child labor and raise adult 
wages so that children could attend school without starving. Unless these regulatory changes 
were made, taxing the poor for national education effectively transferred money up the social 
ladder. The National Union of the Working Classes submitted a petition to parliament objecting 
to the “wringing of taxes from the hard-earnings of the poor, in order to pay for the education of 
the rich.” Yet this announcement was followed by a Mr. Warden who “exhorted the Working 
Classes to bestir themselves and get knowledge” to “show them [Parliament] (mob and rabble as 
we are) that we are capable of doing our business in that house [of commons], better than it has 
ever yet been done for us.”412 Clearly, “getting knowledge” did not necessarily require support 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 Holyoake, “The Bible and the Child,” The Reasoner, 1847, 156. For more on Holyoake, see Royle, Victorian 
Infidels, 171-98; Marsh, Word Crimes, 109-26. 
411 Hetherington, “Mr. Hunt at Blackburn and Padiham,” The Poor Man’s Guardian, December 8, 1832. 
412 Hetherington, “National Union of the Working Classes,” The Poor Man’s Guardian. July 16, 1831.	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 for government schools. Unlike more conservative opponents of national education schemes, 
radicals embraced the education of the poor, but those who supported national education were 
not willing to cede control of the schools to churches or more conservative government 
appointees. Self-governance was closely tied to education for radicals, not only to qualify them 
for suffrage but because they desired popular control of the means of public and political 
information. 
 
Respectability and Radical Pedagogy 
 While performing child and instructor, the working-class press engaged with pedagogical 
theories in order to lend authority to their education project. Their formulation of object learning 
was part of a larger effort to use education and improvement as a sign of working-class 
adulthood and maturity. Adult radicals were not above screening the literature of their own 
children, and their willingness to protect “innocent” youth was a sign of respectability. 
Censoring what children read may seem hypocritical for the champions of the free press, but by 
doing so radicals asserted their right to determine what their children should learn.  
 Likewise, women radicals could use the “surrogate mother” position common in middle-
class children’s literature, just like Anna Letitia Barbauld or Charlotte Elizabeth Tonna, to 
present themselves as responsible authorities on education. Most women may not speak as Isis in 
the Rhotunda, but they could participate in public politics as mothers who educate their children. 
In a letter thanking The Poor Man’s Guardian for a list of pro-union shops, one woman writes, 
“I was much pleased, and said to myself this is what women can do, this is a part in the drama 
we can take . . . The spending of money (especially in domestic concerns) is the province of 
women, in it we can act without the risk of being called politicians.” She explains that women 	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 are helpmates of men, and they can support their reform efforts in several ways, especially by 
reading educational literature to their families: 
the “poor Man’s Guardian,” Mr. Cobbett’s “History of the Reformation,” the “Poor 
Man’s book of the Church,” “Church Examiner,” “The National Holiday,” the Political 
Writings of Mr. Paine, and other such excellent publications. No man nor woman with 
intellect one degree above that of the brute creation, can read them without becoming 
wiser and better, for they not only expose the wickedness of those in high places, but set 
forth in the clearest light, the duty such an individual owes to himself and his fellow 
creatures; another method is for the mothers and teachers of both sexes, (whose business 
it is to instruct the rising generation,) to read them themselves, so that they may be able, 
by their precepts, to instill into the minds of their young pupils, the important truths these 
works inculcate. Women have much to do in the education of men in their infancy. It is 
from us they imbibe their first ideas, and the impressions we then make on their mental 
faculties, (be they good or bad,) are too indelible for time to wear out; and through life 
the influence we have over their minds, as well as their hearts, is so powerful, that to it 
may be traced the principles which govern their conduct. 
The letter concludes by advocating education for women, “for how can we train up others in the 
way they should go, if we ourselves be ignorant?” Therefore, “I advise all my sex . . . to read the 
publications just mentioned” and to “gather up all the useful information we can, as well for the 
sake of ourselves as for the edification of our children.”413 The title of the letter—“To the 
Women of England”—accidentally aligns this domestic appeal with a similar defense of 
women’s influence and duties published a few years later: Sarah Stickney Ellis’s The Women of 
England (1839). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 M.A.B. “To the Women of England,” The Poor Man’s Guardian, May 26, 1832. 
272
  Respectability and satire are not always easy to distinguish. While Richard Carlile was in 
jail, he received a packet of “religious fiction” from a Rev. W. Wait of Bristol intended for him 
and his children, which he promptly consigned “into the water-closet as an appropriate sacrifice 
to Jehovah,” remarking, “I value the moral welfare of my children much too high to place such 
trash in their hands.”414 Carlile’s playful account of protecting his children affirms his fitness as a 
parent to conduct their education, as he ironically performs the censorship duty that landed him 
in jail. 
 While using middle-class pedagogies, working-class radical walked the line between 
appropriation and satire. They used some of the concepts of objects learning, such the practical 
foundation of knowledge, the pleasure of learning through activity, and the integration of work 
and learning, but for their own purposes. Where radicals deploy the pedagogical philosophies of 
experiential or object learning, they do so to insist on their qualifications to test what the 
government or the church teaches against their practical experience. Responding satirically to 
representations of adult workers as ignorant and childlike objects of charity, radicals wrote their 
own textbooks and formed their own “schools” and “instructors” through the free press. With 
generous charity for the less fortunate, they repeatedly offer to “teach” members of Parliament a 
thing or two, gratis.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414 Carlile, Reformers of Great Britain, 10-11. 
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CHAPTER 6: Figures
Figure 28: (top) Hone, William 
and George Cruikshank. The 
Queen’s Matrimonial Ladder. 
London: William Hone, 1820. 
Cambridge University Library.
Figure 29: (bottom) Ladder of 
Learning. [London, ca 1850]. 
Princeton University Library.
The puzzle at the bottom is 
one example of the “ladder of 
learning” as a children’s toy. 
Marcus Wood shows much closer 
visual connections between 
Hone’s ladder and contemporary 
lottery advertisements and toys 
about marriage. However, this 
puzzle uses Queen Victoria as 
a central figure for the alphabet 
in a way that resembles Queen 
Charolotte’s association with the 
free press.
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Figure 30: (top) Title page. The British Constitution Triumphant; or, 
a Picture of the Radical Conclave. Eighth Edition. London: Dean & 
Munday, [182–]. Cambridge University Library.
Figure 31: (bottom) The Dorchester Guide; or, A House that Jack 
Built. London: Dean & Munday [1819], 6-7. Cambridge University 
Library.
Father and Children in loyalist satires: The opening page from The 
British Constitution Triumphant (top), a response to The Political 
House that Jack Built by Hone and Cruikshank, promises that 
England’s “biting laws” will be used like a father’s birch. 
(bottom) The formula for Jack’s House loyalist parodies includes 
a page like the one on the bottom left, showing an unruly, shouting 
crowd of “scoundrels” or just “the people.” This particular one figures 
reformers as a crowd of children, while a fatherly “John Bull” decides 
“punishment” or “protection.”
275
G
en
er
at
ed
 o
n 
20
12
-0
8-
13
 1
5:
47
 G
M
T 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//h
dl
.h
an
dl
e.
ne
t/
20
27
/u
c2
.a
rk
:/1
39
60
/t
5f
b5
63
5s
Pu
bl
ic
 D
om
ai
n 
 / 
 h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
.h
at
hi
tr
us
t.
or
g/
ac
ce
ss
_u
se
#
pd
Figure 32: (left) Adams, M. A Parody on the Political House that Jack Built: or the Real House that Jack Built. 
London: C. Chapple, 1820. Cambridge University Library.
Figure 33: (right) The Real or Constitutional House that Jack Built. Fifth Edition. London: J. Asperne, W. Sams, 
1819. Cambridge University Library.
Both illustrations show William Cobbett as “the public instructor” with Thomas Paine’s bones on his back. On the 
right, The Real or Constitutional House shows Cobbett as Fallstaff.
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 CHAPTER 7 
Children of the Steam Engine:  
Industrialization in Books and Toys for Young Victorians 
 
“‘Industry’ has made many a fairy scene, and her secret is—work! work! work!” 
—Little Henry’s Holiday at the Great Exhibition (describing the Crystal Palace), 15. 
 
“The atmosphere of those fairy palaces was like the breath of the simoom.”  
—Hard Times (describing factories), 144. 
 
I began this dissertation with object lessons, which teach children through direct observation 
without transmitting prejudice or error. As imagined by Richard and Maria Edgeworth in 
Practical Education, collapsing the distinction between toys and books transforms child’s play 
into serious work. But what happens when work is more likely to damage young people than 
educate them? By the 1830s, reports on poor conditions for children in mines and factories made 
work seem incompatible with learning, while Matthew Arnold, John Ruskin, and William Morris 
depicted the factory system as antithetical to cultivation and a threat to civilization.  
 During the 1830s and 50s, when factory legislation focused on protecting women and 
children from dangerous work, the division between work and play was renegotiated, in part, 
through books for young people on science and manufacturing. Far from sharing Ruskin or 
Carlyle’s aversion to mechanization, these texts envision education as a modernizing force allied 
with industrialization. Such a close relationship between cultivation and manufacturing was not 
uncommon in writings on the factory system. Apologists such as Andrew Ure, William Cooke 
Taylor, and Edward Baines, according to Joseph Bizup, admire the vitalism of machines as 
living organisms and use cultivation metaphors to describe the growth of industry. Bizup argues 
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 that Arnold constructs “culture” in opposition to industry in order to fight this entrenched 
alternative, which for decades successfully promoted manufacturing as a civilizing force.415  
 Appealing to the senses, experientialist industrial children’s books combine fact and 
fiction in ways reminiscent of industrial fiction and nonfiction for adults, often using similar 
rhetorical strategies to expose injustice or apologize for child labor. Viewed through the lens of 
Hard Times, that most canonical of industrial novels, early Victorian efforts to teach children 
about industry and political economy through factual, practical lessons seem like a recipe for 
killing the imaginative faculties necessary for sympathizing with others. Yet many children’s 
texts on industrial processes try to foster cross-class sympathies by educating consumers about 
the labor behind everyday articles, a strategy that Susan Zlotnick locates in early industrial 
novels by Charlotte Elizabeth Tonna and Francis Trollope. Children should visit factories and 
farms, speak with children from other walks of life, and experience what it feels like to work. By 
conflating work with play, however, books on industrialization for children can depict physical 
labor as educational and fun, by, for example, celebrating, in Little Henry’s Holiday, the 
industrial spirit of English workers (“work! work! work!”) while Henry and his family are on 
holiday. Furthermore, most books for children celebrate wonderful machines while overlooking 
workers, which frustrates efforts to expose the hardships people endure from grueling or 
dangerous work. As one author warns his young readers, “Such advocates of the factory system 
seem to be so taken with the beautifully polished wheels and spindles of the machinery” and the 
“perfect motion of the same, as to lose all sight of every consideration but the iron and steam of 
the question.”416 I conclude by putting these children’s books in conversation with two industrial 
novels that critique the conflation between education and labor: Hard Times, for These Times by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
415 Bizup, Manufacturing Culture, 18-30; 1-5. 
416 Brown, Cotton Fields and Cotton Factories, 147. 
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 Charles Dickens and The Life & Adventures of Michael Armstrong, the Factory Boy by Francis 
Trollope. 
 
“Now, what I want is, Facts” . . . with a healthy dollop of fiction 
 Books on industrialization for middle-class children formally deny any divide between 
imagination and utility by combining textbook-style lectures, technical diagrams, domestic 
fiction, and biography into a unified narrative form. Francis Lever, the Young Mechanic (1835) 
first published by John Harris (known for imaginative children’s literature), exhibits the 
heteroglossia typical of this form [figure 34]. Young Francis is unenthusiastic and unmotivated 
in school until he witnesses construction equipment used to repair a home on his street. Amazed 
at the practical application of abstract subjects like math and physics, he declares, “I should like 
to understand mechanics. . . then I could understand machines and engines. I—I—I think I 
should like to be—an Engineer.”417 His parents enroll him with a professor who combines 
theoretical principles with practical experiments and field trips, a pedagogical approach endorsed 
by the novel’s formal combination of theoretical concepts, with practical diagrams and the 
particularity of fictional characters. The children who read Frank’s story learn the same way that 
he learns; they can emulate Frank by using the book’s instructions for home experiments and by 
studying the same diagrams. 
 Adapting this form to biography, Henry Mayhew wrote a popular series on the boyhood 
of famous inventors.418 The Wonders of Science; or, The Young Humphry Davy (1840) invites 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417 Harris, Francis Lever, 5. 
418 The full titles for Mayhew’s scientist biographies for children emphasize autodidacticism of poor boys: The Story 
of the Peasant-boy Philosopher; or, “The child gathering pebbles on the sea-shore.” (Founded on the early life of 
Ferguson, the shephard-boy astronomer, and intended to show how a poor lad became acquainted with the 
principles of natural science.) (1854); The Wonders of Science; or, Young Humphry Davy (the Cornish apothecary’s 
boy, who taught himself natural philosophy and eventually became president of the Royal Society), The Life of a 
Wonderful Boy; Young Benjamin Franklin; or, The Right Road through Life: A story to show how young Benjamin 
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 child readers to perform, in real life, the experiments of the famous chemist who improved 
conditions in mines by inventing a safe lamp that avoids explosions, called “the miner’s friend.” 
The biography provides diagrams and directions for building Davy’s lamp, but Mayhew spends 
just as much time developing Davy as a fictional character, making him sympathetic to suffering 
miners and imaginative about the symbolism of fire and steam as figures for God’s spirit that 
breathes inside every person. Note that Mayhew focuses his biography of Davy around his safety 
lamp, since “the miner’s friend” demonstrates that intellectual labor can serve manual labor; this 
is a biography about class unity, about healing the two nations.  
 These books are not always exclusively about men or written for boys. Several of the 
books about industry that I have examined are given by women or signed by girls.419 In one case, 
The Triumphs of Steam (1840), the female author (Mrs. E. Burrows) publishes anonymously 
[figure 35]. She frames biographies of James Watt, Joseph Arkwright, and Robert Stephenson 
within a fictional story about two boys who learn the history of steam-engines from their Aunt 
Helen, a strong lady fashioned after the surrogate rational mother figures of didactic children’s 
fiction. The Triumphs of Steam uses its fictional framework to offer meta-commentary on how 
children are supposed to combine theoretical and applied mechanics. One of the nephews only 
wants quick answers about who invented what: “give me the results,” he declares, “and I do not 
care so very much to know how they were obtained.”420 Aunt Helen responds that true 
knowledge means understanding the larger picture. Using her husband’s mechanical prints, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Franklin learnt the principles which raised him from a printer’s boy to the first ambassador of the American 
Republic; a boy’s book on a boy’s own subject (1861). 
419 More technologically detailed works from the later half of the nineteenth century are more commonly given to 
boys, but adult women are often listed as the giver. Gift inscription examples from Cotsen Children’s Library at 
Princeton: “R.B. Clifton Presented by Aunt Beth” on Wallis’s Picturesque Round Game of the Produce & 
Manufactures, of the counties of England and Wales; “Elizabeth Glibbom Prin [?] to her granddaughter Sophia” 
dated 1843 when all the children and 12 grandchildren dined at Anna Wills” in The cabinet of useful arts and 
manufactures, designed for the perusal of young persons. From the Rare Book & Manuscript Library at the 
University of Illinois: F. Aglynn Price The gift of his friend Mrs. Jenkins April 1864” in The Triumphs of Steam. 
420 Burrows, Triumphs of Steam, 24. 
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 Helen painstakingly teaches her nephews to understand the “principles” behind the machines she 
describes, and implicitly child readers must try the same experiments for themselves in order to 
acquire more than superficial knowledge. By doing so, readers follow the example of James 
Watt, who was inspired by his Aunt’s teakettle and “used, when quite a boy, to take his toys to 
pieces; examine how they were made, and then put them together again” to learn “the principle 
on which they were constructed.”421 For famous inventors and child readers alike, domestic 
settings and everyday objects illustrate scientific principles. 
 While often neglected by modern scholars, this popular hybridized fiction/textbook genre 
has its roots in several canonical eighteenth-century children’s texts. The use of a loose fictional 
framework imitates Newbery’s immensely popular Tom Telescope, in which Tom, a child 
genius, teaches the natural sciences to neighborhood families through lectures and experiments 
in his home salon. The level of textbook specificity provided by Mayhew recalls Charlotte 
Smith’s natural history lessons in Rural Walks (1795) and Rambles Farther (1796) or Maria and 
Richard Edgeworth’s Harry and Lucy (1801-1821), the story of two siblings who perform 
experiments at home, examine prints from science books, and tour factories and shipyards. Less 
obvious but equally influential, The History of Sandford and Merton by Thomas Day (1783-
1789) and Adèle et Théodore ou Lettres sur l’éducation by Stéphanie-Félicité, Mme de Genlis 
(1782) combine fiction with descriptions of instructional activities and family tours.422 
 The early Victorian hybrid texts of this kind provide nonfiction material through fictional 
characters; they use conversation between children and adults, either retaining the “dialogue” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421 Burrows, Triumphs of Steam, 18-9; 16-7. Biographies of James Watts for boys are fond of mentioning his ability 
to learn from objects. The teakettle story is a favorite. One article on Watt from The Boys Own Magazine from April 
1, 1855 begins “the observations of a boy may lead to results of the utmost value to his country,” accompanied by a 
picture of young Watt reading next to a boiling tea kettle. 
422 Mme de Genlis includes a manufacturing tour in this immensely influential work on education. Adelaide and her 
family visit a utopian artisan village founded by a local aristocrat couple who study manufacturing methods and 
teach them to whomever comes searching for work. 
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 form used for many textbooks or superficially nesting instructional child/adult dialogue within a 
novelistic form; and they invite child readers to perform the same activities as the fictional 
characters by providing detailed instructions. Their fictional child protagonists model how to 
combine practical and theoretical education by referencing books and prints, performing 
experiments, and visiting modern manufacturing locations, such as cottages, factories, or 
shipyards. Such works continue in the later Victorian period through adolescent periodicals, 
which offer factual and fictional stories side-by-side. The Boys’ Own Magazine, launched in 
1855, offers a familiar compendium of inventor biographies, fictional stories, odd facts, and 
instructions for science experiences, accompanied by advertisements for magic lanterns, steam 
engines, and “Brougham Microscopes”—in effect replacing the hybrid novel-length form. One 
of the most cherished articles in The Boys’ Own Magazine was a series instructing children how 
to build their own model steam engine. The correspondence section of the paper for years 
received repeated requests for information on steam engines—for instance, a child with the 
pseudonym “Crankshaft” inquires “how to make a model steam engine and a sponge cake”—
suggesting that children enjoyed literature that combined fact and fiction.423 
 As published in the early Victorian period, children’s books of this hybrid genre perform 
cultural work in common with industrial novels. They address middle-class readers; they 
imagine solutions to class conflict through sympathy and charity rather than wide-spread reform; 
they draw on biography and contemporary factory reports. If their hybrid form seems distinct 
from industrial fiction, that is because we no longer read industrial novels as they first appeared, 
serialized in Victorian magazines and priced affordably for working-class readers. For instance, 
Dickens included Hard Times in Household Words alongside news articles about contemporary 
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 strikes or Harriet Martineau’s descriptions of factory tours.424 His readers could switch between 
the scene of Stephen Blackpool’s death, when he falls down an abandoned mine shoot, and 
Henry Morley’s harrowing factual accounts of factory accidents. Both Morley and Dickens 
targeted Utilitarians, who favored statistics, by humanizing accident victims. Fiction and 
nonfiction work together in Household Words to convince readers to support safety regulations 
so effectively that Butwin argues “an independent volume” of Hard Times “was bound to appear 
incomplete,” compared to the experience of the serial.425 
 Formal similarity between children’s science books and early industrial novels is more 
pronounced in Charlotte Elizabeth Tonna’s novels, which lean towards popular tales or 
children’s literature in their heavy reliance on instructional dialogue and factual references. Her 
first industrial novel, Helen Fleetwood (1839-1841), describes itself as a social experiment based 
on real life: “We are to follow a single family through vicissitudes that thousands of English 
families are perpetually encountering.”426 Although Tonna uses fictional characters, her narrator 
corrects readers who expect a novel: “Let no one suppose we are going to write fiction. . . . 
Names may be altered,” she admits, but she places her fiction in the same category as sworn 
worker testimonies before Parliament: “we will set forth nothing but what has been stated on 
oath, corroborated on oath, and on oath confirmed beyond the possibility of an evasive 
question.”427 Composed on the same premise, Tonna’s narrator in The Wrongs of Women (1843-
1844) periodically lays aside her fictional storyline altogether for an extended essay on factory 
conditions. The hybrid method favored by Tonna is less pronounced in Francis Trollope’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
424 See Waters, “‘Fairy palaces’ and ‘wonderful toys,’” online. 
425 Butwin, Hard Times: The News and the Novel, 186. For a more recent appraisal of factual reports in dialogue 
with Hard Times, see Berman, “Aweful Unknown Quantities.” 
426 Tonna, Helen Fleetwood, 17. 
427 Tonna, Helen Fleetwood, 45. The question of whether workers swore an oath was used to undermine the 1833 
Saddler reports. Tonna’s reference to oaths shows that she wants to place her fictional account in the same formal 
category as autobiographical interviews circulating during this period. 
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 Michael Armstrong (1840), but any reader familiar with Joseph Blincoe’s autobiography would 
recognize memorable events and conversations lifted from Blincoe’s apprenticeship at Litton 
Mills.428 By comparison, more canonical novels by Charles Dickens and Elizabeth Gaskell less 
directly replicate contemporary nonfiction. Scholarship on industrial fiction understandably 
favors novels, such as Hard Times, that repudiate “facts” in favor of imaginative entertainment, 
obscuring earlier influences on industrial novels. 
 
Joining the “Two Nations” by exploring the labor behind everyday things 
 In addition to uniting fact and imagination, these hybrid texts address the condition of 
England question by teaching children the labor used to make everyday things. In this respect, 
plain factual books of industrial information build cross-class sympathy by educating consumers 
about producers. An edition of George Dodd’s Days at the Factories; or, the Manufacturing 
Industry of Great Britain Described (1843), published by Charles Knight and drawing on articles 
from The Penny Magazine, describes the problem of alienated labor and argues that children 
should become educated consumers: “The bulk of the inhabitants of a great city, such as London, 
have very indistinct notions of the means whereby the necessaries, the comforts, or the luxuries 
of life are furnished. The simple fact, that he who has money can command every variety of 
exchangeable produce, seems to act as a veil which hides the producer from the consumer.”429 
Days at the Factories raises the veil on labor, for instance, by informing children that most of 
their toys are produced in London by other children: “Could we dive into the alleys and narrow 
streets at the east end of London, we should probably find many whole families—father, mother, 
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 and children—employed in making toys under their own poor roof.”430 Considering that 
progressive reformers of this period seek to regulate without abolishing child labor, Dodd’s 
description of families working together may have a more celebratory tone than we might think. 
Such an apology for child labor is by no means inconsistent with promoting an ethics of 
informed consumption among middle-class child readers; most fictional stories and “rags-to-
respectability” biographies of working children adopt the same position.431 
 Fiction for middle-class children creates sympathy with working families through child 
protagonists who visit farms and factories. Children’s author Jane Marcet, who inspired Harriet 
Martineau with her immensely popular books on science and political economy, wrote a fictional 
story about a six-year-old child’s railroad journey to discover the labor behind everyday things. 
In Willy’s Travels on the Railroad (1847), Willy admires the power of steam when he sees a train 
for the first time; he learns how people dig tunnels and construct tracks; he meets agricultural 
workers who bring goods to the market and who explain the economic benefits of railroads; and 
he tours a Derby factory and a family farm. Working children describe the production of food 
and goods for Willy with a level of technical detail appropriate for a textbook.  
 During his trip from London to his grandmother’s farm, Willy learns that everyone is 
interdependent because the division of labor requires exchanging goods and services. The 
railroad becomes a metaphor for personal connections made possible by new markets. Not only 
is Willy connected to his distant relations, but he is connected with other children who share the 
railroad, with the farmers who trade goods by rail, and with child factory workers who make the 
cloth he wears. These lessons begin with Willy’s family and expand to geographically broad 
communities connected by the rail line.  	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  The book opens with a familiar stagecoach-as-state metaphor applied to the steam 
carriage. Willy must imaginatively expand his notion of community beyond his family by 
making his desires compatible with the happiness of other passengers. At first, Willy tosses a 
ball with another little girl until their rambunctious play annoys an elderly passenger, who (after 
a warning) throws the ball out the train window. In complete disregard for all the other travelers, 
the spoiled girl throws a tantrum and demands that her mother turn the train around to retrieve 
the ball. Since Willy controls his temper, the annoyed passenger lends Willy a children’s book 
and allows him to look at the bag of toys she bought for her grandchildren. If Willy restrains his 
pleasures to meet the needs of other passengers, then everyone enjoys the ride, whereas the 
spoiled girl insists on her own direction of travel. Willy expands his cooperative abilities across 
classes when the family moves (as his request) from his first class carriage to the open carriages 
of third class, where he helps Betsy, a farmer’s daughter, feed and unload her fowls; finally, he 
visits farms, gardens, and factories, learning the interdependence of agriculture and 
manufacturing, worker and capitalist, consumer and producer. 
 The grand lesson of Willy’s Travels is that the division of labor facilitates interpersonal 
relationships. The degree to which every activity in Willy’s Travels requires sharing and 
specialization approaches the absurd. Even picking daisy chains in the arboretum requires a 
division of labor by gender, since the girls, accustomed to sew, have the skills to rapidly split 
stems and assemble the chains, while the boys agree to gather the flowers. As the daisy chains 
illustrate, dividing any task creates opportunities for collaboration. Thus every object exchanged 
in Willy’s Travels prompts an intimate story about human relationships: The stern grandmother 
shows Willy her beloved purse, created by three pieces, each sewn by three granddaughters, 
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 which she, in turn, fills with toys for them; likewise, Betsy’s fowls afford her tea and sugar to 
comfort her blind mother. 
 Although Marcet anoints regional rail trade with the intimacy of a small village, she 
nonetheless reasserts the importance of personal property and free markets by teaching Willy the 
difference between capitalist and gift economies. At his first visit to an Inn, Willy discovers that 
hospitality, in the case of strangers, is a business, and his parents must pay for food and lodging 
that supports the Innkeeper’s children, “So you see, Willy, she takes money out of her pocket to 
spend for us, and we put money into her pocket to pay her back again”—plus a little extra, his 
mother explains.432 Willy similarly mistakes a farm for a food charity that makes “bread and 
meat for poor people’s dinners,” until the farmer’s son, Johnny, explains:  
 “father don’t give it away . . . he could not afford that; he helps the poor people as 
much as he can, and pays them wages for their work, but his corn he sells to the baker, 
who makes it into bread; and his cattle to the butcher, who makes it into meat; and they 
sell it both to rich and poor, they care not which, so that they do but get paid for it.” 
 “But the poor have no money to pay with,” observed Willy. 
 “Then they must work to earn money; and that they may do either in a farm or a 
factory. Why, in a factory, as I told you, even little children get paid for their work.” 
(131-32) 
Such conversations are basic lessons in political economy, with a specific focus on how child 
consumers and producers relate to one another. Jane Marcet’s approval of child labor is by no 
means unusual; the point is that Willy should know why these children work and what they 
produce. Johnny explains that his family must buy clothes produced by these factory workers, 
and the boys discuss of all the different factories that each produce thread, cotton, wool, etc. that 	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 combine to form finished clothes. “Well, how nicely that is contrived!” Willy exclaims, “People 
all help one another; it is tit for tat, like Betsey and her hens” (133). 
 Marcet conjoins trade with “help” by depicting generosity as the best protection for 
personal property. In Marcet’s novel, amiable business exchanges between strangers universally 
conclude with gifts between friends, tempering impersonal capitalism with cooperative spirit. 
The Innkeeper’s daughter, for example, picks berries with Willy on the condition that he won’t 
eat any, and Willy’s temperance earns the children an invitation from the Innkeeper to eat some 
of the cherries. On their return home, the innkeeper presents Willy’s mother with a basket of 
fruit, which she reciprocates with a silver pencil case for the daughter. Likewise, Mr. Joseph 
Strutt, who owns the factory that Willy tours, “may spend his profits in whatever manner he 
chooses.” Fortunately, he chooses to build a beautiful and instructive arboretum, free to the 
public, and “made for the poor more than for the rich” (66). Because of Strutt’s generosity, 
Derby serves “other factory towns, ever so far off” with its leisure gardens, the same towns and 
countryside that feed and clothe one another—all joined by the railroad (110). Because each 
person respects the property of the other, exchange facilitates friendship, gifts, and charity. In 
this light, the opening carriage scene in which Willy plays ball depicts an immoral, selfish 
economy. The ball toss, a metaphor of property exchange, introduces the children at the expense 
of other passengers. As a fit punishment, Willy forfeits his property. 
 Prior to Willy’s Travels, Marcet wrote Bertha’s Visit to her Uncle in England (1830), a 
three-volume fictional child’s journal about Bertha’s voyage from Rio de Janeiro to England. 
Together, Willy’s Travels and Bertha’s Visit offer a panoramic survey of global trade that 
manages the increasing complexity of Victorian production and consumption. By applying the 
order of personal narrative, Marcet gives children a comprehensive view of an interconnected, 
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 global system. Rather than dividing humanity or atomizing individuals, modern industries unite 
everyone in mutual dependence and necessary cooperation. Victorian nonfiction books about 
manufacturing communicate the same message. Whereas earlier books about artisan trades tend 
to feature a master and apprentice, or parent and child, Victorian books depict many people 
working together; Beautifully illustrated books such as this edition of The Boys Book of 
Industrial Information, include sections on raw materials, international trade, skilled labor, 
engineering, and industrial design, capturing huge networks [Figures 36 and 37]. “This is the 
meaning of commerce,” explains An History of Useful Arts and Manufactures, “that nations 
separated from each other by six or seven thousand miles, busy themselves reciprocally about 
each other’s wants.”433 
  Manufacturing-themed games from the Victorian period teach that complex 
manufacturing systems are comprehensible and invite cooperation. Consider the game produced 
by Wallis in the 1830s, titled New Game of Genius, or Compendium of Inventions Connected 
with the Arts, Sciences, and Manufactures, Accompanied by a descriptive book and designed for 
the amusement and instruction of youth of both sexes [figure 38]. Most educational games of this 
kind are like chutes and ladders. Game play requires children to give information memorized 
from an accompanying booklet in order to advance from each square where they land. In the 
Game of Genius, the outer ring of pictures represents traditional fine accomplishments (singing, 
painting, and archery), children’s entertainments (the kaleidoscope, the magic-lantern), and 
industrial processes both ancient and modern (battering-rams, steamboats, and pin-making). 
Players progress along a road of technologies and activities towards a central contemporary 
scene, which celebrates the conquest of time and space through engineering. The rulebook 
narrates this image: “At the distance is seen a manufactory worked by steam; on the river a 	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 steam-vessel pursues its rapid course, while the stream is crossed by a suspension, or chain-
bridge, along which is passing a train of those wonderful locomotive engines, which on a railway 
have conveyed the most enormous burdens at the almost incredible speed of thirty miles per 
hour.”434 
 Games like this one feature temporally and geographically expansive networks of 
workers, inventors, producers, and consumers. Using their game pieces, children are virtual 
travelers who use the train, steamboat, or suspension bridge of the central image to trace 
connections between diverse human accomplishments. During the 1840s, Wallis produced 
another game with a similar message, the Picturesque round game of the Produce and 
manufactures of the counties of England and Wales [figure 39]. The map depicts the unique 
historical, literary, and industrial contributions of each region, which players pass through as 
they spiral toward London. These two Victorian games comprehensively represent vast systems 
of production and exchange and allow child players to navigate these systems. Players who 
master the booklets traverse a metonymic geography of all labor and invention from the comfort 
of home. 
 In their sanguine exuberance for machines,435 books for children are comfortable 
asserting that machines and people are interchangeable and may describe workers as bionically 
connected to their tools. As his name suggests, Francis Lever is like a machine when he first 
struggles to learn engineering. Without a supportive teacher, Frank’s “slowly moving powers 
might not have gathered sufficient force to overcome so disastrous a check . . . ; and thus the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434 Rule book, n.p.; available at Cotsen Children’s Library, with Wallis, Game of Genius. 
435 The steam engine, in particular, attracts rhapsodies, such as these lines from A Popular Description of the Steam 
Engine: “the Steam Engine has infinitely increased the mass of human comforts, and rendered cheap and accessible 
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 actual powers of the intellectual machine would have remained inert, like those of an engine, 
whose fly-wheel may be detained at first by a cause incomparably less in power than that which 
could arrest it during its subsequent tremendous motions.”436 The metaphor—Frank’s brain is an 
engine—is ludicrously detailed, yet the tone is entirely serious, and there is no indication that 
Frank’s progression from broken to flawless machine is anything to regret. Neither does Jane 
Marcet’s Willy’s Travels hesitate to pronounce functional equivalence between biological and 
mechanical sources of power when Willy learns about factory machines. “I think a spinning-
wheel must be very like a factory in little,” Willy conjectures, “for it does just the same thing, 
only grandmamma’s foot, which turns the wheel, is not a bit like a steam-engine or a stream of 
water.” Willy’s friend, Johnny corrects him, “Well, if it is not like, it does the same thing; her 
foot is the power that turns the wheel; it don’t signify what the power is, so that it be strong 
enough to do the work” (120). Comparisons between humans and machines are rarely 
threatening if children are depicted as mechanically literate. For many writers who celebrated the 
factory system, machines symbolized the divine beauty of an automated system run on the 
regular laws of physics. As managers of machines, surveyors over the factory system, the 
wealthier child readers of these works enjoy a privileged position over machines and over the 
workers who tend them. 
 
Machines as teachers; factories as schools 
 A positive association between machines and child education may seem puzzling in 
books published during the same decades when factory work was blamed for destroying the 
minds and bodies of child workers. But as I explore more in depth in chapter 4, this paradox has 
a long history in public discussions about educating the working poor. British philanthropists 	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 who supported schools for poor children quoted from The Wealth of Nations that the division of 
labor advances civilization while degrading the minds of common people. These arguments were 
repeated in the early nineteenth century. James Mill warned that “The minds . . . of the great 
body of the people are in danger of really degenerating, while the other elements of civilization 
are advancing,” unless we employ the “instruments of education.” As civilization progresses, our 
minds atrophy.437 Unfortunately, a healing education is impossible for children who work long 
hours from a young age. Rather than regulate child labor, early Victorians applied the division of 
labor to the schoolroom using the Monitorial methods of Andrew Bell and Joseph Lancaster to 
reduce the cost and time it takes to learn. What Lancaster described as his “new and mechanical 
system of education,” Samuel Taylor Coleridge praised as “this incomparable machine, this vast 
moral steam-engine,” and Henry Brougham named “the steam engine of the moral world.” Sir 
Thomas Bernard, an early advocate of educating the poor, clarified the connection to Adam 
Smith, “The principle in schools and manufactories is the same. The grand principle of Dr. Bell’s 
System is the division of labour applied to intellectual purposes.”438 And for decades these 
phrases were echoed in Parliament. If factory machines degraded the mind, then intellectual 
machines could fix them. 
 Ultimately, the association between education and machinery was one way to evade child 
labor regulations. Once education is associated with machinery and steam power with child 
genius, then factories conveniently seem like wonderful schools. By arguing that machines turn 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
437 Extending these anxieties to intellectual specialization, Victorians John Henry Newman and Matthew Arnold fear 
that even professionals degrade their minds through narrow intellectual work. In “The Idea of A University” (1852), 
Newman argues that human progress is at odds with individual cultivation: “the more the powers of each individual 
are concentrated in one employment, the greater skill and quickness will he naturally display in performing it. But, 
while he thus contributes more effectually to the accumulation of national wealth, he becomes himself more and 
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438 Lancaster advertised for subscriptions in papers for years, referring to his “new and mechanical system of 
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Education, 128; Coleridge, Stateman’s Manual, Lay Sermons, 41; Bernard, Education of the Poor, 35. See also 
Bernard, New School, 17-18. He repeats the same passage about the division of labor in both works. 
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 labor into leisure, defenders of the factory system like Andrew Ure make a 72 hour work-week 
seem compatible with self-cultivation. Because steam engines relieve workers from heavy 
manual labor, they leave the mind free for contemplation. Ure reports, “A mule-spinner told Mr. 
Tufnell, that in the intervals of labor allowed by his steam-going spindles, he had read through 
several books. The workmen who superintend the frames . . . seemed to me so much at their 
ease, that they might study the circle of the sciences in the course of their business.”439 
Criticizing Lord Ashley’s call to limit how long children work so that they can attend school, 
Ure suggests that the factory is itself an educational environment. Three quarters of children 
“engaged at piecing at the mules,” have the free time to study while they work. “When the 
carriages of these have receded a foot and a half or two feet from the rollers, nothing is to be 
done, not even attention is required.” Ure interprets this interval as an opportunity for self-
improvement. The adult spinner and child piecer “stand idle for a time, and in fine spinning 
particularly, for three-quarters of a minute, or more. Consequently, if a child remains at this 
business twelve hours daily, he has nine hours of inaction. And though he attends two mules, he 
has still six hours of non-exertion. Spinners sometimes dedicate these intervals to the perusal of 
books” or “moving about in a sportive mood.”440 
 Adolescent periodicals regularly print rags-to-riches stories about children who learn in 
factories. An 1881 article in “Chatterbox” on David Livingston, the missionary to Africa, claims 
that “He brought his books to the factory, and placing one of them on the ‘jenny,’ with the lesson 
open before him, he divided his attention between the running of the spindles and the rudiments 
of knowledge.”441 In such stories, mere proximity to machines inspires children to learn. An 
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 article on the history of abolition in Boys’ Own Paper notes that “While watching a steam-engine 
fire in a shipyard, [Frederick Douglas] learned to write.”442 
 Implicitly supporting Ure, biographies for children imply that child workers can easily 
teach themselves while they work because factory machines leave them little to do, and steam 
engines are so inspiring. In such cases, children’s books that claim to expose the hidden labor 
behind everyday articles make a false revelation where machines seem to do all of the work. In A 
Visit to the Exhibition in eight changeable pictures. Showing its beautiful objects of art and how 
they were made, children make a virtual visit to The Great Exhibition of 1851, where they first 
admire finished products, then “raise the curtain” to reveal how these goods are produced 
[Figures 40 and 41]. The pictures show people at work, but in the captions parents wax poetic 
about machines and neglect to mention the workers. In Jane Marcet’s Willy’s Travels, Willy 
observes: 
 “Every thing seems alive in the factory, . . . nothing stands still except the people, 
who are really alive, and they move only when they have threads to tie, or other work to 
do, whilst the machinery is at work all day long; it works a great deal harder, and does a 
great deal more, than all the live people.”  
 “Very true,” observed his papa, “but the machinery would work to no purpose if 
these living people did not set things to rights when they went wrong” (156-7).  
Willy’s father barely qualifies his son’s impression that factory work is leisurely, and he is 
comfortable with Willy’s personification of the machines.  
 In one case, I have seen these ideas directed at children who work in factories, blaming 
them for their ignorance. A lengthy tract entitled The Young folks of the factory; or, Friendly 
Hints on their Duties and Dangers (1840) informs children that factory work may “quicken your 	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 faculties of observation,” but warns them against “being so entirely engrossed with one pursuit, 
as not to exercise the faculties of observation and common sense upon the various objects that 
surround us. People of this class are little better than machines.”443 Here is Adam Smith’s well-
worn fear about the division of labor; but the author believes the factory itself offers a 
schoolroom to mend the mind: “I can hardly conceive of a young person so stupid as to go day 
after day to work in a factory an never inquire into the principle of the steam-engine, into the 
method of obtaining cotton, wool, coal, iron, . . . and through what process they have previously 
passed, and what is still required to fit them for the consumer.”444 The author of this pamphlet 
assumes that factories supply child workers with an empowering vision of the factory system, 
failing to consider that only children of leisure, like Francis Lever or Willy, who learn abstractly 
from books in schoolrooms benefit from a practical field trip to a factory. In other words, the 
same narrative used in books for wealthier children was leveraged to make child labor and mass 
education seem compatible, when in fact, education for children and adult workers alike 
depended on regulating work hours to create the leisure to learn. 
  Not surprisingly, Chartists argued this point when they demanded a ten-hour workday. 
During the 1830s, Radicals redefined education on their own terms, calling for a political 
education that would prepare people for public life. One of the children’s books on industrial 
production that I found articulates a Radical position. The Cotton Fields and Cotton Factories: . . 
. adapted for youth, by “Henry Brown, artisan” (1840) spends half its pages in textbook reveries 
on factory machines, and half in virulent denunciation of child labor. This volume demonstrates 
that celebratory language about machines does not always correlate with a particular political 
stance on the factory question. Brown directly enlists middle-class children as agents responsible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
443 Young folks of the factory, 310. 
444 Young folks of the factory, 312-13. 
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 for learning the “full political and moral bearing” of the factory system and criticizes the present 
state of education that leaves most Englishmen “utterly ignorant of the nature of that policy 
which regulates their present existence.”445 Because they, too, are children, young people should 
know that the wealth of English manufacturing “has done little more than nothing for that infant 
population, whose nimble fingers are said to be so essential to the manufacture.”446 One day, 
Brown envisions, his child readers may end child labor in favor of schools. Then an educated 
workforce will “feel their own consequence, morally and politically” and “command that 
machinery which has so long and cruelly commanded their parents.”447 Despite his politics, 
Brown closes his volume with the same image of children who master their destiny by mastering 
machines. 
 The most Radical moment in Brown’s text is when he energetically condemns Sunday 
and Factory Schools that attempt to make education compatible with work to avoid regulating 
child labor and implementing universal primary school. Ascribing selfish motives to charity 
schools, Brown blames the wealthy for educating the poor out of fear: 
Doubtless, like Frankenstein, they beheld with silent dread the monster which they had 
created, and feared, like him, its solitary and mindless wanderings. Perhaps this fear was 
the origin of the education system which was now about to be introduced among them. 
Education! Pardon us that word; it was proposed that the children should be taught to 
read; but mark! The mill-owners were still determined to relinquish no part of the 
children’s toil. Sunday schools and night schools were to be established for this purpose. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
445 Brown, Cotton Fields and Cotton Factories, 2. 
446 Brown, Cotton Fields and Cotton Factories, 138. 
447 Brown, Cotton Fields and Cotton Factories, 166. 
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 Truly, the children must have had but an irksome life; what with their toil of the day and 
their “education” at night, a jaded and miserable existence must have been theirs.448 
Remarkably, this book for children uses the same rhetorical strategy as The Poor Man’s 
Guardian when Brown puts “education” in quotations, which was code for schools that 
indoctrinate children without providing access to political information. Brown anticipates what 
slowly becomes public consensus over the second half of the Victorian period, that young 
children should be prevented from working while they attend school. Learning is the proper 
work of children, but work that is incompatible with labor because equally exhausting; 
furthermore, all people deserve “rest, for relaxation, in short, for pleasure.”449 Brown’s Cotton 
Fields is a fascinating example of a radical author who addresses a technologically and 
politically sophisticated message explicitly to child readers as political agents and serves as a 
reminder that much of what was written for adults on the factory system, however venomous or 
polemical, may have circulated among the family.450 
 I have argued that books for children engaged in the condition of English question that 
occupied canonical Victorian industrial fiction of the 1830s through 1850s. While some of these 
children’s texts exposed the labor behind everyday things, others compromised this project by 
occluding human work behind industrial technology. Susan Zlotnick offers a similar reading of 
industrial novels by Charlotte Elizabeth Tonna and Francis Trollope, which use everyday objects 
purchased by middle-class women to reimagining the factory as an extension of the home. “By 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448 Brown, Cotton Fields and Cotton Factories, 121. 
449 Brown, Cotton Fields and Cotton Factories, 148. 
450 Another example of a radical addressing children with a political message is Rev. Bell’s speech to the children of 
Leeds in 1833, urging them to protest the Royal commissioners appointed to investigate factory conditions for 
young workers. According to published reports, over 1,000 children marched in Leeds to protest the choice of 
commissioners, whom they suspected of partiality. Trollope mentions Bell, briefly, in Michael Armstrong, as a hero 
to children, praising him through the criticism of evil characters. A more conservative work for children on the 
factory system is Charles Knight’s Knowledge is Power; A View of the Productive Forces of Modern Society, and 
the Results of Labour, Capital and Skill (1855), which in its original introduction specifies Knight’s wish to attract 
young readers. 
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 creating a private world either littered with or sustained by objects manufactured in the public 
world,” Tonna and Trollope “lay bare the submerged connections between the factory and the 
family.” As consumers, women are “directly implicated in a system of economic exchange and 
hence economic exploitation,” but their complicity is obscured as long as the domestic sphere 
appears protected from and morally superior to the public sphere of market competition.451 
 Although Zlotnick sees “domesticity,” which divorces objects from the human labor used 
to create them, as “commodity fetishization on an epic scale,” these same domestic values 
supported educational enterprises that recovered for middle-class children “a social biography” 
of household objects.452 Because child education is both a domestic enterprise and a national 
crisis, the question of what constitutes education (or miseducation) traverses public and private 
educational discourses, joining nursery, schoolroom, and factory. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I consider intersections of work, leisure, and learning in the educational spaces of two 
industrial novels: Michael Armstrong and Hard Times.453 
 
Michael Armstrong 
 Francis Trollope’s Michael Armstrong addresses education of both the rich and the poor 
in a sophisticated way. The novel makes fiction a subject of study by exposing the carefully 
orchestrated political fictions invented by Sir Matthew Dowling, factory owner, and supported in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451 Zlotnick, Women, Writing, and the Industrial Revolution, 130. 
452 Zlotnick, Women, Writing, and the Industrial Revolution, 133. 
453 In the tradition of Mary Edgeworth’s Belinda or Eliza Fenwick’s Ruin on the Rock, briefly examined in chapter 
2, both Hard Times and Michael Armstrong contain tropes of the education experiment novel, with Sissy “reclaimed 
and formed” by Gradgrind like Michael’s (performed) adoption by Sir Matthew (84). In the female gothic education 
plot, a scientifically minded male instructor observes the development of a female protagonist under his pet system 
as he prepares her to become the ideal wife for himself or his associate. In the case of Hard Times, this pupil and 
instructor dynamic is split between Sissy/Louisa and Gradgrind/Bounderby, with Louisa’s upbringing under 
Gradgrind’s “system” following the same pattern as the doomed brides in novels by Edgeworth and Fenwick, while 
Sissy and Gradgrind find redemption at the novel’s close. Dickens wrote another novel that loosely fits the 
education experiment formula: Our Mutual Friend. 
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 exchange for favors by his circle of corrupt beneficiaries. The father of a family large enough for 
Malthusian hypocrisy, Sir Matthew Dowling adopts (or abducts) young Michael, the only 
healthy wage-earner for his widowed mother, as a publicity stunt. Soon tired of a boy who 
cannot perform affecting gratitude on cue, Sir Matthew packs him off as apprentice to a secluded 
mill, where Michael languishes half-starved until rescued by the novel’s heroine, Mary 
Brotherton, an independent heiress drawn to his plight. Mary’s trajectory follows her reeducation 
from a complacent beneficiary of her father’s wealth, garnered from parish poorhouse 
apprentices, to an inquiring mind on a mission to investigate the factory system. She demands to 
know whether factory workers are shunned and kept out of sight for their infectious moral 
decrepitude, as generally reported (and as Tonna’s factory novels depict), or for the moral 
convenience of everyone else. For much of the novel Sir Matthew and Mary offer competing 
interpretations of Michael and the Lancaster factory system, dramatizing how second-hand 
accounts of Industrial Districts, Trollope’s novel included, compete for believability among 
uninformed readers—much as the public and Parliament debates concerning child factory labor 
revolved around which testimonies or witnesses were deemed trustworthy.454  
 Trollope’s novel positions Mary Brotherton as a young adult version of Marcet’s Willy, a 
model for readers of an active pedagogy that supplements reading with experiential learning. The 
antidote to Sir Matthew’s rumors and political fictions is not more reading but personal 
observation. Trollope’s narrator reflects on Michael’s apprenticeship, “Let none dare to say this 
picture is exaggerated, till he has taken the trouble to ascertain by his own personal investigation, 
that it is so.” And “woe to those who supinely sit in contented ignorance of the facts.”455 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
454 Recalling factory reports and investigations, Mary plays the part of a commissioner by interviewing several 
factory children, while Michael endures nearly the same exact experience as Robert Blincoe reported as Linton 
Mills. 
455 Trollope, Michael Armstrong, 268. Hereafter cited in text. 
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 Trollope’s readers, like Mary, must visit Industrial Districts and use their eyes and ears to 
investigate what they have heard second-hand, especially because factories like Deep Valley, 
where Sir Matthew banishes Michael, are “hid from the eye of every human being but those 
engaged in them” (160).456 Rather than trust Sir Matthew’s report that his workers are well-paid 
but miserable from their indolence and wickedness, Mary proposes to her companion (her nurse 
from childhood) “to see and judge for ourselves” (219). And rather than trust Trollope, or other 
publications, readers should reject the fashionable practices of rising families whose children 
abhor the factory as “shop talk” by learning about their business (200). 
 Fiction, rumors, and hearsay compete against observation in the opening third of 
Trollope’s novel, which culminates in a “masque” commissioned by Sir Matthew from an 
obsequious poet and performed by his family—notably in the Dowling Place schoolroom. The 
amateur theatrical recounts Michael’s heroics while “rescuing” Sir Matthew and Lady Clarissa (a 
silly, middle-aged aristocrat of declining family) from a harmless cow, which under Sir 
Matthew’s embellishment becomes a vicious monster threatening the love object of his chivalric 
pretentions. Mere propaganda masquerading as high art, the masque is a fiction adapted from 
romantic fancies, created to bolster Sir Matthew’s reputation. It opens with an ironic 
“Shakespearean Prologue” that commands Sir Matthew’s neighbors (as Trollope commands her 
readers) to “Open your ears! For which of you will stop / The seat of hearing, when rumour 
speaks?” and promises to reveal Sir Matthew’s true nature (150).457 What Mary hears, however, 
as she steps backstage at the play’s conclusion is Sir Matthew beating Michael for forgetting his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 See also, “It is hardly possible to conceive a spot more effectually hidden from the eyes of all men, than this 
singular valley” (Trollope 259). 
457 These lines echo Jesus’ defense of his didactic use of parables, perhaps parallel to Trollope’s use of fiction: 
“Therefore speak I to them in parables: because they seeing see not, and hearing they hear not, neither do they 
understand.” The Biblical passage appears, suitably for Sir Matthew, in Matthew 13:13 (King James Version). 
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 lines, the noise obscured from the audience out front by the many “accomplished” Dowling 
children banging their “tambourines and triangles” (163). 
 By setting this revelatory scene in a schoolroom, Trollope simultaneously critiques 
middle-class education as a performance of learning that disguises ignorance, while exposing 
how child factory labor is excused through a strategic conflation of work and instruction. 
Accompanied by Martha, the eldest Dowling daughter, Mary exits behind the curtain through a 
room “dedicated to the reception of globes, slates, guitars, dumb bells, dictionaries, 
embroidering-frames, and sundry other miscellanies connected with an enlarged system of 
education” adjoining “that part of the school-room now occupied as the stage” (160). Instead of 
enlightening Dowling’s children, the implements of their well-stocked schoolroom are an 
expensive “masque” for the ignorance of wealthy second-generation manufacturing families. The 
sheer abundance of instructive objects transforms the Dowling schoolroom into a self-contained 
educational space. These tools of object lessons no longer function to bring practical lessons into 
the home, but to erase from the home any evidence of their father’s business. Like the 
instruments that drown out Sir Matthew while he abuses Michael, the schoolroom’s “enlarged 
system of education” is mere noise, or the clanging symbol of false charity.458 
 The repressed factory returns to haunt the schoolroom through the figure of Sir Matthew, 
who ambiguously exhibits the discipline of schoolteacher and factory overseer. His friend, the 
doctor, cautions him to stop his abuse before he destroys his scheme merely “because a stupid 
brat can't say his lesson perfect” (163). But Sir Matthew insists that Michael is a rebellious 
worker who refuses to say anything positive about his employer: “It was not the lesson that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458 I am drawing out a possible Biblical resonance to this scene. Sir Matthew’s play is supposed to create the illusion 
that he is charitable, but ends with noisy symbols, recalling I Corinthians 13:1: “Though I speak with the tongues of 
men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal” (King James 
Version). Biblical allusions are generally subtle but important for Michael Armstrong. For instance, Mary’s quest for 
the truth is contrasted with Martha’s feminine obedience, like the Biblical Mary and Martha. 
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 choked him. How much will you bet me that if I get fifty lines written down abusing me and 
nothing else in ‘em, he won’t learn them off as glib and perfect as any actor on the stage?” (163). 
Sir Matthew’s concept of education is indoctrination through repetition, exactly the sort of 
government or charity supported education that some Radicals feared would pacify the 
workforce while claiming to empower them.  
 Lending credence to these fears, Dowling and the mill owners regularly use the pretense 
of education as a masque to keep workers ignorant. We learn from Mary’s interview with a 
factory girl that long work hours for mothers and children interrupt the popular mode of 
transferring literacy from mother to child. Factory schools replace the mother’s role ineffectually 
because the exhausted children cannot stay awake, but these schools perform exactly as intended 
by the mill owners who are themselves barely educated and feel threatened by popular literacy. 
Workers who cannot read or who do not know the law are forced to depend upon Dowling and 
his circle to advise them, whereas Mrs. Armstrong’s literacy is “one reason she is so outdacious 
about the workhouse.” As one of Sir Matthew’s accomplices imperfectly pronounces, “There’s 
nothing on earth does so much mischief among the mill people as making scholards of ‘em” 
(207). Ultimately, Sir Matthew, with Martha’s help, convinces Mrs. Armstrong to sign Michael’s 
apprenticeship papers because she trusts their promise to educate him in a trade, when in fact 
Michael is sent to the secluded Deep Valley mill where he learns nothing. Through multiple 
substitutions of work for education, Sir Matthew inserts himself into the working family as an 
indispensible advisor and replaces the intimacy of home schooling or artisan apprenticeship with 
factory schools and factory apprenticeship. As both schoolmaster and mill master, Sir Matthew 
removes working children from familial education and sequesters his own family from the mills. 
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  The central place of apprenticeship in Trollope’s plot may seem strange, since by 1840, 
parishes rarely apprenticed poor children to factories. It makes sense, however, as a way to 
expose apologists for child labor, like Andrew Ure, who deceptively laud factory work as 
instructive. Nowhere is the slippery division between education and work more glaringly abused 
than in the apprentice system. While water-powered factories of the early nineteenth century, 
located in the countryside, lacked an urban population from which to draw child labor, they 
imported poor and orphaned children from London parish workhouses, promising to teach the 
boys stocking-weaving and the girls lace-making. Apprenticing workhouse children was a 
common investment that provided a future livelihood for children who might otherwise become 
adult parish paupers. But binding so many children to work in factories located hundreds of 
miles from their parish and parents (if alive) ensured that factory owners, bereft of oversight in 
isolated country towns, could abuse their charges and abandon their contractual promise to teach 
these children actual skills. Factory Apprentices were not usually paid, and they could not legally 
leave their “contract,” which could bind them into service for many years. 
 Although apprenticeship declined significantly by the time that Trollope researched 
Michael Armstrong with a Manchester tour in 1839, harrowing stories of abused apprentices 
were instrumental in stirring the public against child labor throughout the 1830s, following the 
publication of working-class autobiographies that detailed abuse suffered by adult survivors.459 
Shaped by its Radical editors, Robert Blincoe’s memoire (1828, 1832) links the abuse he 
suffered as a child apprentice with efforts to further limit child labor in the present by reminding 
readers that public outrage largely ended parish apprenticeship and could again improve 
conditions for another generation of children through protective legislation. Apprenticeship 
would have resonance in the 1830s public consciousness, furthermore, because of constant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
459 For background on parish apprenticeship, I draw from Horn, Children’s Work and Welfare, 12-34. 
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 comparisons between child factory workers and West Indies slaves, typified by Richard Oastler’s 
remarks in the Leeds Mercury (1830). The same Act that abolished slavery in the West Indies 
required former slaves to work 40 hours per week without pay for their former owners under 
what was called the “Apprenticeship System,” supposedly so that these workers could “learn to 
be free.” Thus Parliament used “apprenticeship” in 1833 to legalize unpaid work under the guise 
of “instructing” former slaves and their owners how to practice the idealized paternalism 
supposedly enjoyed by English agricultural workers. For these reasons, the rhetoric, laws, and 
practices surrounding “apprenticeship” helped to renegotiate the line between education and 
labor during the mid-nineteenth century, which explains why Michael Armstrong attacks child 
labor through a practice largely fallen from use. Apprenticeship served as a constant reminder of 
the fine distinction between factories and schoolrooms. 
 The malicious Sir Matthew and his cronies, who rub their hands and cackle while they 
whip children, may make Trollop’s novel appear simplistic compared with more nuanced works 
like Elizabeth Gaskell Mary Barton or Charlotte Bronte’s Shirley. However, Trollope comes 
closest to the note of Radical working-class periodicals where education is concerned (see 
chapter 6). Her novel distinguishes between real education, the kind that would empower Mrs. 
Armstrong to make an independent, informed decision for Michael, and the appearance of 
“education.” And Trollope exposes how wealthy children become complacently misinformed 
about working-class life in much the same way that The Poor Man’s Guardian laments the 
Princess Victoria’s expensive education as deception. 
 Trollope’s exposé is significantly more radical than most of the middle-class children’s 
literature I have examined. Although aimed at reconciling the two nations, books like Marcet’s 
Willy’s Travels or The Triumphs of Steam too often provide middle-class children with the false 
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 impression that work is leisurely or educational. A wealthy boy like Willy uses the railroad to 
learn about trade, manufacturing, and farm labor, but his participation in work activities 
alongside less privileged children is, for him, a form of play. Whether picking cherries, helping 
with the chickens, or monitoring factory machines, Willy only has to work as long or as hard as 
he likes. By imitating work in play, a boy like Willy learns that work is light, fun, and universal 
for all classes. But unlike many child workers, a wealthy boy’s hands-on learning complements 
his book learning; it is but one component of a diverse education that elevates him, through 
object-learning, from a child of the senses to a well-rounded, affluent adult, who can think 
abstractly and command the world of men and things. For privileged boys who need not labor at 
a young age to support their families, educational work is leisurely and empowering. By 
collapsing work and play, experientialist pedagogies make unrelieved child labor seem playful, 
educational, even invisible. 
 Experiential education does not always so consistently obscure the hardship of physical 
labor. Late-eighteenth-century Rousseauvian children’s books like Sandford and Merton usually 
depict labor as arduous but restorative. For John Locke or Rousseau, with their domestic Spartan 
attitude towards comfortable clothes and fine food, a gentleman’s infant who exerts himself 
barefoot outdoors gains health and initiative because he is not spared physical pain. A closer 
antecedent to Marcet’s Willy, Maria Edgeworth’s Rosamond suffers pain in her feet as the 
consequence of mismanaging her money, even though her affluent mother could intercede and 
purchase some shoes (see Chapter 2). Pain has its place in economic lessons. In Dorothy Kilner’s 
The Life and Perambulation of a Mouse (1884), a gentleman commands his mischievous son, 
who mixes threshed grain as a practical joke, to sort the grain and beat the rest himself. Soon 
exhausted, Will bursts into tears; “his arms ached ready to drop off, and his hand was so sore he 
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 could not bear it,” but he must work into the night before his father allows him to eat.460 The 
poetic justice is clear: A boy who does not know that making bread is hard work cannot eat until 
he feels that fact in his body. Is this the haptic lesson that Willy learns, blithely picking cherries 
with the Innkeeper’s daughter? Kilner’s Will suffers while he works and cannot choose to rest. 
When his father returns, he asks Will how he would like, “after you have been labouring all day, 
to have your work to do over again, for the sake of diverting a foolish boy.” He is a demanding 
task-master, who forbids his son from relieving his limbs until he experiences the full measure of 
compulsory labor: “But go on, William, I am determined that you shall, for one day, know what 
it is to work hard, and thereby be taught to pity, and help, not add to the fatigue of those who 
do.” Kilner offers a convincing lesson in cross-class sympathy that uses experiential education 
expressly to distinguish work and play.461 
 
Hard Times 
 If experiential education fails in Willy’s adventures and Sir Matthew’s nursery because it 
transforms work into play, then the very reverse happens in Hard Times. Gradgrind’s school fails 
because it transforms playful childhood cultivation into painful work. As Catherine Gallagher 
demonstrates in The Body Economic, Dickens rejects Carlyle’s religion of work in favor of 
Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarian categorization of labor under “pain.”462 Since labor is by definition 
misery, the source of Coketown’s unhappiness is that everyone works all the time, even the 
children at school or Sleary’s troupe at the circus. Contrary to most political economists, for 
whom performers and teachers are unproductive, Dickens asserts the value of his own profession 
by depicting entertainment as productive labor, and to make this point, he emphasizes the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460 Kilner, Life and Perambulation, 1:75-6. Published as “Perambulations” in other editions. 
461 Kilner, Life and Perambulation, 1:76. 
462 Gallagher, Body Economic, 64-7. 
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 psychological and physical toll of circus work, “the weariness of imposed jollity and the 
affective dissonance that results from ceaselessly troping play into work and work into play.”463 
Only Bounderby mistakenly insists that the circus children are apprenticed “to idleness.” 
According to Gallagher, the circus deforms and mangles its workers just like the factory, a 
comparison that destroys the novel’s clean “work-versus play opposition.”464 
 If entertainers like Dickens and Sleary are workers, what of students and teachers? The 
one character in Hard Times who equates education with pain is Bounderby, and even Gradgrind 
suspects his error: “Education! I’ll tell you what education is—To be tumbled out of doors, neck 
and crop, and put upon the shortest allowance of everything except blows. That’s what I call 
education.”465 For Bounderby, education is either labor or abuse. Creating his life story after 
biographies of inventors with humble origins, Bounderby purports to be an autodidact formed 
purely out of his environment, like “a commercial wonder more admirable than Venus, who had 
risen out of the mud instead of the sea” (268). The odd conjunction of Venus with Bounderby 
hints that he has usurped the role of wife and mother, a figure who in the children’s literature 
market symbolized the earliest memory of learning letters, seated at the mother’s side. 
 In order to appear the self-made man, Gradgrind (like Sir Matthew) repeatedly seizes the 
mother’s role in transmitting literacy, first by denying the instruction provided by his own 
mother, and then by supplanting Mrs. Gradgrind’s place in Tom and Louisa’s family. We first 
meet Bounderby in the Gradgrind kitchen, boasting that he learned his letters and numbers by 
studying chance objects encountered in his environment: “Josiah Bounderby of Coketown learnt 
his letters from the outsides of the shops, Mrs. Gradgrind, and was first able to tell the time upon 
a dial-plate, from studying the steeple clock of St. Giles's Church, London, under the direction of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
463 Gallagher, Body Economic, 74-78; 80. 
464 Gallagher, Body Economic, 78. 
465 Dickens, Hard Times, 263. Hereafter cited in text. 
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 a drunken cripple, who was a convicted thief, and an incorrigible vagrant” (55). Oddly enough, 
he describes an experiential technique piloted by Ellenor Fenn as “education of the moment” and 
often modeled by characters in domestic moral tales, only he eliminates the mother figure who 
generates conversation about everyday things to instruct her charges.466 
 One way that education is reduced to work and equated with pain is, therefore, by 
eliminating its connection with familial affection, embodied in the mother-as-instructor. The 
novel pulls hope from its despairing pages by restoring the mother teacher, concluding with 
“Sissy’s happy children loving her; all children loving her,” while Louisa shares her position 
(315). Together these women fill the “surrogate mother” defined by Mitzi Myers, an 
authoritative motherly character who commands from within a text as stand-in for the female 
author’s supplement to biological parents. As both Myers and Mary Hilton argue, writing 
didactic literature provided women authors with a legitimate avenue for participating in political 
life as the nation’s educators, here suggested by Sissy’s ambiguous future as either a biological 
mother or a mother to all England.467 Elizabeth Starr is right when she reads Dickens as 
appropriating female domestic authority by allying himself, as author-educator, with Louisa and 
Sissy in this closing scene, but such appropriations were standard practice for male authors who 
sought to write for family audiences.468 Dickens is one of many male authors toting 
“imagination” as child liberation who push aside the female didactic tradition—the women 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466 See Immel, “Mistress of Infantine Language.” 
467 See Myers, “Impeccable Governesses”; Hilton, Women and the Education of the Nation’s Young. The surrogate 
mother is the role taken by female authors, and in the case of Wollstonecraft, explicitly supplements negligent or 
absent mothers with literary instructor/parent exempla. Myers shows that many male critics over the years have 
expressed unease at the intimidating position assumed by the strong, perfect, controlling instructress figure in 
didactic literature. Her description of this figure clarifies that Bounderby is a male version, the man who steps into 
the family because of the weak mother, Mrs. Gradgrind, while Dickens allies himself with Louisa and Sissy, 
surrogate mothers who ascribe to his preferences for imaginative literature.  
468 Starr, “Manufacturing Novels,” 333-34. Alan Richardson explains that fairy tales, preferred by Romantic poets 
for child reading, were not superior to the didactic tales usually produced by women. Fairy tales were not as political 
as other forms of literature available for children. See Literature, Education, and Romanticism. 
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 authors Percy Muir infamously called “that monstrous regiment” because they threatened to 
replace fairy tales in the nursery with moral tales.469 While the genders are reversed in Hard 
Times—Louisa and Sissy replace Bounderby—the battle they represent is an old and familiar 
one. While celebrating the mother, therefore, Dickens offers his own substitution, which 
obscures that many children’s authors who wrote “factual” fiction embraced the “surrogate 
mother” role, like Mrs. Mrs. E. Burrows, who speaks through “Aunt Helen” in Triumphs of 
Steam. 
 Next to Bounderby, Gradgrind at least intends to cultivate his children, but he pursues an 
expensive, modernized version of Bounderby’s school of hard knocks. Hard Times offers an 
astute critique of what amounts to an eviscerated form of experiential learning, by questioning 
whether such techniques succeed on their own terms. In a scene reminiscent of Trollop’s 
revelation in the Dowling nursery, Dickens describes Gradgrind’s home as a state-of-the-art 
educational environment, a modern estate equipped with the latest home technologies and, 
among these, every instructional technology the market can supply: 
 A lawn and garden and an infant avenue, all ruled straight like a botanical 
account-book. Gas and ventilation, drainage and water-service, all of the primest quality. 
Iron clamps and girders, fire-proof from top to bottom; mechanical lifts for the 
housemaids, with all their brushes and brooms; everything that heart could desire. 
 Everything? Well, I suppose so. The little Gradgrinds had cabinets in various 
departments of science too. They had a little conchological cabinet, and a little 
metallurgical cabinet, and a little mineralogical cabinet; and the specimens were all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
469 “The Monstrous Regiment” is that name of a chapter in Percy Muir’s English Children’s Books, 1600-1900. For 
the recuperation of women authors who wrote children’s literature with strong female mothers, see Norma Clarke, 
“‘The Cursed Barbauld Crew,’” Opening the Nursery Door. Dickens transfers his enmity to Bounderby, who takes 
the place of a dame school teacher in the kitchen.  
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 arranged and labelled, and the bits of stone and ore looked as though they might have 
been broken from the parent substances by those tremendously hard instruments their 
own names; and, to paraphrase the idle legend of Peter Piper, who had never found his 
way into their nursery, If the greedy little Gradgrinds grasped at more than this, what was 
it for good gracious goodness’ sake, that the greedy little Gradgrinds grasped at! (48) 
The specimen cabinets refer to Pestalozzian object learning, popularized for middle-class 
education by Charles and Elizabeth Mayo in the 1830s. Just prior to the publication of Hard 
Times, object learning cabinets like these were sold as mini domestic versions of the materials, 
machines, and manufactured products on display at the Great Exhibition of 1851, and by the 
1860s, children’s magazines regularly advertised both new and used domestic cabinets of 
chemistry, botany, and mineralogy [Figures 42 and 43]. While Pestalozzi’s methods repeatedly 
drew praise for their “organicism,” he approaches religion, spirituality, and affections by 
providing concrete objects that children can explore with their senses.470 Although Hard Times 
may seem consistent with the Pestalozzian call to unite “head, heart, and hand,” Dickens rejects 
the notion that affection or imagination can be “grasped at” through objects.  
 As Dickens sees it, teaching children though the senses does the very opposite of what it 
intends. Instead of transitioning material-minded children into abstract thinkers, object lessons 
deprive children of the room for creating mental pictures of things unavailable to the senses. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
470 I discuss Pestalozzian methods more in depth in Chapter 4. In his biography of Pestalozzi, Charles Mayo 
summarizes the purpose of object learning as a method for activating abstract thought: “In every branch of study the 
point de depart is sought in the actual experience of the child; and from that point where he intellectually is, he is 
progressively led to that point where the instructor wishes him to be. Thus he proceeds from the known to the 
unknown by a process that connects the latter with the former . . . he is lead by a course of analytical investigations 
of the knowledge actually possessed, to form for himself those intellectual abstractions which are in general 
presented as the primary truths . . . . For this purpose, real objects are presented to the examination of the younger 
pupils; the physical senses are trained to accurate perception, and the understanding is gradually led to generalize 
and classify the notices it receives through them” (Mayo, Memoirs of Pestalozzi, 27).  
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 Unlike the (often materialist) British thinkers who advocated object-learning techniques, Dickens 
assumes that children are not stuck in a material state but forced into one. Thus when Louisa, 
broken by marriage and seduction, returns to her father, she wishes her senses had been 
impaired: “if I had been stone blind; if I had groped my way by my sense of touch, and had been 
free, while I knew the shapes and surfaces of things, to exercise my fancy somewhat in regard to 
them; I should have been a million times wiser, happier, more loving, more contented, more 
innocent and human in all good respects, than I am with the eyes I have” (242). Substituting 
groping for grasping, Louisa describes blind man’s bluff as a parody of the technique used by 
Pestalozzian instructors to develop the mental faculties of young children by handing them 
unusual shaped pieces of wood or other materials and asking questions about line, texture, color, 
and so forth. She claims that the emphasis on sense learning in her youth created the “deadened 
state of my mind,” which is precisely the condition among neglected, traumatized orphans that 
Pestalozzi developed his methods to treat (242). 
 Hard Times also targets the genre of industrial children’s books explored in this chapter 
by questioning whether these accomplish their aim. Whereas Jane Marcet and Charles Knight 
praise the division of labor as a boon to cooperation across classes, Dickens specifically rejects 
any notion that learning about how things are made constitutes a sympathetic engagement with 
workers. The “improving party” that attend Louisa’s wedding “knew what everything they had to 
eat and drink was made of, and how it was imported or exported, and in what quantities, and in 
what bottom, whether native or foreign, and all about it,” but as Bounderby’s self-centered 
marriage speech demonstrates, the event marks an affectionless and barren union that bodes ill 
for national unity (140). Nevertheless, Dickens supports the purported goal behind such 
instruction—to bring together rich and poor in common understanding and sympathy—by 
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 assigning this message to the novel’s working-class hero, Stephen Blackpool, who reflects with 
his dying breath, “If soom ha’ been wantin’ in unnerstan’in me better, I, too, ha’ been wantin’ in 
unnersta’in them better” (292). 
 As an alternative to industrial, rational, or sensual education, Dickens offers 
entertainment: Sleary’s circus. While the circus is a place of work equal to the factory, it 
nonetheless offers an educational arena that foils Gradgrind’s model school and his nursery. And 
in order to do that, the circus must remain on some level a source of pleasure. In order for the 
circus to function as an educational space that critiques Gradgrind’s home, Dickens must juggle 
two contradictory views of its operations—one from the perspective of Sleary’s troupe, for 
whom horseriding is work, and the other the perspective of the audience, who, like Bounderby, 
mistakes a theatrical performance of play for “idleness.”  
 There is a price for retaining the circus as a place that nurtures the imagination. 
Ultimately, Dickens reinforces the same problem exhibited in Marcet’s Willy’s Travels, in which 
a wealthy child acts out in play what less affluent child companions experience as work. Indeed, 
the novel emblematizes this contradiction in the circus children who perform “the fairy business” 
while Louisa seeks redemption by experiencing their performance as a forbidden wonderland 
(73). Although Hard Times rejects the invasion of work into the nursery through practical 
education, Dickens remains invested in a romantic “child of nature” that just as easily 
appropriates the working child (usually the peasant child) for its own purposes and, in the 
process, pushes aside, for a moment, the reality that poor children perform labor.  
 
Conclusion 
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  The confusion between work and play in Sleary’s circus is one example of the larger 
problem with experiential education that I have examined in this chapter and in this dissertation 
as a whole. As a form of experiential education, object learning empowers children by placing 
them above the elements composing their environment, which they control through mechanical 
literacy—that is, by learning the dependable laws governing how things are sensed, manipulated, 
created, purchased, manufactured, and exchanged. Gaining popularity at a time when middle-
class families increasingly sent their children to learn in institutional settings outside the home, 
experiential pedagogies appropriated and idealized the instructional practices used in working 
families, in which children learn in a familial space that serves as home, schoolroom, and place 
of work. The industrial books for children and the industrial novels examined in this chapter 
reveal how these pedagogies could empower middle-class children while conflating work and 
play in ways that potentially obscure the needs of child workers, who required time and space 
apart from work in order to learn. 
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Figure 34: (all images) Harris, John. Francis Lever, the young mechanic: being incidents and lectures explanatory 
of the first principles of mechanics: with some account of the most celebrated engines, ancient and modern. London: 
John Harris, 1835. Princeton University Library.
Illustrations for Francis Lever combine technical drawings or sketches of what Francis observes during his studies 
with depictions of his school. In the top illustration, Francis dramatically displays a model for other students. This 
combination of illustrations switches the child reader between watching Francis and seeing through his eyes as he 
investigates machines and books, a common focalizing technique in books about child scientists and engineers.
CHAPTER 7: Figures
314
Figure 35: (both images) [Burrows, Mrs. E.] The Triumphs of Steam; or, Stories 
from the Lives of Watt, Arkwright, and Stephenson. Illustrated by John Gilbert. 
London: Griffith and Farran, 1859. Courtesy of The Rare Book & Manuscript 
Library of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
“Stephenson teaching the Navvies” communicates the engineer’s leadership 
presence by highlighting both his physical strength (grasping a pick-axe) and 
his literacy (pointing to the map). Burrows praises Stephenson for working 
alongside his men, whom he prepares to become construction leaders. The train-
themed book cover is on the left.
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Figure 37: (bottom left and right) Noyce, Elisha. The Boy’s Book of Industrial Information. Illustrated by the Dalziel 
brothers. London. Ward & Lock. 1859. Princeton University Library.
Both of these nonfiction works are beautifully illustrated. Noyce’s Boy’s Book has engravings by the Dalziel 
Brothers, the only artists whom Dante Gabriel Rossetti trusted to engrave his prints. The Frontispiece montage 
places physical labor in the center, joining natural landscapes (the source of raw materials) with the printing press 
(the spread of knowledge). The boy who reads on the right implicitly becomes the industrial manager on the left 
through a combination of literacy and labor.
Figure 36: (top) Dodd, George. Days 
at the Factories; or, the manufacturing 
industry of Great Britain described. 
(1843), Cotsen Children’s Library.
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Figure 38: (top) [Wallis]. Wallis’s New Game of Genius or 
Compendium of Inventions connected with the Arts Sciences 
and Manufactures Accompanied by a descriptive book and 
designed for the amusement and instruction of youth of both 
sexes. London. E. Wallis. [183–]. Cotsen Children’s Library. 
English 18 40513. Princeton University Library.
(right) Game protective envelope for same.
Note how steam transportation unifies all of the inventions 
and accomplishments featured in this game, both with the 
central illustration and the cover envelope. Games like this 
one are printed, then divided into panels, which are attached 
to a cloth for easy folded storage in an envelope.
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Figure 39: (top) [Wallis]. 
Wallis’s Picturesque Round 
Game of the produce & 
manufactures, of the counties 
of England and Wales. 
London: Edward Wallis 
[not before October. 1840]. 
Princeton University Library.
(bottom) Detail of same.
Each region on the game 
map shows local attractions 
and industries, often with 
tiny figures at work. Wallis 
originally produced maps, 
which is why they began 
inventing games in the 1790s 
that use left-over maps. 
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Figure 40: (top) A Visit to the Exhibition in eight changeable 
pictures. Showing its beautiful objects of art and how they 
were made: sculpture, pottery, jewelry, carved word, glass, 
metal work, silk fabrics, machinery. Illustrated by Harrison 
[William Charles Harrison?]. London: Dean & Son, pub., 
11, Ludgate Hill, [between 1857 and 1865]. Princeton 
University Library.
Figure 41: (right) Detail of same, tab pulled.
Each of the eight pictures in this moveable book use the 
same printed framing picture shown here, with families 
gathered around the manufactured items on display. Only 
the text and stage contents change. There are two pictures 
per page, switched by pulling a tab at the bottom. In the 
dialogue, a mother tells her daughter that lace is made by 
steam, like a tea kettle.
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Figure 42: (top) Advertisement appears in: 
[Newcombe, S. P.] Little Henry’s Holiday at the Great 
Exhibition. By the Editor of “Pleasant Pages.” London: 
Houlton & Stoneman, [ca. 1851]. Online. Google 
Books.
Figure 43: (bottom) Advertisement appears in: 
[Newcombe, S.P.] The Royal Road to Reading Through 
the Great Exhibition. In which those who were too 
young to visit the exhibition, may learn to read about 
it. London: Houlton & Stoneman, [ca. 1851]. Online. 
Google Books.
Several lesson books about the Great Exhibition were 
published in the 1850s in association with periodical 
called Pleasant Pages. Pleasant Pages claims three 
objectives, the first “To exemplify the PRACTICE of 
a system of instruction founded on the principles of 
Locke, Pestalozzi, and others.” The “object lessons” 
advertised on the right are probably a picture book, 
but other advertisements mention box kits with actual 
objects to accompany the texts. The Gradgrind nursery 
follows an education system like the one described 
here.
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